Energy disputes between Russia and Ukraine from 2006 to 2009 : analysis of Russian's decisions in the escalation process through the lenses of prospect theory by Pardo Sauvageot, Eric
UNIVERSIDAD COMPLUTENSE DE MADRID 
 
FACULTAD DE CIENCIAS POLÍTICAS Y SOCIOLOGÍA 
 
Departamento de Derecho Internacional Público y Relaciones 
Internacionales (Estudios Internacionales) 
 
 
 
TESIS DOCTORAL   
 
Energy disputes between Russia and Ukraine from 
2006 to 2009: analysis of Russian's decisions in the 
escalation process through the lenses of prospect 
theory 
Disputas energéticas entre Rusia y Ucrania desde el 
2006 al 2009: análisis de las decisiones de Rusia en el 
proceso de escalada a través de la teoría de las 
perspectivas 
 
 
MEMORIA PARA OPTAR AL GRADO DE DOCTOR 
 
PRESENTADA POR 
 
Eric Pardo Sauvageot 
 
Director 
Antonio Marquina Barrio 
 
 
Madrid, 2015 
 
 
© Eric Pardo Sauvageot, 2015 
    
 
i 
 
UNIVERSIDAD COMPLUTENSE DE MADRID 
FACULTAD DE CIENCIAS POLÍTICAS Y SOCIOLOGÍA 
 
Departamento de Derecho Internacional Público y Relaciones Internacionales (Estudios 
Internacionales) 
 
TESIS MENCIÓN EUROPEA 
 
 
 
ENERGY DISPUTES BETWEEN RUSSIA AND UKRAINE FROM 
2006 TO 2009: 
ANALYSIS OF RUSSIA´S DECISIONS IN THE ESCALATION PROCESS 
THROUGH THE LENSES OF PROSPECT THEORY  
 
Doctorando:    Eric PARDO SAUVAGEOT 
     Licenciado en Ciencias Políticas y de la Administración 
     Máster en Relaciones Internacionales 
 
Director de Tesis:   Antonio MARQUINA BARRIO 
     Catedrático de Relaciones Internacionales 
    
 
ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
iii 
 
CONTENTS 
 
Contents           p. iii 
List of Acronyms          p. viii 
Acknowledgements         p. x 
Summary in Spanish         p. xiii 
Summary in English         p. xxiii 
 
PART I: INTRODUCTION          
 
Chapter 1: Introduction: Theoretical Framework:  
Energy Disputes between Russia and Ukraine     p. 2  
 
1.1. Introduction          p. 2   
1.2. Theoretical Framework        p. 7 
1.3. Research Design and main Hypothesis      p. 24 
1.4. Chapters Outline         p. 28 
 
Chapter 2: Literature Review       p. 32 
 
2. 1. Russian Foreign Policy        p. 32 
2. 2. Russian Energy Policy        p. 33 
2. 3. Energy Disputes         p. 50 
2. 4. Literature Review and the Energy Disputes     p. 59 
 
    
 
iv 
 
PART II: BACKGROUND: ENERGY IN THE TRIANGLE RUSSIA-UKRAINE-
EUROPEAN UNION (EU)
 
Chapter 3: Russia and Ukraine Energy Sectors     p. 62 
 
3. 1. The Soviet Energy Sector and its Energy Policy    p. 62 
3. 2. The Russian Federation´s Energy Sector and its Energy Policy  p. 65 
3. 3. Ukraine´s Energy Sector and its Energy Policy    p. 75 
 
Chapter 4: Russia-Ukraine Energy Relations     p. 87 
 
4. 1. General Picture of Russo-Ukrainian Relations  
in the First Years of Independence       p. 87 
4. 2. Gas Disputes and Energy Agreements      p. 89 
4. 3. The Internal Factor in Russia-Ukraine Energy Relations  
and Intermediaries          p. 97 
 
Chapter 5: Russian Relations to Europe and the Energy Factor  p. 106 
 
5. 1. Soviet Energy Relations with Europe in the Context of the Cold War p. 106 
5. 2. Russian Energy in Europe after the Collapse of the Soviet Union p. 109 
 
PART III: ENERGY DISPUTES AND THE STATUS QUO 
 
Chapter 6: Russia-Ukraine Energy Dispute of January 2006  p. 124 
6. 1. Turkmenistan´s Energy Policy       p. 124 
6. 2. Russo-Ukrainian Energy Relations      p. 131 
    
 
v 
 
6. 3. Ukraine Trapped in the Triangle between Russia and Turkmenistan      p. 139 
6. 4. Last Negotiations and Failure to Reach an Agreement:  
Ukraine and Russia Head to Crisis                p. 150 
6. 5. The Gas Dispute Leads to Supply Cuts: 1 January to 4 January  p. 159 
6. 6. The 4th January 2006 Agreement      p. 164 
6. 7. Epilogue: Negotiations on the Establishment of UkrGazEnergo  p. 186 
6. 8. Preliminary Conclusions        p. 189 
 
Chapter 7: Russia-Ukraine Energy Dispute of March 2008   p. 191 
7.1. New Tremors from Central Asia in 2006  
and  the Complex Triangle between Russia, Turkmenistan and Ukraine p. 191 
7.2. The New Relation between Naftohaz and RosUkrEnergo  
and Derived Problems         p. 195 
7. 3. Yanukovich Government and Gas Relations with Russia   p. 204 
7. 4. Timoshenko Government: New Debt Problems Lead to a Dispute  p. 221 
7. 5. The Gas Dispute and Eventual Agreements     p. 233 
7. 6. Preliminary Conclusions        p. 241 
 
Chapter 8: Russia-Ukraine Energy Dispute of January 2009  p. 244 
8. 1. Introduction: Again, Pricing Changes from Central Asia   p. 244 
8. 2. Naftohaz Tries to Secure an Agreement with Gazprom  
and Debt Problems Persist        p. 246 
8. 3. The October Memorandum Illusion and the Trap of Debts  p. 252 
8. 4. December and the Blockage of Debt Issues:  
the Prelude to an Impending Dispute       p. 257 
8. 5. The January 2009 Energy Dispute Starts:  
Gazprom Imposes Total Gas Cut-Offs      p. 266 
8. 6. The 19th January 2009 Agreement      p. 285 
    
 
vi 
 
8. 7. Preliminary Conclusions        p. 294 
 
Chapter 9: Assessing the outcome in the three energy disputes  p. 296  
9. 1. Introduction          p. 296 
9. 2. Dispute of January 2006        p. 297 
9. 3. Dispute of March 2008        p. 301 
9. 4. Dispute of January 2009        p. 303   
 
PART IV: PIPELINE POLITICS AND THE RISK FACTOR 
 
Chapter 10: Pipeline Politics between Europe and Russia   p. 307 
10. 1. Introduction          p. 307 
10. 2. Pipeline Projects from the Post-Soviet Space from 2006 to 2009:  
Competence between Nabucco and Nord and South Stream   p. 323 
 
PART V: CONCLUSIONS 
 
Chapter 11: Conclusions:  
Prospect Theory, the three Disputes and Final Comments   p. 367 
11. 1. Main Hypothesis and Results of the Present Research   p. 367 
11. 2. Russia´s Attitude towards Risk and the Value of Risk   p. 368 
11. 3. Explaining Energy Disputes through Prospect Theory:  
Attitudes to Risk and Economic and Political Factors    p. 368 
11. 4. Attempting to Measure the Risk Factor     p. 380 
11. 5. Final Comments         p. 382 
 
    
 
vii 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY         p. 386 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
viii 
 
LIST OF ACRONYMS 
 
bcf: Billion cubic feet. 
bKWh: Billion Kilo-Watt per hour. 
bcm: Billion cubic meters. 
bbl: (oil) Barrel. 
bt: Billion ton. 
BTC: Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (Pipeline). 
BTE: Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (Pipeline). 
CIS: Confederation of Independent States. 
CNPC: China National Petroleum Corporation. 
EBRD: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
ECT: Energy Charter Treaty. 
FSB: Federalnaia Sluzhba Bezopasnosti. 
FSU: Former Soviet Union. 
GDF: Gaz de France. 
GDP: Gross Domestic Product. 
GTS: Gas Transportation System. 
IMF: International Monetary Fund. 
JV: Joint Venture. 
LNG: Liquefied Natural Gas. 
    
 
ix 
 
MOL: from: Magyar Olaj- és Gázipari Nyilvánosan működő Részvénytársaság, (Hungarian Oil and Gas 
Public Limited Company). 
Mtoe: Million of ton of oil equivalent. 
MWh: Mega Watt per hour. 
NEGP: North European Gas Pipeline. 
NKRE: National Regulatory Commission of Electrical Energy. 
OblHazy: Regional gas distributor. 
ÖMV: Österreichische Mineralölverwaltung (Austrian Oil Administration). 
PPP: Purchasing Power Parity 
RUE: RosUkrEnergo. 
RWE: Rheinisch-Westfälisches Elektrizitätswerk (Rhineland-Westphalia Electricity Network). 
SBU: Sluzhba Bespeki Ukraïni.  
TGI: Turkey-Greece-Italy Interconnector. 
Mtoe: Million tons per oil equivalent. 
tb: Thousand barrels. 
tcm: Thousand cubic meters. 
Tcf: Trillion cubic feet. 
Tcm: Trillion cubic meters. 
TPES: Total Primary Energy Supply. 
TurkmenNefteGaz: Turkmenistan´s Oil and Gas State Company. 
WTO: World Trade Union. 
 
    
 
x 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
This work is the result of years of effort studying the complex world of energy in the Eurasian space, its 
complicated relations with Europe, and in particular, the intricacies of the explosive dyad of Russia-
Ukraine. I  may say with the benefit of hindsight, that my focus on Russia and the post-soviet space 
started as early as in my high school years, when I decided to learn Russian. This took me to spend three 
summers in a host family in Saint Petersburg, where I made the progress necessary as to analyze all 
materials in Russian used for this study. My gratitude should therefore go first to the family Ledovskikh, 
who through their dedication, inadvertently first paved the way that led me here. 
 My subsequent studies did not necessarily predispose me to go into graduate school. Having 
majored in Political Science in the Universidad Complutense de Madrid (UCM), I must say that my very 
initial interest was set on a future career as civil servant in the European Union or as a Diplomat in the 
Spanish Foreign Office. Nothing thereof happened, as I realized my calling was to remain in academia 
and to become a professor. Thus I decided to start a Master of International Relations in my Alma Mater, 
where I would subsequently work on my Phd thesis.  
 Still, I was not necessarily destined to choose the post-soviet space in general and the topic of 
Russia-Ukraine energy disputes in particular, as the realm where my studies would unfold. My experience 
in Singapore (where I worked as intern in the ASEF Foundation after my undergraduate studies) and my 
yearning for studying in Japan (which I did as exchange student within my master studies) predisposed 
me at the time, to focus my future Phd studies on Asia. However, my linguistic knowledge of Russian 
determined that Russia would be part of the picture. My acknowledgements must therefore go to these 
people that had an influence on me in those formative years, Ramón Molina from ASEF, professor David 
García Cantalapiedra from UCM, who first provided me with the suggestion of  doing my Master thesis 
on energy relations between Russia and Japan, professor Yuji Kurokawa, my tutor in Nihon University 
during my stay in Japan and professor Yukiko Koshiro, one of the people most responsible for instilling 
in me the pleasure of research. 
 Then, my first occasion to focus on the fascinating topic of energy disputes between Russia and 
Ukraine and the dilemmas posed by the presence of the European Union in the background came with 
two seminars organized by the research center UNISCI, directed by my Phd supervisor, professor 
Antonio Marquina, in October 2009 and May 2010. These two seminars revised the EU Security and 
    
 
xi 
 
Defense policy and as a result, I could publish two chapters in two subsequent publications, mostly 
devoted to EU-Russia energy relations. In these two chapters, energy disputes and energy diversification 
loomed large already and they set the ground for my final topic.  
 After these two academic experiences, the academic year 2010-11 was determinant. During this 
academic course, I had the honor to receive a grant from the Caja Madrid Foundation to spend a year as 
fellow in the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University. My utmost gratitude 
must go to the Foundation for having considered me as eligible for this grant and for opening me a 
privileged window to shape in a decisive way my future career as scholar. My boundless gratitude must 
go to Harvard University and to its thrilling research environment, as well as to the seminars organized in 
the Davis Center and the Government Department, where I learnt both from the papers presented and 
from the comments directed at me when I had the occasion to present the first drafts of my current Phd 
thesis. However, I must in particular thank professor Margarita Balmaceda, whom I met in Harvard and 
whom I would subsequently meet again in the 10th "Changing Europe" Summer School, in Kazakhstan, 
and without whom this Phd thesis could never have taken its current shape. I had the enormous privilege 
to learn from her first rate academic expertise and from her unequaled professionalism, finding as she did, 
as often as possible time in her overloaded agenda to work on my earliest drafts and to comment on them. 
Whatever I may achieve in my starting career, this will be necessarily bound to the formative experience 
of learning from Dr. Balmaceda.     
 Until the present moment, I had the honor to receive the selfless help from many other scholars to 
whom my gratitude must also go: In the first place, I must name professor Anke Schmidt-Felzmann, 
whom I first met as discussant in the Madrid IPSA Conference, July 2012 and who selflessly provided me 
with comments again, when meeting for the second time in the panel she co-organized in the EWIS 
Conference of Tartu, June 2013. Her care and professionalism have strongly impacted on my current 
work and will probably still influence me in the future. Professor Veli-Pekka Tynkynnen hosted me in the 
Aleksanteri Institute, Helsinki University, from January to April 2013, as I was enjoying a short stay as 
CIMO fellow and helped me in the measure of possible, including his useful comments on my work. 
Professor Andres Kasekamp also hosted me from May to June 2013 in the University of Tartu and I could 
privilege from his kindness and helpful attitude at every moment during my short stay. I could personally 
meet professor Heiko Pleines, always helpful in my two (unsuccessful) attempts to earn a grant from the 
German DAAD program, in the 10th "Changing Europe" Summer School, "Export Pipelines from the CIS 
Region", which took place in Kazakhstan and I thank both the Forschungsstelle Osteuropa for admitting 
    
 
xii 
 
me in the Summer School and Dr. Pleines personally, for his kind support and for his devotion to the 
organization where I could present my Phd research. Finally, my gratitude also goes to professor Antonio 
Marquina, my Phd supervisor, who has patiently led me to successfully finishing this Phd thesis and who 
has opened to me so many opportunities for research and publication through the UNISCI research 
institute; my gratitude goes also to the whole UNISCI team. 
 My academic gratitude should not let me forget all my colleagues that have been so during these 
long and so often, hard years. My colleagues Beatriz and Cuqui share with me the same supervisor and 
have always be an unflinching support in the face of difficulties inherent to being a graduate student. 
Javier, who earned his Phd with Prof. Marquina some years earlier, has always been a wise counselor. My 
gratitude to graduate students is extensive to all other colleagues within the same department, as Victoria, 
Lucía, Carlos, Fran, Jorge and Manuel. Lunch with all of them has always been inspiring, full of humor, 
talks on music and poetry and of course, political science and has probably contributed no less than my 
seniors´ wisdom to move forward in this endeavor. In addition, Guillermo, Mikko and Elina have been 
the best support I could have dreamt of during my stays abroad. Great friends have emerged from this 
adventure, whom I hope I will keep for ever. 
 Finally and above anything else, my gratitude must go to my closest friends and to my family. 
Óscar, María, Jaime, Nandi, David, Carolina, Guillermo, Nacho, Alonso, Isra, José Luis and Lourdes 
have remained close friends during all this period and are dear to my heart for all their kindness, love and 
support. My brother Hugo has shared his intellectual support as a former political scientist, while all 
discussions together on historical topics are a reminder of my love for constant learning, and of course, 
healthy interruptions as well, from the throes of writing a doctoral dissertation. My mother has always 
been close, giving her love. However, the biggest gratitude among every person during these last years, 
must go to my father, without whom, this dissertation would never have been the light; besides always 
supporting me, he has been selfless enough to support me financially whenever grants were absent, 
providing me with an opportunity for which I must feel myself blessed. In so difficult and crisis-ridden 
years for public education, unfairly underfunded, if not abandoned, I should never forget this privilege, 
along with the responsibility this puts on me, to guarantee no one is left aside in the coming years, from 
lack of opportunities. 
Eric Pardo Sauvageot  
Madrid, 24 June 2015   
    
 
xiii 
 
THESIS SUMMARY IN SPANISH 
 
Introducción 
La presente tesis doctoral busca explicar las decisiones de la Federación Rusa y de Gazprom en la gestión 
de tres disputas energéticas con Ucrania (enero del 2006, marzo del 2008 y enero del 2009)  a través de la 
teoría de las perspectivas. La hipótesis de base de nuestra tesis es que las decisiones de escalar o des-
escalar cada una de las disputas respondía al grado de empeoramiento del status quo en que se encontraba 
la Federación Rusa y en la mayor asunción de riesgos en consecuencia de ello. Además, se valorará en la 
medida de lo posible, las fluctuaciones en el riesgo objetivo. 
 Nuestra tesis doctoral se enmarca dentro del tema genérico de las disputas energéticas en el 
espacio post-soviético. El interés que ofrece al investigador de las relaciones internacionales tal región, 
reside en el hecho de que la disolución de la Unión Soviética (URSS) y la caída del Telón de Acero dejó 
expuestas complejas relaciones de interdependencia energética entre las nuevas repúblicas post-soviéticas 
y los países consumidores de hidrocarburos. Así, lo que era un espacio común dentro de la Unión 
Soviética y del espacio económico de la CMEA (siglas en inglés de "Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance"), quedó fragmentado entre los países de Europa Central que escapaban a la órbita de Moscú y 
las nuevas repúblicas post-soviéticas (nueva "Confederación de Estados Independientes", CIS en sus 
siglas en inglés). De resultas de ello, la relación de interdependencia entre la antigua URSS y los países 
consumidores, tanto de Europa central como de Europa occidental se veía complicada por un tercer actor: 
los países de tránsito. 
 La relación triangular que surge entre los consumidores europeos, los países productores del 
espacio CIS (principalmente la Federación Rusa, pero también países de Asia Central) y los nuevos países 
de tránsito se caracteriza desde los inicios por un notable desequilibrio que hace que los patrones de 
interdependencia existentes sean notablemente asimétricos. En este sentido, tal asimetría se hace 
manifiesta en el plano del gas natural, ello por una serie de razones: no encontramos un mercado 
integrado a nivel mundial de gas natural. Así, existe una clara diferencia con el mercado del petróleo, 
integrado a nivel mundial. En cambio, el gas natural tiene una elevada dependencia de los gasoductos 
como medios de transporte, mientras que el petróleo, por el contrario, depende principalmente del 
transporte marítimo, más flexible. Al mismo tiempo, el gas natural presenta mayores dificultades para su 
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almacenamiento. Estos elementos exponen a los países consumidores a una mayor vulnerabilidad en caso 
de cortes de gas natural.  
 Además de estas características, como ya hemos mencionado más arriba, el hecho es que dentro de 
la dependencia de una serie de países de tránsito, el espacio post-soviético presentaba una notable 
asimetría: si los dos principales países de tránsito para el gas natural ruso tras la caída de la URSS eran las 
nuevas repúblicas independientes de Bielorrusia y Ucrania, la práctica totalidad del gas natural exportado 
por el monopolio ruso Gazprom pasaba por el segundo país. Además, la complejidad del nuevo panorama 
energético en el espacio post-soviético hacía que esta interdependencia resultase particularmente 
explosiva. Ello se debía a la particularidad de que Bielorrusia y Ucrania, además de países de tránsito para 
el gas natural ruso hacia otros países de Europa central y occidental, tenían una enorme dependencia 
como consumidores de Gazprom, ya fuese para el consumo de gas ruso o de gas de Asia Central 
(principalmente Turkmenistán). Esto tuvo una clara expresión en las disputas energéticas entre la 
Federación Rusa y Ucrania en la década de los 90, donde los conflictos sobre precios y deudas se 
tradujeron en cortes de gas de Gazprom y Turkmenistán hacia Ucrania, que llevaron a su vez a que 
Ucrania extrajese volúmenes de gas natural en tránsito a través de su territorio, destinado para otros 
consumidores. 
 
Objetivos 
Los objetivos de esta tesis doctoral están centrados principalmente en un actor dentro de este complejo 
entramado de interdependencia energética: la Federación Rusa. La razón de ello es la siguiente: como 
país productor, en relación con numerosos países consumidores y dependiente de países de tránsito, se 
enfrenta a un dilema en lo que a su gestión de disputas energéticas con países de tránsito se refiere. Lo 
hemos podido ver más arriba en relación con las disputas energéticas en los años 90: toda decisión de 
someter a cortes de suministro de gas natural a un país de tránsito (por su carácter igualmente de país 
consumidor) puede acarrear perturbaciones en el flujo de gas natural para otros países consumidores. El 
dilema estribaría en los costes en reputación ante la UE que ello provocaría a Gazprom y al gobierno ruso 
por extensión. Ese es un factor de negociación con el que el país de tránsito puede razonablemente jugar. 
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La Federación Rusa como actor internacional y la respuesta al dilema de disputas energéticas 
Nos interesa centrarnos en tal aspecto como estudio de caso de la Federación Rusa como actor 
internacional. En términos generales, buscamos contribuir a esclarecer cómo se comporta la Federación 
Rusa y en qué medida reacciona como expresión de poderío o como respuesta a desafíos; una Rusia 
activa y revisionista del status quo internacional es muy diferente de un actor reactivo y que busque 
preservar tal status quo. Para ello, vamos a elegir una secuencia de disputas que cumplan el requisito de 
presentar una situación de dilema como la descrita en la sección superior con el fin de ver cuáles fueron 
las decisiones tomadas por parte de la Federación Rusa.  
 Por las razones ya esgrimidas, encontramos que las disputas energéticas que impliquen gas natural 
y la relación entre la Federación Rusa y Ucrania son las más susceptibles de presentar la situación de 
dilema que buscamos. En cuanto a la secuencia óptima, encontramos que se trata de aquella formada por 
tres disputas energéticas entre Rusia y Ucrania, acaecidas en enero del 2006, marzo del 2008 y enero del 
2009. Un elemento adicional que hace interesante este periodo, es el hecho de que se da en una época en 
que el control del gobierno ruso sobre Gazprom es más intenso que en etapas anteriores. La presunción de 
control por parte del gobierno sobre el proceso en que se desarrollan las disputas está plenamente 
justificada. Sin embargo, lo más interesante de estas tres disputas, es que presentan tres patrones muy 
distintos:  
Tres disputas energéticas y tres patrones de escalada diferentes 
Disputa de enero del 2006 
En enero del 2006, Gazprom corta el gas natural a Ucrania como resultado del fracaso de las 
negociaciones sobre nuevos precios. Al no haberse firmado un nuevo contrato para el mes de enero, 
Gazprom toma tan fatídica decisión. Como resultado de ello, Ucrania empieza a extraer gas natural de los 
flujos de gas natural exportados a través de su territorio. Así tiene lugar una crisis de suministro en los 
países más dependientes de Europa Central. Ante este panorama, Rusia decide restaurar los flujos de gas 
natural a Ucrania y proseguir las negociaciones hasta que se alcance un acuerdo.  
Disputa de marzo de 2008 
En marzo del 2008, ante una disputa centrada en el endeudamiento del monopolio energético ucraniano 
Naftohaz, Gazprom establece cortes parciales hasta reducir el flujo a Ucrania en la mitad. Sin embargo, 
    
 
xvi 
 
Gazprom no va más allá y por el contrario, restablece el flujo normal tras dos días, dejando que prosigan 
las conversaciones con normalidad hasta que se alcanza un acuerdo.  
Disputa de enero de 2009 
Finalmente, en enero del 2009, con la tercera de las disputas, se alcanza un nuevo patrón de disputa. 
Habiéndose empezado de forma similar a enero del 2006, la gran diferencia se da con la respuesta por 
parte rusa a la extracción de gas natural de Ucrania de los flujos de gas en tránsito: en vez de restablecer 
el flujo de gas natural para consumo ucraniano y proseguir las negociaciones, Gazprom impone un 
embargo progresivo a todo gas natural que cruce el territorio ucraniano. De tal manera, se imposibilita 
que Ucrania extraiga gas natural, si bien a cambio, se recrudece de forma significativa la crisis energética 
que la disputa estaba provocando en los países dependientes del gas natural ruso. En esta disputa, no se 
restablece el flujo normal hasta que se alcanza un acuerdo. 
Sobre la disputa de 2014 
Una nueva fase de turbulencias se inicia en 2014 con la crisis del Euromaidán. Es desde el 16 de junio 
hasta el 2 de diciembre cuando tiene lugar la disputa más larga entre la Federación Rusa y Ucrania, con 
un corte de gas sostenido durante todo este periodo. Tal disputa se queda fuera de esta tesis doctoral por 
no haber derivado en crisis energética hacia otros países consumidores. El hecho de que la importancia de 
los flujos que atraviesan Ucrania se había reducido en esta época y que gran parte de la disputa tuvo lugar 
en época estival y por tanto de bajo consumo, puede explicar esta circunstancia, así como el hecho de que 
el dilema de sufrir costes en reputación fuese mucho más reducido, si no inexistente.   
Proceso de escalada y su aplicación a las disputas energéticas  
El diferente patrón que presenciamos en las tres disputas objeto de estudio nos presenta con la pregunta 
de por qué la Federación Rusa y Gazprom tomaron decisiones diferentes en cada una de las disputas, 
causando diferentes patrones de escalada. El proceso de escalada ha sido aplicado en el estudio de los 
fenómenos bélicos y pensamos que es perfectamente aplicable a este estudio. El proceso de escalada, que 
podemos encontrar perfectamente teorizado por Kilgour y Zagare, consiste en la disyuntiva en la que se 
encuentran una serie de actores ante los llamados nudos de decisión: cada actor ha de decidir si da un 
paso para desafiar el status quo o mantenerlo; si un actor (A) está insatisfecho con tal status quo, puede 
decidir abstenerse y situarse en él, o desafiar a otro actor (B) con el fin de cambiarlo. En el próximo nudo 
de decisión, el actor desafiado (B) ha de decidir si se somete a las demandas del primer actor (A) con el 
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fin de retornar pacíficamente a un nuevo status quo, o de resistir a tales demandas. En último término, 
dependiendo de las preferencias de los actores, el último nudo de decisión implicaría declarar o no, la 
guerra, el último estadio dentro del proceso de escalada. 
 Viendo cómo se desarrollaron las disputas energéticas objeto de estudio, podemos trasponer 
perfectamente el esquema de escalada a tales disputas. Los nudos de decisión a los que Gazprom y el 
gobierno ruso debían de hacer frente son completamente reconocibles en toda ocasión en la que había de 
tomarse la decisión de establecer un corte de gas natural y de cómo responder a las perturbaciones en los 
flujos de tránsito provocadas por Ucrania. Establecida pues, la idoneidad del instrumento del proceso de 
escalada para el estudio de las decisiones rusas en nuestras tres disputas energéticas, cabe destacar la 
aportación como herramienta interpretativa de la teoría de las perspectivas. 
Teoría de la disuasión y lógica de espiral 
Hay que apuntar que el proceso de escalada, tal y como ha sido teorizado hasta el momento, se basa en la 
teoría de la disuasión. Tal teoría se sustenta a su vez en la teoría de la utilidad esperada y de la elección 
racional. Según sus postulados, cualquier actor, como actor racional, busca maximizar sus beneficios y se 
decantará por la opción óptima en este sentido. Así, según la teoría de la disuasión, cualquier amenaza 
creíble por parte de un actor (A) debería servir para disuadir a otro actor (B) de llevar a cabo acciones 
agresivas. Esto valdrá indistintamente de que la disuasión sea realizada por parte de un estado agresor o 
defensor: ante una agresión creíble, un estado defensor se someterá, mientras que ante una defensa 
creíble, cualquier agresor cejará en su empeño.   
 Sin embargo, existen ejemplos que escapan a la lógica de la disuasión y que parecen seguir lo que 
otros autores, como Robert Jervis, han venido a llamar lógica de la espiral. En esta lógica, que diversos 
estudios han logrado identificar a lo largo de la historia, ocurre exactamente lo contrario que lo que la 
teoría de la disuasión prevería: ante una amenaza creíble, un actor, lejos de amilanarse, profundiza en su 
agresión o se defiende hasta las últimas consecuencias. Se origina así una espiral que en último término 
lleva al conflicto. La existencia de la llamada lógica de espiral pone pues en duda la universalidad de la 
teoría de la disuasión como sustento para explicar los procesos de escalada. Por esa razón, esta tesis 
doctoral va a asumir la teoría de las perspectivas como herramienta analítica. La teoría de las 
perspectivas, tal y como explicamos más abajo, vendría a conciliar la contradicción entre la teoría de la 
disuasión y la lógica de espiral, complementando la teoría de la utilidad esperada y la elección racional. 
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Teoría de las perspectivas y su aplicabilidad al presente estudio: actitud ante el riesgo y factor de riesgo 
La novedad de la teoría de las perspectivas, según los estudios de Daniel Kahneman y Amos Tversky, 
consiste en observar los comportamientos de un actor bajo estudio, en condiciones de riesgo. Los 
resultados mostraban que según las circunstancias, un mismo actor podía mostrarse conservador, es decir, 
que rehuía el riesgo, u osado, es decir, que aceptaba gustosamente asumir riesgos. Por lo general, un actor 
con un status quo satisfactorio, rehuía apostar por ganancias que entrañaban el riesgo de pérdidas que 
empeorasen tal status quo. Ello parecía responder a los presupuestos de la teoría de la utilidad esperada. 
Sin embargo, cuando se trataba del mismo actor con un status quo insatisfactorio, la actitud tendía a 
cambiar: esta vez sí se tendía a asumir riesgos con tal de obtener unas ganancias que corrigiesen el status 
quo. En resumidas cuentas, un mismo actor era conservador ante los riesgos cuando percibía el status quo 
como satisfactorio, pero se volvía osado en cuanto a asumir riesgos cuando, al contrario, percibía tal 
status quo como insatisfactorio. 
 La teoría de las perspectivas pronto empezó a ser aplicada en una serie de estudios en el campo de 
las relaciones internacionales. Aquellos actores que perseguían ganancias que añadir a un status quo 
satisfactorio, cejaban en su empeño si los riesgos eran excesivos toda vez que se enfrentasen a una 
disuasión creíble; la disuasión, con tales actores, y no el apaciguamiento, funcionaría. Sin embargo, se 
observó que actores que veían su status quo sufriendo un deterioro, eran precisamente susceptibles de 
asumir riesgos con tal de lograr restablecer tal status quo. Se originaban reacciones si las demandas de 
tales actores no eran atendidas; disuadir a tales actores tendía consecuencias negativas, mientras que el 
apaciguamiento sería la estrategia más recomendable. 
 ¿Cuál es la utilidad de la teoría de las perspectivas  a nuestro estudio? El factor de riesgo inherente 
a este tipo de disputas, vista la incertidumbre sobre la reacción, tanto de Ucrania, como de los países 
miembros de la Unión Europea, hace aconsejable la aplicación de la teoría de las perspectivas. Al estudio 
de los cambios en el status quo, este estudio añade otra variable, que es el riesgo mismo. Si las 
variaciones del status quo pueden explicar por qué ante riesgos similares un actor puede decidir asumirlos 
o no, no hay que perder de vista la variación en el riesgo. En este sentido, el principal riesgo, que es la 
reacción crítica hacia Rusia por parte de los países consumidores miembros de la UE a los efectos de una 
disputa energética, podría medirse razonablemente a través de la reacción tanto de las instituciones 
europeas, como los países miembros, a tales disputas ¿qué lección extrajeron estos actores de la primera 
disputa de enero del 2006? Si la respuesta fue promover proyectos de diversificación energética que 
buscasen reducir la dependencia de Gazprom (véase, gasoducto Nabucco), podríamos decir que la 
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conclusión extraída fue que es la Federación Rusa el elemento problemático; la lección que podría extraer 
a su vez la Federación Rusa, ante posteriores disputas, es que el riesgo de costes de reputación es elevado. 
En cambio, si la respuesta fue promover proyectos de diversificación energética que buscasen reducir la 
dependencia de los países de tránsito (véase Nord Stream y South Stream), podríamos decir que la 
conclusión extraída fue que es Ucrania el elemento problemático; la lección, pues, que podría extraer a su 
vez la Federación Rusa, ante posteriores disputas, es que el riesgo de costes de reputación es bajo.   
 A la vista de los diferentes patrones de escalada en cada disputa, se plantea la pregunta de en qué 
medida los cambios en el status pudieron modificar la actitud ante el riesgo de la Federación Rusa y así 
influir en sus movimientos en cada nudo de decisiones y en qué medida los cambios en el factor riesgo 
(medido a través de los proyectos de diversificación) pudieron tener igualmente influencia en tales 
decisiones. Las dos variables independientes serán pues los cambios en status quo y el factor de riesgo, 
siendo la variable dependiente y objeto de estudio aquí, la variación en el proceso de escalada de cada una 
de las disputas objeto de estudio. La hipótesis de trabajo es que efectivamente, cambios en el status quo, 
modificando la actitud ante el riesgo de la Federación Rusa, así como cambios en el factor de riesgo 
mismo, incidieron sobre las decisiones tomadas en tales disputas. 
 
Resultados 
Los resultados obtenidos tras haber realizado el estudio son los siguientes: 
 En primer lugar, tras la parte introductoria en la que se expuso el marco teórico y la revisión 
bibliográfica (capítulos 1 y 2) y tras una parte descriptiva (capítulos 3, 4 y 5) explicando los sectores 
energéticos de Rusia y Ucrania y las relaciones energéticas en el complejo triángulo Rusia-Ucrania-UE, la 
parte empírica de las tres disputas, a la que se dedicó un capítulo para cada una (capítulo 6, disputa de 
enero del 2006, capítulo 7, disputa de marzo del 2008 y capítulo 8, disputa de enero del 2009), nos 
permite obtener resultados en cuando a los cambios en el status quo se refiere: 
 El primer paso consistió en determinar quién había ganado cada una de las disputas. Esta 
información era esencial, pues las diferencias en el proceso de escalada podrían haberse dado no tanto por 
decisiones cambiantes por parte de la Federación Rusa, sino por diferentes grados de resistencia por parte 
de Ucrania. En este sentido, los primeros resultados apuntaban claramente a que no era el caso; 
efectivamente, tras un pormenorizado análisis de cada uno de los acuerdos alcanzados que ponían fin a las 
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disputas, podemos ver que Moscú optó por acuerdos dispares, en lo que a los beneficios alcanzados en 
cada uno de ellos se refiere. Si en enero del 2006 y marzo del 2008 Rusia acabó aceptando acuerdos de 
compromiso o que incluso empeoraban su situación, en enero del 2009, la disputa no acabó hasta que se 
logró un acuerdo plenamente favorable. Tales resultados refuerzan la pregunta de por qué desde Rusia se 
tomaron decisiones diferentes y abren así, la puerta a considerar nuestra hipótesis. 
 Así, el segundo paso consistió en considerar qué cambios se dieron en el status quo que hubiesen 
podido incidir en un diferentes grados de asunción de riesgos por parte de la Federación Rusa en cada una 
de las disputas. En este sentido, se han encontrado valiosos resultados, centrados principalmente en los 
aspectos económicos, aunque sin perder de vista los factores más estrictamente políticos.  
 Observamos que un aumento del coste de oportunidad de mantener subsidiados los precios del gas 
natural para Ucrania durante el año 2005 explicaría por qué Gazprom llegó al punto de provocar una 
disputa energética, si bien por parte de Rusia no se llegó al extremo de querer asumir el riesgo de 
proseguir la disputa una vez que Ucrania demostró no querer aceptar las condiciones de Gazprom. Un 
empeoramiento del status quo, a causa de la acumulación de deudas, explicaría de nuevo otra disputa, la 
de marzo del 2008, en la que de nuevo, la Federación Rusa mostraba preferencias por llegar a acuerdos de 
compromiso antes que proseguir la disputa con el fin de imponer sus condiciones. Finalmente, la disputa 
de enero del 2009, la más dura de todas, en la que se llega al mayor punto de escalada y donde Gazprom 
no pone fin a la disputa hasta lograr imponer sus condiciones, corresponde a un contexto muy difícil para 
la Federación Rusa, dada la crisis económica y las pérdidas que ello acarreaba, unido al menor margen 
derivado del aumento de precios del gas natural de Asia Central, comprado por Gazprom pero consumido 
por Ucrania. Ello podría explicar por qué el sempiterno problema de las deudas bloqueó las 
conversaciones sobre precios para el año 2009 con los funestos resultados de una nueva disputa. 
 Los factores políticos también parecen haber operado, si bien por lo general dentro del marco de 
los intereses económicos subyacentes. Así, parece que la reorientación política de la nueva administración 
Yushchenko a partir del 2005 habría sido determinante para que el coste de oportunidad de mantener los 
precios subsidiados para Ucrania, en comparación con los crecientes precios a nivel internacional, 
resultase inaceptable. Al mismo tiempo, la elevación de los problemas de endeudamiento por parte de 
Gazprom en causa suficiente como para forzar cortes de gas (tal fue el caso en marzo del 2008) surge a la 
víspera de la llegada del segundo gobierno de Yulia Timoshenko. Si bien parece haber razones 
económicas subyacentes (respuesta a los planes del nuevo gobierno y miedo a que no se paguen las 
deudas existentes), la politización de estos elementos económicos no puede perderse de vista. El que el 
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pago de una nueva deuda fuese condición para iniciar las conversaciones sobre precios en los últimos 
meses del 2008, bien podría responder a razones estrictamente económicas, como apuntábamos más 
arriba, o tener un elemento de politización igualmente, como reacción a un actor identificado como hostil. 
 Una vez que se extrajeron conclusiones de los cambios en el status quo, teniendo en cuenta tanto 
los elementos económicos como políticos, el capítulo 10 analizó los proyectos de diversificación 
(Nabucco por un lado y Nord Stream y South Stream por otro) para intentar determinar si hubo 
variaciones en el factor de riesgo. Los resultados en este apartado no pueden resultar concluyentes, pues 
el desarrollo de los proyectos de diversificación, contrapuestos en sus objetivos de diversificación, se 
desarrollaron con relativa indeterminación en el periodo 2006-2009. No se puede concluir que la 
Federación Rusa tuviese la información suficiente como para extraer conclusiones sobre significativos 
cambios en el factor de riesgo. 
 
Conclusiones   
En definitiva se puede concluir que tal y como nuestra hipótesis suponía, cambios en el status quo, (la 
primera variable independiente) relacionados con un empeoramiento de este, tienen una clara correlación 
con una mayor asunción de riesgos por parte de la Federación Rusa con el fin de alcanzar una serie de 
objetivos e influyen poderosamente en la variable dependiente, es decir, los diferentes patrones de 
escalada. El caso más manifiesto sería el de la disputa de enero del 2009. Al mismo tiempo, el desarrollo 
de los proyectos de diversificación no aporta suficiente información como para asumir una influencia 
significativa de la segunda variable independiente sobre nuestra variable dependiente. 
 En lo que a la Federación Rusa como actor en la escena internacional se refiere, este estudio no 
parece confirmar la clásica imagen de Rusia como un estado agresivo y revisionista, en pos de maximizar 
su poder. La actitud más agresiva por parte de nuestro actor, que podemos encontrar claramente en la 
disputa de enero del 2009, responde a una clara deterioración del contexto en que se encontraba, y tiene 
un cariz más reactivo que activo. Esto no tiene por qué ser extrapolable a otros ámbitos de la acción 
exterior de la Federación Rusa. Sin embargo, resulta ser una muy valiosa aportación al persistente debate 
sobre la naturaleza de este controvertido actor.   
 Por último, cabe destacar la importante contribución sobre uno de los puntos oscuros de las 
relaciones energéticas entre Rusia y Ucrania, que es el factor de las empresas intermediarias. En nuestro 
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estudio, RosUkrEnergo goza de un enorme protagonismo durante todo el periodo. Precisamente, este 
empresa, dirigida a partes iguales por Gazprom y un conglomerado empresarial ucraniano, con Dmitro 
Firtash a su cabeza, ha sido (y sigue siendo) objeto de debate en cuanto a si era o no un instrumento 
estratégico de Gazprom. Siempre con las debidas prevenciones, visto el tipo de información disponible y 
que hemos manejado aquí, creemos que se logra presentar un relato plausible sobre los intereses relativos 
de la parte rusa en la existencia de este tipo de actores que relativiza pues mucho la supuesta victoria de 
Gazprom en enero del 2006, a la vista sobre todo, tanto de los intereses ucranianos en tal empresa, y del 
hecho de que la Federación Rusa se deshizo de tal empresa en enero del 2009, ocasión de una clara 
victoria en la disputa que en tal ocasión, como hemos visto, tuvo lugar, en vez de reforzar aún más su 
papel. 
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THESIS SUMMARY IN ENGLISH 
 
Introduction 
This Phd thesis seeks to provide explanations for decisions taken by the Russian Federation and by 
Gazprom in the management of three energy disputes with Ukraine (January 2006, March 2008 and 
January 2009), and that, through the lenses of prospect theory. Our hypothesis is that decisions to either 
escalate or de-escalate each of the three disputes responded to the degree of worsening of the status quo in 
which the Russian Federation located itself and in consequence, to the higher degree of risks assumed. In 
addition to this, we will value in the measure of possible, how the objective risk fluctuated. 
 Our Phd thesis is framed within the generic topic of energy disputes in the post-Soviet Space. The 
interest this region offers to researchers in international relations is based on the fact that the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Iron Curtain left exposed a set of complex interdependencies 
between the new post-Soviet republics and consumer countries of hydrocarbon resources. Thus, what had 
been a common space within the Soviet Union and the economic space of the CMEA (Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance), collapsed, leaving Central European countries free of Moscow´s grip and a set of 
new post-Soviet Republics (new "Confederation of Independent States", CIS). As a result, the relation of 
interdependency between the former Soviet Union and consumer countries, be it from Western or Central 
Europe, became more complex and complicated due to the emergence of a new third actor: transit 
countries. 
 The triangular relation that emerged between European consumers, producers within the CIS 
space (mainly the Russian Federation, but also countries from Central Asia) and the new transit countries, 
was characterized from its very inception by a remarkable unbalance. As a consequence, existing patterns 
of interdependency resulted to be very asymmetrical. In this respect, such asymmetry became more 
manifest concerning natural gas, and that, for the following reasons: we do not find an integrated market 
at the world level yet, as opposed to petrol. The main consequence thereof is that contrary to petrol, which 
depends on more flexible maritime transportation, natural gas is highly dependent on pipelines. In 
addition to that, natural gas is more difficult to store. These elements make consumers of natural more 
vulnerable to cut-offs of natural gas. 
 In addition to these characteristics, as mentioned above, the fact is that within the reality of 
dependency on a set of transit countries, the post-Soviet space presents an important asymmetry: if the 
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two main transit countries for Russian natural gas after the fall of the Soviet Union were the newly 
independent republics of Belarus and Ukraine, most of the natural gas exported by Gazprom went through 
the latest country. Besides this, the complexity of the new energy panorama in the post-Soviet Space 
made this interdependency particularly explosive. That was due to the particularity that both Belarus and 
Ukraine were at the same time dependent of Gazprom, be it for consumption of Russian natural gas or for 
the transit through Gazprom´s facilities of Central Asian (mostly Turkmen) natural gas. This had a clear 
translation in the energy disputes between the Russian Federation and Ukraine in the decade of the 90s, 
where conflicts on prices and debts degenerated in gas cut-offs by Gazprom and Turkmenistan and which 
then led Ukraine to siphon gas out from the flows of natural gas that transited its territory, but meant for 
other consumers. 
 
Objectives 
The objectives of this Phd thesis center on one actor in particular within the complex pattern of energy 
interdependence: The Russian Federation. The reason for this is the following: as a producer country, 
bounded to many consumer countries and dependent on transit countries, Russia faces a dilemma 
whenever energy disputes with transit countries take place. We had the chance to see this above, when we 
mentioned the energy disputes in the 90s: every decision to impose cut-offs of natural gas to a transit 
country (due to its simultaneous condition of consumer) can cause disturbances in the flow of natural gas 
to other consumer countries. The dilemma concerns reputational costs for Gazprom, and for the Russian 
government in extension. This a factor with which the transit country can arguably play in negotiations. 
The Russian Federation as an international actor and its reaction to the dilemma of energy disputes 
We are interested on this aspect as case study of the Russian Federation as an international actor. In 
general terms, we endeavor to clarify how the Russian Federation behaves and in what measure it 
responds as an expression of its power or as a response to challenges: a Russian Federation who actively 
seeks to review the international status quo is very different than a reactive actor that aims at preserving 
the status quo. Therefore, we will choose a sequence of disputes that present situations where the 
dilemma described in the section above in order to see which were the decisions taken by the Russian 
Federation. 
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 For the reasons put forward above, we find that energy disputes involving natural gas and the 
relation between the Russian Federation and Ukraine are those more liable to present the situation we are 
seeking. The optimal sequence can be found by three energy disputes that took place in January 2006, 
March 2008 and January 2009. An additional element which makes this period so relevant is the fact that 
at that time the government´s control on Gazprom was more intense than in the past. The presumption of 
control from the side of the government of the process which led to the disputes seems fully justified. 
However, the most interesting aspect of these three disputes is that they present each different patterns:. 
Three energy disputes and three patterns of escalation 
Dispute of January 2006 
In January 2006, Gazprom cuts off natural gas to Ukraine as a result of the failure of  negotiations on new 
prices. With no new contract having been signed at the start of January, Gazprom took thus the fateful 
decision. As a result thereof, Ukraine started extracting natural gas from the flows of natural gas exported 
through its territory. Thus an energy crisis started in those consumer countries most dependent on 
Gazprom´s natural gas. Facing such situation, Russia decides to restore flows of natural gas to Ukraine 
and to pursue negotiations until an agreement is reached. 
Dispute of March 2008 
In March 2008, facing indebtedness by the Ukrainian energy monopoly Naftohaz, Gazprom imposes 
partial gas cut-offs and reduces the supply to Ukraine by half. However, Gazprom does not go further 
than that and on the contrary, reestablishes normal flows two days after the start of the dispute, allowing 
for conversations to continue until an agreement is reached. 
Dispute of January 2009 
Finally, in January 2009, the third dispute in our sequence, a new pattern of dispute is reached. Having 
started in the same fashion as its predecessor of January 2006, the big difference comes from the way the 
Russian side responds to the extraction of natural gas by Ukraine from the flows of natural gas in transit: 
instead of reestablishing the flow of natural gas for Ukrainian consumption and then continue 
negotiations, Gazprom imposes a progressive embargo for all natural gas crossing Ukrainian territory. As 
a consequence, Ukraine cannot extract any additional flows, but the energy crisis in most dependent 
consumer countries provoked by the dispute worsens significantly. In this dispute, the situation does not 
come back to normalcy until a final agreement is reached. 
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On 2014 dispute 
A new era of disturbances starts in 2014 in the wake of the Euromaidan crisis. From 16th June to 2nd 
December takes place the longest dispute to date between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, with a gas 
cut-off sustained during the whole period. Such dispute remains outside of this Phd thesis for not having 
degenerated into an energy crisis for other consumer countries. The fact that the importance of natural gas 
flows that transit Ukraine had reduced at that time, along with the fact that most of dispute took place 
outside of the heating season and thus, during a period of low energy consumption, may explain this 
circumstance and the fact as well, that the dilemma of suffering reputational costs was much lower, if not 
none existent. 
Escalation process and its application to the energy disputes 
The different pattern that we may witness in each of the three disputes whish are the object of study here, 
provoked different escalation patterns. The escalation process has been applied to the study of war and we 
consider it can perfectly be applied to this study. The escalation process, which we can find perfectly 
theorized in Kilgour and Zagare, consists in the dilemma faced by a series of actors when locates in the 
so-called nodes of decision: each actor has to decide whether it wants to challenge the status quo or to 
maintain it; if an actor (A) is unsatisfied with the status quo, it may decide either to abstain from changing 
it, or challenge another actor (B) in order to change it. In the next node of decision, the challenged actor 
(B) had to decide whether it will submit to the firs actor´s demands (A) and to go back peacefully to a 
new status quo or to resist such demands. Ultimately, depending on the actors´ preferences, the last node 
of decision may lead to war, the last stage in the escalation process.  
 Considering how the energy disputes unfolded, we may perfectly transplant the scheme of 
escalation to these disputes. The nodes of decision to which Gazprom and the Russian government had to 
face match the decisions in a escalation process whenever they had to decide to impose a gas cut-off and 
whenever they had to face the consequences of disturbances in the transit flow provoked by Ukraine. 
Given the suitability of the escalation process as a tool for the study of Russian decisions in our three 
energy disputes, we may highlight the contribution made by prospect theory as a way to interpret them 
Deterrence theory and the spiral logic 
We must point to the fact that escalation processes, as theorized to date, are based on deterrence theory. 
Deterrence theory is based on expected utility theory and rational choice. According to its tenets, 
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whatever actor, as a rational actor, seeks to maximize its profits and will thus tend to take decisions that 
favor optimal solutions. Thus, following deterrence theory, credible threats from the side of an actor (A) 
should deter another actor (B) to carry through aggressive actions. This should be valid irrespective of the 
fact whether deterrence is carried through by an aggressor or defender state: in the face of a credible 
aggression, a defender will submit, whereas whatever aggressor will let on when faced with a credible 
defense. 
 However, there exist examples that escape deterrence theory and which seem to follow another 
logic, which authors like Robert Jervis have preferred to call spiral logic. In this logic, which divers 
studies have identified in several historical examples, the exact contrary of what deterrence theory would 
predict, happens: facing a credible threat, an actor, far from being intimidated, deepens its aggression and 
defends to the last consequences. Thus a spiral starts that eventually leads to conflict. The existence of the 
so-called spiral logic puts into question the pretension of universality of deterrence theory as the basis to 
explain escalation processes. For this reason, this Phd thesis assumes prospect theory as the main 
analytical tool. Prospect theory, as explained below, offers an explanation that reconciles both deterrence 
theory and spiral logic, serving thus, as a complement to expected utility and rational choice . 
Prospect theory and its applicability to this study: risk attitude and risk factor 
The novelty offered by prospect theory, following studies by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, 
consists in observing behavior in conditions of risk. Results show that depending on circumstances, one 
same actor may assume a risk-averse or risk-acceptant attitude. In general, an actor perceiving itself in a 
satisfactory status quo, was risk-averse as for risk to that same status quo that prospective benefits 
entailed. In this respect, it seems that this goes in line with expected utility theory. However, when the 
same actor faced a status quo which it deemed unsatisfactory, its attitude tended to be reversed: there was 
a tendency to risk-acceptance in the face of risk that prospective benefits that might improve the status 
quo, entailed. Summing-up, one actor proved risk-averse in the face of risks when perceiving its status 
quo as satisfactory, whereas that same actor proved risk-acceptant in the face of risks when perceiving its 
status quo as unsatisfactory. 
 Prospect theory soon started being applied to a series of studies in the field of international 
relations. Those actors that sought profits to improve an already satisfactory status quo, submitted when 
risks proved to be excessive, namely, when faced with credible deterrence; thus, confirming deterrence 
theory, deterrence and not appeasement would be advisable with such actors. On the contrary, actors that 
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perceived their status quo as worsening were more liable to assume risks if there was a possibility to 
reestablish the status quo, so if faced with a refusal to see their demands attended, spiral logic would 
ensue. To deter such actors with credible deterrence would have negative consequences, whereas 
appeasement would be the most advisable strategy. 
 What may be the utility of prospect theory for our study? The risk inherent to this type of disputes, 
given uncertainty as for prospective reactions, be it from the side of Ukraine, or from the side of EU state 
members, makes advisable the application of prospect theory to our study. Besides analyzing the effect of 
changes in the status quo and how this may match higher degrees of risk-aversion or risk-acceptance, we 
add here an additional variable, which is risk itself. If variations in the status quo may explain why an 
actor changes its attitude towards risk, variations in risk should not be overseen either. In this respect, the 
main risk for the Russian Federation is the critical reaction from the side of EU consumer countries as a 
result of an energy dispute. The best way to measure that risk is to find out how did translate reactions 
from an energy dispute by either EU institutions of relevant EU members. In our sequence of disputes, we 
would ask: what lesson did these actors draw from the energy dispute of January 2006? If the answer was 
to promote diversification projects that aimed at reducing the EU´s dependence on Gazprom (as for 
example, through the pipeline Nabucco), then we could conclude that the lesson was that the Russian 
Federation was the problematic actor; then, the Russian Federation´s lesson for prospective energy 
disputes would be that the risk of further reputational costs was high. On the contrary, if the answer was 
to promote energy diversification projects that aimed at reducing dependence on transit countries (as for 
example, through Nord Stream and South Stream pipelines), then we could conclude that the lesson was 
that Ukraine represented the problematic actor; the lesson then, that the Russian Federation could extract 
for future energy disputes, is that the risk of further reputational costs was low. 
 Due to the different patterns of escalation in each of the disputes, we find justified to ask in which 
measure changes in the status quo modified the Russian Federation´s risk attitude and in which measure 
they had an influence on decisions made in each of the nodes of decision. We will ask as well, in what 
measure changes in the risk factor (measured through the development of diversification projects) could 
have had an influence. The two independent variables in our study are changes in the status quo and in the 
risk factor. The dependent variable and our object of study here, are variations in the escalation process in 
each of the disputes we will analyze in this Phd thesis. Our hypothesis is that indeed, changes in the status 
quo, which modified the risk attitude of the Russian Federation, as well as changes in the risk factor itself, 
had an influence on decisions taken by the Russian side in these disputes. 
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Results 
Results obtained after having carried through the study are the following: 
 In the first place, after our introductory part, where we exposed our theoretic frame and were we 
exposed our literature review (chapters 1 and 2) and after a descriptive part (chapters 3, 4 and 5) 
explaining the energy sectors in Russia and Ukraine as well as the complex Russia-EU-Ukraine triangle, 
the empiric part of our three disputes, to each of which a single chapter was devoted (chapter 6, January 
2006 dispute, chapter 7, March 2008 dispute and chapter 8, January 2009 dispute), allowed us to obtain 
the following results as for what concerns changes in the status quo: 
 The first step consisted in determining who had won each of the disputes. This information was 
essential, as differences in the escalation process could have stemmed not so much from different 
decisions from the part of the Russian Federation, but from differing degrees of resistance from the side 
of Ukraine. In this respect, our first results clearly pointed that this was not the case; indeed, after a 
detailed analysis of each of the agreements reached to put an end to the disputes, we may determine that 
Moscow chose disparate agreements in each case, in what respects the benefits it offered. Thus, if in 
January 2006 and March 2008 Russia ended up accepting compromises from where it even ended up 
worse off than before the dispute had started, the dispute of January 2009 did not end until a fully 
favourable agreement had been reached. This reinforces the question of why the Russian side assumed 
different decisions and open the door to consider our hypothesis. 
 Our second step consisted in considering which changes had undergone the status quo that might 
have determined different degrees of risk acceptance from the part of the Russian Federation in each of 
the disputes. In this respect, we found valuable results, centered mainly on economic aspects, but never 
losing sight of strictly political factors. 
 We observed that a higher opportunity cost of maintaining prices for natural gas subsidized for 
Ukraine during 2005 would explain why Gazprom went as far as to provoke an energy dispute, even if 
this time Russia did not go as far as to assume risks to carry on with the dispute once Ukraine proved 
unwilling to accept Gazprom´s conditions. A worsening of the status quo, due to Ukraine´s indebtedness, 
would explain a new dispute, this time in March 2008, in which again, the Russian Federation showed its 
preference for a compromise rather than continue the dispute and to impose its conditions. Finally, the 
dispute of January 2009, the harshest of all to date, and where the highest degree is reached in the 
escalation process due to the fact that Gazprom did not relent until its conditions were fully met, 
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corresponds to one of the most difficult contexts for the Russian Federation, due to the economic crisis 
and due to the losses this was bringing to Gazprom, along with the lesser margin that an increase in prices 
for natural gas in Central Asia, purchased by Gazprom but consumed by Ukraine. This could explain why 
the never-ending problem of debts blocked conversations regarding natural gas pricing for 2009, with the 
ill-fated results of this new dispute. 
 Political factors also seem to have had a great influence, even if mostly within the framework of 
underlying economic interests. Thus, it seems that the reorientation of the new Yushchenko 
administration in 2005 would have been determinant for the opportunity cost of subsidies for the 
Ukrainian economy via low priced natural gas, compared to international prices, to become unacceptable. 
At the same time, debt issues became a reason enough to lead to natural gas cut-offs (as it was the case in 
March 2008) in the context of Yulia Timoshenko´s return as Prime Minister. Even if there were clear 
underlying economic reasons for this (response to the new government´s plans and fear of not recouping 
outstanding debts), the politization of this issue cannot be overseen. That the repayment of debt in a new 
debt episode in the last months of 2008 was linked with talks on pricing for natural gas in 2009 could 
have strictly economic reasons, as pointed out above. Still, the element of politization might also be 
present, with a reaction to an actor identified as hostile. 
 Once that conclusions were drawn from changes in the status quo, considering both economic and 
political aspects, chapter 10 analyzed diversification projects (Nabucco from one side and Nord Stream 
and South Stream from the other) in order to determine whether there were variations in the risk factor. 
Results here cannot be concluding, as the way these diversification projects unfolded, shows that they 
remained in a state of relative indeterminacy during the period 2006-2009. We may not conclude that the 
Russian Federation had sufficient information as to extract conclusions regarding significant changes in 
the risk factor. 
 
Conclusions  
As a summary, we may conclude that, as our hypothesis foresaw, changes in the status quo (our first 
independent variable), related to its worsening, have a clear correlation with a higher risk-acceptance 
from the part of the Russian Federation aiming at attaining a series of objectives. These changes strongly 
affected our dependent variable, namely, changes in the escalation pattern. The case where this had its 
more manifest expression, was the dispute of January 2009. At the same time, the development of 
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diversification projects does not provide enough information as to assume a decisive influence of the 
second independent variable on the dependent variable. 
 As for what concerns the Russian Federation as an actor in the international scene, this study does 
not confirm the classic image of Russia as an aggressive and revisionist actor, seeking to maximize 
power. The most aggressive attitude from the side of our actor, which we may clearly find in the dispute 
of January 2006, answers to a clear deterioration of the context in which Russia was located, and had 
more of a reactive character. This is not necessarily representative of how the Russian Federation behaves 
as an international actor in other fields. However, our results do represent a valuable contribution to the 
on-going debate surrounding this controversial actor . 
 Finally, we may highlight the important contribution of our study to one of the most obscure 
points in energy relations between Russia and Ukraine, which is the role played by intermediary 
companies. In our study, RosUkrEnergo enjoys an enormous prominence. It is precisely this company, 
controlled both by Gazprom and by a Ukrainian business consortium, with the businessman Dmitro 
Firtash at its head, which has been (and still remains) the object of a debate as for whether it was or not, a 
strategic instrument of Gazprom. Assuming due caution, given the sources of information that we have 
used here, we strongly believe that we present a plausible narrative regarding relative interests from the 
Russian side in what concerns the existence of these actors. What was described by some as a victory of 
Gazprom in January 2006 assumes a different shape in the light of Ukrainian interests linked to 
RosUkrEnergo, while the company was removed in January 2009, when Gazprom did clearly win that 
dispute, instead of reinforcing its role. 
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Lo que sucedió a una zorra que se tendió en la calle y se hizo la muerta 
 
"Una zorra entró una noche en un corral donde había gallinas, y se cebó tanto (...) que encontró que ya 
era de día y que las gentes andaban por la calle. Cuando vio que no podía escapar salió ocultamente del 
corral a la calle y se tendió como si hubiera muerto. (...) pasó por allí un hombre que dijo que los pelos 
de la frente de la zorra, puestos en la frente de los pequeños, impiden que les hagan mal de ojo. (...) le 
cortó a la zorra con unas tijeras los pelos de la frente. (...) pasó otro y dijo lo mismo de los pelos del 
lomo; otro (...) de los de la ijada, y otros (...) de las otras partes. De modo que acabaron por trasquilarla. 
La zorra, a todo esto, no se movió, porque creía que perder el pelo no era un daño muy grande. 
Después vino otro, que dijo que la uña del pulgar de la zorra era muy buena para los panadizos, y se la 
sacó, sin que ella se moviera. Al rato llegó otro, que dijo que el colmillo de la zorra era bueno para el 
dolor de muelas, y se lo sacó, sin que tampoco ella se moviera. Al cabo de un rato vino otro, que dijo que 
el corazón de la zorra era bueno para el dolor de corazón, y cogió un cuchillo para sacárselo. La zorra 
vio que si le sacaban el corazón no era esta una cosa, que como el pelo, volvería a crecer (...). Decidida 
a aventurarlo todo antes que perderse, se esforzó por escapar y consiguió hacerlo. 
 
Es mejor disimular todo lo que se pueda; pero si la cosa llegara a ser ofensa grande o 
perjuicio grave, entonces debe aventurarlo todo y no disimular.   
 
EL CONDE LUCANOR (Infante D. Juan Manuel) 
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PART I: INTRODUCTION 
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Chapter 1: Theoretical Framework: Energy Disputes between Russia and Ukraine 
 
1. 1. Introduction 
In January 2006, consumers of Russian gas in many European countries were shocked by an energy 
dispute between Russia and Ukraine which severely affected supplies. As a result of a pricing dispute 
between the Russian gas monopoly Gazprom and its Ukrainian counterpart, Naftohaz Ukraïni (henceforth 
Naftohaz), the former decided to cut off supplies to Ukraine on January 1st. Immediately after such a 
decision, end consumers in those especially dependent Central European countries, started noticing lower 
pressure in the pipelines which serviced them with Russian natural gas. This led to lower levels of 
available supplies, while Russia and Ukraine accused each other: Russia accused Ukraine of siphoning 
gas off, whereas the latter accused Russia of intentionally reducing supplies so as to provoke a supply 
crisis in other consumer countries and blamed Ukraine instead. The dispute did not last much longer, as 
supplies started being restored on the 3rd January and an agreement was reached the next day. A similar 
pattern was repeated exactly three years later, in January 2009. However, this time the dispute reached a 
much bigger dimension, lasting three weeks, until the 19th January. It started on January 1st in the same 
fashion, with Gazprom cutting off gas as a result of the absence of agreement on prices for gas in 2009. 
As in January 2006, consumers of Russian gas, starting with countries in Central Europe, also reported 
lower than usual pressure and started facing supply problems.1 Then as this stage had been reached, 
Russia decided to stop all supplies through Ukraine in order to prevent the latter siphoning gas off (as it 
was accused again by Russia),2 establishing something which looked like a total gas embargo fully 
imposed on 7th January. This critical situation was not solved until a final agreement was reached between 
Russia and Ukraine on 19th January. What had happened during these three years, 2006 and 2009, to 
provoke such fierce disputes and to affect end consumers in third countries in such a critical way? This 
question seems warranted, and many tried to answer it, especially after January 2009. 
                                                           
1
 As we will see in Chapter 9, the energy crisis was particularly hard in countries of South-Eastern Europe. For an analysis of 
this crisis in the Balkans, see: Kovacevic, Aleksandar: "The Impact of the Russia–Ukraine Gas Crisis in South Eastern 
Europe", Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (March 2009), at  
http://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/NG29-
TheImpactoftheRussiaUkrainianCrisisinSouthEasternEurope-AleksandarKovacevic-2009.pdf (Accessed on the 19th November 
2013). 
2
 As there will be occasion to show in chapters 6 & 8 and to further explain in chapter 9, there seems to be a substantial 
difference between January 2006 and January 2009 regarding the amount of gas siphoned off by Ukraine. Whereas in both 
disputes Ukraine claimed to be siphoning gas off in volumes equivalent to those required to power the transit system, what is 
called technical gas, and which Kiev claimed that Gazprom was responsible for supplying, the fact is that whereas in January 
2009 Ukraine seemed to be siphoning a daily volume which matched technical needs (23tcm of gas), in January 2006 there 
was a report of a much more substantial fall in supplies for consumers in other countries of Eastern Europe (around 60tcm). 
That gives more credence to accusations of manipulations towards Ukraine in January 2006 than three years later.  
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The fact that a dispute like those in January 2006 and January 2009 could happen was 
understandable due to the complex triangular relation between Russia, Ukraine and gas consuming 
countries in most of the rest of Europe: Russia is the major supplier of gas both for Ukraine and for the 
rest of Europe. Regarding Ukraine, the country has been relying enormously on Russian gas for its 
supply. If Ukraine was a large gas producer at the peak time of its production, it then fell dramatically and 
has remained at a level of around 20bcm of gas per year.3 Consumption at the same time also underwent a 
dramatic reduction with the industrial collapse of Ukraine´s economy with the end of the Soviet Union.4 
As a result of both Ukraine´s consumption and production patterns, the country has become dependent 
either on Russian or Central Asian natural gas.5 However, as Margarita Balmaceda stated, geographical 
diversification towards Turkmenistan did not solve the problem of dependence as the latter´s relations 
with Russia, the unavoidable transit country for Central Asian gas, were determinant.6 At the same time 
that Ukraine was either directly (through Russian gas) or indirectly (through Central Asian gas) 
dependent on Russia, the latter was dependent on the former for most of the natural gas piped to third 
countries who consume Russian gas. During the time period from 2005 to 2009, roughly 80% of 
Gazprom´s transit gas had to be transported through Ukraine.7 Dependence on Ukraine had been reduced 
from 90% at the beginning of the past decade, but plans to transport half of supplies through Belarus 
never materialized. 8  Thus, the relation between Russia and Ukraine was (and remains) one of 
                                                           
3
 Production peaked at nearly 70bcm during the decade of the 70s and then started a dramatic downward trend, stabilizing at 
the beginning of the 90s at around 20bcm (see: Natural Gas and Ukraine´ s Energy Future, IHS CERA, Ministry of Energy and 
Coal Industry of Ukraine, February 2012, Chapter 3, p. 3-1 (33), Figure 3-1, at  
http://s05.static-shell.com/content/dam/shell-new/local/country/zaf/downloads/pdf/research-reports/Ukraine-Policy-Dialogue-
report.pdf). 
4
 Consumption was at a level of 120bcm in 1990 and fell to 70bcm in 2002 to see a slight increase closer to 80bcm. Since 2005 
Ukraine has witnessed a gradual reduction due to fuel substitution as well as increasing efficiency and at some points, as in 
2009, the onset of economic crisis pushed it to new lows of around 50bcm (see: "Natural Gas and Ukraine´ s Energy Future", 
op. cit.,  Chapter 2, p. 2-2 (26), Figure 2-2. 
5
 The proportion between Russian and Turkmen gas has been changing since the accession to independence in 1991. 
6
 Balmaceda, Margarita M. (2008): Energy Dependency, Politics, and Corruption in the Former Soviet Union: Russia´s power, 
oligarchs´ profits, and Ukraine´s missing energy policy, 1995-2006, Routledge, London & New York, p. 72; since the moment 
when the first tumultuous years in Russia-Ukraine energy relations were over and debt issues solved, the energy market was 
reorganized around private traders ("Gazotreidery in Russian or "Hazotreideri" in Ukrainian) such as "Respublika", "Itera", 
"EuralTransGaz" and "RosUkrEnergo" which traded with Central Asian, mainly Turkmen gas (see: "It´s a gas: funny business 
games in the Turkmen-Ukraine gas trade", Global Witness (April 2006), pp. 32-57 at 
http://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/its_a_gas_april_2006_lowres.pdf (Accessed on the 18th January 2013); 
RosUkrEnergo would eventually become from 2006 to 2008 the monopoly importer of all Ukrainian gas, (at least) almost 
100% Central Asian (see chapter 6). 
7
 The remaining 20% was transported either through Belarus or shipped via the Finland Connector and the Blue Stream. Since 
the Nord Stream pipeline to Germany was inaugurated and started operating in November 2011 (see: http://www.nord-
stream.com/about-us/), a new outlet exists that allows Russia to bypass Ukraine.  Since then, the share of Russian gas transiting 
Ukraine has been reduced: the figure was down to 66% in 2010 (see: "Natural Gas and Ukraine´ s Energy Future", Chapter 2, 
p. 2-3 (27), Figure 2-3). 
8
 See: Victor, David and Victor, Nadejda M.:"The Belarus Connection: Exporting Russian Gas to Germany and Poland", Baker 
Institute, Geopolitics of Gas, Working Paper, no. 26 (May 2004), at http://iisdb. 
stanford.edu/pubs/20603/Yamal_final.pdf. 
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interdependence.9 Finally, the third side of this triangular relation is constituted by European countries 
who both depend on Russia for gas and on Ukraine as a guarantor of safe transit and who will suffer any 
disruption in gas flows through Ukraine, whoever may be responsible. If global dependence of Russian 
gas is limited,10 there is a big imbalance between European countries themselves. While Western EU 
members are the biggest clients of Gazprom,11 the share of Russian gas in their economies is low;12 some 
of the Eastern EU members, in spite of accounting for a relatively low share of Gazprom´s exports, are 
nevertheless very dependent on that source of supply.13 This energy dependence is worsened by the fact 
that many of these countries are not prepared to substitute for gas cut-offs in case of emergency, as 
January 2009 clearly showed.14 The deficiencies in gas interconnectors were manifest in the hardest hit 
countries.15 The other side of the coin is Russian dependence on European consumers for its energy 
exports, which in fact is bigger.16 Given this interdependence, the "energy weapon" used by Russia 
against Ukraine as an escalation of either pricing or debt disputes is liable to affect either automatically or 
                                                           
9
 Balmaceda, op. cit., p. 6. 
10
 As Pierre Noël reminded in 2008, Russian gas represented only 6,5 % of the EU primary energy supply, besides the fact that 
of all gas supplies to the EU, Russia´s share had been halved to 40% from 80% (Noël, Pierre: "Beyond Dependence: How to 
deal with Russian gas", European Council on Foreign Relations, Policy Brief (7 November 2008), at http://ecfr.eu/page/-
/ECFR-09-BEYOND_DEPENDENCE-HOW_TO_DEAL_WITH_RUSSIAN_GAS.pdf (Accessed on the 19th November 
2013); the situation has been fluctuating in the latest years: the share of Russian gas in EU imports fell behind that of Norway 
(Umbach, Frank: "European-Russian gas partnership threatens to unravel", Energy Post, 30 September 2013, at 
http://www.energypost.eu/european-russian-gas-partnership-threatens-to-unravel/ (Accessed on the 19th November 2013) with 
the latest´s share amounting by then to 35% to 34% for Russia´s, according to the US Congress Research Service, based on the 
BP Statistical Review from 2013 (see: Ratner, Michael; Belkin, Paul; Nichol, Jim and Woehrel, Steven: "Europe´ s Energy 
Security: Options and Challenges to Natural Gas Supply Diversification", US Congress Research Service (20 August 2013), p. 
6, at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42405.pdf (Accessed on the 19th November 2013); data from Eurogas registered 
however, Russia´s share higher than that of Norway by a small margin (see: 
www.eurogas.org/uploads/media/Eurogas_Statistical_Report_2013.pdf (Accessed on the 21st May 2015). If we follow Eurogas 
again, Russia increased its share in 2013, accounting for around 27% of the EU´s total consumption (see: "Statistical Report 
2014", Eurogas, p. 6 at 
www.eurogas.org/uploads/media/Eurogas_Statistical_Report_2014.pdf (Accessed on the 21st May 2015), while other reports 
talked of as much as 30%.  
11
 Noël, , op. cit., p. 11. 
12
 Ibid., Idem. 
13
 Ibid., p. 10. 
14
 Kovacevic, op. cit., pp. 11-15. 
15
 As a report from Clingendael analyzed in September 2009, gas interconnectors were very underdeveloped if a common 
European gas market was to be set up (see: "Crossing Borders in European Gas Networks: The Missing Links", Clingendael 
International Energy Programme (September 2009), at 
http://www.clingendaelenergy.com/inc/upload/files/Crossing_borders_in_European_Gas_Networks.pdf (Accessed on the 19th 
November 2013). As the crisis showed, this lack of interconnections (besides other deficiencies such as insufficient reserves 
and difficulties to switch to other energy sources) in countries like Bulgaria was decisive. 
16
 Kropatcheva, Elena: "Playing both ends against the middle: Russia´ s geopolitical energy games with the EU and Ukraine", 
Geopolitics, no. 16 (2011), p. 556. 
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not,17 end-consumers in other countries and is thus a very difficult tool.18 The complexity of this energy 
triangle is such that Russia faces difficult dilemmas.  
That gas disputes between Russia and Ukraine and between Russia and some other countries in 
the post-Soviet space would happen, was nothing new either. Similar disputes had already taken place 
before during the decade of the 90s between Russia and Ukraine, and apart from January 2006 and 
January 2009,19 there was also a small gas dispute in March 2008 provoked by debt disagreements that 
led for two days to partial gas cut-offs to Ukraine.20 Disputes have also been frequent with Belarus, as 
was the case in 2004, 2007 and again in 2010.21 A new dispute between Russia and Ukraine took place 
recently from June to December 2014, lasting a record of several months, even if this time no disruptions 
affected supply to end consumers in the rest of Europe. It seems clear that energy disputes have always 
been recurrent in the post-Soviet space, 22  involving both end-consumers and transit countries.23  All 
disputes, which had Russia at its center as either the main supplier of fuel or as a transit country itself of 
Central Asian gas with a varying degree of monopsony, have raised several debates as to Russian 
motivations for initiating them. These debates arguably reached their high point with the gas dispute of 
January 2009 due to the huge (and justified) attention it attracted. As could have been expected, and as we 
will see in further detail in the next chapter, these debates parallel those we can find regarding Russian 
foreign policy in general. As is the case in the debates that have discussed Russian foreign policy after the 
                                                           
17
 The specification of intended or unintended consequences stems from the intricacies of the way gas flows operate through 
Ukraine. As will be seen below in chapters 6 and 8, and as has already been mentioned above in ftn. 2, a relevant issue when 
Gazprom stopped supplies to Ukraine was the responsibility for "technical gas". Technical gas is gas spent to fire up the transit 
pipelines in order for the volumes of export gas to cross Ukraine. Both in January 2006 and January 2009 Ukraine made Russia 
and Gazprom responsible for this gas and decided to siphon it off from Gazprom´s own export gas; this can be labeled as an 
automatic consequence of a gas cut-off. However, as already mentioned, it seems that in January 2006, far from siphoning off 
technical gas, Ukraine decided to siphon off more gas than necessary, which raises the question whether that was not done on 
purpose to blame Gazprom in the face of European customers taken "hostage".    
18
 Kropatcheva, op. cit., pp. 555-556. 
19
 These two disputes, which will be studied in Chapters 6 and 8, were analyzed before in the following articles: Stern, 
Jonathan: "Natural gas security problems in Europe: the Russian-Ukrainian crisis of 2006", Asia-Pacific Review, vol. 13, no. 2 
(2006), pp. 32-59 and Pirani, Simon; Stern, Jonathan; Yafimava, Katja (2009): "The Russo-Ukrainian gas dispute of January 
2009: a comprehensive assessment", Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (February 2009), at 
www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/NG27-
TheRussoUkrainianGasDisputeofJanuary2009AComprehensiveAssessment-JonathanSternSimonPiraniKatjaYafimava-
2009.pdf.  
20
 This dispute will be studied in Chapter 7. 
21
 See: Yafimava, Katja (2009): "Belarus: The domestic gas market and relations with Russia", in Pirani, Simon (ed.): Russia 
and CIS markets and their impact on Europe,  Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 133-169  and Yafimava, Katja: "The June 
2010 Russian-Belarusian Gas Transit Dispute: a surprise that was to be expected", Oxford, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 
(2010), at www.oxfordenergy.org/pdfs/NG43.pdf. 
22
 Orttung, Robert W., Overland, Indra: "A limited toolbox: Explaining the constraints on Russia´ s foreign energy policy", 
Journal of Eurasian Studies, vol. 2, no. 1 (2011), pp. 74-85; The authors list 31 energy disputes between 2000 and 2010. 
23
 For the gas cut-off by Russia to Georgia in 2006 and the energy disruptions that took place in 2008, see: Tokmasishvili, 
Micheil: "Georgia´s Gas Sector", in Pirani, op. cit., pp. 267-268.  
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collapse of the Soviet Union, assessments range between two extremes where Russia is seen either as an 
expanding power making use of its increasing confidence to challenge the status quo or as a challenged 
country itself responding to, rather than taking the offensive. Within this debate, this research aims at 
providing a contribution in this same direction through the case study of three energy disputes and 
searches to clarify whether Russia challenges itself or responds to challenges and that in the particular 
field of energy relations in the post-Soviet space. For this goal, I will focus on three gas disputes that 
pitted Russia against Ukraine in the period 2006-2009, including those mentioned in January 2006 and 
January 2009 and the other small dispute of March 2008. These three disputes offer an excellent ground 
to test Russian motivations at least mainly for three reasons:  
In the first place, these three disputes are characterized by very different patterns of escalation. 
This raises the question of why these patterns of escalation differed from each other. One obvious answer 
would be that escalation in these three disputes was the result of different Russian decisions. If that was 
the case, these three disputes represent a very interesting occasion to consider how changing 
circumstances might account for different Russian decisions before and during the disputes.  
In the second place, and this is probably the most important feature, they involve a dispute with a 
transit country, and could (and in two of the three cases, albeit in different degrees, did) affect third 
parties, namely end consumers of Russian gas. The presence of these end consumers is vital as a 
benchmark for testing Russian willingness to assume risks for the sake of achieving interests involved in 
the bilateral dispute. This risk attitude can tell us much about how Russia behaves in the face of its 
environment and could offer us some clues to assess whether Russia seeks to increase its power at the 
expense of its neighbors or whether it responds to what is perceived as diminishing power in the face of a 
hostile environment. Namely, whether we see an offensive or a defensive Russia.  
In the third place, these three disputes involved gas and not oil and Ukraine instead of Belarus. 
These last two elements are important as the effect of gas cut-offs is more serious than that of oil cut-offs 
and because within the transit of Gazprom´s gas from Russia to the rest of Europe, Ukraine held, as 
already stated above, a quasi-monopoly with figures accounting to up to 80% of transit flows during the 
period 2005-2009. This strengthens the reasons for choosing these three disputes as the most suitable for 
testing risk-willingness from the part of Russia, as it is in the dyad Russia-Ukraine and not so much 
Russia-Belarus where we would expect Russia to be more concerned about the effects that supply 
interruptions might cause on consumers of Gazprom´s gas and to be thus trapped in a dilemma regarding 
existing risks once decisions are to be taken in the face of disputes with Ukraine. Such a situation 
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probably forced Russia to assess the stakes in each of the disputes and to consider whether risks were 
worth taking for the sake of prevailing on Ukraine. We will assume that in the three disputes analyzed, 
Gazprom and by extension, Russia, were facing this dilemma. 
As for the dispute, mentioned above, of June-December 2014, it might seem reasonable to see it 
included in our case study. If anything distinguishes this dispute from any other before, is the fact of its 
formidable length thereof: half a year. However, the extreme duration of this dispute betrays an element 
that sets it clearly apart from their three predecessors under analysis here, namely, that no other actor 
apart from the dyad Russia-Ukraine was affected. This might explain why the dispute could so 
"comfortably" last for so long. Objective elements, which will not be the object of thorough assessment 
here, could explain this fact. Having occurred during months of low demand, Ukraine did not have to 
impose restrictions on consumption. Besides this, the fact that at the time, only around 50% of European 
natural gas consumption from Gazprom transited Ukraine, left much spare capacity in the pipeline 
system. This spare capacity enabled Ukraine to use it for supply its consumption through existing reserves 
and additional shipments contracted from Poland, Hungary and Slovakia. In any case, the undeniable fact 
that a similar pattern of disruption, as in previous disputes, did not occur, is in itself a reason enough for 
considering the same risks did not exist for Russia, and for excluding this dispute from our study. 
 
1. 2. Theoretical Framework 
The discussion in the preceding section points to the existing debate regarding deterrence and the studies 
on the phenomenon of escalation. As will be explained in further detail below, the set of moves and 
counter-moves that both Russia and Ukraine made in the three disputes fits quite well into the model of 
escalation that in the study of international relations has been mostly applied to the phenomenon of war. 
Using the model of escalation forces us to pay attention to the logic of deterrence which has been at the 
basis of the concept of escalation: deterrence models presuppose that credible deterrence should correlate 
with a lesser escalation. Following this logic in the current case we would assume that the greater the 
confidence displayed by Russia, the more necessary it should be on the part of either Ukraine as 
consumer or third countries depending on normal flows through Ukraine, to warn Russia of the possible 
consequences of decisions bringing upsets through gas cut-offs.24 If we followed this logic, either there 
                                                           
24
 The obvious warning from Ukraine would be to escalate the dispute and affect third countries with the threat to impose 
reputational costs on Russia. As for these third countries, although more complex, warnings to Russia would take the form of 
imposing costs deriving from the loss of reputation caused by the dispute. 
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was a failure of deterrence in the extreme case of January 2009 or Russia´s cost-benefit calculation made 
deterrence non-credible.25 This would invite us to assume that risks deriving from using end-customers as 
"hostages" of a bilateral dispute were assessed as irrelevant or at least acceptable or that the other actors 
failed to signal their disposition to "punish" Russia for its actions,26 leading to deterrence failure.27 If the 
former was the case, either Russian valuation of its own power or the valuation of another actor´s power 
changed, modifying the cost-benefit calculations in each of the disputes.28 However, the debate cannot be 
closed at this stage without considering the larger debate and all contributions that led to the concept of 
spiral logic as well as those deriving from new findings in cognitive psychology that have been applied to 
the study of international relations as an explanation of this concept.29 Taking into account this larger 
debate, we see the ground open to new hypotheses based on varying degrees of risk-acceptance. While 
most deterrence failures were traditionally assumed to be the result of a lack of information and derived 
miscalculations, the literature on spiral logic which pointed to deterrence as having opposed effects to 
those intended and the insights from prospect theory (as devised by Kahneman and Tversky and as seen 
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 In this case we could consider that Russia felt confident enough to assume the costs deriving from taking third countries 
"hostage" if necessary for the sake of prevailing on Ukraine and thus to dismiss possible consequences. Using expected utility 
which forms the basis of rational choice theory, this can take two forms: either Russia assumed there would be negligible 
consequences from these "hostages", be it in terms of a revision of their energy policies or relations in general with Russia 
(irrespective of whether Russia erred or not in its calculation of these consequences), or that independently of how it calculated 
consequences, it nevertheless assumed that costs deriving from not prevailing on Ukraine were higher than costs deriving from 
any kind of "reprisals" undertaken by "hostages" of the energy dispute. In either case, we would see Russia simply calculating 
costs and taking the most rational option. 
26
 The concept of signaling is discussed in: Jervis, Robert (1970): The logic of images in international relations, Princeton, 
Princeton University Press; for the credibility of deterrence, see: Huth, Paul K. (1988): Extended deterrence and the prevention 
of war, New Haven, Yale University Press. Paul Huth, Christopher Gelpi and Scott D. Bennett (Huth, Paul; Gelpi, Christopher 
and Scott, Bennett D.: "System uncertainty, risk propensity, and international conflict among the great powers", Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, vol. 36 (1992), pp. 478-516 and Huth, Paul; Gelpi, Christopher and  Bennett, D. Scott: "The escalation of 
great power militarized disputes: Testing rational deterrence theory and structural realism", American Political Science Review, 
vol.  87,  no. 3 (1993), pp. 609-623) test deterrence theory against structural realism and conclude that uncertainty is solved 
once disputes are initiated. They also show that escalation processes unfold according to the former´s expectations; once 
disputes are initiated, "signals" provide effective information. 
27
 Deterrence failure by inappropriate signaling presents us with a certain puzzle with regard to the way information was 
processed by the Russian side: de-escalating in January 2006 fits the pattern described by Huth, Gelpi and Bennett (see ftn. 
above), with signals being provided by Ukraine´s counter-moves and Russia ending the dispute in consequence. It is not likely 
that Russia would have forgotten the lesson later in January 2009 and made "worse" mistakes further escalating that new 
dispute. We could accept deterrence failure for January 2006 as a reason for the dispute initiation, but not for January 2009, 
where information was already available and Russia nevertheless applied the "wrong" lesson. Most likely, there was a change 
in valuation of the cost-benefits.      
28
 Deterrence, as applied in cases of disputes (potentially) leading to war, has no trouble in identifying the power attributes by 
different actors and the clear consequences of lesser or greater power. Applying the concept of power to the more complex and 
non-military based energy disputes where "weapons" consist of cutting off gas is more challenging: what can determine an 
increase in Russian "power"? Power is understood here as an objective element that increases the chances of prevailing in the 
dispute and arguably explains a greater or lesser willingness to use force; as force here is represented by the harming capacity 
of cutting off gas, which remains essentially the same, a graduation of power here seems difficult to be considered. However,  
"power" by actors who can impose costs (we consider further below what this "power" can be) on Russia if they negatively 
react to gas cut-offs (namely, if they blame Russia) can be simply measured by their willingness to impose theses costs, 
irrespective of what inspires this willingness.      
29
 See below in the theoretical framework for the discussion regarding these concepts. 
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below, used by several authors in the field of International Relations), raised new questions and arguably 
offered a more complex instrument to analyze escalation processes and the existence of disputes beyond 
what deterrence theory and the literature on miscalculation may have predicted. As will be further 
explained below, for the theoretical framework in this research I will distinguish the status quo as framed 
in gains, which makes actors be risk-averse, and the status quo as framed in losses, which on the contrary 
makes actors become risk-acceptant and likely to respond in ways that increase conflict. The financial 
stakes involved for Russia both when discussing pricing of its own gas and transferring costs of Central 
Asian gas price increases to Ukraine, are easily measurable and can provide us with a clear benchmark to 
consider Russian valuation of the status quo assuming Russia as a profit-maximizer, be it in strictly 
financial terms or in strategic gains through stakes in the energy sector of Ukraine. More complex is the 
political variable: during the whole period from 2005 to 2009, the presence of Yushchenko´s 
Administration and the two Timoshenko governments, the first from January to September 2005 and the 
second from December 2007 to January 2010, are arguably factors that could explain why the two most 
virulent disputes ever between Russia and Ukraine (besides the small dispute of March 2008) took place 
during this period. Compared to the relatively harmonious relations in the energy field between Russia 
and Ukraine during the Administration of Kuchma and the short government by Viktor Yanukovich from 
October 2006 to December 2007, the period when Timoshenko was prime minister stands out indeed, as 
the three disputes happened during her period. If at least this could be an "obvious" explanation of why 
these disputes occurred, explaining the different escalation of the three disputes may be more challenging 
if politics were part thereof, as it is hard to somehow quantify it and to find a clear pattern of cause-effect. 
Non-economic issues become even more difficult once we consider the strategic context for Russia and 
think how this might have affected decisions taken in each of the three disputes. This becomes 
particularly obvious when we consider the most virulent dispute, that of January 2009, and realize that in 
April 2008 the NATO Summit took place in Bucharest (where Georgia and Ukraine were to be invited to 
forge closer relations with the organization and which Russia feared as a first step for their entry into the 
security organization) and in August of the same year Russia attacked Georgia.30 We may face similar 
problems over the role played by internal Ukrainian politics, but we could reasonably expect that changes 
leading to either worsening of the strategic status quo or increasing Russian power would increase the 
                                                           
30
 Some of the accounts for this episode can be found in: Cornell, Svante E. and Starr, Frederick (eds.) (2009):  The guns of 
August 2008: Russia´ s war in Georgia, Armonk, N.Y., M.E. Sharpe; Asmus, Ronald D. (2010): A little war that shook the 
world: Georgia, Russia, and the future of the West, New York, Palgrave Macmillan. 
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likelihood of disputes, which should be reflected in the patterns of escalation.31 Before reaching this stage 
though, it will be necessary to test whether the different escalation is either explained by Russia changing 
decisions or by Ukraine´s lesser or greater resistance to Russian pressure, something which the empirical 
results from a detailed analysis of the negotiations in the energy field from 2005 to 2009 (the time frame 
when the three disputes took place) should help clarify. In a nutshell, the goal of this research will be to 
find out why the pattern of escalation changed in these three disputes and how either changes in the 
valuation of the Russia-Ukraine bilateral status quo or changes of the valuation of risks, affected 
Russian decisions and eventually its responses in each of these disputes.  
The Model of Escalation and Deterrence Theory 
Classical deterrence theory, developed theoretically with the onset of the Cold War, characterized by the 
tense bipolarity between the US and the USSR and most importantly, by nuclear Mutual Assured 
Destruction (MAD), has been (and still is) of utmost importance in the academic field of international 
relations. Authors like Herman Kahn, Thomas Schelling, Albert Wohlstetter, Oskar Morgenstern, 
William Kaufman and Glenn Snyder, can be counted as the most notable scholars responsible for the 
development of the concept.32 Whether as a structural deterrence model or decision-making deterrence 
model, which in fact shares the assumptions of the former and refines it,33 the baseline is that of rational 
actors bent on maximizing power and choosing alternatives according to its highest payoff. This is aptly 
portrayed by the model of escalation and which has been at the heart of deterrence studies. The best 
explanation is arguably that provided by Kilgour and Zagare:   
The reason for choosing this model is because the two authors add important improvements that 
contribute to solving the paradox of classical deterrence. In classical deterrence most of the authors are 
influenced by the dilemmas of nuclear weapons and Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) and rely on 
incredible and arguably irrational threats to provide for a rational explanation of the phenomenon of 
deterrence. Along with this nuclear bias, their portrayal of actors as always being willing to maximize 
power and always having an interest in subverting the status quo, is modified by Kilgour and Zagare, who 
distinguish different actors according to their preferences. As we see in detail below, our two authors 
                                                           
31
 As for an explanation of why both increasing Russian power and worsening status quo (which can be translated as an 
indirect weakening of Russia) may have similar effects of conflict escalation, see below the discussion regarding prospect 
theory. 
32
 The list is taken from:  Zagare, Frank C.& Kilgour D. Mark (2000): Perfect deterrence, Cambridge, UK ; New York, NY : 
Cambridge University Press, p. 4. 
33
 Ibid., pp. 19-20; as authors themselves put it: "the prescriptions of decision-theoretical deterrence theory extend structural 
deterrence theory by considering the micro-level implications of international structure and the high costs of nuclear conflict 
(Ibid., p. 24). 
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usually focus on actors who either prefer submitting rather than risking war, or actually are willing to go 
to war before submitting to a rival. Interestingly, they also mention the possibility that an actor may 
actually prefer war to the current status quo,34 something which is posited by prospect theory (see next 
section).   
Thus the model of escalation explained by Kilgour and Zagare 35  aptly portrays the relation 
between two states either close to engaging in a dispute, or already engaged therein. The model includes 
several nodes of decision where state A and state B have to either accept the status quo, or escalate the 
dispute in order to modify that status quo.36 The whole game stops when a state either chooses not to 
escalate further or when escalation leads to a final stage, which in the model is presumed to be war. The 
concept of escalation, which has been mainly applied to armed conflicts, catches the power dynamics that 
underlined these three disputes. The model of escalation, as designed by professors Zagare and Kilgour, 
will be applied to these three energy disputes that pitted both Russia and Ukraine against each other. The 
model offers a good tool to describe the stages through which the three disputes evolved. In addition to 
that, Zagare and Kilgour´s model depicts different actors according to which decision they take at each 
node of the dispute (either to escalate or to back down) and thus opens the door to many insights related 
to both the deterrence vs. spiral logic debate and the contributions from cognitive theories such as 
prospect theory that is explained below. The latter will be applied to understand Russia´s decisions and its 
underlying reasons for assuming a lower or higher degree of risk-acceptance in each of the disputes.37  
                                                           
34
 As put by Zagare and Kilgour: "A threat will be said to be capable, then, if and only if the threatened player prefers the 
Status Quo to Conflict; when this relationship is reversed, the threat will be said to lack capability" (Ibid., p. 82). 
35
 Zagare & Kilgour, "Perfect Deterrence", op. cit.; Zagare, Frank. C. (1987): The dynamics of deterrence, Chicago, University 
of Chicago Press, and Zagare, Frank C. (2011): The games of July: explaining the Great War, Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press. 
36
 For the decision tree representation, see: Zagare, Frank C.: "The dynamics of escalation", Information and Decision 
Technologies, no. 16 (1990), p. 253. 
37
 These two different actors are "soft" and "hard" actors. The deterrence model leaves open what determines the reasons for 
either two to belong to one typology or other. As the main difference between soft and hard actors is that while both are 
dissatisfied with the status quo, the former would back down from the challenge once counter-challenged by the opponent, the 
latter would still choose war instead of backing down. However, both actors prefer the status quo to war. As explained by 
Frank C. Zagare and Mark Kilgour (Zagare, Frank C. & Kilgour D. Mark: "Asymmetric deterrence", International Studies 
Quarterly, vol. 37, no. 1 (Mar., 1993), p. 5), the difference between the two kinds of challengers is that one (soft) prefers to 
capitulate instead of going to war, whereas the preferences are inversed for the latter (hard). This appears somewhat puzzling: 
as a hard defender prefers to face the challenge instead of acquiescing, such action should not add additional costs to the 
challenger, as the defender´s efforts at deterring simply nullify the expected gains of the challenge; reverting to the status quo 
would be still preferable than war, unless for an actor preferring war to the status quo from the very beginning. If we add the 
variable of reputation, then we can understand that capitulating adds costs apart from nullifying expected gains (as Jack Levy 
asks: "does the first state frame a possible withdrawal of the threat (or failure to implement it) as a retreat to the old status quo 
or a retreat from the new status quo? the second frame is more likely to induce risk-seeking behavior and the escalation of the 
conflict"; see: Levy, Jack S.: "Prospect Theory and International Relations: Theoretical applications and analytical problems", 
Political Psychology, vol. 13, no. 2 (192), p. 290); if these costs were added to the status quo once the challenger has 
capitulated, then we could consider an expected-utility calculation where the status quo simply becomes more costly than war. 
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In this respect, the model of perfect deterrence which the two authors devised in their 
homonymous book, is a welcome expansion from the more simplistic portray of actors bent on risk-
competitions for blind power-maximization as in the initial models, mostly based on Mutual Assured 
Destruction (MAD) dilemmas. A closer look at the way the three disputes escalated can highlight this: 
In January 2006 pricing disagreements regarding both Russian gas supplied as payment for transit 
fees and Turkmen gas imported through Russia, led Russia to impose a total cut-off of shipments to 
Ukraine. Ukraine responded by siphoning off gas exported to Central and Western Europe, thus 
provoking supply disruptions in very dependent Central European countries. Russia decided on 2nd 
January  to restore supplies, which started to come back to normal levels the next day, while an agreement 
was finally reached in the early hours of 4th January. In March 2008, a new dispute occurred this time 
because of debt owed by Ukraine´s energy state monopoly, Naftohaz, filtered through the complex web of 
intermediaries that had been established as a result of January 2006 agreements and which involved 
Central Asian gas supplied in late 2007, and Russian gas exceptionally supplied from the start of 2008 to 
make up for undersupply due to unusually cold weather in Central Asia. This time, Russia decided to 
progressively start cutting off supplies by 25% on the first day and another 25% the next day. Ukraine´s 
response was to threaten to siphon gas off as in January 2006. Russia did not escalate beyond a partial 
cut-off of 50% of normal supplies and an agreement was reached a week later. Then finally in January 
2009, a new pricing dispute after most of the previous weeks had been spent on a debt dispute, led Russia 
to cut gas off as in January 2006. The difference this time however, lay in the fact that Russia did not 
back down in the face of disruptions in Central and Western Europe provoked by new instances of 
Ukrainian siphoning of transit gas. In order to deny Ukraine an escape from the dispute, it decided to 
progressively cut the flows of gas transported to the rest of Europe, thus deepening the energy crisis that 
most dependent countries were suffering. An end of the dispute came only with the signing between 
Russia and Ukraine of a final agreement.      
As for what the concept of escalation can offer in terms of explanatory power, we are 
unfortunately faced with the underdevelopment of the concept itself. We can quote in this sense Pr. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                            
This does not seem to be usually modeled by Kilgour and Zagare´s model, even if they do consider the possibility and mention 
prospect theory, which we consider below (see: Zagare & Kilgour, "Perfect Deterrence", op. cit., pp. 82, ftn. 24 and 83). 
However, even this suggestion is ultimately wanting, as however a status quo may be diminished by the reputational losses, it 
should be seen as arguably better than the option of war if the status quo remained the preferred action in comparison. In any 
case, if war is seen as risky enough as not to be an option preferred to a peaceful status quo, it is our intuition that prospect 
theory and the consideration of risk-acceptance would fit a hard challenger better than expected-utility. This is the reason for 
thinking that this dichotomy between soft and hard actors in fact opens the door to explanations based on cognitive theories.    
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Carlson when she states: "the problem of escalation has been widely discussed,38 but until recently there 
have been few attempts to develop a general theory aimed at generating testable hypotheses of escalation 
processes".39  In that respect, it must be highlighted that the academic debate revolves around two 
different logics underlying the inner mechanism of escalation, according to which we find opposing 
interpretations: the first one, based on the logic of deterrence, assumes an actor would escalate when not 
faced with resistance and would refrain from further escalating any conflict when faced with a credible 
one; as defined by Paul G. Lauren: "deterrence attempts to persuade an opponent to refrain from 
initiating certain action, such as an armed attack, that is viewed as highly dangerous by making him fear 
the consequences of such behavior".40  To this definition, we can add that the (more or less explicit) way 
to deter is to convince the target of deterrence that the cost of its actions will exceed the expected 
benefits.41 As professors Lebow and Stein point out, this presupposes a rational cost-benefit calculus.42 
Another interpretation, based on spiral logic, assumes that an actor may escalate when faced with 
resistance and refrain when not. In fact in the model of escalation by Kilgour and Zagare as portrayed in 
their latest works,43 we can find an approach, which comes close in its most simplified form to what these 
two different logics tell.44 The two authors portray two kinds of actors, a challenger dissatisfied with the 
status quo and a defender satisfied with the status quo, and classify them as soft or hard, having this set of 
priorities: (A) Hard State: prefers war to capitulation, (B) Soft State: prefers capitulation to war.45 
Interestingly, this classification could be expanded from its minimalistic conception to describe patterns 
where each actor is classified according to the response it would make at each of the nodes of decision.46  
In any case, the debate on logics of deterrence and spiral opened the door to questioning the model 
of expected utility, which was the basis for rational choice. Deterrence theory which Paul Huth defines as: 
                                                           
38
 See other works such as: Kahn, Herman (1965): On escalation: metaphors and scenarios, New York, Praeger; Schelling, 
Thomas C. (1960): The strategy of conflict, Cambridge, Harvard University Press; Schelling, Thomas (1966): Arms and 
influence, New Haven, Yale University Press; Holsti, Kalevi (1972): International politics; a framework for analysis, 
Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall; Smoke, Richard (1977): War: controlling escalation, Cambridge, Harvard University 
Press; Brecher, Michael: "Crisis escalation: model and findings", International Political Science Review, vol. 17, no. 2 (1996), 
pp. 215-230. 
39
 Carlson, Lisa J.: "A theory of escalation and international conflict", The Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 39, no. 3 (1995), 
pp. 511-512. 
40
 quoted in Sperandei, Maria: "Bridging deterrence and compellence: an alternative approach to the study of coercive 
diplomacy ", International Studies Review, vol. 8, no. 2 (2006), p. 264. 
41
 Lebow, Richard N. and Stein, Janice G.: "Beyond deterrence",  Journal of Social Issues, vol. 43, no. 4 (1987),  p. 6.  
42
 Ibid., Idem. 
43
 See mainly: Zagare & Kilgour, "Perfect deterrence", op. cit. and Zagare, "The games of July", op. cit. 
44
 As was already mentioned in ftn. 34 and ftn. 37.  
45
 Zagare & Kilgour "Asymmetric deterrence", op. cit., p. 8. 
46
 See: Carlson, Lisa J. & Dacey, Raymond: "Sequential decision analysis of the traditional deterrence game", Peace 
Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, vol. 10, no. 3 (Fall 2004), pp. 1-14 and Simon, Michael W.: "The Rogue State 
Response to BMD: The Regional Context", Defense and Security Analysis, vol. 18, no. 3 (2002), pp. 271-292. 
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"the use of threats by one party to convince another party to refrain from initiating some course of 
action" 47 was precisely based on expected utility and is under whatever of its forms (direct-extended and 
immediate-general)48 linked to the threat of using force to avert an attack. However, as Robert Jervis 
pointed out, there seems to be circumstances where deterrence fails and leads to situations where reprisals 
do not deter, but on the contrary, further fuel conflict. This opposite logic has been named by this author, 
as spiral logic. 49  Ned Lebow proceeded with another vector of critique, blaming psychological 
mechanisms for nullifying information.50 This same author, together with Janice Stein, was thus among 
the first "revisionists" of deterrence and in their ground-breaking article "Beyond Deterrence", they 
expanded to point to what they called political, psychological and practical problems with the 
applicability of deterrence as an effective tool;51 among political reasons, they convincingly distinguish 
between "gains" and "need".52 Echoing the empirical critique already made by Robert Jervis regarding 
spiral logic, the two authors state that if effective in case of "gains", deterrence might backfire when 
challengers are pushed by need.53 The authors go as far as to state that "need" seems to be a better 
predictor of challenge than "opportunity",54 challenging deterrence theory directly.55 The intuition that 
different dynamics exist was already present in Schelling´s earlier insight that deterrence actually is more 
easily achieved than compellence since the latter is an offensive goal and thus liable to cause more 
resistance in the target,56 go precisely in the same direction. Since then, an important literature developed 
                                                           
47
 Huth, Paul K: " Deterrence and international conflict: empirical findings and theoretical debates", Annual Review of Political 
Science, vol. 2, no. 1 (1999), p. 26. 
48
 See: Morgan, Patrick M. (2003): Deterrence now, Cambridge, UK ; New York and Cambridge University Press. 
49
 Jervis, Robert (1976):  Perception and misperception in international politics, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University 
Press and Jervis, Robert: " Cooperation under the security dilemma", World Politics, vol. 30, no. 2 (Jan. 1978), pp. 167-214. 
50
 Richard Ned Lebow strongly makes the case in: Lebow, Richard N. (1981): Between peace and war: the nature of 
international Crisis, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press and his chapter "The deterrence deadlock: a way out of 
the dilemma?, in Jervis, Robert; Lebow N., Richard and Stein, Janice G. (1985): Psychology and deterrence, Baltimore, Md., 
Johns Hopkins University Press; for a critique, see: Orme, John: "Deterrence failures: a second look ", International Security, 
vol. 11, no. 4 (1987), p. 97. 
51
 Lebow and Stein, "Beyond deterrence", op. cit. 
52
 Ibid., p. 6. 
53
 Ibid., Idem., p. 36, 40, 63-64; This distinction closely echoes the difference between perception in the domain of gains and a 
tendency to risk-aversion, and perception in the domain of losses and a tendency to risk-seeking, as was found by the 
advocates of prospect theory and as we see further below (This is mentioned by the two authors to support their distinction 
between opportunity and need; see: Ibid., p. 64; they return to this in: Lebow, Richard N. and Stein, Janice G.: "Rational 
deterrence theory: I think, therefore I deter ", World Politics, vol. 41, no. 2 (Jan. 1989), p. 208). 
54
 Lebow and Stein, "Rational deterrence theory", op. cit., p. 223. 
55
 The problem nevertheless is compounded by the fact that whichever factor, "need" or "opportunity" may be more or less 
present, it is very hard to find out which is the case, so policies advised for each of them can backfire when wrongly applied 
(see: Lebow and Stein, "Beyond deterrence", op. cit., pp. 52-53); as Robert Jervis puts it: "both threats and conciliation can 
produce the very consequences they were designed to avoid" (Jervis, Robert: "Rational deterrence: theory and evidence", 
World Politics, vol. 41, no. 2 (1989), p. 183.                  
56
 Schelling, "Arms and influence", op. cit., pp. 69-91; as Jack Levy states: "it is generally easier to deter an adversary from 
initiating an action she has not yet taken than to compel her to undo what she has already done or to undertake actions which 
she would prefer not to do"; see also: Jervis: "Rational deterrence", op. cit., p. 29.  
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on perception and cognitive biases that accounted for deterrence failures and which questioned the model 
of rational actor that was presupposed in international statesmen.57 Robert Jervis´ work on perceptions,58 
where he first presented the concept of spiral logic, was arguably the first general book devoted to 
misperceptions and cognitive biases applied to International Relations.  
Prospect Theory  
Challenging expected utility theory, prospect theory59 opens the ground for a new understanding of the 
way states respond to the power changes in international relations and offers some explanations to 
account for situations where deterrence does not work.60 As summed up by Jack Levy, prospect theory 
mainly posits the following three theses:61 actors evaluate outcomes not based on the net asset levels 
(objective reference as followed by the theory of decision of expected utility on which rational choice is 
based) but on a reference point (subjectively chosen)62, losses are overweighted as compared to gains,63 
and arguably the main insight, and one which opens more avenues for its application to the study of 
international relations: states tend to be risk-averse regarding gains, 64  and risk-accepting regarding 
losses.65 That means states would not risk their status quo for prospective gains if they are quite satisfied 
                                                           
57
 For a list of some of these, see: Lebow and Stein, "Beyond deterrence", op. cit. pp. 165-166. 
58
 Jervis, "Perception and misperception in international politics", op. cit. 
59
 See the seminal work: Tversky, Amos and Kahneman, Daniel: "Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk", 
Econometrica, vol. 47, no. 2 (1979). Serious attempts to apply prospect theory in international relations theory can be found in: 
Jervis, N. Lebow and Stein, op. cit.; Stein, Janice Gross and Pauly, Louis W. (1993): Choosing to co-operate: how states avoid 
loss, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press; Davis, James W. (2000): Threats and promises, Baltimore, Maryland, The 
Johns Hopkins University Press. and Taliaferro, Jeffrey W. (2004): Balancing risks: great power intervention in the periphery, 
Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press.  
60
 Deterrence failure has been may be blamed on miscalculations. See: Lebow and Stein: "Beyond deterrence", op. cit. 
61
 Levy, Jack: "An introduction to prospect theory", Political Psychology, vol. 13, no. 2 (1992), p. 171. 
62
 The reference point is normally the present position or status quo, but due to this subjective character, it can be some other 
point identified with a certain aspiration (Levy, "An Introduction to Prospect Theory", op. cit., p. 174). The consequence of the 
relativity of the reference point is that whenever this point moves, the evaluation of prospects change (Ibid., p. 181). Expected 
utility does not consider such changes if the net asset does not change (see: Ibid., Idem.), whereas under prospect theory, this 
could remain equal but the actor behaves differently depending on the reference point chosen in the early phase called by 
Kahneman and Tversky as "editing" phase (see: Kahneman and Tversky, "Prospect theory", op. cit.). 
63
 Expressed in the language of utility functions, this means that these are concave in the domain of gains and convex in the 
domain of losses (Ibid., p. 174). This translates into risk-aversion in the domain of gains (concave) and risk-seeking in the 
domain of losses (convex) (Ibid., p. 173), which contradicts the usual assumption in expected utility that risks are defined by a 
linear utility function (Ibid., Idem.) and that actors are risk-neutral. This has also another related dimension, which is the 
general tendency of "loss-aversion" based on the "endowment effect" (Ibid., p. 175), which can be summed up by the 
phenomenon of higher prices demanded for goods already possessed, compared to equivalent ones which are not. Another 
classical phenomenon found in economic behavior is the "trap" of "sunken costs", or to "throw good money after bad", which 
is nothing less than risking further financial resources to recoup losses suffered and which fits with risk-seeking in the domain 
of losses (Jervis, Robert: "Political implications of loss aversion", Political Psychology, vol. 13, no. 2 (1992), p. 188). 
64
 As Robert Jervis points out, this finding is not novel, as this was already foreseen by expected utility theory, whereas risk-
seeking in the domain of losses is what essentially contradicts tenets by expected utility theory (Jervis, "Political implications 
of loss aversion", op. cit., p. 187). 
65
 In the experiments carried out by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, risk-aversion in the face of gains and risk-seeking in 
the face of losses represented high percentages among participants, with percentages of 40% to 20% remaining risk-averse 
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with that status quo, while they would run risks to prevent losses if they consider their status quo to be 
unsatisfactory.66  The complexity added by prospect theory as compared to expected utility becomes 
manifest when we consider how outcomes can change depending on how an actor frames a certain 
problem, as depending on whether a status quo is framed in the domain of gains or losses, we may expect 
that actor to assume different risk attitudes. The consequences these cognitive phenomena may have in 
the case of actors in the international arena is significant and can account for security dilemmas that fuel 
conflict: the endowment effect can lead an actor to undervalue concessions made by the adversary (seen 
as gains) and to overvalue those made to the adversary (seen as losses) and make settlements more 
difficult.67 In a similar way, in line with insights by Schelling, who theorized that deterrence was easier 
than compellence,68 and in accordance with the tendency to accommodate sooner to gains than to losses,69 
an actor trying to recoup losses, would face an actor treating its recent gains as part of his (new) status 
quo; this means that both actors would frame the situation in the domain of losses,70 which would then 
foster risk-seeking and further conflict.71 This would increase the need to discover how a particular actor 
frames the status quo in order to know what are the measures advisable when dealing with its possible 
challenges to the status quo. If an actor acts aggressively in order  to make gains, application of prospect 
theory in the field of International Relations would have us think that deterrence is the best response;72 
actors behaving aggressively and challenging the status quo would be easily deterred if faced with 
credible power as they would not risk the status quo for any prospective gains. Instead, an actor behaving 
aggressively to avoid losses would only become more aggressive in the event of facing deterrence;73 
deterrence would confirm for that state that it is located in the domain of losses74  and would thus 
                                                                                                                                                                                                            
when faced with losses (Levy, "Prospect theory and international relations", op. cit., p. 305). It is for this reason that it seems 
more appropriate to talk about tendencies rather than a constant pattern.  
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 See: Levy, "An introduction to prospect theory", op. cit.  
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reinforce the very motivations that compelled it to act that way. Deterrence would thus backfire. In such  
a case, appeasement would best be advisable, as yielding to certain demands would restore a status quo 
where the actor abandons its perception of being in the domain of losses and  therefore feels satisfied with 
the new status quo.75 Therefore, prospect theory offers the theoretical ground for understanding spiral 
logic and this in coherence with deterrence theory. Prospect theory´s integration of spiral logic provides a 
much broader explanatory tool as it takes into account whether an actor perceives himself as located in 
the domain of gains or in the domain of losses and where failure by third actors either to deter or 
appease/accommodate fuels instability. As Lebow and Stein discussed, risk-prone gain maximizers (a 
"rare animal" according to prospect theory, as gain maximizers should tend to be risk-averse) are 
relatively uncommon in the international realm.76 
Prospect theory as it stands has been criticized in some respects. One of the questions is: how can 
it provide satisfactory explanations for intermediate cases? When do spiral logic reactions set in and turn 
deterrence into a self-defeating tool?77 Stating that this depends on the reference framework taken by the 
actor, only tells half of the truth. If we take Kilgour and Zagare´s game-tree representation, we can 
imagine a potentially never ending set of risk-averse to risk-accepting actors.78 Are only actors willing to 
risk war risk-acceptant? Do all cases under this threshold therefore respond to deterrence theory? This 
seems to be a rather limited classification, the reason being that it does not account for crises short of war. 
Many authors have focused on cases where spiral logic implied a "substantial loss" or "precipitous 
decline"79 and there seems indeed to be a certain bias to focus on either war situations or situations short 
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of war.80 I assume however that within perceptions in the domain of losses there is a wide gradation. This 
is why I understand as intermediate those cases where an actor does perceive changes in its environment 
that pertain to interests guaranteed so far by the status quo, but henceforth endangered by an unfavorable 
change.81 If an actor under such circumstances is thus prompted to react to changes in the status quo, it 
may however counter-react to deterrence far short of escalating to the highest stage (war) when 
expectations are not met. In these cases deterrence may eventually work for preventing war. However, 
deterrence may initially fuel the crisis at earlier stages if deterrence replaces accommodation. These 
intermediate cases would fill the gap left between suicide spiral logic dynamics and ideal deterrence logic 
situations where terror precludes every move at the earliest stages. In fact, as far as this research is 
concerned, prospect theory, understood as encompassing these intermediate cases, seems to offer a more 
realistic framework to apply to our three disputes, where an inherent element of risk remains, due to the 
uncertainty as for the outcome of any eventual dispute. In fact, instead of prejudging a particular point 
beyond which we would define the actor under research, in this case, Russia, as a risk taker, being 
otherwise a risk avoider, and thus establish an unnecessarily artificial binary distinction, we consider that 
each case must be defined in relative terms, taking as a comparison the other cases under consideration. 
Thus for example, in the event that we discover that in the three cases variations respond exclusively to a 
worsening status quo and a constant valuation of the risk factor, we would define Russia in March 2008 
as a more risk-averse actor than in January 2006, and at the same time define it as more risk-averse in the 
latter case than it would end up being in January 2009, thus avoiding a clear-cut but abstract and useless 
definition of Russia as either risk-acceptant or risk-averse.   
A second question emerges, about which we have already introduced some lines above when 
mentioning the risk factor and which is closely related to this research. This second question regards the 
valuation not only of the status quo but of risks too, namely, the probabilities that either desired or 
undesired consequences of any action will ensue.82 As was noticed by Lisa J. Carlson and Raymond 
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Dacey, in most of the analyses of the existing literature of prospect theory applied to the study of 
international relations carried out so far, there is a general focus on the perception of the status quo, 
leaving out the consideration of other payoffs.83  A closer look at Mark L. Haas´ article "Prospect Theory 
and the Cuban Missile Crisis" may exemplify the need to look at both elements:84 In the article, the author 
compared prospect theory with expected utility theory to find that when the situation was framed as in the 
domain of losses, both the US and the Soviet Union were risk takers.85 Interestingly, whenever certainty 
prevailed, both countries would become more cautious even if their status quo had already worsened.86 
What becomes more relevant for the present research is what determined the switch from a situation of 
uncertainty where a status quo framed in the domain of losses fostered risks, to a new one of certainty 
which fostered cautiousness. In that case study, increasing risks that conflict would ensue, with the 
unbearable costs implied, was the determining factor that turned the Soviet Union into a cautious actor 
after having initiated the crisis assuming clear risks.87 As the author explains, "...individuals switch from 
risk-accepting to cautious behavior when either their domain changes or their probability estimates are 
in the ranges in which people are likely to overweight the impact of these estimates on their value 
calculation".88 The limitation of a strictly status-quo based framework as has been applied by most 
prospect theory studies on international studies becomes manifest once we take the case of Russian 
decisions in the three energy disputes. Russia need not have been influenced only by changes in the status 
quo, the payoff of either maintaining or challenging the status quo should be analyzed alongside the 
expected payoff of those (real or possible) consequences suffered by Russia after third countries reacted 
as a consequence of the dispute itself. The consequences for these countries lie at the heart of the dilemma 
that was explained at the start of this chapter and constitute what will be named henceforth the risk factor. 
The prospective reaction of European countries dependent on Russian gas transiting Ukraine was 
arguably a vital factor and should be taken into account along with those factors directly constituting the 
status quo in what we mentioned earlier as the valuation of risks. When we include this second payoff, we 
can then hypothesize another course of events, as instead of a changing status quo, we can imagine a 
                                                                                                                                                                                                            
here, in this research there will be a focus on different degrees of risk, beyond a strict and equally reductionist delimitation of 
certainty and uncertainty. Arguably an unchanged status quo could nevertheless yield different "versions" of a same actor, if 
the probabilities are modified substantially, there being here a substantial change in probabilities and as a consequence, a 
different valuation of risks reflected in the escalation pattern. To this factor should be added changes in the valuation of risk in 
itself. Combined, these two factors should determine a global valuation of risk (risk would be determined by the probability of 
negative consequences and the value of these negative consequences). This can be perfectly integrated either into expected-
utility theories or into prospect theory.    
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stable status quo but with a changing risk factor, be it because of a change in valuation of the 
consequences themselves, or in the probabilities for negative consequences to ensue as a result of the 
dispute. In this case, Russia´s assertiveness could have been proportionally dependent on the degree of 
risk involved in cutting gas off to Ukraine as for the consequences for third countries dependent on 
Russian gas.   
The two questions seen above are closely related to another third question, which has made 
prospect theory vulnerable to critics, even if we consider here this is not a flaw of the theory itself. The 
question is related to the critiques raised against the theory for not accounting for how actors choose their 
reference point and thus establish their baseline of expectations. Although this seems to have been mostly 
missed, this critique points to a much larger debate, which is that of constructivism and rationalism. Since 
Alexander Wendt, building upon previous contributions (mainly Hedley Bull from the English School)89 
introduced the concept of constructivism90 in International Relations,91 many scholars have started along 
this new and promising path of research.92 The main point of contention of constructivism, as opposed to 
both neorealist and neoliberal rationalist mindsets is that interests, far from being given exogenously, are 
endogenously shaped by the actor´s own construction of these interests. Thus the famous catch-phrase by 
Alexander Wendt, applied to the realist concept of anarchy in international relations, that "anarchy is 
what states make of it".93 Even if current constructivist traditions remain far from having established a 
common school and are still divided over the debate of modernists and post-modernists,94 the fact is that 
constructivism has established itself as the big third debate after (neo) realism and (neo) liberalism first 
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imposed themselves in the arena of IR Studies95 and represents the main "challenger" of rationalism. 
Besides, many "constructivist" insights can arguably be traced back to important gaps left by realism96 
which have plagued neo-realism since its "(re)founding" by Kenneth Waltz. Waltz´s own admission that 
foreign policies might differ from what international structure "dictates" and lead therefore to failures, 
beggars the question of why states do not behave as "rationally" expected. Stephen Walt´s "Balance of 
Threat",97 Randall Schweller´s "Bandwagoning for Profit", his discussion on differences between status-
quo defenders and revisionist powers and his "Theory of Underbalancing",98 Gideon Rose´s "Classical 
Realist" 99  formulation or Stephen Brooks´ differentiation between "neo-realism and post-classical 
realism",100  open the door to the role of ideas in states´ formulation of their foreign policy. If realism has 
gone far down the path of abandoning a parsimonious structural theory such as that of Kenneth Waltz, 
whose descriptive power cannot explain different state´s foreign policies, it seems that constructivism, in 
its epistemologically close conventional/non-critical form,101 could come to the rescue.102 Prospect theory 
offers a valuable alternative to expected value theory and adds to strictly rationalist theories contributions 
from the field of cognitive psychology. As the theory lacks a proper theory of framing, it could find a 
valuable ally in constructivism and its contributions to how interests and identities are built. In this 
respect, the concept of securitization seems to open up the most promising prospects:     
One interesting example of constructivist contribution to the debate in IR Theory is the concept of 
securitization. This was coined by Ole Waever and Barry Buzan,103 and linked to what has come to be 
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known as the Copenhagen School,104 security can be summed up as: "not an objective condition but an 
outcome of a specific social process".105 Branding a speech-act as security (thus securitizing it) implies 
casting that issue as an "existential threat".106  The concept of securitization provoked a barrage of 
criticism from different sides. Theorists from the side of critical constructivism have mostly highlighted 
the moral dilemma stemming from non-adverted normative consequences of the theory107  and more 
generally rejected its "objectivism" accusing them of using non innocent categories.108 Other critics, such 
as Holger Stritzel, are sceptical about the validity of the concept of "speech act" and propose its 
substitution by that of "translation", 109  whereas Thierry Balzacq rather tries to rebalance the stiff 
framework of "speech act", as understood by Ole Waever, putting more stress on the audiences of the 
securitization act, the context in which they are located and the power they grant the securitizing actor.110 
One of the firmest defenders of the framework as put forward by the Copenhagen School, Rita Taureck, 
defends on the contrary its validity against normative critics.111 Juha Vuori, from his side, expands the 
concept arguing that the kind of speech act explained by Waever is only one of a range of securitizing 
tools with different possible applications.112 In any case, the debate around the concept of securitization 
seems to reproduce the broader lines of conventional and critical constructivism. The present work does 
not share the normative critic being leveled on the concept of securitization, believing on the contrary that 
its validity as an analytical tool deserves to be positively tested. Since the birth of this theoretical 
perspective, many pieces of practical research targeting securitization have focused on issues such as 
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immigration 113 and terrorism.114 Energy, another soft issue among security studies, is the focus in this 
research.115 However securitization will not be the focus here. The reason for mentioning securitization in 
this introduction is twofold and related to future avenues for research:  
First, we see a parallelism between extreme dichotomies of risk accepting and risk averse 
countries, as has been common in prospect theory and the focus on "existential threats" in studies on 
securitization. Neither seems to have considered a broader understanding were intermediate categories 
exist. Even if this research does not deal with discourse, the positivistic focus on changes in escalation 
and its relation with changes in the status quo as well as the risk factor, opens the door to a discussion on 
securitization beyond discourse analysis. In fact, we might surmise that a discursive instead of positivistic 
focus of securitization and the search in discourse theory of whether something is securitized or not, has 
biased the debate towards absolute distinctions instead of more relative ones. Focusing on how an actor 
reacts to a changing environment could open the concept of securitization both to a positivistic 
assessment. Matching each of the decisions taken in a process of escalation to identifiable changes could 
enable an assessment of what Russia was securitizing and to what degree. 116   
Second, to what extent does constructivism in general and the novel understanding of 
securitization in particular, relate to the alleged shortcoming plaguing prospect theory? Regarding the 
incapacity of the theory to determine the point of reference due to its lack of a framing theory, there is on 
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our part a strong disagreement with the critique that prospect theory is diminished by the absence of a 
framing theory imbedded within the general theory. The basis for this disagreement is that the task of 
providing tools to determine how framing takes place can perfectly be assumed by constructivism. We 
claim here that cognitive theories such as prospect theory and constructivism are fully complementary. 
We also clearly find fault with the critique focusing on framing theory rather than with the point of view 
assumed in this research project. The pretension of a general applicable framing theory for prospect 
theory is based on an objectivist assumption, whereas it seems obvious that the process of framing is 
subjective, an aspect which constitutes the backbone of constructivism and which justifies its 
complementarity with prospect theory.  
 
1. 3. Research Design and main Hypothesis 
This research will link the changing escalation of the three disputes of January 2006, March 2008 and 
January 2009 with changes in the status quo and the risk calculation based on the estimation of 
probabilities for each outcome. From the very beginning therefore, we will be facing a challenging task.  
Defining in a clear-cut fashion what is the value attributed to each of the payoffs involved in this research 
compounds one of the main challenges. As Jack Levy argues, referring to how easily controlled 
laboratory tests are carried out in contraposition to conditions prevailing in international relations: "The 
utilities of the payoffs for each outcome are not given but instead are highly subjective",117 and as the 
same author again points out, application of prospect theory to the realm of international relations is 
compounded by the double difficulty of determining both the value of the payoffs and the existing 
probabilities.118  
Regarding the status quo, the fact that we will be dealing with financial resources that can be 
objectively calculated should help in two ways: first, whenever we will need to define whether each of the 
three agreements that put an end to the energy disputes was advantageous or not for Russia, we can easily 
determine the exact economic gains for each of the two countries.119 This first step will at the same time 
offer the possibility to find out whether changes in the patterns of escalation in the three different disputes 
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 Levy, "Prospect theory and international relations", op. cit., p. 293. 
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 Ibid., Idem. 
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 This is "easy" only in relative terms. The first obstacle is the opacity of the agreements reached in each case, as details are 
often secret and only obtainable through indirect means, mainly press reports. The second obstacle is to know whether Russia 
considered the losses in relative or absolute terms, namely was a "bad" agreement negative in terms of the financial costs, or 
was it considered positive if that agreement was better for Russia than for Ukraine? When we analyze the agreement reached 
after the January 2006 dispute, this will become more manifest. 
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were caused either by Russia or Ukraine. This is an extremely important task, as the goal of this research 
is to analyze Russia´s decisions in the face of these disputes; if it was Ukraine´s differing set of responses 
which could account for these changes, we could deduce that Russia maintained a constant policy. The 
analysis of the agreements reached is arguably the best way to determine this: if for example the three 
disputes ended with three agreements favoring Russia, then we would assume that Russia did not de-
escalate until a series of demands was not fulfilled and that the different length and pattern of escalation 
responded to a lessened or heightened resistance from the part of Ukraine to accept these demands. 
Second, discussions previous to the disputes are a good way to know what were the financial objectives 
each of the two actors aimed at, as many figures are mentioned during lengthy negotiations that often last 
several months.120 This  seems to offer a reasonably well measurable standard. 
Defining with the same ease which were other costs involved in each of the disputes that may 
account for the different decisions taken at each of the nodes of decision is more difficult. As economic 
issues are hardly insulated from political matters pertaining to bilateral relations between Russia and 
Ukraine and the position of the former in geopolitical terms in general, these latter elements also form 
part of the status quo. Matters of prestige involving Russia´s standing among other powers and the 
political situation in the post-Soviet Space are difficult to trace. Even more difficult will be to link these 
issues to the energy disputes themselves. However, whenever the pricing discussions can reveal changing 
financial stakes from one dispute to another, we can, in the measure of possible, link these changes to 
whatever change in the pattern of escalation which took place. This can provide us with an objective 
valuation of the costs of the status quo in terms of negotiations between Russia and Ukraine and help us 
in what is arguably the main factor of what is termed here the status quo (on the preliminary consideration 
of economic issues as more relevant in this particular aspect, see next chapter and its literature review).  
In this respect, as for the valuation of the status quo in bilateral energy relations between Russia and 
Ukraine, one useful benchmark for linking variations in March 2008 and January 2009 to other variations 
that may be registered in the status quo should be the dispute of January 2006 itself, as it represents the 
first part of the whole "game" composed by the three disputes that will be analyzed. The reason for 
proceeding in this way is because this first "match" provides information that was not necessarily 
available before. Both Ukraine´s and other European consumers´ reactions could be guessed, but no 
empirical proof thereof was really available to date. Before the January 2006 dispute, a similar dispute 
had happened in 2004 between Russia and the other main transit country, Belarus. Whether the ease with 
                                                           
120
 A new obstacle will appear here, as for determining what were the optima of Russian interests, a necessary distortion stems 
from the consideration of each of the prices Russia demanded at some point to Ukraine for the gas supplied as either the real 
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which the dispute was solved then and the shortness of gas cutoffs that affected third countries might have 
had a certain effect on Russian calculations, is worth considering. However, since the dilemma was 
arguably smaller then and bearing in mind that January 2006 is the first in a series of three disputes in the 
same dyad, we will not explore the influence the 2004 dispute with Belarus might have had. We will 
simply leave the question open as if it could have influenced January 2006 considering that Russia might 
have started the dispute confident that it could be solved in a similar way as it was two years before. 
After the valuation of the status quo, the second part concerns the valuation of risks depending on 
the assessment of probabilities for each of the outcomes. Here, as opposed to the valuation of the 
agreements reached after the three disputes and the status quo previous to these agreements, we enter a 
much more difficult arena. There are no clearly measurable data to consider whether the risks involved in 
starting an energy dispute that might affect end-consumers was higher or lower in the background context 
of each of the disputes. The energy policy from the European Union is a complex one, as we will show in 
chapter 5, and has two different levels: one is the energy policy promoted by the European Commission 
and the different policies promoted by member states. In this respect, the European institutions tend to 
promote a set of policies opposed to Gazprom, as reflected in particular by the third energy package and 
its legislation against monopolies that affect particularly the Russian state monopoly. Russia thus prefers 
to maintain close relations at the bilateral level with a certain set of countries, where energy projects are 
highly favored. That said, there is a particular element in energy policy that although not easily 
measurable, has a positive expression which makes it arguably the best candidate for trying to link 
changes in the patterns of escalation to other changes that take place at the same time in the general 
context in which Russia is located: the construction of alternative pipelines from the Post-Soviet space to 
the consumer countries in Europe.  
During the time span that will be analyzed in this research, three pipeline projects were being 
promoted: "Nabucco", "Nord Stream" and "South Stream". The interesting fact about these three projects 
is that they represented opposed interests. From one side, Nabucco intended to establish a direct 
connection between Central Asian producers to European consumers. From the other side, Nord Stream 
and South Stream intended to establish a direct connection with consumer countries in Europe bypassing 
"troublesome" transit countries such as Belarus and Ukraine. In a nutshell, these different projects, 
Nabucco on one side and the two "Streams" on the other, represented not only different projects but also 
opposed philosophies. Both fostered direct links between producers and consumers in avoidance of transit 
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countries,121 but at the same time singled out radically different countries as "troublesome": Nabucco saw 
the problem in Russia whereas Nord Stream and South Stream on the contrary saw trouble in transit 
countries such as Belarus and Ukraine; Nabucco implied that over-dependence from Russia had to be 
counter-balanced by searching for an outlet from Central Asia that would not be bought by Gazprom, 
whereas the two "Streams" implied that disruptions stemming from problems caused by transit countries 
could be solved if additional outlets were created for Gazprom´s gas to be exported around them. What is 
most interesting is that tracking the progress of these three projects can provide us with the arguably best 
tool for judging from the Russian side what was the risk of unwanted consequences from the part of 
consumer countries as the result of gas cutoffs in the event of an energy dispute. In a very simplified way, 
we could surmise that good prospects for Nabucco and bad prospects for Nord and South Stream were a 
signal that the mood in Europe was not favorable to Russian discourse of blaming transit countries; it 
seems that the logical consequence would be a negative response for Russia. On the contrary, we could 
surmise that good prospects for Nord and South Stream and bad prospects for Nabucco were a signal that 
the mood in Europe was favorable to the Russian discourse of blaming transit countries. 122   One 
additional, but no less important feature about using the prospects for pipeline construction as an indicator 
of the margin of maneuver available for Russia in the case of a dispute arising with Ukraine, is that no 
other initiative from the side of consumers is more directly linked to the problematic relationship between 
producers and transit countries. The reason for that is simply that support for whichever option is an 
explicit reception of whichever narrative on "troublesome" countries.  
Thus the research design of this project will consist of a dependent variable which is the set of 
decisions that Russia took in response to Ukrainian policies, leading to the genesis and to the different 
patterns of escalation in the three energy disputes pitting both Russia and Ukraine against each other in 
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 This of course has to be qualified: Nabucco could not avoid transit countries in Eastern Europe, but more importantly, it 
would substitute Russia (and Ukraine) as a transit country to Europe for Central Asian gas by Azerbaijan and Turkey. Thus the 
benefit of Nabucco lies in bypassing Russia and assuming that Russia is worse as a transit country than Azerbaijan and Turkey. 
Only Nord Stream and South Stream can arguably be considered as real "alternatives" as bypass pipelines, as both avoid extra-
EU transit countries (namely, Ukraine) and connect EU-territory directly to Russia as producer.  
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 Here we will not deal with two particular issues that seem to be inextricably linked to the general issue of what "signal" the 
(non)promotion of any of these three pipelines provided to Russia. The first one is whether the supposed expectations Russia 
had regarding the mood in Europe were accomplished or not, namely, whether Russia felt secure to escalate a dispute which 
might eventually affect consumers to see that the lesson learnt in Europe after the resolution, went contrary to those "signals" 
before. If good prospects for the two "Streams" or bad prospects for Nabucco before one of the disputes did not reinforce this 
tendency, or even worse, reinforced the opposite narrative, will not be dealt with here; whether Russia´s expectations backfired 
is also somehow secondary regarding the priority in each of the disputes, which was to prevail in the gas dispute with Ukraine. 
In this respect, only two affected European consumers, January 2006 and January 2009, and both affected them not only 
differently in quantitative terms, but were also qualitatively different; in January 2009 Gazprom took the decision to impose a 
total gas embargo through Ukraine (as will be dealt with in detail in Chapter 8), something for which it should bear absolute 
responsibility.  
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January 2006, March 2008 and January 2009. The first independent variable is the value of the status 
quo preceding the three disputes, which we will deal with more extensively later in the literature review 
and analyze in detail in three separate chapters afterwards. Although economic and political factors have 
been mentioned above, most of the empirical part devoted to this variable will focus on the financial 
interests, as pricing mechanism must be dealt with in particular detail and because whatever political 
factors may have influenced the energy disputes, they were probably subordinated to the course of 
negotiations and are secondary to it regardless of their lesser or greater explanatory power. The second 
independent variable is the level of risk, or risk factor, measured by the policies by consumer countries 
in order to solve the dilemma of their dependence on the Russia/Ukraine supplier-transit relation and the 
way it might have influenced Russian perceptions of risk and thus translated into changes in the pattern of 
escalation of the three disputes.  
The main hypothesis we will be working with in this research is that Russia´s decisions to 
either escalate or deescalate in the three disputes were related to changes in the status quo of 
Russia-Ukraine relations, both in economic and political aspects and arguably to the risk factor too, 
regarding how bilateral disputes could eventually affect consumers in the rest of Europe.  
 
1.4. Chapters Outline 
Chapter 2 will be devoted to a literature review of how energy policy in Russia has been dealt with and 
how this same literature has considered the energy disputes that took place in the post-Soviet space 
between Russia and other consumer and mainly, transit countries. A short introduction in the chapter will 
deal with the fault lines that go through the general discussion on Russian foreign policy to trace later 
how they condition the debate on energy policy. The main importance of the literature review will be to 
see how different authors have dealt with the three energy disputes of January 2006, March 2008 and 
January 2009 which are the focus of this research. Apart from these three, energy disputes between 
Russia and Belarus will also be given special attention, due to the similarity between them and those that 
happened between Russia and Ukraine. A particular emphasis will be placed on whether the three energy 
disputes could be better explained by political or economic reasons, as this debate is of great relevance for 
the detailed analysis of them that will be undertaken in the first empirical part. Chapter 2 will close this 
first introductory part. 
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Chapter 3 will open the second part of this research and will be devoted to a description of the two 
energy sectors of Russia and Ukraine, the two countries at the center of this thesis. Starting with a small 
explanation of the origins of the energy sector when both countries were part of the Soviet Union, most of 
the chapter will be devoted to how the two energy sectors developed in their respective countries after the 
fall of the Soviet Union during the tumultuous decade of the 90s and how stabilization ensued in Russia 
in the next decade while Ukraine still remained in a state of disorganization and low state control. Chapter 
4 will complement this chapter focusing on how energy relations between Russia and Ukraine developed 
after the fall of the Soviet Union. After a brief introduction on relations between the two countries in 
general, the chapter will describe the level of conflict existing between both countries and the frameworks 
of cooperation that were applied or were at least contrived. The chapter will span until the latest events in 
2015. The last chapter of this second part of the book, chapter 5, will devote its attention to the other "leg" 
of the triangle formed by the complex relation between Russia, Ukraine as consumer country and 
consumer countries in Europe, most of them, members of the European Union: energy relations between 
Russia, the European Union and some of its more relevant member states. As done in chapter 3, the 
chapter will start with how energy relations between the former Soviet Union and consumer countries on 
both sides of the iron curtain developed in the rest of Europe first with oil and then gas and the general 
panorama of political relations between the European Union and its main powers. Energy relations will be 
studied, as in the previous chapter, only until 2005, when the historical series of the three energy disputes 
starts. 
The third part of this research will constitute our first empirical study and will therefore, focus on 
the first independent variable: Chapter 6, chapter 7 and chapter 8 will each be devoted to the three energy 
disputes of January 2006, March 2008 and January 2009 respectively. The time frame for the three 
chapters will cover the four years from 2005 to early 2009. The reason for doing so is that the start of the 
energy dispute of January 2006 arguably covers most of the previous year. Determining when an energy 
dispute starts is difficult, as any previous issue left unsolved can be identified as a necessary cause of the 
dispute. Reducing the energy dispute to the immediate causes would deprive the reader of a real 
perspective of the matter under discussion and reduce it to a strict description of the stages of the dispute 
without providing enough information about the deep reasons for the dispute to have occurred. In the case 
of January 2006 the choice seems relatively easy, as 2005 brings a substantial change with the arrival of 
Yushchenko at the Ukrainian presidency and his proposing radical changes both in the country´s foreign 
and energy policy which depart from the agreements of Summer 2004 favored by Gazprom. As for 
chapters 7 and 8, they will cover the period from early 2006 to early 2009. In this respect, chapter 7 will 
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close with the relatively uneventful dispute of March 2008, while a big part of it will deal with the equally 
calm years of 2006 (after the first dispute) and 2007. Much of what happens in these two years before 
2008 is somehow disconnected from March 2008 as the two price negotiations for years 2007 and 2008 
developed successfully and debt disputes were also solved satisfactorily. However, we consider that the 
whole period from 2005 to 2009 needed to be recounted for the sake of the reader´s general understanding 
of the energy dynamics that often develop between Russia and Ukraine. Events between January 2006 
and late 2007 (where some elements appear which have a more direct bearing on the next dispute) have 
thus a secondary importance to the disputes themselves but may arguably have a pedagogical importance 
for the reader who may thus gain a window to the general dynamics. For chronological coherence, this 
period seems to fit chapter 7 best. Separating it into an additional chapter does not seem appropriate as it 
nevertheless easily connects to the events of March 2008 due to the negotiating dynamics present.  As for 
chapter 8, the short distance between March 2008 and January 2009 solves the dilemma of the temporary 
frame we may have encountered before. This first empirical part will be closed by chapter 9, which will 
sum up the first relevant findings in the previous chapters answering whether Ukraine or Russia won each 
of the three disputes.      
The previous part will be complemented by a second empirical part which will be devoted not to 
the status quo as before, but to the risk factor from the part of Gazprom and Russia. Therefore, similar to 
chapters 6 to 8, the time frame will be 2006-2009, when the three disputes occurred and as already 
mentioned, the focus will be what I have considered to be the best indicator of the "European mood" 
towards Russia as a manifestation of the possible repercussions for Russia of prospective reactions by 
consumers indirectly affected. These indicators are three pipelines projects, Nabucco, of (simplifying) 
anti-Russian intent and the two others, South Stream and North Stream, of (simplifying again) pro-
Russian intent.  
This thesis will end with conclusions in chapter 11, where findings made in chapters 5-10 will be 
interpreted through the lenses of prospect theory and final remarks will close our research. chapter 11 will 
answer whether the differences in escalation between the three disputes respond exclusively to Ukrainian 
decisions, and if not, how did changing Russian decisions match a changing status quo and to what degree 
that changing status quo was determined only by economic factors or also political ones. Whereas the 
second empirical part is restricted to one single chapter (chapter 10), the first part will occupy as much as 
four chapters (chapters 6-9). This is justified by the complexity between energy negotiations and disputes 
between Russia and Ukraine: whereas explaining negotiations and the three disputes requires much space 
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to clarify both the complex dynamics and the interpretation of several points that remain obscure, tracing 
the development of the three bypass pipelines is arguably less time and space consuming. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
2. 1. Russian Foreign Policy  
The traumatic collapse of the Soviet Union and the ensuing turmoil threw the foreign policy of the new 
Russian Federation into disarray. After an idealistic and botched attempt to set a pro-Western course, as 
advocated by Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev (From 1990 to 1996), several schools then started 
contending for influence with the goal of determining the new Russian foreign policy.1 Labels such as 
pro-Western policy, Eurasianism, Nationalism, CIS focused Imperialism, Multipolarism, etc., have 
become common in the academic debate and have been classified along a spectrum identified by two 
extremes which could be roughly labeled as pro-Western and anti-Western. The general view is that after 
the confusing decade of the 90s, the arrival of Vladimir Putin to the Russian presidency brought a more 
coherent foreign policy.2 Whether this represented a substantial change in itself or was on the contrary a 
solidification of a previous tendency is a matter for debate. Jeffrey Mankoff for example considered in 
2009 that the Russian foreign policy had indeed been following a pattern dating back from the very 
beginnings of the Russian Federation.3 This seems correct, as the failure of the pro-Western turn of the 
early 90s set the ground for a more assertive Russian foreign policy. However, as Tsygankov has 
highlighted, Putin´s policy has been one of "Great Power Pragmatism", which he managed to translate 
both into identity and success.4 Even if national assertiveness has been crucial for the new foreign policy 
course, cooperation with the West when necessary has been pursued. In any case it probably seems fair to 
consider Putin´s rule (including the "interregnum" of Dmitry Medvedev´s Presidency) as the "restoration" 
of Russia´s stature in tune with national identity, as this is the way it is understood by large parts of both 
the Russian elite and society. The question that emerges then is to know if this internal "alliance", which 
as explained by Tsygankov consists of the so called "checkists" and oligarchs,5 may have remained 
constant, leaving the government a degree of autonomy to change course depending on the circumstances 
or whether it evolved on the contrary in response to a rebalancing of domestic constituencies in favor of 
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 See: Buszynski, Leszek (1996): Russian foreign policy after the Cold War, Westport, Conn: Praeger.; Lo, Bobo (2002): 
Russian foreign policy in the post-Soviet era: reality, illusion, and mythmaking, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan.; Tsygankov, Andrei´ (2010): Russia´ s foreign policy: change and continuity in national identity, 
Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield Clunan, Anne L. (2009): The social construction of Russia´ s resurgence: aspirations, identity, 
and security interests, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
2
 Lo, Bobo (2003): Vladimir Putin and the evolution of Russian foreign policy, Oxford, Blackwell. 
3
 Mankoff, Jeffrey (2009): Russian foreign policy: the return of great power politics, Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield. 
4
 Tsygankov, "Russia´ s foreign policy", op. cit. 
5
 Tsygankov, Andrei´: "Vladimir Putin´ s vision of Russia as a normal great power", Post-Soviet Affairs, vol. 21, no. 2 (2005), 
pp. 139-140. 
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the siloviki.6  Some authors trace changes of Russian foreign policy during Putin´s and Medvedev´s 
Presidencies back to changes in the power configuration in Russia´s foreign environment,7 whereas others 
highlight the changing authoritarian nature of Putin´s system of government supported by high oil prices 
as evidence of its expansionist intentions.8 Hegemony in the CIS space, multipolar balancing acts against 
the US, and cooperative relations with both the US, European countries and non-Western countries, 
compound what Russian foreign policy is made of. In any case, whereas some authors see Russia as an 
expansionist and revisionist power, others either contend this or limit the scope of revisionism to the post-
Soviet space. The main divide is reflected by the difference in responsibility attributed to Western powers 
in Russian behavior. Often it is not disagreements over the existence or not of Russian aggressive 
responses to the expansion of the Western liberal order into the post-soviet space which explain this 
difference, but rather a diverging assessment of these responses. Whereas a first school blames Russia for 
this opposition and terms her behavior as revisionist, a second school on the contrary blames "Western" 
expansionism (NATO enlargement or support to agendas of democratization) as strategic revisionism. 
 
2. 2. Russian Energy Policy 
When it comes to Russian energy policy we must first highlight the vital role it has as an element of 
Russian state power and diplomacy. The goals of national strengthening and increased diplomatic stature 
have been explicitly linked to energy. As Putin himself had defended in his later famous candidate 
dissertation: "Russia´s natural resources base will not only secure the country´s economic development, 
but will also serve as the guarantor of the country´s international position".9 This has been clearly 
reflected in the state´s growing influence in the energy sector. As for its energy diplomacy, Russia has 
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 Staun, Jorgen: "Siloviki versus liberal-technocrats: the fight for Russia and its foreign policy", Copenhagen: Danish Institute 
for International Studies, DIIS; Andrei´ Tsygankov does also suggest something similar, but stating that the middle course 
outlined by Putin would have become even more stable (Tsygankov, Andrei´: " Russia´ s international assertiveness: what does 
it mean for the West?", Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 55, no. 2 (March/April 2008), pp. 45,48). 
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 See: Tsygankov, Andrei´: "Finding a civilisational idea: "West," Eurasia," and "Euro-East" in Russia´ s foreign policy", 
Geopolitics, vol. 12, no. 3 (2007), pp. 375-399; " Russia in the Post-Western World: The end of the normalization paradigm?", 
Post-Soviet Affairs, vol. 25, no. 4 (2009), pp. 347–369; Ambrosio, Thomas: "From balancer to ally? Russo-American relations 
in the wake of 11 September", Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 24, no. 2 (2003), pp. 1-28.; Andrei´ Tsygankov for example 
foresaw an anti-Western turn in case of changes in "Russia´s international settings" (Tsygankov, "Vladimir Putin´ s vision of 
Russia", op. cit., 250-51). 
8
 Bugajski, Janusz (2004): Cold peace: Russia´ s new imperialism, Westport, Conn.: Praeger; Washington, DC.: Published in 
cooperation with the Center for Strategic and International Studies; Bugajski, Janusz (2009): Dismantling the West: Russia´ s 
Atlantic agenda, Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books and Brzezinski, Zbigniew: " Putin´ s imperial designs are reminiscent of 
Stalin´ s ", New Perspectives Quarterly, vol. 25, no. 4 (2008), pp. 50-52. 
9
 Olcott, Martha Brill: "The Energy dimension in Russian global strategy, Vladimir Putin and the geopolitics of oil", James E. 
Baker Institute, Baker Institute Energy Forum (2004), p. 17; further on this: Balzer, Harley: "The Putin thesis and Russian 
energy policy", Post-Soviet Affairs, vol. 21, no. 3 (2005), pp. 210-25. 
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always shown itself assertive in bilateral disputes, a pattern that can be traced back to the decade of the 
90s. As several case studies of disputes between Russia and transit countries in its Near Abroad have 
suggested, energy has been used either as an economic or political coercive tool in its relations with 
Belarus and Ukraine.10 The general pattern we can see in the relation established between the contending 
parts in two dyads, Russia-Belarus and Russia-Ukraine, is one of confrontation. As for the reasons for 
these recurring episodes of confrontation, and as happens in general debates about Russian foreign policy, 
interpretations range from the thesis of "Russian political blackmailing" 11  to the opposite thesis of 
"economic reasons",12 the latter usually taking a more favorable view of Russia´s reasons for many of its 
(at least alleged) aggressive reactions. The two "schools" mentioned above 13  and the different 
interpretations they provide for Russian foreign policy, translate into analyses of Russia´s energy policy 
which provide equally differing answers, especially when it comes to particular energy disputes. 
The Narrative of Russian Energy and Political Power 
The first narrative portrays Russia as a strategy motivated actor: according to this narrative, Russia uses 
energy as a weapon of foreign policy. Several analysts lump together the domestic process of energy 
policy implementation with the government´s and dependent companies´ (either public or private) foreign 
                                                           
10
 Regarding Russia´s energy power and its relation to foreign policy interesting studies have been published: Perovic, Jeronim; 
Orttung, Robert W and Wenger, Andreas (eds.) (2009):  Russian energy power and foreign relations: implications for conflict 
and cooperation, New York, Routledge; Baev, Pavel: "From west to south to north: Russia engages and challenges its 
neighbours", International Journal, vol. 63 (Spring 2008), pp. 291-305.; Goldman, Marshall (2008): Petrostate: Putin, power, 
and the new Russia, Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.; Orban, Anita (2008): Power, energy, and the new Russian 
imperialism, Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International and Balmaceda, Margarita; Rosner, Kevin (series ed.) (2006):  
Oil, gas, transit pipelines and Russian foreign energy policy, London, GMB Publishing Ltd; Regarding issues related to 
Russian bilateral relations with transit countries and their domestic energy sector, see: Yafimava, Katja (2011): The transit 
dimension of EU energy security: Russian gas transit across Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova, Oxford; New York, Oxford 
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between domestic oligarchs and Russian pressure, Toronto; Buffalo; London, Toronto University Press; for Ukraine, 
Balmaceda, Margarita (2008):  Energy dependency, politics and corruption in the former Soviet Union: Russia´ s power, 
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Balmaceda, "Oil, gas, transit pipelines and Russian foreign energy policy", op. cit.. The two main bilateral gas crises pitting 
Russia versus Ukraine have been analyzed in the following works: Stern, Jonathan: "The Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis of 
January 2006", Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (16 January 2006), at http://www.avim.org.tr/icerik/energy-gas.pdf and 
Pirani, Simon; Stern, Jonathan; Yafimava, Katja (2009): "The Russo-Ukrainian gas dispute of January 2009: a comprehensive 
assessment", Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (February 2009), at  
www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/NG27-
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2009.pdf. 
11
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European countries.   
12
 Some examples will be mentioned below. 
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toolbox: Explaining the constraints on Russia´ s foreign energy policy", Journal of Eurasian Studies, vol. 2, no. 1 (2011), pp. 
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energy policy.14  They either state or at least hint at a correlation between market and rule of law-
unfriendly policies carried out by Putin´s government to bring the energy sector back into the state´s sway 
with supposed expansionist and maximalist goals enabled by the use of energy in Russia´s foreign 
policy.15 Among this group the emphasis is placed either on the imperialistic policy of Russia towards 
countries in the post-Soviet space or on the European countries in general (sometimes by extension, the 
influence on the US is also underlined). As an example, Zeyno Baran portrays Russia as playing a game 
of divide and rule as a tool to preclude European energy projects reaching their goal of conveying Central 
Asian energy supplies bypassing Russia. 16 The author goes as far as to equate energy power with military 
power and hints at the political power Russia would be willing to exert through state-owned Gazprom.17 
On the side of Russian energy policy in the CIS, Bertil Nygren sees it as a tool to reintegrate the Post-
Soviet space under the aegis of the Russian Federation and the restoration (or consolidation) of a Russia-
centered regional space.18 In other accounts the emphasis is put on the nefarious effect on Trans-Atlantic 
and intra-European solidarity that Russian energy deals with some European states may have.19 This is a 
fruitful line of research that can be found in several authors. One clear example is Vladimir Socor, who 
relies on NATO reports of alleged Russian political motivations in its attempts to create an OPEC style 
gas cartel and echoes again the possibility of energy being used to split the Euro-Atlantic community.20 
Janusz Bugajski,21 or Martin Walker stress the same divide and rule game, allegedly consciously intended 
to prevent a common European policy.22 Moving to specific energy disputes, there is also a large array of 
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analyses in a similar line, as is the case with Evert Faber Van der Meulen, who takes for granted the 
political aspects of energy disputes with Georgia, Belarus and Ukraine.23 Something similar can be found 
in Richard E. Ericson, who gives as an example of political use of energy the gas dispute of January 2006 
between Russia and Ukraine,24 and portrays Putin´s Russia as having turned energy into a weapon since 
2004 as a tool for integrating the CIS space.25 Chloë Bruce on the contrary is a representative of a more 
nuanced vision of the narrative of politicization: while showing some instances of politicization of energy 
issues between Russia and Belarus in the 90s, as when Russia, in April 1994, offered subsidized prices in 
exchange for not being charged for the stationing of her troops on Belarusian territory, she avoids labeling 
Russian energy policy as a tool of imperialism.26 
The Narrative of Russian Energy and the Economic Dimension 
Turning to the second narrative, which portrays Russia as an actor mostly motivated by economic reasons,27 
we may start with one of the most global accounts of Russian energy policy in the last decade, Orttung and 
Overland. The two authors account for a variety of motivations,28 including political ones, but do point to 
the decision to turn to market prices in the whole Post-Soviet space as a general turning point. This is a fact 
equally stressed by Tsygankov,29 who rejects the strategy motivated arguments and points to economic 
reasons, vital for Putin´s regime to maintain Russia´s standing as a Great Power. Here, the role of politics is 
subsumed in economic motivations and seen as a secondary factor. As it is assessed by Simon Pirani when 
dealing with Ukraine,30 economic reasons have held the upper hand even if political considerations may 
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have had an impact on the timetable to move to market prices: CIS countries with whom Russia enjoyed 
good relations have been granted a more progressive timetable, whereas other countries, which like 
Ukraine, decided to move closer to the West, have been confronted with sharper demands. In fact, in 2005 
Putin seems to have made explicit the political link between Russia and Belarus when he stated that in 
regard to energy prices, Belarus, as a partner in a project of political integration, was different.31 However, 
even these political motivations have to compete with more economic reasons when we take into 
consideration the usual Russian policy of gaining ownership of key assets in exchange for an advantageous 
pricing policy or debt condoning. The best example is probably Belarus: this country has managed to enjoy 
much better relations with Russia than Ukraine both under Yushchenko and under Yanukovich since 2010, 
but it also yielded 50 % of Beltransgaz´s pipeline ownership to Gazprom to postpone the transition to 
market prices and eventually yielded the rest of its shares to the Russian monopoly to be ensured Russian 
domestic prices. Moves in the same direction in Ukraine have failed to date due to the resistance from 
Ukraine to yield strategic assets, even if there are also instances of "political" discounts: a new gas 
agreement was signed between Russia and Ukraine in April 2010, with the latter being "granted" a 30% 
discount in exchange for the extension of the Black Sea fleet lease up to 2042.32 Then on the 17th December 
2013, Russia offered what looked like an explicitly political discount of 33% (bringing prices to 
US$268tcm from around US$385tcm), which lasted until April 2014.33 The latest examples given for 
Ukraine as well as Russian tolerance for deviation from the agreed contract with Belarus in 2009,34 are 
clear examples of politicization, but whether asset ownership is only a trade-off between economic interests 
and political interests is not fully clear, as it could be as much a guarantee of political control as a guarantee 
of economic predictability in the face of troublesome transit countries.35 In other cases politics have also 
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been a supporting factor, as has been the case with the international expansion of oil and gas companies.36 
However, the political factor here was not the main driver; it was rather subordinated to economic interests. 
This is the direction taken by Anita Orban´s analysis of the period of the 90s to the early 00s decade, where 
she highlights how economic expansion by energy companies into Europe is actively supported by the 
government.37  
The Narrative of EU-Russia Interdependence 
In the literature on Russian energy policy, other authors prefer to focus on interdependence as the most 
distinctive feature of Russia-Europe energy relations. This is closely related to the former narrative, which 
highlights the economic dimension, and this for two reasons: first, Russia as an energy supplier is 
necessarily dependent on demand. Thus, a thorough assessment must necessarily take into account this 
other (strictly economic) side of energy relations to determine Russia´s real position of power; second, 
whatever political dimension that may be derived from this reality is most probably determined by the 
margin left by the existing pattern of interdependence. Thus, if authors highlighting the Russian threat 
mainly underline European dependence (see above), Russian dependence on Europe is often an overlooked 
reality. Taking into account this other side of the coin yields a general picture of interdependency.  
This interdependency is in essence ambivalent: it can be seen as the basis for strengthened and 
beneficial cooperation, but if undue mistrust is not avoided, this may eventually harm both actors, pushing 
them to a rush for diversification in attempts to escape (real or imagined) entrapment.38 In this respect, 
Richard E. Ericson highlights the mutual dependence of both Russia and its European customers,39 and 
acknowledges the potential both for monopoly and for monopsony.40 Andrew Monaghan focuses on the 
fact that the energy weapon becomes ineffective and difficult to use for blackmailing purposes in such a 
context and then concludes that Russia is actually more dependent on Europe as supplier than the other way 
round.41 This is something that Jaffe and Soligo also state highlighting the damaging effect this would have 
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for Russia given its state of dependence on European customers.42 In close relation to this reasoning, we 
may consider Anke Schmidt-Felzmann´s explanation of the diverse measures taken by individual European 
countries in January 2009; this leads her to conclude that most countries could have withheld (even at high 
financial costs) some more weeks,43 limiting therefore the real impact of the "energy weapon".  
An "asymmetric interdependence" in favor of the European side is also highlighted by Elena 
Kropatcheva and Roland Götz.44 Friedemann Müller takes another perspective and states on the contrary 
that in spite of the apparent asymmetric interdependence in favor or Europe, asymmetry favors Russia. Her 
explanation is that the latter would be readier to temporarily forego financial gains from exports than the 
former to stand protracted cut-offs.45 This fits with the argumentative line followed by Richard E. Ericson 
of "asymmetric interdependence" between those dependent on immediate costs (consumers facing cut-offs) 
and those dependent on long term costs (suppliers stopping shipments).46 Monaghan who rejects such 
assessment, coins the term of "energy dilemma" (later reflected, as seen above, by Orttung and Perovic),47 
to make the case that the real danger in mutual relations lies not in dependence but in the possibility of 
Europe unnecessarily pushing for diversification away from Russia against a non-existent danger of 
dependence, for this might trigger Russian diversification away from Europe.48 Monaghan further adds that 
the fear of Russian use of energy as a weapon and the possibility of seeing the taps turned off is derived 
from an extrapolation of Russia´s relations with Post-Soviet neighbors.49  In fact, if any, the "threat" 
stemming from Russia according to Andreas Goldthau, would stem not from a non-existent Russian 
leverage at the service of geopolitical interests but from a lack of supply due to structural deficiencies 
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caused by under-investment in the Russian energy market and by perverse incentives in the domestic 
market where prices remain subsidized.50  
In any case, whatever particular aspect is highlighted at the expense of the other, there seems to be a 
clear tendency for most of the authors to turn around the argument of dependence on Russian energy 
supplies and substitute it by the picture of interdependence, often pointing to outright Russian dependence 
on Europe and vulnerability to transit countries. 
The Narrative of Russia-Transit Countries´ Interdependence 
The short discussion above highlights the fact that energy security, far from being only applicable to 
consumers, must also take into account producers´ need.51  In this sense, as for producers´ energy security, 
we should consider their dependence on transit countries. This is particularly manifest in the case of Russia 
as highlighted by Elena Kropatcheva.52 Ericson also points to transit countries who "have the capability to 
block trans-shipment and to "siphon off" natural gas for their own use if there is a shortage";53 "Ukraine 
and Belarus have some leverage over Russia, and indeed Europe, through their ability to independently 
disrupt Russian natural gas supply to Europe".54  
In this respect, the latest book by Margarita Balmaceda,55 analyzes the reality of interdependency 
between Russia, who supplies energy to three states under analysis: Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania, while 
it is dependent on these states due to their condition of transit countries. The three countries are used as case 
studies to analyze in what measure they reduced their dependence on Russia, and what can explain their 
success or lack thereof. What is interesting for our discussion is that the author acknowledges the existence 
of a pattern of interdependence between this group of three countries and Russia. In her assessment, this 
dependence is asymmetric in favor of Russia.56 
                                                           
50
 Goldthau, Andreas: "Rhetoric versus reality: Russian threats to European energy supply", Energy Policy, vol. 36, no. 2 
(2008), pp. 686-692. As a complement to this, we may mention the short article published in 2012 (Henderson, James and 
Heather, Patrick: "Lessons from the February 2012 European gas "crisis"", Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, Oxford Energy 
Comment (April 2012), at  
http://www.oxfordenergy.org/2012/04/lessons-from-the-february-2012-european-gas-%E2%80%9Ccrisis%E2%80%9D/): the 
authors highlight how particularly cold weather in February 2012 led to supply problems for consumers in Europe, as Gazprom 
had to guarantee domestic supplies first. 
51
 See: Quester, George H.: "Energy dependence and political power: some paradoxes", Democratizatsya, vol. 15, no. 4 (2007), 
pp. 445-54. 
52
 Kropatcheva, op. cit., pp. 555-556. 
53
 Ericson, op. cit., p. 33. 
54
 Ibid., p. 38. 
55
 Balmaceda, "Politics of energy dependency", op. cit. 
56
 Ibid., pp. 30-31.  
    
 
41 
 
This question may remain open, as the frequency of disputes in the 90s and the long periods where 
transit countries managed to maintain subsidized prices could be interpreted as a sign of relative weakness 
from the side of Russia. Pavel Baev´s consideration that Russia pursues economic optimization and suffers 
from an excessive leverage from the side of these transit countries57 offers an opposed interpretation, where 
Russia is precisely the one who suffers this asymmetry. 
The issue of interdependence between Russia and transit countries is the starting point for the focus 
of this work, as energy disputes are the most extreme phenomenon deriving from this reality and where the 
interdependence between Russia and the rest of Europe also becomes entangled in a complex triangular 
relation. Further below we will consider the literature existing on energy disputes. As for the degree of 
asymmetry regarding this dyad, our work may offer a contribution to determine it. In any case, as far as this 
literature review is concerned, the fact is that an analysis of this pattern of asymmetry, in the same way as 
for that between Russia and the EU, determines what is the margin of action Russia has. It may be argued 
that in this case, the interconnection between political and economic factors is arguably more complex and 
makes a clear assessment more difficult.        
Other Narratives 
Narratives sketched above present the image of a Russian rational and centralized energy policy, either for 
political or for strictly economic reasons. There are however other narratives that can be complemented 
with our discussion of Russian energy policy, which take into account alternative factors such as domestic 
politics, social construction of identity, issues that may introduce irrational actions or leave space to sub-
state agents liable to hijack the state agenda and impose their particular interests.  
Domestic politics 
As for domestic politics, Jeffrey Mankoff offers some insights suggesting for example that the August 2008 
war was engineered so as to force the liberal minded Medvedev to take a hard-line course.58 His account in 
Chapter 2 "Dogs fighting under the rug" portrays Putin as a leader able to conveniently manipulate 
constituencies, as Eurasianist or Slav nationalists.59 The author seems to portray Putin´s system of power as 
dependent on these constituencies, but managing to chart a middle course and thus keep full control. The 
idea of the August 2008 war provoked for the sake of domestic interests (curtailing the autonomy of the 
liberal sectors), is suggestive of a very sophisticated and risky manipulation, this time aimed at a 
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constituency whose prospective influence is mistrusted. The reasoning could lead us to think that something 
similar might have happened in some of the energy disputes.  
Social construction 
Regarding social construction, we can take Sinikukka Saari when she states: "Sherr highlights that Russia’s 
‘soft imperialism’ has a strong psychological dimension and is not entirely based on calculus-based 
rationality",60 and as the above-mentioned author himself, James Sherr, explains in his own article, Russian 
strategic conception of its "Near-Abroad" is defined in geopolitical terms identifying presence rather than 
intentions and capabilities,61 which points to a particular construction of threat, arguably not based on strict 
calculus-based rationality as Saari understands it, but rather on psychological reasons.  
Sub-state agents 
However, analyses devoted to the role of sub-state agents, are those that arguably offer us the most 
promising insights in relation to energy policy-making. This line of research has also been very present in 
studies of Russian foreign policy in general and in the debates about how power was centralized since the 
onset of Vladimir Putin´s rule. It seems now to be generally accepted that Yeltsin´s unlikely successor has 
managed to hold power in a much more effective way than his predecessor. Compared to the chaos of the 
90s, Putin´s rule (including Dmitri Medvedev´s "Interregnum") might be seen as a time of stability and 
prosperity.62 With the advent of Putin, potentially contending interests among elites did not translate into 
paralysis: they seemed to be interested in accepting Putin´s rule.63 In the foreign policy realm, this stable 
support led to Putin being able in his first years to take pro-Western policy orientations that ran counter to 
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some of his supporting elites´ mindset.64 That consensus also enabled him to sideline challenges to his 
authoritarian policies.65  
However, Putin´s authoritarianism might have been more reliant on his base of support than it may 
apparently be. The characterization of a man who "stake(s) out maximalist positions, accept(s) 
compromises when he encounters opposition, but then return(s) to the issue again when his position is 
stronger",66 may be more appropriate.67 Did Putin manage to control fights among the so called siloviki 
dubbed by many as his main constituency? 68 Had Putin been forced to strike awkward balances between 
them and the more liberal sectors? 69 As Jørgen Staun suggests, events starting off with the YUKOS take-
over (leading to Khodorkovsky´s arrest and 10-year detention) and the many instances thereafter of Putin´s 
calls for market friendly policies contradicted by measures in the opposite direction, could be seen as a 
proof of siloviki´s free-ride.70 There exist some suggestions that murky affairs such as the assassination of 
Litvinenko might have responded to free-riding siloviki sectors trying to push for a third Putin term.71  
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Sub-estate agents in the energy sector: Gazprom and intermediary companies 
When it comes to the energy sector, discussions regarding the degree of unity in the formulation of energy 
policy are also common. To begin with, we may start with Pami Aalto when he states in the introductory 
literature review to his edited work72 that most of the literature focusing on energy decision-making in 
Russia has highlighted deficiencies in the functioning of institutions. Margarita Balmaceda in the same 
publication deals with the institutional framework of Russian policy-making with a focus on competing 
rationality frames where state, business and personal rent-seeking interest intermingle.73  
Given that we are dealing with energy policy in the gas sector, our main focus should be 
Gazprom, as its agenda could have superseded that of the state. If that had happened, the government´s 
decision-making process might have ended up being hijacked. In a more complicated twist, we might 
consider that behind the relations between the government and Gazprom, infighting between contending 
bureaucracies was in play.  
Indeed, as Angela Stent expresses it, it is difficult to determine when politics and business start in 
the symbiotic relation between the Russian government and Gazprom.74 In his analysis of Russian energy 
diplomacy, Adam Stulberg finds that the Russian government has been rather unsuccessful in controlling 
the state company responsible for the pipeline network, Transneft.75 On the contrary, he does point to the 
fact that Gazprom, in spite of frequent clashes regarding energy policy when interests were opposed, has 
been generally very compliant with state priorities.76 Margarita Balmaceda rejects simplistic portrayals of 
Russian energy policy as either entirely policy or business driven, and while not further dealing with the 
matter, she does provide us with an interesting vision of Gazprom as influenced by both business, state 
and personal rent-seeking interests. Whereas the latter seems to have affected mostly the period before the 
state´s firmer control of the company (a process which lasted from 2001 to 2004), 77  it must be 
acknowledged that although pricing policy in the FSU differs much from country to country, leaving thus 
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great room for political interests alien to a strictly business logic, price transitions towards business logic 
have been the norm compared to the subsidization policies of the 90s.78 Markku Kivinen, who also deals 
with the debate of public and business actors in his own contribution to Pami Aalto,79 builds a series of 
hypotheses, and tentatively concludes that the business frames seem to be dominating Russia´s energy 
policy;80 as Hanna Smith puts it: "The behavior of Russian market players in the energy sector is far from 
free of political logic especially when it comes to export supplies. Nonetheless, a strong economic 
component is present in it and most steps are dictated by the objective of maximizing profits from 
hydrocarbon sales".81 Another author, Stacy Closson, on the contrary, focuses on the Russian subsidy 
policy in the 2000s compared to similar policies in the Soviet period in relation to CMEA countries and 
concludes that: "Putin transferred patterns of poor energy management from the CMEA to the former 
Soviet states. While he claimed to be ridding the trade of subsidies, unofficially it continued";82 however, 
once we get the whole picture, the biggest share of subsidization seems to involve internal Russian 
market, whereas, as it has been stated before, subsidization in the CIS countries actually started being 
reversed in the 2000s. Although Prof. Closson highlights the backlash in political relations with CIS 
countries due to Russian energy projects, in particular those decisions to cut flows of gas in disputes, we 
would rather say that attempts at enforcing price markets, or as an alternative, at acquiring assets in 
exchange for accumulated debt or as a condition for maintaining subsidized prices, are the main reason 
for disputes.83 Many authors in fact, follow the version of close state-Gazprom interests: Karen Smith 
Stegel for example finds anecdotal evidence of the state´s control of Gazprom relying on President 
Medvedev´s declarations that the 2010 pricing agreement with Ukraine helped to find an arrangement for 
the extension of the Black Sea Fleet, with Gazprom clearly offering a political price discount not in the 
business interests of the company;84  Nina Poussenkova also underlines the closeness of relations of 
Gazprom (subordinated to the state) and the Russian government. 85  Mert Bilgin follows a similar 
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narrative when she highlights Gazprom´s and the state´s symbiotic relation, with the latter supporting 
both Gazprom´s expansion abroad and its monopolistic role in Russian domestic market, while the former 
secures for the state coffers a stable financial flow;86 indeed, as we can read in Kalman Kalotay: "Until 
1999, the latter occupied an undoubted dominant position in their relationship. Since then, the power 
balance has tilted gradually in favor of the state".87 In the case of Gazprom, the stronger the role of the 
state has become, the lower the subsidization of the FSU market has become, which arguably confirms 
the assumption that the state has assumed as its own the business interests of the company and has 
reinforced a symbiotic relationship around financial interests as the bedrock of their common relations.  
However, acknowledging that both Gazprom and the Russian state consistently maintain their 
support for business logic does not mean in itself that they do support exactly the same strategies and 
tactics when confronting certain dilemmas. As Andreas Heinrich stated in 2006: "In this area (the 
international level beyond the CIS), Gazprom pursues an independent policy that is in line with the 
market, and seeks cooperation with transit and customer states in Western Europe (…) The Russian 
government’s support for the company in this sector is limited to creating favorable framework 
conditions, as is customary in Western countries as well". 88  If beyond the CIS the state supports 
Gazprom´s business strategies, the situation in the CIS countries, while different as far as it concerns a 
strictly business logic, seems nevertheless to show a similar  coincidence of interests between Gazprom 
and the state, with the latter pursuing an active support. The main difference may lie here not just in the 
fact that the legacy of subsidized prices has to be overcome, but in the "non-orthodox" (but nevertheless, 
may we say, at least partly) business logic of swapping accumulated debts with the cession of 
transportation facilities of transit countries such Belarus and Ukraine or control of end-suppliers´ assets as 
in Central Asia and the Caucasus. In relation to these countries, Russia has been consistently aspiring to a 
position of monopoly and monopsony as for direct access to other countries within and without the CIS. 
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However, as already stated, both Russian diplomacy and Gazprom have coordinated themselves fairly 
well when it came to enforce (or rather try to enforce) policies to acquire transport assets in Belarus and 
Ukraine, with some success in the former but adamant opposition from the side of the latter. If 
background divergences unnoticed to the observer did take place, either Gazprom or the government 
systematically yielded to each other with few hints of lack of coordination.    
An obscure point however, seems to be Gazprom´s relation with intermediaries. These companies 
have been very active in Russia-Ukraine energy relations, where personal interests alien to either the state 
or Gazprom have frequently appeared. The ubiquity of these companies raises the question of whether 
both Gazprom and the Russian state were unable to control or were on the contrary in agreement with the 
former. In the case of Itera, which functioned from the mid-90s, this was clearly a vehicle for self-
enrichment of Gazprom´s own leadership. Thus it worked against the company´s interests for the sake of 
the personal interests´ of its own members. Although Rem Viakhirev´s leadership ended and was 
substituted by that of Alexei´ Miller in 2002, the company worked as an intermediary until 2003. As full 
state control of Gazprom did not ensue until 2004, the resilience of Itera might be easily explained by the 
slow pace of Alexei´ Miller´s progressive control. However, other intermediary companies continued to 
operate until 2009. EuralTransGaz and RosUkrEnergo were the two successors of Itera, with the role of 
the latter, as we will later see, even expanded after January 2006. As in other topics pertaining to both 
Russian foreign policy in general and energy policy in particular, there are different interpretations: 
writing in 2006, Margarita Balmaceda hinted that these new intermediaries could have played the same 
role of vehicles of self-enrichment for Gazprom´s leadership as had been the case with Itera.89 Another 
narrative regarding intermediaries justifies their existence as vehicles to enforce strategic objectives, such 
as asset acquisition in transit countries. This is the case made for example by Stacy Closson 90 and which 
has been extensively voiced in the Ukrainian press, as for example Zerkalo Nedeli and Ukrainska Pravda. 
Margarita Balmaceda touches on this topic again in subsequent publications and as for the changes that 
took place since 2001 when the Russian government started to have a firmer control of Gazprom, she 
joins this narrative when pointing to the upholding of these actors as strategic assets to maintain good 
contacts with local actors.91 She expands the rationale for this interpretation while analyzing the case 
study of Lithuania, where Gazprom´s new intermediary in Lithuania, Dujotekana, established a complex 
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web of interests with local businessmen and members of the secret services. The intermediary thus played  
a different role to that of its predecessor. Enriching officials from Gazprom ceased being the sole goal, 
superseded by the more complex goal of maintaining a network of allies within Lithuania who would help 
the company´s strategy. Drawing the parallel with Ukraine, Balmaceda interprets the expanded role of 
RosUkrEnergo in 2006 in a similar fashion, possibly in this case too, for the sake of expanding the 
network of corruption in Ukraine and solidifying the basis of its allies.92 As for what exactly these 
interests may have been, the author provides some clues: regarding Lithuania, she puts forward that the 
role played by Dujotekana was devised to use Lithuania as a bridgehead into the EU or to use it 
eventually in order to foster divisions within the EU.93 In the extrapolation to the Ukrainian case the 
author simply puts forward the assumption that RosUkrEnergo´s objectives may have been political or 
geopolitical.94 The way we could term these intermediaries under this narrative could be that of "strategic 
vehicles". Roman Kupchinsky is a strong proponent of Gazprom´s strategic rationale for building a 
network of intermediaries in many transit and consumer countries.95 However, conclusions in this respect 
cannot be definitive because of the high level of opacity. If evidence for the enrichment narrative is clear 
in the case of Itera and it seems warranted to assign a strategic role to its successors, it is nevertheless 
more complicated to prove in the case of EuralTransGaz and RosUkrEnergo what was the exact goal they 
were assigned. In this respect, it must also be highlighted that for some authors intermediaries should be 
considered more as "strategic buffers" than "strategic vehicles". The main difference between the two 
definitions lies in the fact that under the term of "strategic buffers", intermediaries are understood more 
for their defensive nature than as a tool for expansion, serving rather as insurance against liabilities 
related to transit countries. Peter Ševce from the Energy Security Institute (Slovakia), considers that 
intermediaries in Ukraine may have been established to fight chronic problems deriving from 
irregularities in the Ukrainian side as well as to impose contracts on Ukraine more effectively than 
Gazprom.96 As Margarita Balmaceda again explains, lending support to this line of interpretation too, the 
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rationale for the existence of intermediaries was their role to get around liquidity problems, restructure 
non-performing loans, find out complex barter schemes or actually transfer kickbacks.97  
The limited literature above points to a certain degree of complexity concerning relations between 
the Russian state and Gazprom. Clarifying the degree of independence of Gazprom in relation to the state 
should be crucial, as my assumption in this work is precisely that Gazprom was subordinated to the state 
and that we may therefore expect a high degree of coordination. This assumption is justified given the 
process of centralization that was undertaken under Putin and because the three disputes under analysis 
here fall within the period when this centralization had been completed.  
That the state and Gazprom´s interests diverge is something that the literature review above can 
testify. That this divergence has found a stable "modus vivendi" is also manifest in the trade-off between 
Gazprom´s subsidization of Russian customers, which runs counter to the company´s interests and its 
being maintained as the gas monopoly in exchange. Regarding the price revisions that were imposed on 
Ukraine from 2005 to 2009 and which will be analyzed in chapters 6, 7 and 8, these moves go precisely in 
the direction of what are Gazprom´s interests and were not only assumed, but primarily promoted from 
the government. Even if we imagined that the government was being manipulated by Gazprom and 
blindly followed its strategy (something not quite plausible), we can assume a notable coherence during 
the above-mentioned period, where the strategy of price revisions was maintained.  
Furthermore, tensions between Gazprom and the state influencing the outcomes ought not 
necessarily to result in "incoherence", namely, the Russian side´s response not being in line with 
fluctuations of the general context. A lessened or increased role for Gazprom in the management of the 
disputes (either negotiations before or the dispute in itself) could precisely respond to these 
circumstances. The Russian state could have for example either enabled a more restrained business-like 
strategy in disputes where the stakes were not that high, while imposing its agenda on Gazprom in cases 
where the stakes were higher. If Gazprom was a hardliner and the state a softliner, the state could have 
restrained Gazprom when needed, and then switched to Gazprom´s hard-line policy when it suited best. If 
we want to consider a reversed hierarchy, a similar process could have taken place but in reverse. 
Differences between Gazprom and the state along with the influence on the outcome of each of the 
disputes could be subsumed in the process of how circumstances influenced decision taking and the 
eventual outcome. 
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In any case, even if the current literature can hardly produce hard proof of the relation between 
Gazprom and the Russian state, it does point to a subordination of the former to the latter and a coherent 
strategy, where existing divergences seem to have resulted in compromises. Proof to the contrary does not 
seem to have been produced to date. The plausibility test points to this and we may thus, for the sake of 
parsimony, assume a unitary actor during the process of the three disputes that took place from 2005 to 
2009. If divergences between Gazprom and the state are revealed in the future to be more important than 
expected, they should not have affected the core of the problem. Any additional information on Gazprom 
and the Russian state that may be discovered in chapters 6-8 will be further discussed in the conclusions.           
 
2. 3. Energy Disputes 
In the article by Robert Orttung and Indra Overland mentioned above, "A limited toolbox: explaining the 
constraints on Russia’s foreign energy policy",98 the authors listed 31 energy disputes with more than 20 
countries from 2000 to 2010. To these disputes we should add those that already took place back in the 
decade of the 90s. Among these earlier disputes, Russian cut-offs to Ukraine both in September 1993 and 
November 1994 stand out.99 The main disputes involving transit countries and thus having had an unwanted 
effect on final consumers have centered on three transit countries, Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova. 
Excepting the single 2006 dispute with Moldova,100 Belarus and Ukraine, both because of the frequency of 
disputes and because of the fact that most of the gas bound for  Europe transits through them (20 % in the 
case of Belarus and 80 % in the case of Ukraine for the period 2005-2009), have been the main actors in 
these kind of disputes. Gas is more conflict-prone, as gas cut-offs are clearly more sensitive due to the 
lesser gas reserves in comparison to the existing reserves of oil in many consumer countries in Europe, as 
well as the lesser outlets both connecting to downstream production in Russia and to alternative sources. As 
Richard E. Ericson puts it, "Because of the peculiar technological and economic characteristics of 
acquisition and use of natural gas as an energy carrier, and in particular its infrastructure requirements, 
gas "markets" are highly inflexible and political".101  The shale gas and LNG revolution are arguably 
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changing the situation, but that was nevertheless not the case yet at the time when these disputes took place. 
As opposed to gas, oil is sold in the world market and any cuts can be easily compensated for by further 
purchases in the spot market.102 Gas is more dependent on long term bilateral contracts linked to gas 
pipelines, so not only is the power relation in pricing negotiations stronger, but it is also more difficult to 
switch to other suppliers when confronted to troublesome partners.103  
Russia-Belarus Gas Disputes 
The first significant dispute between Russia and Belarus happened in 2004. Before that, Belarus, like most 
of the CIS states, had been supplied with cheap subsidized Russian gas without seriously considering that 
Russia might eventually separate energy supplies from political issues such as the Belarus-Russia 
integration process.104 Belarus enjoyed a value-added advantage compared to Ukraine, as it could partly 
solve the uncomfortable quasi-monopoly as transit country that the neighboring Ukraine enjoyed. This 
position represented an important asset and was determinant in the plans spawned in the decade of the 90s 
of bypassing Ukraine.105 The down-scaled result of these schemes is the Yamal-Europe pipeline which 
started in 1999 and reached full capacity in 2006. However, in spite of the comparative stability (the 
situation in Ukraine was far more chaotic and unpredictable), the fact is that as was the case in Ukraine, 
disputes were very common.106 With the advent of Vladimir Putin, Russia started unlinking politics and 
economics. Turning away from geopolitics and towards geo-economics, Russia started demanding market 
prices. The January-February 2004 energy dispute, the first in which Gazprom went as far as to stop 
supplies bound for Europe, was the result. As Belarus refused to sign an agreement to raise gas prices from 
US$30tcm to US$50tcm, Gazprom stopped supplies through the Northern Lights pipeline on the 1st January 
2004 and left Belarus with supplies on a short term contract basis provided by Itera, Transnafta and Sibur 
(averaging US$46.68tcm). Belarus, which by the 18th February was facing the end of the short term 
contracts, far from bending to pressure, started siphoning gas off bound for Europe from the Yamal-Europe 
pipeline. Russia then decided to stop gas supplies altogether, thus affecting other consumers (Germany, 
Poland, Lithuania, and the Russian Kaliningrad enclave). The cut-off barely affected European consumers, 
first, because of the limited amounts of gas involved (Germany received 90% of its supplies via Ukraine), 
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second, because additional Russian supplies could come from alternative routes (that helped mostly 
Lithuania) and most importantly, because a new short term stopgap contract was soon agreed. Thus, the 
cut-off, which lasted for one day, only really affected Poland. A final agreement was reached in June, with 
Belarus being supplied with gas for the rest of the year at US$46.68tcm, whereas transit fees would rise to 
US$0.75tcm/100km from US$0.53tcm/100km via the Northern Lights pipeline and to US$0.43tcm/100km 
from US$0.36tcm/100km via the Yamal-Europe pipeline.107 It was additionally agreed that Beltransgaz 
would be assessed so as to determine the price of its assets. This assessment was the first step to turn the 
company into a Joint Venture where Gazprom would enjoy co-ownership (the first agreement about this 
aspect dated from 2002).108 However, despite the fact that Belarus had been able to avert a significant 
increase of gas prices, Gazprom started demanding higher prices (US$200tcm) when negotiating prices for 
2007, while disagreements also surfaced regarding the price assets of Beltransgaz. A dispute was averted at 
the very last moment before the 1st January 2007 (Instead, both countries started an oil dispute)109. The 
agreement reached foresaw an increase of the supply prices to US$100tcm from US$46.68tcm, a timetable 
of progressive increases towards market prices which should lead to European prices by 2011 and transit 
fees for gas transiting through the Northern Lights pipeline rising to US$1.45tcm/100km from 
US$0.75tcm/100km. Regarding Beltransgaz, the agreement foresaw an accord by June 2007 regarding the 
sale of 50% of the state company to Gazprom. The first 12,5% was sold to Gazprom on 6th June.110 
The next significant gas dispute between Russia and Belarus happened in June 2010. The 2007 
agreement had left undetermined the reference for calculating European market prices and the relation 
between prices and transit fees.111 In addition to that, Belarus, which was heavily hit by the 2008 financial 
crisis and the January 2010 changes in the Russian oil export regime and was at the same time fearful of 
diminished leverage after the prospective completion of the Nord Stream in 2012, had new incentives to 
push for a revision.112 Thus, in April 2010, Belarus offered Gazprom a draft agreement to push transition 
to European prices to 2014-15, instead of 2011 as had been agreed in 2007. Gazprom balked and also 
rejected an offer to keep prices subsidized in exchange for new shares in Beltransgaz, of which it already 
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owned 50%.113 The situation became explosive in June 2010 as Belarus, which had refused to pay more 
than US$150tcm, was confronted with an increased debt (US$192 mill). Russia accordingly started 
reducing gas supply in equivalence to the outstanding debt. Belarus, which started demanding alleged 
debts for transit fees, threatened to divert gas bound to Europe, as it had done in 2004 and as Ukraine had 
done in 2006 and 2009. Reports on 23rd June from Lithuania suggested that problems of gas delivery were 
taking place, this possibly meaning that gas was being diverted by Belarus, but as Belarus fully paid its 
debt that same day, supplies were subsequently restored. A new stage in the dispute ensued when Belarus 
started demanding debts that Gazprom owed for transit fees, which led to a renewing of the threat to halt 
any supplies (initially gas and later oil too) transiting its territory if there was no payment the following 
day. As Belarus subsequently made the timetable more flexible, Gazprom eventually managed to pay the 
debts and further transit disruptions were averted.114  
If prices in general have tended to rise more slowly for Belarus compared to Ukraine under 
Yushchenko, Minsk´s readiness to trade prices for assets (Russian co-ownership of Beltransgaz) might 
support economic rather than political arguments. The fact that Russia applied total cut-offs in disputes 
both for oil (Russia cut off oil to Belarus, extending the cut to any oil bound for Europe after Belarus 
started siphoning off oil in January 2007) and for gas (as seen above in February 2004), could also be 
explained by the fact that strategic oil reserves are larger and outlets for diversification in case of 
emergency are more developed for oil than gas, and because whereas 80% of gas bound for Europe 
transited through Ukraine, the figure was only 20% for Belarus.  
Russia-Ukraine Gas Disputes 
The January 2006 dispute between Russia and Ukraine was already explained by Jonathan Stern in that 
same month (to be later complemented by an article on the same topic)115:116 The background to that 
dispute came from the rejection upon the arrival of Viktor Yushchenko to the Presidency in January 2005 
of the agreement of August 2004. That agreement contained provisions regarding delivery prices and 
transit fees, a resolution for the standing debts and the management and upgrading of the pipeline system 
through a consortium by both Gazprom and Naftohaz. The new political era started with Yushchenko 
reinstating the pattern of Ukrainian non-payments, Russian disruptions and Ukrainian siphoning gas off 
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which characterized the relation in the 90s.117 Two particular elements coincided in 2005. From one side, 
after the new Ukrainian administration itself showed eagerness to bring energy relations into a market 
framework, Gazprom considered the 2004 agreement nullified, so it proposed the same as for gas 
deliveries and as a result started demanding higher market prices.118 From the other, conditions for the gas 
supply from Central Asia were becoming more unstable, with Turkmenistan trying to push up the prices 
for its gas too. Ashgabat kept sending contradictory signals throughout 2005 regarding prices and supply 
(after having cut supplies temporarily to both Ukraine and Russia over price disagreements in January 
2005) and finally sold all of its gas exports to Gazprom (among which were included supplies for 
Ukraine). Russia then unsuccessfully tried to bargain on a price ranging from US$160tcm to US$230tcm 
from the US$50tcm that had been agreed in 2004. As Ukraine balked, Gazprom cut off supplies on 
January 1st and Ukraine retaliated by siphoning off gas bound for Europe. The crisis lasted four days until 
the early hours of 4th January , when both parties reached an agreement.   
Because of the big impact the dispute had on gas supplies, many were the commentaries on the 
dispute: Putin´s blunt assertion in an interview for the German TV Channel ZDF stating that "if anyone 
wants to support certain [political] forces [in Ukraine], then by all means, only not on our account" do of 
course lend credence to strictly motivated political reasons119 and easily invoke the image of the Russian 
"bully". However, many analysts preferred to focus on the economic reasons for the dispute, as can be 
seen in Angela Stent,120 even if with different combinations of strictly economic and political factors. 
Gilles Dubien for example, while acknowledging the underlying economic rationale, saw in Russian 
insistence on taking advantage of the Ukrainian decision to modify the gas agreements a political 
motivation related to the Orange Revolution with the intention of making these negotiations an "example" 
of its new energy diplomacy.121 Chow and Elkind introduce an interesting assessment when they consider 
that in the 2006 energy dispute, after four days, Russia backed down from its initial pretensions in the 
face of widespread European criticism.122 This assessment contradicts the image of a powerful Russia 
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abusing a much weaker Ukraine. Other authors such as Pavel Baev seem to follow the same line of 
Putin´s miscalculation in starting a crisis without guessing the prospective negative effects for Russia in 
underestimating the Ukrainian leverage,123 with Arkady Moshes pointing out that the agreements were far 
below the initial Russian demands.124 These authors thus support the idea of a Russian "defeat" in the face 
of Ukraine´s decision to siphon gas off and to disrupt the gas flow to Europe. Pirani, Yafimava and Stern 
make a similar statement, pointing to Russia´s frustrated attempt to enforce market prices in the face of 
Ukraine´s use of transit gas as a negotiating chip.125 Rawi Abdelal on the contrary, while acknowledging 
the fact that Russia did not fully achieve its objectives, highlights the positive aspects for Russia, namely 
the fact that the transition to market prices started, and the negative aspects for Ukraine, who lost in 
global terms with the new agreement.126  
Assessments regarding who was the victor in the dispute are particularly difficult with regard to 
the January 2006 dispute because of the arrangement pertaining to RosUkrEnergo, as the intermediary 
became the importer of all Central Asian gas supplied to Ukraine. Was it an outcome preferred by 
Ukraine or Russia? Gazprom´s interests might have laid in the possibility of bankrupting Naftohaz (and 
bringing forward a future privatization). 127  Another undeniable fact is the involvement of many 
personalities from the former Kuchma Administration in the creation of RosUkrEnergo back in 2004 
(thus allegedly rather "pro-Russian").  Simon Pirani considers RosUkrEnergo as an ally of Gazprom 
considering its stake of 50 % in the company,128 but it is nevertheless hard to know whether at that time 
RosUkrEnergo´s prominent role stemmed from Yushchenko (who supported Dmitro Firtash, main owner 
of Centragas, representing 50% of the intermediary) or from Gazprom (who owned the other half of the 
intermediary).129 This matter will be dealt with again in Chapter 6.  
The March 2008 energy dispute was much more limited in its scope and was not therefore the 
object of much attention beyond the press reports at the time. This is understandable given the fact that 
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this dispute did not reach the stage of extensive gas cuts translating into supply distortions for end-
consumers in Central Europe as two years before. The reason the dispute started was because of debt 
accumulation and mainly because the government by Timoshenko refused to honor a previous agreement 
reached by presidents Yushchenko and Putin in mid-February which solved the debt problem and 
guaranteed Gazprom its expansion into the internal Ukrainian market in substitution of the internal 
intermediary UkrGazEnergo. Timoshenko demanded instead an immediate suppression of both 
UkrGazEnergo and RosUkrEnergo and balked both at paying outstanding debts from 2007 and those 
accumulated since January 2008 for Russian gas sold extraordinarily in substitution for reduced supplies 
from Central Asia.130 Gazprom then reacted by imposing an accumulated cut in supplies of 50% (by 25% 
on 3rd March followed by a similar cut the next day). Ukraine responded warning that further cuts causing 
supply problems within the country could translate into undersupply to customers in the rest of Europe. 
That was probably intended as a veiled threat, the result of which was the early end of the dispute. 
Gazprom decided to de-escalate the dispute and to restore supplies while negotiations continued. Finally a 
new agreement was reached on 14th of March.    
The last dispute, in January 2009, originated for reasons similar to those of three years ago. 
Discussions on the final prices for 2009, which were supposed to absorb increases for Central Asian 
gas,131 were blocked by late 2008 due to new debt accumulated by the Ukrainian side. Russia insisted on 
its resolution before any discussion on prices continued. Besides, the general situation was much more 
complicated than three years before: the onset of the financial crisis, putting both Ukraine and Russia in 
very delicate positions, could have made bargaining positions even more intransigent. Initial prospects for 
successful negotiations were high. Agreements reached in March 2008 served as the basis for a detailed 
memorandum which was agreed in October 2008. The memorandum foresaw a regime of direct export 
(no intermediaries) from January 2009, a three year timetable for the introduction of market prices both 
for imports and for transit fees, guarantees for safe transit of gas to Europe and a joint export scheme of 
gas to Europe.132 However, with debts only repaid on the eve of the new year,133 there was not enough 
time for an agreement on prices to be reached, even if positions had neared with Gazprom demanding 
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US$250tcm and Naftohaz on the contrary demanding US$235tcm. Gazprom, which since early on, had 
threatened with a price of US$415tcm for 2009 in the event of no agreement being reached,134 made its 
threat real and took the decision to stop gas supplies for Ukraine.  
After Gazprom took the decision to stop supplies, the sequence of events was very similar to three 
years before. As Ukraine had already warned in the March 2008 dispute, it would siphon gas off bound 
for Europe in case of need. This in fact seemed to happen since the first day, as Ukraine accused Gazprom 
of having stopped supplies including technical gas needed to power pipelines that transported gas to 
Europe. As Ukraine made Gazprom responsible for its supply, it simply took it from the volumes of gas 
that were exported to the rest of Europe. As this stage was reached, the Russian reaction changed as 
compared to the January 2006 dispute. If by 4th January 2006 an agreement had been reached, on 5th 
January 2009, Putin personally ordered Alexei´ Miller to start reducing the flow of gas according to the 
volumes diverted, which meant that for the first time since February 2004, Russia would take the step of 
stopping natural gas supplies for Europe altogether. Amid contradicting allegations from Naftohaz and 
Gazprom, the fact is that by 7th January, gas flows to Europe dried up completely. This cut-off involving 
near to 80% of Russian gas supplies to Central and Western Europe, was to last an unprecedented 13 
days.135 By 12ve January a monitoring agreement was reached with the European Union. However the gas 
flows could not be restored as Russia tried to restart pumping gas through inlets connected to pipelines 
which were being used by Ukraine in reverse mode with gas from storage facilities located in Western 
Ukraine. The crisis continued only to find a solution not earlier than on 19th January. That day a final 
agreement was reached and the next day, gas started flowing again both for Ukraine and Europe. 
According to the new agreement, the new price would be henceforth calculated on the basis of European 
prices (possibly German prices) with a discount of 20%. New prices would thus amount to US$360 for 
the first quarter of 2009, updated henceforth every quarter of the year, on the basis of oil prices´ average 
of the three previous quarters. Transit fees would remain unchanged for the current year, whereas 
intermediaries such as RosUkrEnergo would be eliminated under the promise of establishing a joint 
venture by Gazprom and Naftohaz.136  
As with the general discussion in both academia and media, the same fault lines resurfaced with 
explanations of this latest dispute. The undeniable role Ukraine played in the dispute was highlighted or 
downgraded in different accounts corresponding to the role Russia was attributed. Pavel Baev for 
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example, saw the dispute as a bid by Ukraine to provoke Russia and force its isolation from the European 
Union.137  From a radically different perspective, Keith Smith blamed the dispute and the subsequent 
energy crisis in Central and Western Europe on Russia, as this dispute would have been the willing 
consequence of Russia´s strategy to destabilize Ukraine with periodic price renegotiations.138 Vladimir 
Milov, former deputy energy minister, also fully supported the version of Russian political and strategic 
motivations in an interview with RFE/RL; he stated that "Gazprom was intentionally paving the way for a 
cutoff of gas (…) It is perfectly possible that this is a continuation of the same political line that we first 
saw last August during the conflict with Georgia".139  Robert E. Ebel also hinted at possible interests from 
the Russian side to provoke the crisis for strategic reasons,140 even if he admitted the possibility of 
miscalculation from the Russian side regarding repercussions to European customers.141 However, Ebel´s 
characterization of the dispute as informed by Russian desperation rather than confidence, something 
equally emphasized by Schleifer and Treisman142 and by Indra Overland,143 put Russia in a different light. 
The comprehensive report by Pirani, Stern and Yafimava, which served as the basis for the previous 
section and provides to date the most thorough account of the crisis, acknowledges that in spite of the role 
played by Ukraine, Russia consciously escalated the crisis with measures out of proportion with 
Ukraine´s appropriation of gas. Ukraine allegedly siphoned gas off for its use as technical gas, not putting 
European interests in the forefront and thus shunning its responsibility as a reliable supplier.144 The 
authors move further from the previous theses and reject the speculation of a politically motivated 
dispute. However they still credit Russia with a manipulative role aimed at Europe. Russia would have 
escalated the dispute intentionally in order to convincingly put forward the argument of Ukrainian 
unreliability and open the door to Russian and European management of the Ukrainian transit network.145 
This is the case made also by Karen Smith Stegel, who explains that thus Russia would manage to 
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"convince" European consumers of the necessity of alternative transit projects bypassing Ukraine.146  
Simon Pirani strongly focuses on the underlying economic rationale for an increase of prices in supplies 
that had been subsidized until that date for countries such as Ukraine and on the effects both on Ukraine 
and Russia of the world financial crisis starting in 2008 (Adding in Russia´s case the investment flight 
after the August 2008 War). He nevertheless leaves some space for political factors, when he points to the 
reduced threshold for tolerance since the "Orange" leaders came to power.147 This is something equally 
mentioned as a possible cause for escalation by John Lough.148  Jeronim Perovic also highlights the 
financial dimension and the fact that just before the crisis, Russia had to face an increase in prices for 
energy supplies from Central Asia. This author also suggests what would later be considered by Smith 
Stegel, namely that interests to portray Ukraine as an unreliable transit country in order to favor bypass 
pipeline projects and/or to gain a share in the Ukrainian energy transportation system lay behind the 
dispute.149 Peter Rutland in an article published when the dispute was still unfolding, supported the 
economic explanation of the crisis pointing to the desperate financial situation of Ukraine and Russia after 
the global financial crisis.150 As in the case of the energy crisis of 2006, a preliminary analysis points to 
strong economic reasons for the dispute to take place. As we have seen above, some authors suggest that 
there were political motivations behind the dispute that would explain the unprecedented harshness, but as 
Pirani, Stern and Yafimava point out, if that was the case, it is hard to see what were the exact 
motivations and how the pressure exerted could translate into political gains for Russian foreign policy,151 
unless we imagine that Russia was consciously manipulating European opinion so as to blame Ukraine, 
thus looking for long-term solutions for the "Ukrainian mess" or fighting for short-term gains.  
 
2. 4. Literature Review and the Energy Disputes 
The general review on literature devoted to Russia´s energy policy showed that the same usual cleavages 
that permeate the analysis of Russian foreign policy are present too. In certain respects this applies also to 
the discussion on energy disputes. As we could see above, the two main disputes between Russia and 
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Ukraine, those of January 2006 and January 2009, were the object of several analyses which differed in 
the degree of responsibility they accorded to either political or economic factors. However, whatever the 
degree, the fact is that the presence of the economic factor in most of the arguments is ubiquitous. A 
preliminary assessment of the disputes following the existing bibliography that has been devoted to them 
so far is that there are strong arguments, both because of the context and the timing of the crisis, to 
support the version of economy-induced disputes.  
In any case, it is not until we have undertaken a thorough analysis of the three disputes that will be 
dealt with in this research, that we can draw clearer conclusions in that respect. That is what will be 
undertaken in chapters 6, 7 and 8, each of them devoted to a single dispute, January 2006, March 2008 
and January 2009. The conclusions that will be drawn from there will serve the purpose described in the 
preceding chapter. Before that, the three following chapters, 3, 4 and 5 will deal with the energy sectors 
of Russia and Ukraine, the course of energy relations between Russia and Ukraine until 2005 and energy 
relations between Russia and its European customers.   
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Chapter 3: Russia and Ukraine Energy Sectors  
 
3. 1. The Soviet Energy Sector and its Energy Policy 
The former Soviet Union was bound due to its (at least in terms of resources) privileged geographical 
position to be a resource rich country. The plentiful supply of oil and gas that the Soviet Union managed 
to develop was a good proof thereof and largely sustained the Soviet lackluster economic performance 
and prevented it from collapsing under unsustainable contradictions. Plenty did not only translate into 
cheap resources for the domestic economy, but in substantial exports and currency earnings that helped to 
close up the imbalance in both agricultural and developed industrial goods when oil prices skyrocketed in 
the 70s. When prices plummeted in the mid-80s, the Soviet Union felt the impact and that accelerated the 
economic crisis that eventually brought down the Soviet system.1 
The first contact of Russia with domestic production of oil came in the 19th Century from what 
would remain for a long time the main producer of oil in the Russian Empire: nowadays Azerbaijan. 
Kerosene made from oil extracted in the oil-rich region of Baku found a rich market in Northern Russia in 
need of artificial lighting.2 As a sign of what would be Russian importance in the world market  as one of 
the main producers until now at the time of writing, from 1898 to 1902 Russia managed to become the 
top producer of oil in the world.3 However, at the same time there appeared another fateful tendency 
which has been bedeviling Russia since then and which has translated into an inconstant production: the 
rapid exhaustion of existing wells,4 the slow introduction of technology to maximize extraction5 and the 
disregard of small wells not fit to produce an immediate substantial output.6 The crisis faced by the Baku 
wells at the start of the last century, where companies had not bothered to introduce enough modern 
techniques to maximize extraction was the first example, even if at the time the main harm came from 
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unrest related to the explosive social tensions in the late Czarist times.7 After the Revolution and with the 
advent of communism in what became the Soviet Union, new discoveries took place in the region of the 
Volga and the Urals. However, full development of these new fields would have to wait until after World 
War II. The region of Baku remained vital as a source of oil and became a major geostrategic objective 
during the war.8 
Once the war was over and the Soviet Union recovered, those new deposits in the Volga and the 
Urals starting being exploited, with huge deposits in West Siberia soon to be added.9 In a shift similar 
both in pattern and chronology to that in Western Europe, the Soviet Union moved to substitute coal 
lignite, peat and shale for oil (mainly for electricity production and heating) due to the latter´s cleanliness 
and greater efficiency.10 As seen in the paragraph above the Soviet extraction policy was short-term and 
favored immediate benefits from huge deposits until depleted.11 With technologies that were already 
outdated, resources remained untapped. Luckily for the Soviet Union, the huge reserves still available in 
the whole territory allowed such a policy of exploitation with such technology. Thus, a combination of 
increased investments during the 60s and the undemanding conditions for exploitation of the new fields of 
the Urals/Volga reserves helped increase production dramatically.12 To that came huge reserves of natural 
gas, which assumed an increasing share of internal consumption13 and freed volumes of oil previously 
consumed domestically for export.14 The industry of gas extraction was limited before World War II to oil 
production in the area of Baku, with natural gas associated to oil fields.15 Significant development came 
afterwards when production started in Ukraine. From there, new deposits were found in the region of 
Orenburg, in the Central Asian Republics and mostly, as with oil, in Western Siberia. Thanks to the added 
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output of both oil and gas from these regions, the Soviet Union managed in the 70s to become an 
alternative to the OPEC. The timing favored the Soviet Union particularly, as it represented an alternative 
to higher prices imposed after the 1973 oil embargo. Still, fabulous volumes of gas in Western Siberia 
were belatedly developed. Development had to wait till the gas surge of the early 80s due to the previous 
belief in sufficient oil reserves which were cheaper to develop at the time than gas.16 More gas output 
translated into a clear increase in the share of gas in Soviet energy, going from 19% in 1970 to 26% a 
decade later and finally 33% in 1985.17  
Crisis came when world oil prices fell in 1985 after the decision by Saudi Arabia to increase its 
production.18 That came with the beginning of Perestroika and worsened the ensuing economic crisis.19 
However, it was the chaotic state of the economy brought by the Perestroika that tipped the energy sector 
into utter collapse, a situation that would continue in the turmoil of the first years of the Russian 
Federation. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, oil and gas production were to plummet dramatically 
in the first years of the Russian Federation. In Ukraine, gas output remained stable after a sustained 
collapse during the decade of the 80s. Both the Russian Federation and Ukraine would inherit some of the 
vexing problems derived from Soviet  economic shortcomings. Among these problems, the high energy 
intensity ranked high. The problem of excessive energy intensity, already evident by the early 80s in the 
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 When oil was to became more expensive as a result of decreasing marginal productivity, which demanded increased 
investment for similar yields, gas development became less expensive in relative terms (see: Gustafson, "crisis amid plenty", 
op. cit., p. 143). 
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 Ibid., pp. 251-152; the increase continued in the last years of the USSR, as natural gas was used to reduce vast consumption 
of oil in the power sector instead of coal as was initially intended (see: Ibid., p. 256). As inherited from that period, in the 
present day Russian Federation natural gas represents 56% of the energy primary consumption (see: EIA (2013): "Russia", p. 
2, at http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/Russia/russia.pdf (Accessed on the 10th March 2014). 
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 As Thane Gustafson explained in his review to Dienes and Shabad (1979): The Soviet Energy System, the problem caused by 
the foreseen reduction in resource availability for the Soviet Union due to exhaustion of existing fields and insufficient 
discovery of new ones, stoked fears of seeing the Soviet Union turning into an importer from a big exporter, thus pushing 
world prices up or aggressively turning to the Persian Gulf  (Gustafson, Thane: "The Soviet Energy Problem: What Policy 
Choices will it Require", The Rand Corporation (July 1980), p. 1). Similar concerns had worried analysts in the US in the 
decade of the 50s, when the Soviet Union had not recovered its pre-war oil production and was not expected to achieve it in the 
coming future; it was equally feared that an import-dependent Soviet Union would covet Middle-Eastern resources (see: 
Jentleson, op. cit., p. 82). The real danger for the Soviet Union, though, was rather not be able to cover up for needed imports 
as a consequence of reduced reserves of currency (Gustafson, "The Soviet Energy Problem", op. cit., p. 2;). As we now know, 
reports about impending resource scarcity in the Soviet Union (Echoing them: Stein, Jonathan B. (1983): The Soviet bloc, 
energy, and western security, Lexington, Massachusetts, Lexington Books, p. 2; Dienes & Shabad, op. cit., p. 1.) were 
unjustified (see: Goldman, op. cit., p. 50). Paradoxically, warnings by the CIA may account for the increase in investments in 
the energy industry in the late 70s when worse than expected depletion rates made their appearance (see: Gustafson, "Crisis 
amid plenty", op. cit., p. 29).  However, sinking oil prices in the mid-80s did put the Soviet Union in the face of a badly needed 
foreign currency scarcity. 
19
 Prices increased dramatically as a consequence of wages being raised, which translated into prices for all utilities, excepting 
oil which was still regulated; the oil industry had thus to face more unacceptable production costs without compensation 
(Gustafson, Thane (2012): The wheel of fortune: the battle for oil and power in Russia, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, p. 42). In addition to that, soon the government lacked investment  resources to power up oil 
production and the sector was restricted from selling abroad; all this translated into dramatic falls in output (Ibid., p. 48). 
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whole Eastern bloc, 20  was to persist in Russia and Ukraine while the former communist republics 
progressively improved their energy consumption in terms of efficiency during the transition to capitalism 
and their progressive integration into the European Union. As it will be seen later, this problem mostly 
concerns Ukraine, maybe less than due to its status as one of the most energy-intensive world consumers, 
but because of its energy dependence as opposite to the Russian Federation. 
 
3. 2. The Russian Federation´s Energy Sector and its Energy Policy 
Russia´s Energy Resources  
The Russian Federation suffered a tremendous decline in output during the decade of the 90s. The decline 
affected both oil and gas and was related to the collapse in demand and production. Figures available at 
the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) show that if consumption in 1992 amounted to almost 
4,500tb/day, it dipped to half of that in 1998 with 2,500tb/day.21 The production of oil in the Russian 
Federation since it became independent went from nearly 8,000tb/day in 1992 to barely above 
6,000tb/day between 1996 and 1998, that is, an output reduction non-concomitant with that of 
consumption which left a much needed commodity available to maintain exports.22 In fact, if the Russian 
Federation managed to export almost 3,500tb/day in 1992, it actually exported more in the lowest point of 
the Russian economic collapse, with slightly above the former figure in 1998;23 after having reached the 
bottom in 1994, oil exports started an upward trend that only stopped in 2007.24  
With regard to natural gas, a similar pattern happened in parallel with the collapse of the Russian 
economy. Natural gas consumption also witnessed a big decline, falling from 16,500bcf  in 1992 to 
12,250bcf in 1997.25 Production fell from slightly over 22,500bcf in 1992 to less than 19,000bcf five 
years later in 1997.26 As in the case of oil, the mismatch between production and consumption translated 
not only into sufficient volumes to maintain exports, but into bigger ones, as consumption fell much more 
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 This was dealt with by Jonathan B. Stein in 1983 (Stein, op. cit., p. 1); as Dienes and Shabad explained in 1979, substantial 
decreases in energy intensity, that is, improvement of the ratio consumption/GNP growth were made through the substitution 
of coal by oil and gas and through the electrification of the country. As soon as this happened, the Soviet Union faced more 
difficulties in decreasing the energy intensity through saving measures that required additional investments and better 
technology (see: Dienes and Shabad, op. cit., pp. 14-16). 
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 See: EIA: "Russia: Overview data for Russia", at 
http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=rs#pet (Accessed on the 10th March 2014).  
22
 Ibid. 
23
 Ibid. 
24
 Ibid. 
25
 EIA: "Russia: Overview data for Russia", op. cit. 
26
 Ibid. 
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dramatically than output. In the case of natural gas, hence, while the Russian Federation was exporting 
between 6,250bcf and 6,000bcf in 1992, the bottom was reached a year later with a volume between 
5,750bcf and 5,500bcf.27 Since that year there was a sustained upward trend so in 1996 exports were well 
above the volume reached at the dawn of independence with slightly above 6,750bcf.28 After a fall the 
next year, a new upward trend continued until the year 2000 when the peak in exports was reached: 
7,000bcf.29 
Oil and gas exports which during the 90s, as seen in the paragraph above, either maintained their 
volumes or even increased them, offered an important  financial cushion to the Russian Federation during 
the critical years of the chaotic economic transition to capitalism. After the catastrophic situation of the 
economy was compounded by the financial crash of 1998,30 the subsequent recovery came mostly due to 
the substantial role played by oil and gas exports. More than that, bigger volumes became ready in the 
coming years which proved crucial to sustain economic growth. These volumes expanded precisely when 
oil prices started increasing after the Asian and Russian crises of 1997 and 1998, becoming determinant 
for the stabilization of the country after the chaotic Yeltsin years. Thus, if total oil production remained 
barely above 6,000tb/day from 1996 to 1998, it had reached a staggering volume of nearly 10,000bt/day 
in 2007 while in 2012 the output had overcome that figure; with consumption moving only from 
2,500bt/day to nearly 3,250bt/day in 2012, volumes for export grew substantially.31 Output of natural gas 
also grew even if it did not come close to such increase rates as in the oil industry: from less than 
19,000bcf in 1997, the Russian Federation was producing around 21,750bcf in 2006, with a transitory fall 
to around 19,250bcf in 2009 due to the financial crisis of 2008, only to bounce back and reach its peak 
two years later with 22,250bcf.32 Natural gas production, mostly geared towards internal consumption 
(with Gazprom´s exports subsidizing prices), has proved very sensitive to internal consumption. This can 
be seen in the effect that the 2008 crisis had, which similarly affected both production and consumption. 
The Russian Federation has not been able to offset increasing internal consumption which would have 
freed volumes of gas for exports in order to reproduce the success registered by the oil industry.33  
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 Ibid. 
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 Ibid. 
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 Ibid. 
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 As explained by Thane Gustafson in his masterful account of the energy sector in Russia since independence, the spiral of 
inflation only got worse with the economic policies taken in 1992 (Gustafson, "the wheel of fortune", op. cit., p. 53), with the 
disastrous breaking into pieces of the oil industry (Ibid., pp. 54-57) and the dislocation of the former Soviet industry, so the oil 
sector ceased receiving supplies from Azerbaijan and Ukraine (Ibid., p. 60). 
31
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At the time of writing, the great challenge for the Russian gas industry remains to maintain the 
level of production for the coming years.34 As Jonathan Stern pointed out in 2005, either increasing or at 
least maintaining production in the face of the depletion rate of big fields such as Urengoy, Yamburg, 
Medvezhe and Orenburg comes with the exploitation of new fields in the Yamal era and the Shtokman 
fields in the Barents Sea, which are more difficult to exploit.35 A particular quandary is posed by the 
offshore field of Shtokman, requiring foreign assistance but then stumbling on Russia´s reticence to allow 
foreign capital, this being a reason for the constant delay of the project.36 
Internal Energy Sector 
The energy gas sector in the Russian Federation is much less plural than that of oil, with Gazprom being 
both the main producer and the owner of the transport and distribution networks.37 The Ministry of 
Natural Gas did not have any competence in distribution during the Soviet times. However, the situation 
was such during the 90s, that many municipal distribution companies, being unable to pay their debts to 
Gazprom, swapped debts for equity, so the monopoly came to control the sector.38  
Domestic prices for natural gas in the Russian Federation are regulated, and that, contrary to what 
happens in Ukraine, includes industrial consumers. Gazprom demands that consumers bid for quotas in 
beforehand, with out of quota gas paid at non-regulated prices and under-consumption penalized by 
swaps of non-regulated prices in moments of demand. As the OECD economic survey from 2004 (quoted 
by Jonathan Stern) pointed out, this system is very opaque and some consumers do not receive supplies as 
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 The oil industry, which managed to increase proved reserves to 80bbl in 2012 from less than 50 up to 2002 (see: Ibid.). 
However, the natural gas industry remains still below the level of 1,700Tcf up to 2002, having peaked at 1,687.5Tcf in 2012 
after slightly bouncing up from a previous plateau of 1,680Tcf.  
35
 Stern, Jonathan (2005): The future of Russian gas and Gazprom, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 11. The huge 
difference that the exploitation of new fields would make for Gazprom´s output can be seen in: Noël, Pierre: "Beyond 
dependence: how to deal with Russian gas", European Council on Foreign Relations, Policy Brief (7 November 2008), Figure 
6, "Gazprom´ s gas output (2000-2035)", p. 6 , at  
http://ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR-09-BEYOND_DEPENDENCE-HOW_TO_DEAL_WITH_RUSSIAN_GAS.pdf. 
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 A consortium was formed in 1995 between Total (France), Conoco (USA), Hydro (Norway) and Fortum (Finland) with 
Rosshelf (Gazprom), the latter owning 50% plus one shares; although a production sharing agreement was approved in 2000, 
the 1996 framework expired and the licence was transferred to Rosneft Purneftegaz (50%) and Rosshelf (50%). With the 
former selling its shares in 2005, Gazprom remained the sole owner (see: Stern, "The Future of Russian Gas and Gazprom", 
op. cit., p. 17). The same state of indeterminacy prevailed regarding the means of transportation, whether pipeline 
developments to Europe or possible LNG exports to the US (Ibid., pp. 17-18). Neither of these materialized.  
37
 This is explained by Thane Gustafson as a result of the skilful management of Viktor Chernomirdin and the lucky turn of 
Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar in 1992 who overruled those who wanted to split the Ministry of Gas, from where Gazprom 
stemmed (see: The Wheel of fortune, op. cit., pp. 69-71). Gazprom remained an essential factor to ease the catastrophic 
economic situation of the Russian Federation, ensuring much needed supply of domestically consumed gas.  
38
 Distribution companies ended up concentrated in 60 regional companies (55 of them controlled by Gazprom) (Stern, "The 
Future of Russian Gas and Gazprom", op. cit., pp. 38-39). 
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contracted, having therefore been forced to purchase additional gas at higher prices.39 The downside for 
Gazprom in this system is that prices are so regulated that the company sells at a loss in the domestic 
market.40 Aware of this problem, the decision was taken in November 2006 and a timetable agreed in May 
2007, through the Decree No. 333 "On Improving State Regulation of Gas Prices", to impose a gradual 
increase in wholesale domestic gas prices (for industry, power and district heating sectors). The objective 
was to raise them to parity with Gazprom´s European exports´ netback prices.41 If initially set to 2011, the 
timetable was pushed to 2014.42 The Decree No. 1205 from 31 December 2010 established a transitory 
period from 2011 to 2015 which allowed yearly increases in prices of 15%, so by 2015, no difference 
remained between domestic and export prices.43 Prices rose from 2003 to 2010 from US$24.7tcm to 
US$82.60tcm for wholesale prices and US$16.3tcm to US$63.43tcm for domestic consumers. 44  The 
increase from 2006 to 2012 was US$34tcm to US$90tcm, an increase of 2.6 times in current prices.45 In a 
new revision, the "Outlook for Social and Economic Development of the Russian Federation for 2013 and 
the Planned Period of 2013-2015" approved further price increases until 2015, which however, were later 
limited to 5% only.46 Gains made by Gazprom were partly offset by inflation.47 In fact, if we compare 
industry prices in Russia to IEA member countries, in Russia they range slightly above US$10MWh, 
while most of IEA members´ prices  range between US$40MWh and US$50MWh.48   
Regarding losses due to non-payments, the situation, which was catastrophic during the 90s, 
improved progressively so Gazprom could receive most of its due payments as the decade of the 00s 
advanced. By 2003, as a consequence of previous non-payments the company still had around US$1 of 
non-recovered debts.49 Another element that impinges on Gazprom´s finances is the importance for the 
government to tax one of the main Russian sources of foreign currency. In fact, by 2003, Gazprom 
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 Ibid., pp. 40-41.  
40
 Ibid., p. 43. According to Jonathan Stern´s calculations, not even industrial prices, higher than those in the residential sector, 
were profitable (see: Ibid., p. 48). 
41
 IEA, "Russia 2014", Energy policies beyond IEA countries, p. 106. 
42
 Pirani, Simon: "Elusive potential: natural gas consumption in the CIS and the quest for efficiency", Oxford Institute for 
Energy Studies (July 2011), Table 6: "Gas for the heat and power sector: comparisons", p. 25,  
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represented 20% of all federal tax receipts.50  The prices for electricity also affect gas consumption, as it is 
one of the main items for power generation.51 
In spite of the initial huge problems Russia had to face, its fate changed radically (at least 
regarding energy) and that right after the country had plunged into a new crisis due to the economic 
financial crisis of 1998. As already mentioned above, after nose-diving in the wake of the Asian financial 
crisis of one year before, 52 oil prices started to recover from 1999 in a trend which was to last until the 
global financial  meltdown that began in 2008. As a result of the global economy bouncing back, oil 
prices had doubled by the year 2000 compared to two years ago with US$33 per barrel53 and were poised 
for a near record, achieved in January 2008, when prices reached US$100 per barrel.54 This situation 
encouraged imports of top technology from Western countries which helped Russia increase its output. 
Thus Russia managed to become again the world´s top oil producer in the first decade of the current 
century. This economic reality came together when it encountered two positive political turns, which 
were Europe´s desire to turn away from the troublesome Middle East as main source of imports 55 and the 
EU´s policy of increasing the share of natural gas in the energy mix of the country for environmental 
concerns. Russia´s gas booming production was in the right place at the right moment. 
The arrival of Putin as President of the Russian Federation in the elections of 2000 (he had 
become Prime Minister in 1999 and then acting President after Boris Yeltsin´s resignation) coincided 
with this positive conjuncture. Putin´s era also signaled a process of recentralization of the energy sector 
after the rough decade of the 90s and the chaotic process of privatization. This had a clear reflection in the 
case of Yukos, Mikhail Khodorkovsky´s company. Vladimir Putin´s focus on competitive companies that 
could play a defining role in the international arena and the need to remain a superpower as Russia was 
intended to be, translated into state control or at least reining in of oligarchs owning companies 
responsible for Russia´s vast commodities.56 In any case, that translated into more certain capital in the 
energy sector. As Marshall Goldman exposes, from 2000 to 2007, the Russian state managed to increase 
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 Ibid., p. 56. 
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 With data for 2008: gas consumption represented a token share of 0.6% in electricity plants: however, it represents a share of 
41.5% in CHP (Combined Heat and Power) plants (see: Pirani, "Elusive potential", op. cit., Table 6: "Gas for the heat and 
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 Ibid., p. 81. 
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its shares in the oil sector from 17% to about 50%.57 The most striking measure taken in the oil sector was 
the imprisonment of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and the seizure of its company, Yukos by Rosneft.58 The 
reaction to Khodorkovsky´s economic assets had a large political motivation, 59  but the fact that he 
pretended to lay private-owned pipelines in avoidance of the state monopoly Transneft should not be 
overlooked.60  
In the gas sector, the state´s policy easily translated into changing the balance in favor of the state 
in the company Gazprom, where it had managed to retain between 35% and 40% of its capital. The 
chairman of Gazprom, Viktor Chernomirdin was removed in 2000 as was its CEO, Rem Viakhirev one 
year later, to be substituted by the faithful Alexei´ Miller who has retained his post to date. The first step 
after this was to rein in Itera, a company headed by Igor Makarov and which had been used for the 
personal benefit of Gazprom´s own executives. As the largest Russian natural gas company after 
Gazprom, Itera was its main competitor and had taken a significant position in the CIS space (more on 
this in chapter 4). Itera was simply denied most of its contracts and as a consequence lost its importance.61 
A proof of the renewed power from Gazprom can be found in how it managed to take natural gas 
development in the field of Kovykta from its competitor TNK-BP. The Russian energy policy soon 
started facing the challenge of keeping up with a sustained production that could maintain or increase its 
exports in order to offset a predicted increase of internal consumption. In 2008 Pierre Noël showed graphs 
(based on Gazprom and BP statistics) calculating the increase in output to 2035: from gas output at the 
time of writing around 550bcm, in the best case scenario Gazprom would be able to increase it to 
630bcm.62 At that time, predictions were that Gazprom would not be able to fill the gap of a declining 
production in Europe,63 something that increasing Russian internal consumption and failure to invest to 
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guarantee a best case scenario could make even worse.64 According to IEA data from 2012, the Russian 
Federation had produced 656bcm,65 down from 677bcm in 2011,66 but still more than 637bcm in 2010.67 
Now that the shale revolution in the US has left many former LNG supplies available for consumption in 
Europe, it is thought that the production gap in this region can be easily made up. However, the LNG glut 
is expected to be short-lived, only until the market adapts to the recently gained US energy independence. 
Besides that, unless a shale revolution also changes the whole picture in Europe (which is unlikely), 
energy dependence on LNG can hardly translate into cheaper prices than what Gazprom offers.68 With 
Russia retaining price competitiveness, it is crucial that it increases its output as much as possible and 
increases efficiency at home to curb domestic consumption. The fact is that during the last years, the 
Russian gas market has become less Gazprom-centric with an increasing role for the state company 
Rosneft and mainly the independent producer Novatek, something which could translate in increased 
Russian gas output.69    
Energy Efficiency 
The problem of efficiency with which the previous  paragraph closes made its appearance already in The 
Soviet Union. During the oil shocks of the 70s the West coped with the new challenge through increased 
efficiency which would translate itself into reduced consumption. None of it happened in the Soviet 
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Union,70 the fact that it was one of the largest producing countries probably being at least a partial 
explanation for this.71 Gas thought to be in greater supply than oil was used to offset feared oil depletion 
instead. This turned the economy of the Russian Federation into a highly gasified one and where 
incentives to increase efficiency were scarce.  
The historic evolution of energy intensity, in a similar way to how it  happened in Ukraine (see 
below) was determined after the fall of the Soviet Union by the reduction of energy intensive industries, 
but the average reduction of 3.4% per year was lower than the average of the rest of CIS countries. The 
potential for further reduction from this side seems to have become spent by 2006.72 One of the incentives 
in the last years for postponing the resolution of the dilemma posed by insufficient energy efficiency has 
been caused by the existence of gas supplies from Central Asia that could complement Russian 
production. The potential to reduce high energy intensity in Russia has to be qualified as it is related in 
3/4 to temperature, land mass, and industry structure.73  
As can be seen in the latest report of the IEA devoted to the Russian energy sector, Russia´s 
energy intensity has been significantly reduced since independence: if the TPES/GDP coefficient was 
0.47 in 1990 and increased to a peak above 0.55, in 2012 it had fallen to 0.35,74 declining by 23.6% since 
2002, even if a slightly upward trend resumed in 2008, the year which marked the lowest coefficient.75 
The Key World Energy Statistics by the International Energy Agency (IEA) from 2012 showed a sharp 
reduction in 2011 (since 2005, the energy intensity per GDP (PPP) represented a coefficient of 0.42)76 that 
Russia´s energy intensity lowered to 0.35 in 2011.77 This probably results from a statistical  correction 
which concentrated in one single year past years´ improvements which had gone unreported to date. As 
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efficiency policies (see: Pirani, "Elusive potential", op. cit., p. 22). 
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the global economic crisis according to some reports would have provoked an increase in energy intensity 
instead,78 and gas consumption according to the Oxford Energy Institute had already not only recovered 
but even overcome consumption previous to the crisis by 2010 (based on Russian Energy Ministry data, 
while statistics from Gazprom point to just a recovery),79 this matches the trend by the IEA Russia report. 
The truth is that this reduction in TPES/GDP is not mainly derived from increased general 
efficiency of the Russian economy. This reduction was due, to a large extent, to increased energy prices. 
This increased revenues for equivalent volumes of hydrocarbons, so the GDP increased in value without 
increased energy outputs.80 The energy required to produce a unit of GDP remains two and a half times 
more expensive than the IEA average, and twice as much as in Canada, a country sharing a similar 
climate.81   
Regarding natural gas in particular, our focus in this research, namely, the perverse effect of 
pricing in the Russian Federation since independence must be highlighted, as it has made matters worse 
as far as  gas consumption is concerned. As seen in the section above, gas prices have been historically 
highly regulated in the Russian Federation. The effect was that many customers, seeing gas priced more 
cheaply than coal and oil, switched to this source of energy.82 This has only made the need to resolve the 
efficiency problem more pressing. President Dmitry Medvedev approved an action plan to halve Russia´s 
energy intensity by 2020 and a Russian Energy Agency (REA) was established. Russia´s energy policy, at 
the time of writing, is determined by the Energy Strategy to 2030 approved in 2009 and the Decree No. 
512 approved in 2013 and in process of being updated in 2014, "On Energy Efficiency and the 
Development of Energy".83 The overall efficiency goal  calls a reduction in energy intensity by 40% in 
2020, taking 2007 as a benchmark,84 based on the June 2008 Presidential Decree No. 889 "On Measures 
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to Raise Energy Efficiency and Foster Environmental Stability in Russia’s Economy".85 It remains to be 
seen whether Russia is on track to achieve goal.  
According to a study by the International Finance Corporation (IFC), dependent on the World 
Bank of 2008, the Russian Federation has indeed the potential to reduce consumption by a 45% taking 
figures from 2005 as a reference.86 Natural gas consumption´s breakdown by sector is the following: 40% 
electricity, 14% heat plants, 13% industry, 11% households, 6% raw materials, 10% technological needs 
and losses and finally 6% in other sectors.87 As for the efficiency potential, this is, according to the IFC 
report, mainly concentrated in the following sectors: buildings (with heating as the major item), 88 
manufacturing and electricity generation and delivery, heat generation, transport, fuel production and 
transformation.89 Significantly, in Russia natural gas represents 53.3% (referenced on 2008 data) of its 
total primary energy supply, compared to only 25.2% in the EU. 90  Translated into savings of gas, 
additional volumes could be freed for export and for earnings of international currency. Accordingly, this 
might amount to as much as 240bcm.91 If Gazprom for example in 2012 sold 466.8 bcm (217.1bcm were 
sold abroad),92 the change of applying the efficiency measures advised in the report becomes manifest. 
Russia could easily assume an expansion of consumption at home while securing added exports abroad, 
even in the face of reduced output.93    
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3. 3. Ukraine´s Energy Sector and its Energy Policy 
Ukraine´s Energy Resources 
Ukraine was far from being poorly endowed in terms of energy resources. However, the general picture in 
energy development is one of insufficiently exploited potential, as both the Black Sea region and the Sea 
of Azov are home to rich fields of both gas and oil. The reason for this under-exploitation is that the 
Soviet Union favored cheaper fields (in terms of costs of exploitation) in the Volga region and in West 
Siberia, which explains the reason why in 1996 Ukraine only consumed 13% and 17% of domestic oil 
and gas respectively, with Russia being the main supplier.94 However, Ukraine had some decades ago a 
very high output of domestic gas until the decade of the 80s. If extraction had started in the Carpathian 
region in West Ukraine after its inclusion into the Soviet Union in 1939,95 it was not until 1955 when 
production surged dramatically. The exploitation of the huge Shebelinka field (similar to fields in the 
other big producing regions) in Eastern Ukraine made Ukraine for a time the main production region in 
the USSR.96 Output reached a peak of 68.7bcm in 1975 which fell to 53.8bcm in 1980.97 However the 
classic pattern of gas depletion soon doomed the Shebelinka field and Ukraine suffered a huge loss of 
production during the decade of the 80s.98 Output remained stable during the 90s, ranging from 20.9bcm 
in 1992 and 17.9bcm in 2000 99 and has since then slightly recovered to stabilize again around 20bcm by 
2005.100 This meant that Ukraine ended up at the time of its independence with a very high rate of energy 
dependence: 89% of its oil needs were covered by imports, 101 as well as importing around 60% of its gas 
from Russia.102  
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As surprising as this might seem, the situation in Ukraine after independence has not changed 
substantially in spite of becoming highly dependent on an external actor, the Russian Federation. Failure 
to agree on a border demarcation in the Azov Sea surely affected any chances to develop rich resources in 
the area.103 However, the main obstacle stemmed from the complex energy relations with producers within 
the CIS. As a transit country, Ukraine was entitled to transit tariffs that ensured free supplies. At the same 
time danger of supply disruptions further West ensured that gas disputes often translated into Gazprom 
accepting subsidized prices. In addition, Ukraine could for a long time import gas from Central Asian, 
mainly Turkmenistan (See chapter 4). Finally, if that was not enough, companies could often translate 
energy debts to the state budget.104 Incentives thus barely existed to exploit domestic resources. In any 
case, the fact is that Ukraine is still endowed with very important resources in hydrocarbons that could 
boost production and lessen its energy dependence from other producers in the CIS. With an estimate of 
5.37Tcm of conventional gas, more than other countries as UK, the Netherlands and Norway,105 Ukraine 
has still a big potential to tap, without counting reserves in unconventional gas, which some estimates 
calculate as high as 11.5Tcm.106 If Ukraine introduced new recovery techniques (3D seismic, horizontal 
drilling, multilateral completions, hydraulic fracturing, compression and nitrogen injection) to maximize 
output of existing fields and developed the so called "tight reservoirs" not exploitable before, 107 
production could be boosted in 2035 to around 50bcm per year, instead of the slightly more than 10bcm 
that Ukraine might be producing from its depleting existing fields under current exploitation.108 If an 
optimistic scenario of exploitation of unconventional gas is considered, Ukraine might be producing 
around 70bcm of gas instead.109 That could turn Ukraine not only into an energy independent country, but 
it could even transform it into a gas exporter, especially if these rates of exploitation were coupled with a 
better management of its consumption and if energy efficiency was improved. The biggest challenge in 
order to meet the figures suggested in the report by IHS CERA is to maintain investments of around 
                                                                                                                                                                                                            
in 1980 in the whole of the USSR, while in Ukraine the results were even worse: the share simply doubled (see: Gustafson, 
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104
 Balmaceda, "Energy dependency, politics and corruption", op. cit. 
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US$10bill per year from 2012 to 2035.110 The measure of the challenge appears clearly when considering 
that current investment levels are of only US$1bill.111 
It must be noted that apart from oil and gas, Ukraine is also endowed with coal and has 
hydroelectric and nuclear production of electricity. However, the legacy of the Soviet Union in this 
respect has proved disadvantageous for the independent Ukraine. From one side, the preference of gas for 
thermal plants left them unsuited technically for the use of coal,112 while nuclear power plants are obsolete 
and the  potential was diminished after the accident of Chernobil.  
Internal Energy Market 
The transition from the Soviet Union to the independent Ukraine brought huge changes in the volumes of 
consumption, in a similar fashion to what had happened to the Russian Federation at the same time. That 
is, Ukraine suffered a collapse in demand in parallel with the rapid decay of its industry once it could not 
adapt to capitalism. One look at the figures shows clearly the dimension of the collapse: according to 
sources from the World Bank in 1996, productive consumption of electricity fell from 206.1bKWh in 
1990 to 124.2bKWh,113 with industrial consumption, the main item, falling from 146.2bKWh to as little as 
81.1bKWh. 114  If adding consumer needs, which represented a small share compared to productive 
consumption, and which actually increased from 21.1bKWh to 27bKWh, total consumption of electricity 
in Ukraine fell from 1990 to 1996, from 227.3bKWh to 151.3bKWh.115 These changes were obvious 
given the fact that Ukraine´s GDP fell a 68% from 1991 to 1997.116 This phenomenon obviously had an 
impact on the volumes of gas that were imported during those years: if Ukraine consumed in 1990 as 
much as 120bcm, a dramatic fall set in after the year 1992, until Ukraine was consuming a third less in 
1997 with a reduced volume of 80bcm;117 consumption of gas was further reduced in the next years until it 
reached a nadir around 70bcm in the early 00s.118 
One of the most conspicuous features of Ukraine´s energy market has been the chaotic and 
changing nature of its internal market and the succession of different domestic actors along with the 
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catastrophic level of indebtedness during the 90s.119 These actors have been assuming and losing their 
preeminence alternatively depending on the volatile political circumstances of each moment. An 
enormous factor has been played here by one of the biggest scourges in the country, corruption.  The fact 
is that until 1996 the system was somehow predictable thanks to the existence of one single actor, the 
state company "Ukrhazprom" which centralized gas imports.120 This picture however, changed radically in 
1996 when the government of Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko decided to end this centralized system and 
established a system of import quotas for private companies. State imports were reserved for the general 
population and state organizations.121 The system that was put in place, the gas trading concession system, 
was actually a recommendation from the IMF.122 The stated goal for this new system was to put an end to 
the harmful accumulation of debt to Russia which was disrupting energy relations within the complex 
triangle Russia-Europe-Ukraine. 123  However, this system failed miserably as it served Lazarenko to 
promote his sponsored company, United Energy Systems (UES), which was headed by Yulia 
Timoshenko. Far from proving a useful device to liberalize the market as it was intended, it was turned 
into a tool of the new government to cartelize the market in its own profit. He started providing licenses 
to eight private companies, but this was soon reduced to only two, with UES being favored and being 
promoted in the rival stronghold of Donetsk (Lazarenko´s base was Dnipropetrovsk), until UES managed 
to import as much  as 50% of all natural gas for Ukraine.124  
Lazarenko had not respected Kuchma´s policy of balance between all oligarchic clans (mainly, 
Kiev, Dnipropetrovsk and Donetsk), 125  with disastrous results. This led to the energy system within 
Ukraine to undergo a new and equally radical re-haul. The short-lived Prime Minister was sacked in 1997 
as a result of his growing power and the threat it represented for President Leonid Kuchma. The decision 
was then taken to resurrect a state-centered system similar to that which prevailed under Ukrhazprom. 
Thus was created a new company "NAK Naftohaz Ukrainy" (henceforth Naftohaz) which would be run 
by a close associate of President Kuchma, Ihor Bakai´.126 Bakai´ himself, as could have been suspected, 
was not alien to the energy market, as he had been involved in the company "Respublika" (see next 
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chapter) and had then headed the company "Interhaz", which saw its quota reduced under the rule of 
Lazarenko. Ihor Bakai´ was thus a convenient  ally to Kuchma.127 The creation of Naftohaz may have 
secured for Kuchma control in a sector that would have otherwise enriched his future enemies, but it did 
not provide any guarantee for a healthy and transparent management of the energy sector in Ukraine. In 
fact, as the thorough report by Global Witness states: "Bakai was the chairman of Naftohaz when all three 
of these practices were rife"; "these practices", were illegal siphoning-off of Russian gas sent to Central 
and Western Europe, tax avoidance through barter schemes with producers and passing of the costs of gas 
to the Ukrainian state instead of consumers. 128  The Bakai´ system of management of the new state 
company proved to be no less of a disaster compared to the experiment undertaken by Lazarenko. The 
company accumulated a huge debt to Gazprom,129 the Ukrainian state was sacrificed to private interests 
and Russia could not be assured of a flawless transit of its gas further West through Ukraine. Of course, it 
was widely suspected that Naftohaz served Kuchma´s interests directly as a source of patronage. 
Naftohaz has been since its inception, and still remains so, the biggest actor in the Ukrainian 
market. It is however, not the only one and has started sharing some of its preeminence with new actors in 
recent times. Naftohaz is the producer of 90% of the whole domestic production, the owner of the 
pipeline system (through its filial "Ukrtransgaz") and controls the access to all consumers through its 
regional network of distribution (until November 2011 through another filial "Gaz Ukrainy").130 However, 
Naftohaz has to share the turf with another set of subordinated actors which have nevertheless also taken 
on a life of their own and which represent an important opening for corruption as will be showed below; 
these actors are companies of regional and local distribution, "Oblgazy" and "Gorgazy" and although 
initially public owned, private actors have increased their presence in a sector which could become very 
lucrative if subsidizing of prices is lifted in the future.131 Besides them, those actors which have attracted 
the greatest attention during most of the period of independence of Ukraine are those called 
"Gazotreidery", or gas traders, which have played the role of intermediaries between Naftohaz and 
between producers in Russia and Turkmenistan; mainly four have held the upper hand since 1994 to 
                                                           
127
 Ibid., p. 25. 
128
 Ibid., Idem.; the support provided to private companies through state debt is very well explained by Margarita Balmaceda 
(see: Balmaceda, "Energy dependency, politics and corruption ", op. cit.). 
129 According to data provided by Global Witness, the debt to Gazprom in early 2000 amounted to US$760mill (see: "It´s a 
Gas", op. cit., p. 25). 
130
 IHS CERA, op. cit., p. 5-1 (53); there are exceptions to this picture, as some of the largest industrial groups own their own 
pipelines connected to Ukrtransgaz´s network (Pirani, "Ukraine´s gas sector", op. cit., p. 58). Besides, some of the small 
producers that complement Ukraine´s gas production sell directly to consumers (Ibid., Idem).  
131
 Privatization became legal under the government of Viktor Yushchenko in 2000 (see: Duchêne, Gerard: "Équilibres 
institutionnels et performances économiques: le cas de l´ Ukraine", Revue d´Études Comparatives Est-Ouest, vol. 37 no. 4 
(2006), p. 144. 
    
 
80 
 
2009: "Respublika", "Itera", "EuralTransGas (ETG)" and "RosUkrEnergo (RUE)". All of them were 
controversial and were suspected of concealing obscure interests by either corrupt private interests, 
Gazprom or the Ukrainian government itself (They are discussed in detail in the next chapter). Since the 
monopoly of Naftohaz was lifted in 2011, new actors of a similar kind have entered the Ukrainian gas 
market which besides being granted the right to import gas, have also acquired the right to sell directly to 
consumers. So far "Ostchem" of the DF Group (owned by Dmitro Firtash, former main owner of 
RosUkrEnergo) has been the main actor, but during the last year of Yanukovich´s rule, other ones such as 
VETEK and DTEK  had joined in, making Ukraine´s energy market more diverse. Finally, there are some 
small traders that buy gas from independent producers (trading these, very small volumes as compared to 
Naftohaz) and sell it to industrial consumers.132  Some of these companies in 2006 were: "Metinvest 
Holding", "Industrial Union of Donbass", "Shell Energy Ukraine Ltd", "Energoalians", "Energoinvest", 
"Gazservis Trading House" and "Poltavskii GZK".133 
The biggest characteristic in Ukraine´s gas market, similar in that to the Russian Federation, is that 
prices which are regulated by the National Electricity Regulatory Commission (NERC) are differentiated. 
There exist in fact three categories: industrial users that have non-regulated prices, residential users with 
regulated prices and district heating utilities that enjoy semi-regulated prices. The difference lies in the 
share of imported (market-based) or domestic and low priced natural gas, while semi-regulated prices for 
heating correspond to a mix of both sources.134 Many of the liabilities that Naftohaz has been suffering 
stem from this system, as semi-regulated prices have been kept below what the market share should have 
determined since prices started growing from 2006.135 This has forced the state to sustain the company´s 
financial losses, especially as the share of imported gas ended up making up most of the gas needed for 
this sector.136 The fact that many district heating companies are indebted to Naftohaz makes the financial 
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situation of the state company even more delicate. 137  However, not only prices for heating and the 
industrial sector had to increase due to changes in pricing for imported gas from 2006.138 Prices for the 
industrial sector did follow import prices, but as for prices in the heating sector, as the International 
Energy Agency wrote in its report on Ukraine in 2012, they were still below cost recovery and did not 
thus allow funds for modernization.139 Prices for residential customers (those most subsidized), increased 
too from 2006. As Simon Pirani explains, after certain price increases in the regulated sector in the mid-
90s, prices did not move from April 1999 to April 2006. Then in May 2006 changes started with new 
increases by 25%, soon followed by an even sharper one of 80% on the 1st July 2006 and then 
complemented by a smaller 2–15% from the 1st January 2007, 140  while the government of Viktor 
Yanukovich tried to soothe the impact on lower-income households by delaying the introduction for less 
affluent sectors of the population.141 As a result, in the category of residential customers, ceilings for 
wholesale prices moved from uah185tcm in 2006 to uah423 one year later.142 Prices would increase again 
in 2008 by a combined 50%. In 2009 increases as an obligation from the IMF in the framework of the 
loan agreements subscribed then, were delayed until August 2010, when they increased again by 50%.143 
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http://zn.ua/ECONOMICS/naftogaz-v-ocherednoy-raz-zayavil-chto-ne-smozhet-zaplatit-gazmromu-iz-za-27-mlrd-dolgov-
teplokommunenergo-138011_.html (Accessed on the 6th February 2014). 
138
 Prices for district heating companies increased in 2005 (Malygina, Katerina: "Populist games: discourse on domestic gas 
prices in Ukraine in 2005-2011", 4th ECPR Graduate Conference (4th-6th July 2012), p. 11, at 
ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/1370c79b-13ac-4974-9a41-ad8616eaa525.pdf, but the capacity for the NERC to raise prices 
was limited by the fact that the competence for this lays in Oblast and municipal authorities too, which have an interest in 
keeping prices as low as possible for political convenience (see: IEA, "Ukraine", op. cit., p. 57). A new regulating body called 
the National Commission for Regulation of Municipal Services has reduced the autonomy municipalities had in setting tariffs 
(Ibid., pp. 57-58); however at the time of drafting its report in 2012, the IEA considered that potential changes had not yet 
materialized, with many district heating companies not regulated by the municipal regulator, still keeping their tariffs 
subsidized by the municipalities (Ibid., p. 59).  
139
 IEA, "Ukraine", op. cit., p. 58; this is compounded by the fact that the payment rate from residential consumers for heating 
bills ranges from 75% to 85%, thus creating a debt problem for the district heating companies (Ibid., Idem.); in addition, 
municipalities, which tend to set tariffs as low as possible, not always provide the needed subsidies to the heating companies, 
creating an additional source of indebtedness (Ibid., p. 59). The coverage of average tariffs was calculated by the IEA as 70%, 
covering generation but not modernization investments (Ibid., p. 59). 
140
 Pirani, "Ukraine´s gas sector", op. cit., p. 60. 
141
 Ibid., p. 61; this was agreed upon in January 2007 after the transitory measure taken by the government in October 2006, to 
reduce by 20% the tariff for households after the sharp combined increases of May and July (see: Malygina, op. cit., p. 13). 
142
 Pirani, "Ukraine´s gas sector", op. cit., p. 60, Table 5.5; in fact, as Katerina Malygina explains (Malygina, op. cit., p. 11), 
changes first started in late 2005 as a result of the rise in prices of Turkmen gas that had taken place that year; thus, prices were 
raised for district heating companies. 
143
 Malygina, op. cit., p. 14; this loan, amounting to US$16.4bill (US$11bill were released to which US$3.4bill under a Stand-
by Agreement from mid-2010 were added) was agreed to in November 2008 and was meant to stabilize the banking system. In 
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Since then, no more price increases took place, 144 until 2014-15, after the fall of Yanukovich and under 
the Administration of Petro Poroshenko. However, since the last price hike (August 2010), households 
devoid of meters pay more than those which have installed them.145 IMF pressure on raising gas prices is 
one of the explanations why cooperation was severed by Ukraine and new advantageous price 
arrangements were agreed with Russia in December 2013. A similar pattern can be found as for tariffs in 
the electricity generation sector, which had increased in 2006, 2007, in 2011,146 and again in 2014 and 
2015. 
But why had prices to move up for residential customers too, while they consume domestic gas? 
There seemed to be political reasons for that, as President Yushchenko wanted to bring prices on line with 
those much higher in the rest of Europe.147 However, it also seems that economic imperatives forced the 
situation. One plausible explanation is that actually, prices for residential customers did not even cover 
costs of production; while Naftohaz did have the right until 2006 to sell gas (bought from the 
intermediary RosUkrEnergo) and thus earn profits which could subsidize prices linked to domestic gas,148 
this was forbidden by the agreements of January 2006 and confirmed in those of January 2009. The 
public sector, which falls into the same category of regulated prices, has seen gas prices since 2005 
remain flat once the inflation is taken into account.149 
Energy Efficiency 
Along with the under-exploitation of its internal resources, Ukraine faces another problem that has been 
only partially solved to date and whose significant potential remains thus largely untapped, which is 
energy efficiency. Simon Pirani calculated back in June 2007 an energy coefficient of 2.61 for Ukraine, 
representing the ratio of consumption per GNP, more than Russia with 2.47 and far from countries like 
the UK and Germany, with much lower coefficients of 0.67 and 0.76 respectively.150 Interestingly, Poland, 
former member of the CMEA, had achieved by then a coefficient of 1.00.151 Following the coefficients 
calculated by the International Energy Agency (IEA), in 2010 Ukraine had a coefficient of 1.44 and the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                            
exchange, Ukraine had to approve a set of reforms focused on the budget deficit, the exchange rate and energy policy (IEA, 
"Ukraine", op. cit., p. 20).  
144
 IEA, "Ukraine", op. cit., p. 124. 
145
 Ibid., p. 125: consumers without meters pay US$150tcm, whereas those with installed meters, pay 33% less, US$100tcm. 
146
 IEA, "Ukraine", op. cit., p. 171, at 
http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/Ukraine2012_free.pdf (Accessed on the 14th April 2014). 
147
 Pirani, "Ukraine´s gas sector", op. cit., pp. 60-61. 
148
 Malygina, op. cit., p. 10. 
149
 IEA, "Ukraine", op. cit., p. 124. 
150
 Pirani, Simon: "Ukraine´s gas sector", op. cit., p. 11. 
151
 Ibid., Idem. 
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Russian Federation one of 0.78.152 While Ukraine´s energy intensiveness grew by 30% from 1991 to 
1995, it stabilized during the rest of the decade and then Ukraine managed to reduce it by a considerable 
40% from 2000 to 2005,153 the fact that Ukraine still held such position at the time means it clearly lagged 
behind in international standards.  
However, significant improvements were done since 2006 as a consequence of the annual increase 
in gas prices that started that year as a consequence of the January 2006 gas dispute and which culminated 
with the imposition of market prices for Russian gas after the January 2009 gas dispute.154 The main weak 
point in the Ukrainian economy is the importance of high consumption in the heavy industry, with 
industrial consumers using as much gas as residential consumers do.155 As Figure 4-3 from IHS CERA 
report shows, there was a certain reduction in consumption from 2005 to 2008, which corresponds with 
those years when Ukraine started facing higher prices and had thus an important incentive to increase 
efficiency.156 The sudden drop in consumption cannot however be related (or at least only partially) to the 
same phenomenon, as it also coincided with the onset of the financial crisis that severely hit y Ukraine´s 
industrial sector. The level of consumption has remained lower since 2009, 157  not only because of 
economic circumstances though, as improvements in efficiency have continued.  
The situation in the industrial sector is the following: The chemical industry consumes 8bcm to 
8.5bcm annually. It has a great degree of energy intensiveness due to its being mostly geared to the 
production of nitrogenous fertilizers, where roughly 75% of the production costs depend on energy.158 The 
two complexes of "CherkasskAzot" and "RivneAzot" reported substantial reductions from 1990 to 2010 
in energy intensiveness, while prospects of further improvement seemed positive in the light of recent 
                                                           
152
 IEA (2012): "Energy Balance of Non-OECD Countries", p. II. 433 (515), at 
http://www.iea.org/media/training/presentations/statisticsmarch/BalancesofNonOECDCountries.pdf (Accessed on the 6th 
February 2014); the energy intensity to GDP was 10 times than the OECD average and 3.2 times more in purchasing parity 
power terms, even through taking into account shadow economy of around 34% would lower these figures (IEA (2012): 
"Ukraine", op. cit., p. 20. 
153
 Pirani, "Ukraine´s gas sector",  op. cit., p. 12. 
154
 IHS CERA, op. cit., p. 4-1 (39). 
155
 Ibid., Idem. 
156
 Ibid., Figure 4-3, p. 4-2 (40) 
157
 This can be seen for example in: IHS CERA, op. cit., Figure 5-7, p. 5-6 (58); the figure shows global consumption: if in 
2008 Ukraine imported 66.6bcm of gas, in 2010 it was importing only 57.7bcm. Consumption in 2011 surged slightly to 
53.9bcm and fell the next year to 54,7bcm (see: "Ukraina sokratila potreblenie gaza na 7,6% (Украина сократила 
потребление газа на 7,6%)", Kommersant, 24 January 2013, at http://www.kommersant.ua/news/2112042 (Accessed on the 
4th February 2014). 
158
 IHS CERA, op. cit., p. 4-3 (41). According to the IEA, roughly 80% (IEA, "Ukraine", op. cit., p. 103) efficiency 
improvements in this sector are bound to have an important impact on the whole energy intensity of the Ukrainian economy, as 
this accounts for 7% of the country´s GDP and 8% to 10% of all export earnings (IHS CERA, op. cit., p. 4-3 (41).  
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announcements. 159  The assessment by the IEA in 2012 was not very optimistic in the light of the 
industry´s approaching pre-crisis consumption levels.160  The metals´ sector consumes about 8.5bcm to 
9.5bcm annually. This is why it is one of the main sectors regarding gas consumption in Ukraine and the 
reason for its high inefficiency, compared to international standards. 161  This means there is a great 
potential for improvement. A process of modernization is in fact taking place in this sector which should 
therefore fulfill many of the promises inherent in the application of more modern technology. According 
again to IHS CERA, there could be a potential for 44% (3.9bcm) savings taking 2007 production levels as 
a benchmark.162 The global consumption in industry went from 35bcm to 30bcm four years later, and then 
down to 18.4 bcm in 2009 due to the crisis, to bounce back to 24.6 bcm in 2011.163  
Important changes have also taken place in other sectors: The most spectacular success has taken 
place in the power sector, which from 2000 to 2010 has managed to reduce consumption by a staggering 
75%, that is, from 12bcm to 3bcm annually.164 This is explained by the fact that most thermal power 
stations were built in the 60s to 70s as coal-fired plants but endowed with flexibility to switch to gas. For 
this reason, after having been mostly turned to gas, returning to coal was not difficult.165 This sector also 
enjoyed a relatively good starting position due to the significant share of nuclear energy in power 
generation.166 Another sector which deserves attention is that of district heating and households, which has 
inherited many shortcomings from the Soviet legacy, mainly the fact that gas meter installations were 
                                                           
159
 Ibid., Idem; the exact data of the increase in efficiency are the following: CherkasskAzot reduced the ratio of gas per ton of 
ammonia in the period 1990-2010 from 1.46tcm to 1.12tcm; such reduction, interestingly, seems to have taken place in the last 
four years, in coincidence with the increase of gas prices from January 2006. RivneAzot is reported to have reduced the ratio 
from 1.24tcm to 0.99tcm in 2007 owing to the reconstruction of some of its units. At the time of publication of the IHS CERA 
report, the DF Group (main producer in the sector) was working on further modernization leading to a 20% reduction in gas 
consumption from the output registered in 2007. If applied to the whole, modernization would yield a reduction in 1.7bcm per 
year  (Ibid., p. 4-4 (42). 
160
 IEA, "Ukraine", op. cit., p. 102. 
161
 IHS CERA, op. cit., p. 4-5 (43): these costs (50%) represent roughly twice as much as the global average (20% to 25%). 
162
 Ibid., Idem; if one is to believe reports as published by Ekonomichna Pravda in December 2013, the share of natural gas in 
global costs of metal production would have fallen to only 5-7% (see: Vyshinskii´, Andrei´: "Ianukovich "leg" pod mosckvu. 
Chto vzamen? (Янукович "лег" под Москву. Что взамен?)", Ekonomichna Pravda, 17 December 2013, at 
http://www.epravda.com.ua/rus/publications/2013/12/17/409320/ (Accessed on the 5th February 2014). 
163
 IEA, "Ukraine", op. cit., p. 102. 
164
 A single reduction by half took place from 2005 to 2006 (IHS CERA, op. cit., p. 4-6 (44). Savings in the thermal power 
sector started as soon as 2001, when consumption was cut by 33% next year (from 12bcm to 8bcm) (Ibid., Figure 4-7, p. 4-7 
(45). Coinciding again with unexpected increases in gas prices in 2006, a reduction of as much as 6.5bcm in the period 2006-
2007 (see: Ibid., Figure ES-2, p. 4 (10), may not be ascribed either to the power sector (in fact, in 2007, consumption there 
jumps back to 2005 levels), or to economic slowdown (2006 and 2007 witnessed an increase in GDP growth of 7.3% and 7.9% 
respectively compared to only 2.7% in 2005. See: Global Finance: http://www.gfmag.com/gdp-data-country-reports/154-
ukraine-gdp-country-report.html#axzz2sR8vxa00). Therefore, significant savings must have been made in other sectors. 
165
 IHS CERA, op. cit., p. 4-6 (44); closely related to the power sector, the electricity transmission and distribution sector has a 
certain potential for improvement in terms of efficiency, as losses were calculated by the IEA in 2012 to represent as much as 
13% (IEA, "Ukraine", op. cit., p. 46). 
166
 As of 2014, nuclear share in power generation amounted to as much as 49.39% (see: 
http://www.iaea.org/PRIS/CountryStatistics/CountryDetails.aspx?current=UA (Accessed on the 22th April 2015). 
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inexistent. A certain jump in efficiency in households´ consumption seems to have happened from 2006 
to 2007, where the volume of gas was reduced by around 1bcm.167 While reduction in district heating has 
proceeded constantly since 2003 with a big reduction in 2007 again, it seems that as of 2011-12, 
reductions have not been substantial.168  Other sectors where there is potential for saving and where 
progress has also been made, are: the category where the rest of the industry is lumped together, which 
consumed in 2006 as much as 11bcm and which managed to reduce consumption in 2008 to 1bcm less.169 
Ukraine also consumes a sizable amount of technical gas to power gas pipelines needed not only for its 
own gas, but also for Russian gas that has to transit the country. With total technical needs amounting to 
almost 7bcm in 2007,170 the reduced transit of Russian gas is surely proving an important factor in the last 
years.171 However, the bulk of the savings made to date might be related to technical improvements 
instead. According to Naftohaz in 2007, there were potential savings of 3.9bcm a year.172 As reported by 
the IEA, substantial reductions have already happened, with technical gas falling from 6.6 bcm in 2005 to 
just half thereof, 3.3 bcm in 2010.173  The major technical improvement made here is related to the 
substitution of gas pumping stations by electrical units; according to Ukrtransgaz, about 35% of the 
pumping units were electric by end 2011, something that allowed the company to save 0.41 bcm of gas in 
2011 alone.174 Still, one caveat here is necessary, as before Nord Stream, Russian gas transit was already 
reduced substantially.175 
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 IHS CERA, op. cit., Figure 4-10, p. 4-11 (49). 
168
 Ibid., Figure 4-11. p. 4-12 (50); here a non-negligible factor may be temperature fluctuations from year to year which could 
account for changes exogenous to gains made in efficiency. However, a certain trend seems to register from 2003, which can 
be attributed to modernization and switching to coal in the big Kyivenergo combined heat and power (CHP) plant (IEA, 
"Ukraine", op. cit., p. 101-102). As can be seen in the report by IHS CERA (op. cit., Figure 4-11, p. 4-12 (50), the biggest 
reduction comes from consumption in the city of Kyiv. Still, according to the IEA in its report from 2012, there was a rate of as 
much as 15% in heat losses (in some cases much more) located in the production stage (IEA, "Ukraine", op. cit., pp. 46, 55) 
while the rate of heat losses in the distribution network amounts to at least 17% (Ibid., p. 55). The potential for reduction if all 
possible modernization and efficiency measures were introduced, according to the Ministry of Regional Development, 
Construction and Building, would amount to about 3bcm (Ibid., Idem); however, the same ministry approved a plan to reduce 
consumption between 5bcm-6bcm in 2020 (Ibid., p. 60). In 2011 the sector consumed around 13bcm (Ibid., p. 60), compared 
to the peak above 14bcm in 2003 (IHS CERA, op. cit., p. 4-12 (50). 
169
 IHS CERA, op. cit., Figure 4-9, p. 4-10 (48); consumption fell drastically to slightly above 6bcm in 2009, probably as a 
result of the financial crisis, where Ukraine registered a fall of 14,8% of its GDP.  
170
 Ibid., Figure 4-12, p. 4-12 (50). 
171
 In 2013 Russia reduced transit of gas through Ukraine to 52% (see: "Cherez territoriiu Ukrainy v 2013 godu "Gazprom" 
transportiroval 52% prodannogo v Evropu gaza (Через территорию Украины в 2013 году "Газпром" транспортировал 52% 
проданного в Европу газа)" Zerkalo Nedeli, 30 January 2013, at http://zn.ua/ECONOMICS/cherez-territoriyu-ukrainy-v-
2013-godu-gazprom-transportiroval-52-prodannogo-v-evropu-gaza-137794_.html (Accessed on the 6th February 2014), as 
compared to near 100% rates in the 90s or 80% during the period 2005 to 2009. 
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 IHS CERA, op. cit., p. 4-11 (49). 
173
 IEA, "Ukraine", op. cit., p. 104. 
174
 Ibid., Idem. 
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 Nord Stream did not start working until 2011 and explains the big reduction in gas transit since then. 2009 and 2010 
witnessed a big but temporary reduction due to the economic crisis (see: IHS CERA, op. cit., Figure 2-3, p. 2-3 ( 27). A 
downward tendency is registered since 2004, with the total gas transit being reduced from 140bcm to under 100bcm since 2009 
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(see: Ibid., Idem.), which seems to be explained mostly by the full functioning of Blue Stream from 2006 (IEA, "Ukraine", op. 
cit., pp. 112-113).Transit of Russian gas through Ukraine in 2013 amounted to 83.7bcm ("cherez territoriiu",  op. cit.). 
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Chapter 4: Russia-Ukraine Energy Relations 
 
4. 1. General Picture of Russo-Ukrainian Relations in the First Years of Independence 
Both The Russian Federation and Ukraine have inherited from the Soviet Union a troublesome pattern of 
energy relations which has marred their relations ever since then. The problem was that in a similar 
fashion as happened in trade between the Soviet Union and the CMEA countries, and as it will be briefly 
mentioned in the next chapter, energy trade was subsidized.1 As Simon Pirani points to, it was neither 
politically desirable nor practically possible to deny Ukraine shipments of needed fuel while the country 
had troubles making payments.2 Thus, Russia was entangled in a pattern of subsidization that would bring 
her continuing headaches for the years to come. Gregory Krasov and Josef Brada analyzed this pattern of 
subsidization for the period 1992-1997 in what regards oil and gas trade prices, tariffs and energy credits. 
They thus highlighted the main elements that have characterized mutual energy relations since then. Both 
countries have been living in almost unsolvable tension since the break-up of the Soviet Union, for as 
soon as Ukraine became independent, the dilemma of maintaining energy subsidization instead of 
enforcing a transition towards market prices increased for Russia with the heightened opportunity costs.3  
As the authors rightly point to, initial interest among analysts regarding a possible liberalization of trade 
between the former Soviet republics, obscured the issue of conflict that was soon to develop between 
many of them. In this respect, the Russia-Ukraine dyad was probably the most troublesome. Margarita 
Balmaceda rightly pointed out that the dissolution of the Soviet Union and its centralized rule was far 
from meaning the disappearance of a Russia-centric economic network and its ensuing dependency. This 
was manifestly the case in Ukraine.4 Both the disputes analyzed later and the most recent events as of 
2014 show that the dilemma is far from being solved. 
With a huge level of dependence of Ukraine on Russia for its oil and gas imports (as was seen in 
the previous chapter, Ukraine´s gas resources suffered severe depletion during the decade of the 80s), the 
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic had been enjoying imports of underpriced energy resources. After a 
central bank clearing system had failed to come to light, the Russian Federation announced in 1992 that 
                                                           
1
 Krasnov, Gregory V. and Brada, Josef C.: "Implicit subsidies in Russian-Ukrainian energy trade", Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 
49, no. 5 (Jul., 1997), p. 825. 
2
 Pirani, Simon: "Ukraine´s gas sector", Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (June 2007), pp. 4-5, at 
http://www.oxfordenergy.org/pdfs/NG21.pdf. 
3
 Here, following Krasnov and Brada, the concept of subsidization follows Marrese and Vanous´ theorization of implicit 
subsidies, which is yielded by using world prices in free markets as the benchmark (Krasnov and Brada, op. cit., p. 825). 
4
 Balmaceda, Margarita M.: "Gas, oil and the linkages between domestic and foreign policies: the case of Ukraine",  Europe-
Asia Studies, vol. 50, no. 2 (1998), p. 257. 
    
 
88 
 
trade would henceforth be conducted at world market prices. This represented a radical departure from 
the pattern that existed under the Soviet Union.5 The transition to market prices affected oil, already in 
1993. However, the story with natural gas was a much more complex one. Although Ukraine depended on 
Russia for its gas supplies, this should not lead to the conclusion that the former´s bargaining power was 
nil. In parallel with that dependency, as was already mentioned in the first chapter, Ukraine held a 
privileged position as transit country. It could therefore demand a transit tariff for Russian gas and more 
importantly, affect supplies through its territory. The result of this situation of mutual dependency was the 
agreement of early 1994, where the gas price for Ukraine was set at US$50tcm in exchange for a low 
transit fee for Russian gas that had to traverse Ukraine to reach consumers further West of 
0.65tcm/100km. 6  This agreement was revised the next year so the transit fee moved up to 
1.75tcm/100km.7 However, credits offered by Russia to Ukraine entered the picture. These credits had 
been provided in order to finance energy purchases both in oil and gas. They transformed into an element 
that still mars common relations as of today: debt. In May 1993 it was agreed that Ukraine owed a debt of 
US$1.5bill plus US$1bill of arrears for energy deliveries in the period 1991-1992 and US$203.9mill as 
agreed one month later for energy deliveries for the current year.8 The Ukrainian debt further worsened 
with an addition of US$1.4bill in 1994.9 No solution could be eventually found and debt accumulation 
and disputes persisted in the coming years until a new arrangement was found in 1998 to reschedule 
debt.10 As for prices, the situation improved for Russia. Already in 1995, when Ukraine was offered a 
higher transit fee, prices were agreed at US$80tcm, raising them to world market levels.11 Besides that, 
producer diversification took place in Ukraine, as compared to 51bcm of gas that was imported from 
Russia in 1995, Russian natural gas supply dropped next year to a meager 12bcm.12 This was the result of 
Turkmen gas coming to fill the gap. Finally, in December 1996 a new agreement was reached between 
Ukraine and Gazprom which set the transit fee at the level of US$1.77tcm/100km and where it was 
agreed that this fee would be paid in gas for Ukraine´s consumption.13 It must be noted, that Ukraine 
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 Krasnov and Brada, op. cit., p. 827. 
6
 Ibid., Idem. 
7
 Ibid., Idem. 
8
 Ibid., pp. 827-828. 
9
 Ibid., p. 828. 
10
 Ibid., Idem. 
11
 Ibid., Idem. 
12
 Ibid., Idem; figures in the same article (Ibid., table 1, p. 830) show in contrast to the figure of 51bcm mentioned, 66.3bcm of 
Russian gas for 1995, which might be explained by supplies out of contract.  
13
 Balmaceda, "Gas, oil and the linkages", op. cit., p. 269. 
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unsuccessfully tried to agree with its Russian counterpart that part of the fees were paid in money instead 
of gas deliveries.14  
According to calculations made by Krasov & Brada, the most likely figure for subsidies in the 
period 1992-95 was US$9.5bill.15 If we compare these subsidies as a percentage of the imports of Ukraine 
from the FSU space, they amounted to 30.5%. If in energy relations between the former USSR and 
CMEA countries this was only 17.6%, then we can follow the authors in their assertion that independent 
Ukraine was favored as compared to Central European countries in the former CMEA space. The authors 
list three probable reasons for this: Russian dependence on Ukraine as a transit country; Russia´s interest 
in Ukraine´s economic stability and pressure from the international community to ensure this stability.16 
Whatever the reason, the fact is that the pattern that may have reached an extreme during the first years of 
independence, nevertheless endured in the coming years. Disputes involving gas cut-offs, in a lower 
dimension than in January 2006 and January 2009, but often affecting end-consumers, happened several 
times during these years. 
 
4. 2. Gas Disputes and Energy Agreements 
Recurring gas disputes happened in the 90s as a result of all the debt accumulated by the Ukrainian side in 
the midst of an economic collapse which was affecting the whole former Soviet Union. Debt issues for 
Gazprom during these years were substantial. In the case of Ukraine, we may see that the percentage of 
gas bills paid from 1995 to 1998 was 80.1%, 90.36%, 88.85% and 70.26%.17 For three years, 1992, 1993 
and 1994, Russia cut off gas deliveries to Ukraine as a result of Ukraine´s indebtedness.18 In a pattern 
which would re-emerge in full swing in the convulsed period from 2005 to 2009, Ukraine responded, 
siphoning gas off from transit gas, something which Ukraine´s near monopoly of Russian supplies to 
Europe enabled. Two instances of gas diversion were acknowledged by Ukraine, in September 1993 and 
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 Ibid., Idem. 
15
 Krasnov and Brada, op. cit., p. 836. 
16
 Ibid., pp. 839-840.  
17
 Stern, Jonathan: "Soviet and Russian gas: the origins and evolution of Gazprom´s export strategy", in Mabro, Robert and 
Wybrew-Bond, Ian (1999): Gas to Europe: the strategy of four major suppliers, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, Oxford 
University Press, p. 156, Table 5. As can be seen in table 5, Ukraine was not in fact the worst debtor of Gazprom, at a time 
when even from the Baltic countries debt accumulated; during that period, Belarus and specially Moldova, had a worse level of 
indebtedness to Gazprom than Ukraine. What set Ukraine apart though, was the size of its economy, which made this 
indebtedness more critical for the Russian monopoly. As Jonathan Stern explains, despite the critical importance of revenues 
from Ukraine, Russian dependence on its neighbor to ensure transit further West explains Russia´s relatively conciliatory 
stance (see: Ibid., p. 158). Another element that sets Ukraine apart from the Baltic states, Belarus and Moldova, is its adamant 
refusal to let Gazprom gain any ownership of its energy infrastructure (see: Ibid., p. 159).  
18
 Pirani, "Ukraine´s gas sector", op. cit., p. 19. 
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November 1994, but Russia claimed on many occasions that Ukraine was still siphoning gas off at the 
expense of customers in Europe.19  
The period of independence in Ukraine was greeted with great uncertainties as for the energy 
future of the country, as Ukraine was extremely dependent on gas and oil imports that could only come 
from CIS countries, mainly Russia and Turkmenistan. Prime Minister Vitold Fokin claimed in March 
1992 to have secured agreements with Russian companies to guarantee enough supplies.20 However, 
clouds were gathering in Turkmenistan. Turkmen gas was also necessary for Ukraine in addition to 
Russian gas and thus, negotiations with Ashgabad were needed too, in order to agree on deliveries. 
Turkmen conditions were extremely advantageous for the first quarter, with a price of US$8tcm. 
However, prices would shoot up to US$73tcm in the second quarter.21 Fokin negotiated and from an 
initial offer of only US$20, Ukraine managed to agree on a price even lower than for the first quarter. 
However, the Ukrainian side insisted on having transport costs included.22 Deadlock ensued and Ukraine 
responded by suspending good deliveries to Turkmenistan. Even if that was not eventually carried out, 
Ukraine went as far as to threaten Ashgabad with closure of the export route to Western Europe.23 The 
result of this situation was that Ukraine had to rely exclusively on Russia 24 until an agreement was 
reached in September 1992 for deliveries in the fourth quarter (US$12tcm), while prices for 1993 were to 
be negotiated later.25  However, problems soon came from Russia too and Ukraine was heading for its 
first gas dispute. 
This dispute happened in October 1992 when Ukraine siphoned off gas and provoked a situation 
in which for around 10 days Germany saw its supplies reduced in 20%-50%.26 Although price and transit 
conditions had been agreed in the month of August, Russia had to resort to a reduction of supplies in 
October as it accused Ukraine of not adhering to the conditions agreed. The only alternative for Ukraine 
was to siphon gas off at the expense of Germany´s energy security.27 This was the context in which Russia 
announced an increase of gas prices to "world market prices" for next year, to start from January 1st. This 
put Ukraine in a critical situation and eventually led then Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma to declare an 
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"energy crisis" in May.28 An agreement had been reached in February 1993, where gas would be sold at 
US$37tcm and the transit tariff set at US$0.43tcm/100km, but Prime Minister Kuchma complained that 
Russia had breached its commitments on petrol deliveries and thereafter the situation degenerated to the 
point that the Russian side decided to be true to its previous announcement in 1992 and sell gas at world 
prices of US$85tcm. Ukraine then retaliated with a transit tariff of US$3.00tcm/100km.29 It is thus not 
surprising that new reports of gas diversions, which Ukraine denied, were reported in March 1993 (until 
that month, insufficient oil deliveries to Ukraine from Russia were also reported)30 and that in September 
supply problems were reported in Turkey, Bulgaria and Rumania (this time, as already mentioned in the 
paragraph above, this was acknowledged by Ukraine).31 In June both countries agreed on a price for gas 
of US$80tcm. This price was quite high if compared to those paid by other countries in Central Europe.32  
Western Europe would soon experience new problems when Russia again decided in February 
1994 to partially suspend gas deliveries to Ukraine.33 This led Ukraine again to use transit gas, siphoning 
off as much as 20% of normal supplies to Europe and provoking a fall in deliveries in Germany, France 
and Italy.34 This month horribilis was compounded by the fact that not only supplies from Russia, but also 
supplies from Turkmenistan were suspended due to non-payment from the Ukrainian side and debt 
accumulation (US$671.9mill).35 This cut-off put Ukraine in a critical situation which was solved when 
Turkmenistan accepted its debt to be sold to the intermediary company Respublika (see below).36 As for 
the dispute with Russia, it ended with the signing of the first inter-governmental agreement, signed that 
same month and which appeared to be a promise of stable relations between both provider and consumer. 
Unfortunately this new agreement did not bring order. 37  One possible reason for this was that the 
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agreement left to contract-based agreements at the companies´ level the decision to fix annual amounts 
and both commercial and technical conditions for transit and export of Russian gas.38 
New gas diversions happened in November 1994, initially denied by the Ukrainian side, and then 
acknowledged the following month, when it was announced that Ukraine had again siphoned off 20% of 
supplies crossing Ukraine (the second time Ukraine acknowledged such an incident). 39  With the 
replacement of President Leonid Kravchuk by his former Prime Minister, Leonid Kuchma in October 
1994, the support of the IMF was sought in order to find a solution with debts to Gazprom in the context 
of a general involvement of the international organization in the economic reform of Ukraine. As a result, 
Gazprom agreed to restructure Ukraine´s gas debts worth US$1.4bill in March 1995 through a special 
government bond called "Gazpromovok".40 This in fact was the prelude to the appearance of gas traders 
(see below) in the Ukrainian energy market. 41  Two years later, on the 4th December 1996, a new 
agreement to decide condition of supplies for the next year and the conditions for transit of Russian gas 
was reached and the transit tariff was set at US$1.77tcm/100km.42 
Although gas was the main source of trouble, this was not the only one, as oil, the other big energy 
commodity transported through Ukraine was also at the center of some punctual disputes. As was seen 
above, Ukraine experienced problems with oil supplies in early 1993 43 and would see Russia interrupt 
supplies in June and July (only resumed in October)44 due to the debt accumulated.45 As opposed to 
natural gas, the situation with oil soon turned in Russia´s favor. After the initial turmoil, it was agreed that 
oil would be traded at market prices. As opposed to what has been the norm with gas, that has remained 
unchanged since then. In 1993 prices for oil were agreed, so Ukraine would pay US$80/ton in the third 
quarter, US$90/ton in the fourth quarter and US$100/ton in the first quarter of 1994. Ukraine thus soon 
accepted that oil prices converged towards market prices.46 The only point where agreement took more 
time to come, concerned transit fees as they did not rise to world market levels. This was clearly 
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unfavorable to Ukraine, which was left with transit fees to be agreed bilaterally.47 Negotiations where 
Ukraine sought better terms led to a short disruption in January 1996, when oil flows were stopped for a 
few hours.48 This led Russia to accept de facto higher transit fees.49 Since then, oil has been left out of 
contentious issues. 
One option that Russia started voicing from the very beginning and for which it has manifested a 
clear preference since then, is the creation of gas consortia where both Russian and Ukrainian capital 
would be involved. This was placed in a more general context of linkage between economics and politics, 
exemplified by the Russian proposal in September 1993 to cancel Ukrainian debts in exchange for control 
of the Black Sea Fleet and possession of Ukraine´s nuclear warheads inherited from the Soviet army.50 
Broached as soon as 1993, the idea was revived in negotiations during 1994. The Russian idea was for to 
obtain 51% for Gazprom in important energy infrastructures.51 The new company was later brought into 
being and named as "Gaztransit". The main interest on the part of Russia seemed to obtain a leverage to 
avoid gas siphoning-off by Ukraine.52  However, resistance within Ukraine prevented any deal to be 
signed, so the project was soon still-born.53  
In the meantime, troubles with gas supplies continued, as when in 1997, with Ukraine now mostly 
depending on Turkmenistan for its supplies (as had been the norm since the year before), the Central 
Asian republic decided to stop supplies due to a debt of US$200mill.54 Gazprom then stepped in with an 
offer to increase by 20bcm of gas to compensate.55 The year 1997 was a year of general crisis in the 
energy sector in Ukraine, mostly due to debts that intermediaries had accumulated to the Ukrainian state.56 
This was coupled with concerns regarding Ukrainian gas storage facilities, which had to be filled enough 
for the next season. This was not evident in the face of lack of money available to pay for gas on the part 
of responsible companies.57 Besides that, it seems that throughout 1997 UESU and Interhaz had each 
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accumulated around US$100-US$120mill owed to Gazprom for supplied gas. 58  In addition to debts 
accumulated during 1997, Ukraine had accumulated in the period before a total debt to both Russia and 
Turkmenistan of as much as US$4.205bill.59 
The 1998 agreements seemed to put an end to this period of turmoil.60 That year it was agreed that 
natural gas would cost US$50tcm. This represented a substantial reduction from US$80tcm agreed a year 
before. In parallel, transit tariffs were also reduced from US$1.75tcm/100km to US$1.01-1.09tcm/100km. 
The price of US$50tcm concerned volumes of natural gas delivered on a market basis, while as much as 
30bcm were supposed to be delivered in concept of transit tariff.61 However, this agreement was illusory, 
as by late 1998, Gazprom was claiming that gas was again being diverted (as much as 2.5bcm in 
December).62 In the critical context of unpaid bills in Russia and falling exports as a result of the financial 
crisis of 1998, all the CIS space, including Ukraine, was hard hit. This set the conditions for new gas 
diversions, unacceptable for Gazprom. After 4bcm were allegedly siphoned off in Ukraine,63 exports of 
oil, gas and electricity in 1999 were suspended. Gazprom demanded a price of US$83tcm for these 
volumes siphoned off and claimed a total debt of US$2.8bill.64 Improvements could have been expected 
as a result of both the economic stabilization of Ukraine after debt and inflation issues had been solved in 
the aftermath of the IMF´s intervention in the country and the recovery from 1999 of the Russian crisis of 
the preceding year. However, a factor for Russia´s recovery, the world surge in oil prices (from US$15 
per barrel (bbl) in 1998 to over US$60bbl in 2005)65, had the potential to bring troubles for Ukraine, 
dependent as the country was on Russian gas. With increasing oil prices, Russia was likely to renew 
pressure on Ukraine to revise prices. In addition to this situation, Russia still needed to recover both debts 
that had been left aside in the 1998 agreements and new ones that had accumulated since then.66 Russia 
kept complaining about new gas diversions by Ukraine,67 which lasted until as late as June 2000. It seems 
that both unlawful gas diversions in mid-2000 and Russia´s efforts to build a bypass through Belarus 
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represented the watershed for a real breakthrough.68 The acknowledgement by Deputy Prime Minister 
Oleg Dubina in 2001 of a volume of as much as 8.7bcm of Russian gas siphoned off in 2000 alone,69 is a 
good example of the magnitude of the problem and the dilemma that this supposed for Russian´s 
dependence on Ukraine. 
As a consequence of the last stage of turmoil, a new round of agreements from 2000 finally 
managed to introduce some predictability into Russia-Ukraine energy relations. Some uneventful years 
ensued until the gas dispute of January 2006. Two agreements, "the agreement on guarantees of transit of 
Russian natural gas through the territory of Ukraine" from the 22nd December 2000 and the "agreement 
on additional measures to guarantee the transit of Russian natural gas through the territory of Ukraine" 
from the 4th October 2001, formed a juridical corpus that would regulate mutual energy relations for the 
coming years. In exchange for putting an end to gas debts accumulation,70 in 2001 Russia confirmed it 
would continue providing gas for transit and it reserved a maximum of 5bcm to be sold at US$80tcm in 
the event of problems with Turkmen deliveries. The transit tariff was set at US$1.09tcm/100km for both 
Russian gas to Europe and Turkmen gas to Ukraine.71 The debt accumulated from the period before was 
finally agreed to be swapped for gas deliveries in the agreements of August 2004.72 Ukraine would thus 
receive 5bcm less per year for the period 2004-2009.73 That led to a gas deficit which in turn brought 
some problems the next year as Ukraine lacked enough supplies and had to renegotiate with Gazprom 
(See chapter 6). 
However, the period from 2005 to 2009, coincidental with Viktor Yushchenko´s Presidency, 
ushered the country into a period of increased opposition to Russia. This is when the three big disputes of 
January 2006 and January 2009 and the minor one of March 2008 took place. The period was far less 
chaotic than that of the first years of independence reviewed above, but the two aforementioned disputes 
reached a degree unseen before. Viktor Yushchenko departed from agreements signed in 2004, which 
opened the door to the creation of an energy consortium in the direction of Russian preferences. Limited 
as the scope of these agreements might have appeared in the beginning, their cancellation along with the 
strong and undisguised pro-Western foreign policy choices by the new Administration, set in motion a 
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dynamic where Russia probably speeded up the transition to market prices as it intended to demand from 
all CIS countries. Resisting prices for 2006 at US$230 as demanded by Gazprom and having closed the 
door to any scheme involving ownership by Gazprom of Naftohaz infrastructures, Ukraine had to face gas 
cut-offs from January 1st which were responded by gas diversions that following the same pattern seen in 
the 90s affected other European consumers.  The dispute was solved on 4th January by a complicated 
arrangement (See chapter 6) expanding the role attributed to the intermediary RosUkrEnergo and through 
a complex mix of Russian and Central Asian gas (more on this in chapter 6; see below for 
RosUkrEnergo). The dispute of January 2006 was the first stage in the new period of turbulence, as two 
new disputes were to hit Ukraine in March 2008 (see chapter 7) and January 2009 (see chapter 8). 
Ukraine faced a partial cut-off of gas due to debts owed to Gazprom in March 2008 while debt issues 
again delayed talks on a price agreement for 2009 that eventually led to the biggest dispute ever. With 
only one day to agree on prices once the debt issue was solved before the midnight deadline and despite 
close positions between both parts, no agreement could be signed. Ukraine again faced gas cut-offs which 
translated into new flow disruptions affecting other European customers. With Gazprom then responding 
with a total gas embargo towards Europe in order to preclude Ukraine making any gas diversions, the 
dispute lasted a total of three weeks. This provoked a serious energy crisis in some countries like 
Bulgaria, with a final agreement being signed on 19th January. 
With the arrival of Viktor Yanukovich as president of Ukraine, energy relations took a significant 
turn, leaving behind the tension of the previous years. They did not improve however, to the point of 
becoming fully cooperative. Tensions remained as the new administration refused to accept Gazprom´s 
wishes for a common management of the transportation facilities through Ukraine. The Kharkiv 
agreements signed in April 2010 boded well for relations between Russia and Ukraine, as in exchange of 
the extension of the lease contract for the Russian Black Sea Fleet in the port of Sebastopol, Crimea, to 
2042,74 Ukraine was granted a further reduction in gas prices (30% from the price agreed in January 2009, 
instead of 20% had been agreed for 2009).75 However, Ukraine balked under Yanukovich at any scheme 
proposed by Russia involving the figure of a gas consortium or the merging of Naftohaz with Gazprom. 
The new administration proved thus to be far from a mere pro-Russian stooge as some imagined. Instead, 
Yanukovich sought instead an active policy of energy diversification. This strategy translated into the 
import of gas from Poland and Hungary (through the German RWE), the planning of a LNG terminal in 
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the Black Sea and the development of shale gas resources. Meanwhile, Ukraine sought to sign the 
Association Agreement with the European Union, challenging Russia who wanted Ukraine to join its 
project of Eurasian Union. Even if economic pressure seemed to be the trigger for the Ukrainian 
government´s rejection of its signature in the Vilnius Summit of the Eastern Partnership, Ukraine signed a 
new energy agreement on the 17th December 2013  in which Russia offered advantageous gas prices in 
what looked like an economic concession for political reasons.76 As the Yanukovich administration was 
ousted on the 22nd February 2014 and the country was engulfed in division and civil unrest with the 
Russian annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and its support to insurrection in Donbass, the future of 
Russian-Ukrainian energy relations remains as open as gloomy in prospects.77 Both the agreements of 
December 2013 and April 2011 were cancelled and in April 2014 Russia asked Ukraine to pay the price 
of US$485tcm for the second trimester. This disagreement, as well as accumulated debts, led to an energy 
dispute where gas flows were cut-off from June 16th to early December.78 The winter package approved in 
late October guaranteed the April 2011 discount, so prices remained for Ukraine as before December 
2013. To the time of writing, this pricing arrangement has been extended to the second quarter of 2015.79  
 
4. 3. The Internal Factor in Russia-Ukraine Energy Relations and Intermediaries 
We were able to have a glimpse of the internal market of Ukraine in the previous chapter and see what 
role corruption played since the beginning. Possibly the best example of the controversial marriage 
between energy and corruption is the plethora of opaque companies enjoying privileged connections to 
the government. The chief protagonists in these complex schemes of corruption were the so called 
"Gazotreidery" or gas traders. That was the name given to these intermediaries when they made their first 
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appearance in the 90s. The rationale for their appearance stemmed from the debt problem that marred 
Russia-Ukraine energy relations. These intermediaries, which were supposed to have at hand the means to 
recover debts, mainly through barter schemes,80 took on a life of their own and started serving their 
private interests. As Jonathan Stern told Global Witness in its report on the Ukrainian energy sector, these 
companies could enforce commercial conditions that Gazprom was not able to do.81 Besides that, they 
often enjoyed better contacts with suppliers who hardly trusted Ukraine as a reliable customer. Hence 
their (at least apparent) indispensability and the reason for their being able to abuse their position.    
The first example of this highly profitable source of revenues was the company Respublika, which 
came to play a significant role between Turkmen-Ukraine energy relations and which, as seen above, 
solved a debt dispute between both countries in February 1994. However, Respublika proved a complete 
disaster and was not up to Turkmen expectations. The main reason lay in the opaque barter system that 
was thought up in order to organize imports of Turkmen gas. The idea behind it, was very simple: 
Respublika would pay US$275mill in money and would then pay the rest of the outstanding debt it had 
inherited from the government, US$578mill, in goods, from which 10,000 tons would be in animal fat 
and 2,000 in baby food.82 Problems came when it appeared that Respublika had sold some of the goods 
well over its real market value. 83  Respublika was eventually removed from the energy trade with 
Turkmenistan and a replacement had to be found to solve the still unsolved debt with the Central Asian 
producer. 
The next solution came with the appearance of a second company, Itera, which would prove much 
more resilient after the false start of Respublika. Itera stayed in business from 1994 to 2002. The origins 
of Itera, headed by Igor Makarov, owed something both to Turkmenistan and to Gazprom. Igor Makarov 
himself was a resident in Turkmenistan who had made a business out of selling food for oil in that 
country thanks to his close relations to high ranking people in the circle of power in Ashgabad,84 as can be 
exemplified by the fact that former Vice-President from 1989 to 1991, Valery Otchertsov, was to become 
Vice-President of Itera. 85  Gazprom´s role was clear when the joint venture "TurkmenRosGas" was 
terminated in 1996 amid allegations from the Turkmen government that Itera owed US$200mill. As could 
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have been expected after the fiasco of Respublika, Turkmenistan wanted to put an end to Itera´s presence 
and called for direct sales without intermediaries.86 Gazprom however, had other intentions and lobbied in 
favor of Makarov´s company. As Makarov himself explained, Itera had the wherewithal through its 
complex barter scheme and could get payments from Ukraine.87 That could provide an explanation for 
Gazprom´s insistence. Irrespective of whether that was true or not, the fact is that Gazprom´s support for 
Itera, a company that looked more like a competitor than an ally and from which it bought Turkmen gas 
at higher prices than if it had purchased them directly,88 had also much to do with corruption and the 
interest of its head, Rem Vyakhirev, to channel funds away from the company for personal enrichment. 
Indeed to some, the way Itera was favored, with as much as 50% of Gazprom´s former markets in the 
post-Soviet space surrendered to the intermediary,89 could not be explained just by a strategic interest in 
Makarov´s company.90 Suspicion that some of Gazprom´s officials had a personal interest in the company 
increased when it was revealed through an audit in April 2001 that some undisclosed individuals owned 
shares of the company.91 But Itera did not profit only at the expense of Gazprom´s corporative interests 
(and of Turkmenistan´s possibly too), but also of Ukraine. For example, it extracted money at the expense 
of its consumers by declaring inflated prices in order to seek state reimbursements and cash in more 
profits. The way for this was paying a reduced cash price to Gazprom for the use of pipelines it owned 
and then asking for a "reimbursement" from Ukraine. This reimbursement was made in gas that was then 
sold abroad at higher prices.92  
However, Itera had its days numbered. The Russian side eventually dumped it, sealing its fate as 
intermediary with Ukraine and opening the door to another company, EuralTransGaz (ETG). The reason 
for Itera´s disgracing had much to do with the arrival of Vladimir Putin as President of the Russian 
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Federation and with changes in Gazprom´s management. This started with the substitution of Rem 
Viakhirev by the trusted Alexei´ Miller in 2001, who then gradually consolidated his power until the state 
became majority share-holder in 2004. Deputy chairman of Gazprom, Alexandr Riazanov, voiced 
concerns regarding Itera and called for its substitution by Gazprom itself, as it could perfectly fulfill the 
same duties without intermediaries.93 Itera´s removal was apparently also desired in Ukraine.94 The next 
step, that of establishing a joint venture between Gazprom and Naftohaz seemed to be the most 
reasonable, as they had a common interest in ensuring Turkmen gas´s uneventful transit. The new 
intermediary would start working from the 1st January 2003. However, the end result eventually ended up 
following the same pattern as with its predecessors. The involvement of opaque third parties happened 
again with EuralTransGaz. 
The origins of EuralTransGaz were shrouded in mystery and its owners mostly unknown until the 
controversial composition came to light in scandal. Even if the original intent was to have the company as 
a joint venture between the two state companies, it ended up being the exact opposite, as opaque offshore 
companies came to form the core instead. The company was headed by the obscure former KGB member, 
the Hungarian Andras Knopp and had been registered by the Israeli lawyer Zeev Gordon. The latter 
admitted having received the demand for registration by a Ukrainian businessman called Dmitro Firtash.95 
Surprisingly, it appeared that the shares owned by Zeev Gordon had been transferred to three Romanian 
citizens, simple private persons that were promised money in exchange for lending their signatures.96 
Both Knopp´s and Boi´ko´s (Iurii´ Boi´ko was then Head of Naftohaz) interviews in 2003 hinted at 
EuralTransGaz being a transitory solution while a new company was discussed.97 By April 2004 the 
situation regarding EuralTransGaz became more confused and Naftohaz and Gazprom still remained out 
of the company´s opaque ownership structure. The structure of EuralTransGaz at that time was the 
following: a British company, Atlantic Caspian Resources, became the owner of 44.67% of the shares, a 
Dutch company called JKX Gas BV came to possess 30%, while the rest of the shares amounting to 
25.33% ended in the hands of an Austrian firm known as DEG Handels. Behind two of these companies 
                                                           
93
 "It´s a gas", op cit., p. 36. Itera was systematically driven out from most of the market niches it had managed to settle itself: 
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appeared two companies from Cyprus, "Dema Trustees Limited" and "Dema Nominees Limited".98 The 
biggest question, which Global Witness dealt with, was to show whom benefits of the company accrued 
and why did Naftohaz and Gazprom shun benefits and leave the business to an apparently useless 
intermediary.99 The contract with EuralTransGaz was terminated in 2004 without apparent reasons, but as 
Zeev Gordon himself argued afterwards, this was the result of the bad publicity the company was 
receiving after details on its ownership structure were filtered.100 It has also been suggested this might 
only have been the trigger for an impending decision from the part of Gazprom, dissatisfied with an 
arrangement which made it incur significant losses. 101  Whatever the reason, EuralTransGaz was 
terminated and substituted by another company called RosUkrEnergo. This would prove the apex in the 
trail of scandals initiated by its predecessors. Besides its murky nature, what definitely set RosUkrEnergo 
apart from previous companies was the shadow it cast on the biggest gas disputes ever: that of January 
2006 and also, at least in part, that of January 2009. In both disputes RosUkrEnergo became the third 
actor apart from Russia and Ukraine. 
RosUkrEnergo started as a more promising formula though. As opposed to previous schemes 
involving only private individuals and in the same way Gazprom seemed to have being insisting before, 
the Russian gas monopoly became 50% owner of the company. The exact ownership was not devoid of 
controversy though, as instead of direct ownership, Gazprombank owned its shares through the company 
"ArosGas Holding AG",102 and through a long list of offshore intermediaries not "simplified" before 
December 2006.103 The stability of Gazprom´s presence was hampered by the opacity that characterized 
the other half of RosUkrEnergo. This other half was owned by "CentraGas Holding AG", a subsidiary of 
the Austrian based "Raiffeisen Investment". Of this second half the only known fact was that the owners 
were Ukrainian businessmen. Their identity however, was not disclosed.104 Agreed in July 2004, the 
company started working in 2005 exporting Turkmen gas to Ukraine and retaining an important share of 
gas in payment of the transit tariff, from which part was resold to Ukraine (to be then resold to Europe at 
market prices) and the rest remained in its hands to be sold in Central Europe, from where it made big 
profits. The issue of ownership came to the forefront after the resolution of the gas dispute of January 
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2006 (see chapter 6) expanded the role of RosUkrEnergo. As a result of this, RosUkrEnergo came to 
monopolize the whole gas mix of Ukraine, made of Central Asian (mainly Turkmen, but also Uzbek and 
Kazakh) and Russian gas and many in Ukraine raised the alarm as for the possible interests Gazprom may 
have had at involving RosUkrEnergo in the resolution of the dispute. The fact that besides its bigger share 
of natural gas to be sold to Ukraine, RosUkrEnergo would also constitute in parity with Naftohaz a new 
company, UkrGazEnergo and which would henceforth monopolize gas imports in the domestic Ukrainian 
market, represented a proof for many that Gazprom was trying to penetrate Ukrainian gas market in order 
to gain ownership as it had always tried since the 90s. In this narrative, these changes were related to the 
financial situation of Naftohaz, which would probably worsen as a result of the prohibition to re-export 
gas in Europe included in the January agreement. This was seen as a way to bankrupt the company and 
leave the path open to Gazprom´s "financial rescue". The fact that only the ownership of Gazprom was 
known, probably reinforced the impression that RosUkrEnergo was nothing more than a pawn serving 
Vladimir Putin´s interests. However, when it was revealed that the owners of CentraGas were Dmitro 
Firtash (90%) and Ivan Fursin (10%), the former having been also involved in the constitution of 
EuralTransGaz and close not only to one of the most influential personalities of the politicians in the 
Party of Regions,105 Iurii´ Boiko,106 but also rumored to be on good terms with the new President Viktor 
Yushchenko.107 As Global Witness delved more deeply into the details, it was revealed that many were the 
links between EuralTransGaz and RosUkrEnergo: "DEG Handels" and CentraGas had the same address 
in Vienna; one of its executives, Sabine Penkler, was on the supervisory board of "Ostchem Holding 
AG", not only at the same address too, but as we know in retrospective, one of Mr. Firtash´s main 
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 The Party of Regions, based in the industrial region of Donetsk, related to the homonymous oligarchy and presumed to have 
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companies;108  Wolfgang Putschek, representative in the Coordinating Committee of RosUkrEnergo in 
representation of Raiffeisen, was a member of a company called "Ostchem Trading"; Robert Shetler-
Jones, who had an important role in EuralTransGaz, was one of the four representatives on the same 
committee on behalf of EuralTransGaz; Raiffeisen Investment had bought in September 2003 54% of 
Rivneazot, a company which was also related to Firtash through its company Nitrofert.109  
RosUkrEnergo soon fell out with both the Ukrainian and with the Russian side, especially when 
Timoshenko came back as Prime Minister in December 2007 and made of the suppression of 
RosUkrEnergo´s presence in the Ukrainian energy market one of her prime objectives. After the dispute 
of March 2008 (see chapter 7), both Kiev and Moscow agreed to do without the company for 2009, and 
indeed, as the 19th January 2009 agreement was signed putting an end to the latest dispute (see chapter 8), 
RosUkrEnergo disappeared from the scene. With the latest revision of Russia-Ukraine´s energy relations, 
the saga of intermediaries which started with Respublika back in the turmoil of the 90s came to its final 
end. However, RosUkrEnergo did not leave without scandal. Although there has not been final 
confirmation thereof, there are allegations that the company was at the center of the trigger that derailed 
conversations on a new contract for 2009 that until the very end seemed to have a certain potential for 
success. When negotiators from Naftohaz and Gazprom were trying to finalize a late-hour agreement for 
a contract and thus avoid impending gas cut-offs, it seems that positions were not quite far from each 
other, with Gazprom insisting on US$250tcm while Naftohaz preferred a slightly lower price of 
US$235tcm. This is the moment when the Russian side would have received an offer from RosUkrEnergo 
of as much as US$285tcm. This could have been understood as a desperate effort from the intermediary 
to stay in business and to avert its suppression. This offer would have incensed Prime Minister Putin 
personally, suspecting the Ukrainian negotiators of absolute duplicity and as a consequence conversations 
were immediately ended.110     
Since then, schemes involving intermediaries as seen above have not been resurrected. 
RosUkrEnergo resurfaced in 2010 when the Stockholm Arbitration Court ruled in favor of this company 
in its allegations that Naftohaz had illegally seized volumes of gas located in storage facilities amounting 
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to as much as 11bcm in January 2009. 111  This temporarily restored RosUkrEnergo as a gas trader, 
although this was nothing more than a belated consequence of the company´s earlier role.  However, the 
new situation derived from the January 2009 agreement did not just restore Naftohaz as the only gas 
importer. In 2011 legal changes in Ukraine opened the door for new private companies to import gas to 
Ukraine directly without intermediation of Naftohaz. This promised to greatly modify the picture of the 
energy sector in Ukraine and had also the potential to affect energy relations between Russia and Ukraine. 
The biggest beneficiary was the company Ostchem, which started importing gas from the fourth quarter 
of 2011 and remained active until 2013. As this company belonged to Firtash, it would seem reasonable 
to imagine that the Yanukovich administration had restored a close oligarch into the gas trade at the 
expense of the state. This could also feed rumours that always identified Firtash with Russian interests. 
The fact that Ostchem started importing cheaper gas from Central Asian would lend credence to the 
narrative of Firtash as close partner to Gazprom. From 2012, Gazprom ceased exporting Central Asian 
gas and started selling Russian gas instead, thus, seemingly ending the short lived policy of favoring 
Ostchem,112 even if recent information (see ft. 108) points out that favorable prices continued. A new 
actor entered the stage, VETEK, owned by Serhyi´ Kurchenko and closely aligned with the business 
interests of Yanukovich´s close circle. This company has been importing Russian gas sold in reverse 
mode from Germany. Another actor that was rumored to be entering the market of gas imports was 
DTEK, owned by the richest oligarch in Ukraine, Rinat Akhmetov.  
With Yanukovich toppled, the energy panorama underwent important changes, with the oligarch´s 
balance within the country, changing radically. Dmitro Firtash was arrested in Vienna on the 13th March 
2014 as a result of a request by the FBI113 and Serhyi´ Kurchenko´s businesses are being investigated for 
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 "Stockholm arbitration rules in favor of RosUkrEnergo", Kyiv Post, 9 June 2010, at 
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tax evasion. None of these two oligarchs, so prominent in the years before will probably be able to pay a 
significant role in the new period, at least in the short term.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                            
oligarca ucraniano y rival de Timoshenko", Blog Guerra Eterna, 13th March 2014, at http://www.guerraeterna.com/firtash/ 
(Accessed on the 14th March 2014) and "Timoshenko y el baile de los oligarcas en Ucrania", Blog Guerra Eterna, 12ve March 
2014, at http://www.guerraeterna.com/timoshenko-y-el-baile-de-los-oligarcas-en-ucrania/ (Accessed on the 14th March 2014). 
Many rumours linked Firtash to UDAR, Vitaly Klichko´s party, as one of its financers. With Klichko (along with Petro 
Poroshenko) ahead of Timoshenko in polls, and in any case beating her in the second run  (see: "Timoshenko v sluchae 
uchastiia v presidentskikh vyborakh mozhet vyi´ti vo vtoroi´ tur i sostavit konkurenstiiu Klichko i Poroshenko - opros 
(Тимошенко в случае участия в президентских выборах может выйти во второй тур и составить конкуренцию Кличко 
и Порошенко – опрос)", Interfax, 12ve March 2014, at http://interfax.com.ua/news/political/195566.html (Accessed on the 
14th March 2014) and Ivzhenko, Tat´iana: "Vybory prezidenta Nezalezhnoi´ mogut perenesti na dekabr´ (Выборы президента 
Незалежной могут перенести на декабрь)", Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 14 March 2014, at http://www.ng.ru/cis/2014-03-
14/1_ukraina.html (Accessed on the 14th March 2014), there seems to be reasons for suspecting obscure interests (besides the 
fact that Firtash is one of the persons most loathed by Timoshenko). As the unfortunate comments by Victoria Nuland, 
Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs at the United States Department of State and which were leaked 
(presumably by Russian secret services) showed, Vitaly Klichko did not seem to be the US sponsored candidate. In the 
presidential elections celebrated in May 2014, Petro Poroshenko won in the first tour.  
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Chapter 5: Russian Relations to Europe and the Energy Factor 
 
5. 1. Soviet Energy Relations with Europe in the Context of the Cold War 
Since the onset of the Cold War, Eastern and Western Europe remained separated to a degree not seen 
before. This obviously affected economic relations, even if these were far from severed in spite of the 
rivalry between the two blocs. The importance of economic relations was manifest during the whole 
period where the Cold War imposed its political logic; economic relations were seen either as a positive 
inducement to ease tension, or on the contrary, trade restrictions as a vital tool to weaken the opponent.1 
Apart from that, quite often Western European countries simply considered the short-term benefits that 
trade might bring and clashed with the US who usually supported a more hard-line agenda.2 As it might 
seem evident, energy figured from the very beginning as a key item in this respect. Besides its contentious 
dimension, energy trade between the Soviet Union and Western Europe was inaugurated at this time, 
starting a trend which as will be seen, has continued until now. 
The first export pipeline project from the Soviet Union with financial involvement from Western 
Europe3 was the "Druzhba (Friendship)" pipeline, whose construction started in the early 60s.4 Before 
that, the Soviet Union had already started selling oil to Western Europe by tanker, mainly to Italy´s ENI 
in the 50s.5 This had raised the first alarms among those fearing increased Soviet influence and the 
possibility of seeing the Western alliance split. The Soviet Union was conscious of the need for hard 
currency if Nikita Khrushev intended to raise the quality of life and import both industrial and consumer 
goods from the West, as well as to soften containment and help his policy of Peaceful Coexistence.6  The 
US managed eventually to reduce Italy´s dependence on Soviet oil from 22% in 1962 to 10% three years 
later7 and also successfully influenced West Germany (as well as Italy and Japan) 8  not to sell steel 
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 As Robert Jentleson puts it: "in the broadest sense the dispute has been over whether détente and defense are complementary 
or contradictory strategies for relations with the Soviet Union" (see: Jentleson, Robert (1986): Pipeline Politics: East-West 
relations, Ithaca; London, Cornell University, p. 37). 
2
 For the tension between the US and its Western allies regarding trade with the Communist bloc, see: Mastanduno, Michael 
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pipelines needed for the construction of the "Druzhba" pipeline.9 However, the trend for increased trade 
with the Soviet Union could not be stemmed. Figures were already going upwards from the mid-60s and 
this trend was reinforced in the 70s in the midst of Détente and Ostpolitik. In this context, as could have 
been expected, energy projects figured highly.  
The idea of developing a gas pipeline to export natural gas to Europe came to substitute the initial 
project (known as "North Star") of exporting LNG to the US, and soon promised to nurture high-scale 
energy projects. Russian natural gas, an advantageous resource after oil prices jumped in 1973, was the 
object, two years later, of a trilateral swap agreement by France, West Germany and Austria with Iran and 
the Soviet Union. This agreement, though, was eventually cancelled due to the Iranian revolution.10 
However, before this project started being planned, Austria had already become the first recipient of small 
amounts of gas, soon to be followed in 1974 by West Germany and Italy.11 With oil prices soaring in 
1979, Soviet natural gas could only be more coveted in Western Europe. This led to the so called "East-
West" pipeline deal,12 which foresaw that the Soviet share in the global natural gas consumption of 
Germany and France would jump from 15% and 11.7% in 1980 to almost 30% ten years later, while Italy 
might by that time have reached as much as 40%.13 European countries interested in Soviet gas ended up 
committing to 25-30 bcm, 10-15 less than initially intended,14 this being caused more by decreasing oil 
prices and the persistence of economic stagnation, which reduced the need for Soviet gas,15 and less by 
American pressure,16 which utterly failed to force the cancelation of contracts.17 
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 Stern, Jonathan P.: "Soviet natural gas in the world economy", in Jensen, Robert G.; Shabad, Theodore and Wright, Arthur 
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 This pipeline was often called "Yamal" during the early 80s, as it was supposed that natural gas would come from the field 
of Yamburg, in the Yamal peninsula (Gustafson, Thane (1989): Crisis amid plenty: the politics of Soviet energy under 
Brezhnev and Gorbatchev, Princeton, Rand Corporation; Oxford, Princeton University Press, p. 162). However, the so-called 
"gas campaign" in the early 80s, meant to increase gas production to offset feared oil depletion rates, prioritized a rapid 
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the late 90s and transports gas through Belarus. 
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 Ibid., p. 199 (to see the complex negotiations on prices and volumes and the subsequent changes favored by Western 
European partners: Gustafson, Thane: "Soviet negotiating strategy: the East-West pipeline deal, 1980-1984", Rand Corporation 
(February 1985), at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2007/R3220.pdf, pp. 29-34). 
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 Ibid., p. 200. 
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economic factors were influential; in fact, West Germany proportionally reduced Soviet gas imports less than other sources 
(Ibid., p. 201). 
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However, it cannot be forgotten that energy was as much a tool to trade with Western Europe as a 
precious instrument to cement relations between the Soviet Union and the satellite communist regimes in 
Central Europe that Moscow imposed after World War II. Pipelines transporting oil and natural gas were 
first built to guarantee energy needs for these countries; while contracts were not favorable for the Soviet 
Union in economic terms, 18 these secured political allegiance.19 The importance of Soviet oil and gas for 
the Central European economies was crucial: the rates of dependence for petroleum in 1965 represented 
as much as 88% (excluding Romania); ten years later, they reached a staggering 96% (75% including 
Romania), whereas in 1989, at the eve of the collapse of communism, dependence remained at 81%.20 
Regarding natural gas, this commodity followed a similar path: dependence on Soviet resources climbed 
to 50% in 1989 from a meagre 6% in 1970.21  
The first common project among countries of the CMEA was the construction of the oil pipeline 
"Druzhba", already mentioned above and which was agreed in 1958.22 Then natural gas would soon 
follow with the signature in the mid-60s of the pipeline "Bratstvo" 23 (Central European countries like 
Czechoslovakia became useful outlets for gas to Western Europe, as happened with the project 
"Transgaz" agreed in 1970 and which would branch out to neighboring Austria)24. Natural gas projects 
expanded in the 1970s with the development of the "Soyuz" project (Soyuz or Orenburg pipeline) which 
would deliver gas both to Western parts of the Soviet Union and to those CMEA countries involved in the 
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 For a detailed account of the episode of pressure from the Reagan Administration on France, UK, West Germany and Italy to 
cancel the contracts, see: Blinken, Anthony J. (1987): Ally versus Ally: America, Europe and the Siberian pipeline crisis, New 
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 Reisinger, William M. (1992): Energy and the Soviet bloc: alliance politics after Stalin, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, pp. 
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 This happened in two ways: loyal countries like Bulgaria and the GDR (the latter having a particular strategic importance 
and an advantageous position as a door to Western economic resources) received advantageous prices, whereas other loyal 
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project.25 It also involved Western companies which supplied materials for construction,26 with part of the 
natural gas being sold to Western Europe in exchange.27  Through this project, gas serving the new 
pipeline came to represent 17% of all gas consumed by the CMEA countries in 1980.28 In a development 
which would have a great impact on the fuel share of the Central European Republics until now, and 
which would materialize in its worse dimension during the gas disputes of 2006 and 2009, the Soviet 
Union insisted in the 80s on increasing the share of natural gas in substitution of oil in its trade with the 
CMEA countries.29 This policy of oil substitution for gas was also applied in the Soviet Union itself.30 
The reason for imposing this policy was simple: in the 70s, the Soviet Union feared that oil production 
might not increase adequately 31 Precisely, oil became in this decade a vital commodity for the Soviet 
Union and helped avert a collapse of its economic system, as it enabled the import of agricultural 
products necessary to make up for low internal production. If initial plans involved an increased use of 
coal, it finally became easier to concentrate gas for internal consumption to free up as much oil as 
possible.32 
 
5. 2. Russian Energy in Europe after the Collapse of the Soviet Union 
Due to the high proportion of coal in their energy mixes,33 the energy transition that Central European 
countries undertook after the fall of communism and the reduced consumption of solid fuels could only 
benefit Russia as an oil and gas producer. In the first years after the fall of communism though, economic 
slowdown and deindustrialization reduced the consumption of oil in former CMEA countries. However, 
even reduced consumption did not offset for Russia the benefit of receiving US dollars in exchange for 
trade with Central European countries.34 Thus, benefits could be found even in a context of halved output 
in the first half of the 90s as a consequence of the Soviet Union´s collapse. However, the gradual 
expansion of the European Union, which translated into the accession in 2004 of 10 countries, most of 
                                                           
25
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them in the former area of influence of the Soviet Union, including the three Baltic republics, had an 
unwelcome effect on Russia, as this brought the expansion of EU´s governance standards.35 This heralded 
several clashes in energy policy as Gazprom would have difficulties in adapting to European regulations. 
The general picture of Russia´s energy relations with Europe is one of very high dependence on a 
set of countries which represent the main customers for energy exports.36  There is however a clear 
imbalance in their importance, both in absolute and relative terms, as for the proportion of Russian gas in 
the energy mix. This imbalance matches in fact the former division between the Western and the Eastern 
blocs. Whereas the biggest consumers are located in Western Europe, with Germany, Italy and France,37 
volumes sold to Central European countries, as for example Hungary and Poland, are smaller.38 At the 
same time, whereas Russian gas represents a limited share in the total gas consumption of the Western 
consumers, some countries like Bulgaria or Slovakia have a 100% dependence.39  
This imbalance among European customers has had big consequences for Gazprom´s strategy. 
Gazprom has focused on ensuring good relations with its most important customers, mainly Germany,40 
while its business policy in Central Europe has been more forceful, with the use of murky and corrupt 
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schemes been also quite common.41 This has also had consequences on its pricing policy: large Western  
consumers have always been able to hold an advantage in negotiations as opposed to smaller and more 
dependent consumers. Finally, it has also affected perceptions of Russian energy policy whenever energy 
disputes have affected supply; besides being more vulnerable, Central European countries had a very 
negative perception of Russia as heir of the former Soviet Union, especially since Putin took a more 
assertive turn, which many commentators have equated to a second cold war. 
The existing dichotomies between Western and Central Europe which have been mentioned in the 
paragraph above, have also gained in complexity with the increasing importance of the European Union 
as a determinant actor by way of its legislation on energy.42 Before the EU´s energy legislation came to 
affect Gazprom´s strategy and the general Russian conception of energy policy, the first clash in 
philosophies was exemplified already by the Russian Federation´s refusal to the Energy Charter Treaty´s 
(ECT) principles. While having signed the charter in the 90s, it never proceeded with its ratification, 
while the charter´s transit protocol, though tentatively agreed, has not come into force.43 As the final 
result of this clash of philosophies, Russia withdrew from the ECT in July 2009.44 This decision, which 
was the logical result of the state of affairs since many years before, came in the wake of the new energy 
concept espoused by President Dmitri Medvedev in April 2009.45  This concept reaffirmed the main 
misgivings Russia had always maintained against the ECT, namely its being biased in favor of consumer 
countries, who would benefit from an open market while Russia would see control on its energy resources 
weakened.46  
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However, the main reason for Russia´s refusal derives from its intention to maintain its transport 
monopoly of Central Asian energy exports. Thus, Russia rejects the ECT for its provisions on the right of 
first access to pipelines and transit tariffs,47 even if too often, its interpretations do not correspond with 
the exact content of the ECT. 48  The EU´s intention to exempt energy transit within the European 
Community to comply with the ECT transit provisions has constituted the main stumbling block to 
reaching an agreement with Russia.49 If Pr. Konoplianik favored the ECT as the best framework for a 
common governance between Russia as a supplier and its European consumers,50 the reality is that this 
will hardly be possible due to resistance from Russia.51  Thus, mostly determining for Russia are the 
bilateral relations it may establish with consumer states and with the European Union, which are briefly 
reviewed below.  
Russian Energy Relations with Western and Central Europe 
As seen above, Europe is mostly split into two blocs: from one side, Western Europe contains countries, 
which like Germany and Italy, are its main consumers in absolute terms,52 but which are fairly diversified 
and have a relatively low dependence on Russian gas. From the other side, we find the inverse picture in 
Central Europe, where there is no such big consumers as on the Western side of the former East-West 
divide, but where Gazprom´s consumers have in general a much higher rate of dependence.53  
From the end of the Soviet Union, Russia saw a fruitful cooperation with Germany bloom. 
Gazprom managed to penetrate the German downstream market, where to date, many of the benefits of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                            
partnership or the modification of exploitation contracts of foreign companies in Sakhalin could not be possible under the ECT 
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direct sales to consumers were out of reach.54 As Andreas Heinrich and Heiko Pleines explain, relations 
developed slowly but in the clear direction of cooperation.55 Starting with cooperation with Ruhrgas 
(which merged with E.On in 2003), dating back to the 70s, from October 1990, cooperation was 
expanded to another company, Wintershall,56 with whom Gazprom created the Joint Venture Wingas in 
1993, where it reached 50% ownership in 2007.57 Cooperation with Ruhrgas continued too and even 
deepened with the German company becoming a share-holder of Gazprom from 1998 to 2009-2010.58 
The synergies existing between Russia and Germany in the energy sector are probably best exemplified in 
the construction of Nord Stream (see chapter 9) in partnership with both E.ON-Ruhrgas and Wintershall 
(besides Gasunie and Gaz de France), in service from 2011 and which represents the first direct link 
between Russia and Germany, bypassing any transit countries. 59  The next partner in importance is 
undoubtedly Italy, not only through being the second consumer of its gas in Europe, but also for the 
patterns of cooperation that have developed between each other. Thus the Italian ENI has been a key 
partner in the construction of the pipeline Blue Stream from Russia to Turkey, officially inaugurated in 
2005, and is also a partner in the important and controversial project of South Stream, another pipeline 
that was to cross the Black Sea bypassing Ukraine and which was cancelled in December 2014. 
It must be said that these patterns of cooperation either just overlap or feed back into patterns of 
geopolitical positioning of the Russian Federation. The same way Germany is a priced energy partner, it 
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is an equally important political partner since the Soviet Union disappeared and the Russian Federation 
had to face the reality of its much diminished role in Europe.60 Relations with Germany easily fit into 
what Hanna Smith highlights as the Russian preference for bilateral relations when multilateralism does 
not work,61 or in what Derek Averre refers as "selective partnership”.62 In fact, these relations fit into the 
pattern of bilateralization of Russia´s relations, not only with Western Europe, but also with Central 
European countries too. Tuomas Forsberg and Antti Seppo have shown how several trade disputes were 
solved at the bilateral level while the involvement of the European Commission had no effect. 63 The 
European Union, which following Hiski Haukkala term´s, is seen by Russia as a "normative 
hegemony",64 also incorporates visions of countries hostile to Russia (mainly Poland) and freezes the 
negotiating agenda in the "lowest common denominator”.65 
In the case of Central Europe, the picture has been revealed to be quite different because of the 
pattern of energy dependence and the historical legacy already mentioned above. Unlike what happened 
with Western countries, in these countries, diversification has been pursued away from Gazprom, with 
maybe the most notable example being the agreement of Czech Transgas with the Norwegian GFU for 
gas deliveries in 1997.66  However, the stance taken by the Czech Republic rather seems to be an 
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exception in the general picture, with many countries not only being unable to get rid of Gazprom as the 
main supplier but actually increasing its cooperation.67  
If general interests seem to have been the main guide in relations with Germany and Italy, in the 
case of many countries in Central Europe, more opaque political interests have been the main support for 
Gazprom´s penetration. Pro-Gazprom policies have tended to swing back and forth depending on 
government changes in many of these countries, but in general, while the penetration of obscure business 
schemes secured an important buffer against deals being revisited, more importantly the geographical 
situation plays to Russia´s advantage, as access to alternative suppliers is difficult. With Netherlands, 
Norway and Denmark out for reach excepted for some marginal supplies,68 Russia remains the main 
supplier. The opportunities offered by LNG may not be competitive in the face of the costs involved.69   
Russian Energy Policy towards the European Union 
The increase in influence by the European Union towards the Russian Federation and its giant Gazprom 
has been incremental both in the sense that the European Union has increased its geographical scope and 
its legislative drive in the energy sector. As professor Konoplianik has highlighted, whereas the current 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) of 1994 did not include any part referring to energy,70 
both the four Common Spaces agreed in 2003 and the Road Map for their implementation from 2005 
introduced energy into their common interests; conversations in 2008 for the renewal of the PCA strongly 
focused on this matter.71  The problem regarding the EU-Russia dialogue is that of utter asymmetry 
provoked by the EU´s policy of convergence towards its acquis communautaire instead of the philosophy 
                                                           
67
 From among the cooperative countries within the European Union, Hungary and Bulgaria, vital partners in the construction 
of the pipeline South Stream are the most important. Without the EU, Serbia is also a close partner of Gazprom and was also a 
partner in South Stream. On the opposite side, we can find Poland along with Lithuania, trying to reduce dependence on Russia 
while at the same time promoting energy policies that target Gazprom at the EU level; most relevant among recent policy 
initiatives, is the Polish proposal to create an energy union at the EU level, which would negotiate prices with Gazprom. 
68
 Except for the Czech Republic, Hungary has been importing some marginal volumes of gas from Germany (Stern, "The 
future of Russian gas and Gazprom", op. cit., p. 111) and Poland has managed to have some access to Norwegian gas (Ibid., p. 
116) and for some years, gas from Central Asian imported through EuralTransGas and RosUkrEnergo. In the case of the latter, 
better located geographically than other landlocked countries, Russia has managed to play its hand successfully with its 
diversification efforts through Belarus in avoidance of Ukraine with the construction of the Yamal pipeline (see: Victor and 
Victor, op. cit.) that runs through Poland; for Poland this has highlighted the advantage involved in Russian gas (see: Stern, 
"The future of Russian gas and Gazprom", op. cit.,  p. 116).   
69
 This has nevertheless not stopped Poland, Lithuania and Estonia to build LNG terminals. When finished, these will offer 
cheaper gas than Gazprom´s, given the fact that spot prices are currently below the latter´s. However, the long-term forecasts 
do not favor this trend, so LNG gas should become more expensive.  
70
 Energy is mentioned (art. 65) indeed but it is only a particular aspect within the dimension of the economic cooperation 
between the EU and Russia, not a section by itself (see: Handfield, Amelia: "EU–Russia energy relations: aggregation and 
aggravation" , Journal of Contemporary European Studies, vol. 16, no. 2 (2008), pp. 231-248. 
71
 Konoplianik, "A Common Russia-EU Energy Space", op. cit., pp. 258-291. 
    
 
116 
 
favored by Russia of reciprocity.72 This reproduces the general pattern of EU-Russia relations, where the 
former only understands harmonizing cooperation not as convergence, but as the adoption by Russia of 
the EU standards.73 We may follow Caroline Kuzemko when stating that the EU has adopted the liberal 
model in the wake of the end of the Cold War out of the conviction that it is intrinsically superior.74 The 
philosophy of the EU in the so-called third energy package,75 which deepens the liberalizing agenda and 
its promotion of new energy outlets bypassing Russia like the pipeline "Nabucco" are two examples of 
the EU´s policy as opposed to the Russian agenda. From the Russian side the discourse is rather focused 
on deepening cooperation with EU countries in avoidance of troublesome transit countries like Ukraine 
(Nord Stream and South Stream pipelines) and as already mentioned, reciprocity in their mutual relations. 
Unfortunately, the gulf remains at this stage unbridgeable. 
The beginning of the past decade started with positive signs though. The Russian Federation, 
which managed to maintain and even increase its energy resources production in oil and gas, and which 
nevertheless saw in its own economic collapse a way to free more resources for export (See chapter 3), 
appeared as a very suitable option for Europe at the onset of the 00s decade. The importance of increasing 
gas in the energy share of the EU, due to the cleanliness of natural gas as compared to coal, and the fact 
that the Russian Federation appeared as a reliable supplier, set the stage for a deepening of the already 
existing relation of interdependence. Thus came the Joint Declaration of the October 2000 EU–Russian 
Summit, where a Russia-EU energy dialogue was established,76 with the support ot the Vice-President of 
the European Commission, Loyola de Palacio, in charge of energy. This promising start seemed to be 
confirmed with the inclusion of energy as part of the common economic space, when the EU-Russia 
Common Spaces were agreed in May 2003, as it had not been part of the EU-Russia Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement, in force since 1997, and renewed each year since 2007. During this time Russian 
natural gas exports to Europe increased, even if it grew more slowly than other suppliers and in relative 
terms, the share of Gazprom´s gas fell in percentage from 75% in 1990 to 40% in 2008,77 whereas in 2013 
it fell further to 30%. In spite of the eventual worsening of these beginnings, an important legacy from 
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this period, of utmost importance for subsequent developments (see chapter 9), was the inclusion of the 
future Nord Stream as a EU strategic project. 
However, contradictions and differences soon started to surface between the EU and Russia, as it 
appeared that indeed, the fifth element of the energy dialogue, the creation of a pan-European energy 
market, implied the adoption by the Russian Federation of the EU´s standards and norms.78 During this 
period in fact, the adoption of the second gas directive in 2003 deepened the EU´s drive towards an 
integrated and liberalized market,79 making Russia´s integration into the European normative space even 
more difficult. The EU´s stance and the increasing divergence this brought in relation to Russia´s interests 
were exemplified in the former´s intention to integrate the Energy Dialogue into discussions regarding the 
Common Economic Space,80 thus subsuming it into an economically liberal logic which the Russian 
Federation rejected. The EU´s pretensions to modify the Transit Protocol (TP) of the ECT, agreed in 
2003, in order to introduce the EU as a Regional Economic Integration Organization (REIO), instead of 
each individual EU member;81 the EU´s introduction in the WTO dialogue for Russia´s membership of 
the so called "Lamy package", where the EU tried to impose on Russia internal transit tariffs for domestic 
consumers equal to transport tariffs,82 with the aim of making Russia´s energy market market-friendly by 
the back-door; and the refusal by the European side to apply reciprocity in asset swaps, with Gazprom 
being refused assets in the European down-stream sector, and with Russia barring entry of Western 
capital in its upstream investments as a retaliation,83 worsened common energy relations.   
Energy relations between Russia and the EU further deteriorated as a result of both the energy 
disputes which will be analyzed later, the (closely related) promotion of the Nabucco pipeline as an 
alternative to Russian gas (see chapter 10) and the reform of the EU´s energy market into the direction of 
further liberalization. This process of reform led to the so-called third energy package. The problem for 
Russia is that in spite of not adapting its legislation in the direction of the European energy policy, it 
unavoidably affects it as the EU is its main energy partner. The disadvantages that the liberalization have 
brought to Russia are best exemplified in the so-called contract discrepancy, with Gazprom insisting on 
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the sanctity of contracts in the face of the new legislation.84 Supply contracts that are signed under the 
new legislation must adapt to new conditions such as the end of the destination clause, but Gazprom 
obviously opposes that this should apply to previous contracts that were extended in 2006. 85  The 
disappearance of the destination clause can become a determinant element in Russia-Ukraine energy 
relations, as henceforth, Russian gas sold to countries like Poland, Hungary and Slovakia can be resold in 
reverse mode to Ukraine.86 Equally disturbing for Gazprom is the separation between supply and transfer 
which is mandatory since the 2009 gas directive (the so called third directive, which became law in 
March 2011). The EU legislation foresees three ways to unbundle: ownership unbundle, independent 
system operator (ISO) or independent transmission operator (ITO). 87   Although the legislation also 
foresees exemptions for projects of strategic interest, 88  the European Commission did not grant an 
exemption for South Stream (see chapter 10), standing in the way of Gazprom´s strategy to bypass 
Ukraine. With the current EU legislation guaranteeing third party access in accordance with the third 
energy package, operators have to guarantee third party access;89 this was precisely one of the main 
reasons for the Commission´s reluctance to grant such exemption. In fact, Gazprom has already seen the 
exact impact of this policy on other projects already terminated. This is the case with the OPAL pipeline, 
a small pipeline that connects Nord Stream (see chapter 10) with other pipelines like "JAGAL" and 
"STEGAL".90 The initial intention by the European Commission was to prohibit Gazprom to occupy 
more than 50% of the pipeline´s capacity, even if the final decision has not yet been taken at the time of 
writing. The opposition between the European Commission and Gazprom found a good example in the 
investigation that was launched against the Russian company for anti-competitive practices.91 
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Finally, the latest negative element in Russia´s energy relations is the EU´s promotion of hub-
based market pricing for gas,92 as opposed to the long-term gas export contract (LTGEC) favored by 
Gazprom and based on the Groningen model. 93  Two realities, one economic and one legal have 
negatively impacted on Russia´s energy export policy. From the economic side, US shale gas revolution 
has had a double impact: from one side, the outstanding conversion of the US from its peak of LNG gas 
imports in 2007 to the status of self-sufficient gas producer, left a surplus of LNG gas in the global 
market, initially planned for the US. This pushed gas prices downwards. Probably the main trigger to 
translate this reality in Europe was the decision of Norway to adapt its gas prices to this new reality, to 
abandon oil-indexation for gas-to-gas competition (indexed to gas spot prices instead)94, in benefit of 
Europe´s consumers and obviously in Gazprom´s prejudice;95 as the 10-year agreement between Statoil 
and Wintershall in 2012 foresaw, Norwegian gas would be traded at spot prices.96 However, the influence 
of the EU in this change should not be underestimated, as the enforcement by national regulators of 
pipeline access, following the EU´s legal reforms, was determinant for the creation of a LNG market in 
Europe.97 From the legal side, a set of decisions by the International Arbitrage Court forced Gazprom to 
translate, at least partially, this new market trend. The Court ruled in favor of the German energy 
company RWE against Gazprom, accusing the latter of overpricing its gas in relation to spot prices,98 
while a year before, in a similar ruling, RWE Transgas, the main Czech gas importer, won the right not to 
pay for non delivered gas,99 nullifying thus the "take-or-pay clause".100 As a consequence, Gazprom has 
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increasingly accepted the renegotiation of contracts in order to reflect natural gas prices in the spot 
market.  
Even worse, as an effect of the pressure the European Commission exerted on Gazprom in 2012-
2013, the Russian company had to waive the destination clauses that protected its supplies from further 
reselling to third parties.101 As seen above, destination clauses were officially suppressed in the third gas 
directive of 2009.102 The negative effect made its appearance in 2013 when the German RWE started 
exporting Gazprom´s natural gas sold in Poland and Hungary to Ukraine: owing to price differences, 
Ukraine ended up buying 2.2bcm of gas at prices slightly cheaper than natural gas sold directly from 
Russia. As a result of the 17 December agreements, where Gazprom offered the Ukrainian Naftohaz a 
33% reduction in gas prices,103 these imports ceased being favorable. However, the changing political 
landscape in Ukraine, with the ousting of President Viktor Yanukovich, brought the cancellation of this 
political price reduction from April 2014. Since then, plans to renew imports from Poland and Hungary, 
and to start importing gas from Slovakia, have resurfaced.104  
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PART III: ENERGY DISPUTES AND THE STATUS QUO 
 
As was explained in our first chapter, the question of why Russia escalated or deescalated the three 
energy disputes that are the object of study in this research, would be answered by the analysis of two 
independent factors: changes in the status quo and changes in the risk factor, mostly based on the 
development of diversification projects during the period analysed of 2005 to 2008/9. 
This third part of this Phd thesis will be devoted to the first independent variable. From the 
following chapters 6 to 8, an analysis of the energy disputes of January 2006, March 2008 and January 
2009 will be carried out. However, most of the chapters will be devoted to the evolution of circumstances 
that would eventually lead to each of these disputes, spanning thus the whole period encompassing the 
years 2005 to 2008, including the first weeks of 2009, where the third energy dispute evolved. After the 
background to this period was explained in Part II, with chapter 4 devoted to Russia-Ukraine energy 
relations, we have decided to establish the starting point of this part in 2005, right after the Orange 
Revolution. This political event led to Yushchenko´s administration in Ukraine and to the alternation 
during the period 2005-2010 of governments of different sign, including "orange" governments led by 
Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko and an interregnum by Viktor Yanukovich from October 2006 to 
December 2007.  
The political element of this period is thus crucial to establish the period, in particular, because the 
three energy disputes happen then. However, the three following chapters will not be a political chronic. 
The political element looms in the background and will be mentioned whenever necessary. Chapters 6 to 
8 will be mostly an explanation of the evolution of energy relations between Russia and Ukraine, as well 
as an explanation of larger energy factors, such as changes in pricing policies in Central Asia, mainly 
Turkmenistan (the other big supplier in natural gas for Ukraine apart from Russia) and the international 
context of increasing energy prices. Due to the richness in factors constituting Russo-Ukraine energy 
relations and the complex and sometimes misleading negotiations to introduce changes, triangle Russia-
Ukraine-Turkmenistan will occupy a good deal of all the space devoted to the evolution leading to the 
disputes. This may result confusing at some points for the reader, as we have decided to reflect, through 
press releases and analyses, each of the elements in discussion, including fausse routes and either 
conscious or unconscious informative intoxication. The goal is informative, so as the reader may have a 
clear picture of the complexity and the room this leaves to negotiations. This is especially so in the 
numerous episodes of indebtedness from the part of Ukraine. 
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In addition to the complexity pointed out above, the reader will have to cope with much confusion 
as for several sub-state agents that have a radical importance. The two most relevant actors are obviously, 
Gazprom and Naftohaz, the natural gas monopolies from Russia and Ukraine. As we already discussed in 
chapter 1, we may assume that Gazprom´s interests were aligned with those of the central state. As for 
Naftohaz, we will have the occasion to see in the next three chapters, the company was heavily 
politicized, with its leadership changing according to political changes. However, the picture becomes 
more complex with the appearance of energy traders, as explained in chapter 4. During our period, two 
energy traders will play a very important role: RosUkrEnergo and UkrGazEnergo. RosUkrEnergo 
appeared already in chapter 4, closing in fact the series started by its predecessors Respublika, Itera and 
EuralTransGas. As we will have the occasion to see in chapter 6, as a result of the agreement reached to 
put an end to the dispute, RosUkrEnergo´s role is expanded. RosUkrEnergo, as explained in chapter 4, is 
in itself owned 50% by two companies: Arosgas, whose indirect owner was Gazprom´s filial 
Gazprombank (in late 2006 Gazprom became direct owner) and Centragas, owned by two Ukrainian 
businessmen: Dmitro Firtash (90% of Centragas) and Ivan Fursin (10% of Centragas). 
The expanded role of RosUkrEnergo will henceforth establish a complex chain in energy 
relations: Gazexport, Gazprom´s external filial, purchases Central Asian gas at these countries´ respective 
border (Turkmenistan, but also Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan), reselling part thereof (if not all) to 
RosUkrEnergo, who carries volumes of natural gas to the Russo-Ukrainian border. Naftohaz, thereafter, 
purchases part of RosUkrEnergo´s natural gas meant for consumption in Ukraine. Then the twisted 
scheme becomes even more complex with the appearance of a new actor: UkrGazEnergo. UkrGazEnergo, 
functioning from February 2006 to April 2008, is a consortium owned by both Naftohaz and 
RosUkrEnergo and the monopolist of imported natural gas, sold at market prices; Naftohaz remained as 
the monopolist of natural gas produced in Ukraine, sold at subsidized prices but as we will have the 
occasion to see in debt disputes, Naftohaz also bought some of UkrGazEnergo´s natural gas, as internal 
production was not enough. An added element of complexity stems from the fact that while 
RosUkrEnergo sold all imported gas to Naftohaz, it secured some volumes to be reexported in Europe; 
these volumes were either sold directly by RosUkrEnergo, or sold through Gazexport or other filials 
belonging to Gazprom.  
The short sum-up above may serve the reader to understand better these complex relations when 
they are explained in the following chapters. Besides this, we may close this short introduction reminding 
two important sets of information that will be derived from chapters 6-8: from one side, we will 
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determine to what degree the outcomes in the three disputes can be credited by either Ukraine or Russian 
decisions. For this reason, analyses will be devoted to consider whether Gazprom won or lost these 
disputes; Gazprom´s having won all three disputes would leave the different pattern of escalation to be 
explained by lesser or higher resistance from the side of Ukraine. On the contrary, if Gazprom accepted 
different outcomes, this would open the door to consider Russia and Gazprom evolving in each of the 
three disputes along different degrees of risk-acceptance or risk-aversion. If these three chapters will 
provide us with as much information as possible regarding the disputes outcomes, it should also provide 
as with information as for how the status quo was evolving, either improving or eroding, as a clue to link 
Gazprom´s different decisions, reflected in different patterns of escalation, following prospect theory 
assumptions that perspectives of impending losses drive actors to assume more risks.  
Each chapter will finish with a short sum-up of conclusions regarding "who won the disputes", as 
well as hints of which elements might be present that fit prospect theory based explanations. An 
additional chapter, chapter 9, will close this part summing conclusions regarding the disputes outcomes, 
whereas all elements pertaining to prospect theory based explanations will be developed in our 
conclusions, in chapter 11, after Part IV and chapter 10 deal with the risk factor.      
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Chapter 6: Russia-Ukraine Energy Dispute of January 2006  
 
With the arrival in 2005 of Viktor Yushchenko as President of Ukraine, a series of changes happened that 
contributed to ultimately provoke the dispute of January 2006 and thus opened a period of instability in 
Ukrainian-Russian energy relations. Attempts at renegotiation between Ukraine and Russia were started 
by Ukraine and then deepened by Russia during the year 2005. However, other changes exogenous to 
Russo-Ukrainian relations also played a determining role with Turkmenistan, which exported half of the 
gas imported by Ukraine, pursuing a different energy policy. If that was not enough, we must mention 
other factors deriving from the complex pattern of energy relations which included other third actors, in 
this case intermediary companies like "RosUkrEnergo" (RUE), which monopolized imports of Turkmen 
gas to Ukraine and which would eventually have a relevant role in the agreements reached as an outcome 
of the January 2006 dispute. 
 
6. 1. Turkmenistan´s Energy Policy 
As early as at the beginning of December 2004, Ashgabat had been hinting at a price hike, for both Russia 
and Ukraine, from the current price of US$44tcm to US$60tcm. In the face of both countries´ opposition, 
Turkmenistan´s President Saparmurat Niyazov decided on 31st December to stop supplies in order to 
"carry out repairs" in the gas pipelines in its territory. It is safe to think that the intended repairs were an 
excuse used as a negotiating instrument in a clear hardening of Turkmenistan´s position. Russia insisted 
upon the contract it had previously signed with Turkmenistan on the 10th April 2003 and which had a 
validity of 25 years1 and refused to yield. Shipments were eventually renewed after 11 days, while both 
countries still had to solve the dispute2 (in fact, it would take some more weeks before normal supplies to 
Russia were reestablished).  
 Ukraine, as a mere recipient of gas from Turkmenistan and not a country which as Russia, enjoyed 
by that time a position of monopsony in relation to Central Asian gas producers,3 was arguably in a less 
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 That agreement foresaw a gradual increase of gas exports to Russia from 4-5bcm in 2004 to 70-80bcm from 2009, with 2007 
being the big turning point, as exports would jump from 10bcm in 2006 to 60-70bcm (see: Fredholm, Michael: "Natural-gas 
Trade between Russia, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine: agreements and disputes", Stockholm University, Asian Cultures and 
Modernity, Research Report, no. 15 (15 Nov. 2008), at  
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favorable negotiating position. This vulnerability was made even worse as Gazprom decided it could not 
compensate Naftohaz for the expected shortages, 4  meaning it would suffer shortages if the company did 
not yield to Turkmenistan´s pressure. Ukraine thus soon agreed for a price of US$58tcm,5 almost as much 
as Turkmenistan was asking for;6 this arguably represented a high potential for instability as it would 
force Ukraine to review its energy policy. The new leadership in Ukraine by the President Viktor 
Yushchenko and his Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko would soon try to modify that recent agreement 
an reach a more favorable one.   
Ukraine attempts to revise prices with Turkmenistan 
The first occasion for revision came on March (22nd to 23rd), when President Yushchenko carried out his 
first official visit to Turkmenistan since his inauguration.7 The aim was to revert to the bilateral contract 
in force which regulated Turkmen imports to Ukraine of 2002-2006, agreed in May 2001 and which 
secured 36bcm of annual imports under prices subjected to annual renegotiation but which were expected 
to remain at US$44tcm.8 The main proposal "in exchange" for reverting to previous conditions was an 
                                                                                                                                                                                                            
through an oil pipeline completed in 2009. Since 2007 both countries are also developing gas pipelines which are breaking the 
country´s monoposonic dependence on Russia.  
4
 This was communicated to Naftohaz on 31st December. Gazprom stated that it could not ensure supplies of up to 36bcm gas 
as expected for the year 2005 from Turkmenistan. Rejecting this interpretation of the contract, Naftohaz´s Head, Iurii´ Boi´ko, 
claimed that Gazprom, according to oral agreements, had to ensure the supply of 21bcm of gas from Central Asia if no contract 
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(Дружбанародов. Туркмени янагрела Украину на газе)", Kommersant, January 11 2005 (Accessed on the 20th August 2011 
from East View, Harvard Libraries). View also: Eremenko, Alla: "Turkmenskii´ Sindrom (Туркменский синдром)", Zerkalo 
Nedeli, 15 January 2005, at 
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5
 Once the border between Russia and Ukraine was reached, the final price should have amounted to around US$74tcm, quite 
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Ющенко подстраховался)", Rossii´skie Vesti, 30 March 2005 (Accessed on the 20th August 2011 from East View, Harvard 
Libraries).  
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 "President Yushchenko meets Turkmenbashy to talk natural gas", Kyiv Post, 24 March 2005, at 
http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/president-yushchenko-meets-turkmenbashy-to-talk-na-22504.html (Accessed on the 
25th June 2012). 
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offer for a consortium in which Ukraine, Germany and Poland, would participate. The goal of the 
consortium (according to what had been stated by Alexei´ Ivchenko, new Head of Naftohaz) would be to 
purchase Turkmen gas for re-export to Europe. The Minister of Energy Affairs, Ivan Plachkov, made very 
unrealistic declarations pledging a doubling of imports9 to Ukraine from Turkmenistan in the current 
year.10 According to sources reached by Kommersant, it seems that Ukraine, more realistically considered 
prices between US$50tcm to US$52tcm instead of US$44tcm as before.11  
However, Ashgabat stayed firm in its intention and maintained the recent unilateral revision of 
prices. If the initiative of a consortium was endorsed, it was also put forward that the Russian side should 
be included. That was equal to nipping in the bud a proposal which Moscow was obviously not 
predisposed to support, as this project was meant for Ukraine to bypass Russia (which in any case, 
seemed impossible for strictly geographical reasons)12 . The acceptance (at least rhetorically) of this 
project came along with a promise by President Saparmurat Niyazov to dramatically increase exports to 
Ukraine in order to reach a figure of 60bcm13 (roughly the same amount promised to Russia). This 
additional proposal though, was also very unrealistic as gas extraction had been dwindling in 2005 for the 
second consecutive year, and long-term prospects for huge extraction increases were still dubious.14 The 
price for gas for Ukraine remained but quite real and was left for further negotiations. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                            
Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 22 March 2005 (Accessed on the 22nd August 2011 from East View, Harvard Libraries); his position 
however, was minoritary. 
9
 Turkmenistan had indeed projects for nearly doubling its current capacity to 120bcm in 2010, thus enabling substantial 
exports to both Russia and Ukraine. As Vladimir Socor stated in his analysis in "Eurasia Daily Monitor", that was a realistic 
prospect indeed, that did not require too onerous investments, though hardly realizable in 2005, and dubious after all, given the 
fact that in 2004 and 2005, extraction volumes had declined (see: Socor, Vladimir: "Yushchenko proposes international 
consortium for Central Asian gas", Eurasia Daily Monitor, vol. 2, no. 38 (23 March 2005), at 
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=27743&no_cache=1#.VR7QQOFPU5w (Accessed on the 2nd 
September 2012); Torbakov, Igor: "Ukraine, Turkmenistan Probe Gas Deal", EurasiaNet, 4 April 2005, at  
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav040505.shtml (Accessed on 3rd September 2012). 
10
 Glumskova, Elena; Chernikov, Andrei´ and Strokan, Sergei´: "Druzhba narodov. S gazu na gaz pogovorili prezidenty 
Ukrainy i Turkmenii (Дружба народов. С газу на газ поговорили президенты Украины и Туркмении), Kommersant, 23 
March 2005 (Accessed on the 24th August 2011 from East View, Harvard Libraries); Such declarations could have been 
intended as posturing against Russia. 
11
 Chernikov, Andrei´ and Glumskova, Elena: "Druzhba narodov. Viktor Iushchenko uekhal bez skidki (Дружба народов. 
Виктор Ющенко уехал без скидки), Kommersant, 24 March 2005 (Accessed on the 22nd August 2011 from East View, 
Harvard Libraries). 
12
 The idea behind this was probably to build new pipelines with no, or at least limited ownership by Gazprom and thus do 
without the Russian company´s transit monopoly. 
13
 Ibid. 
14
 Most of the optimistic assessments relied on the volumes of gas reserves in the huge South Yolotan  field; however, many 
mistrusted the figures of 5Tcm, coming from non-reliable Turkmen authorities, whereas Russian specialists preferred to talk of 
something around 2.6Tcm to 2.7Tcm. It was not until October 2008 when reliable figures that matched the early Turkmen 
estimates were released (see: Fedorov, Iurii´: "The Turkmen gas games", Security Index: A Russian Journal on International 
Security, vol. 16, no. 3 (2010), p. 42), pointing to a maximum of 14Tcm. 
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New attempts at renegotiation from April 2005 
After this first failure, negotiations soon resumed in early April with the Ukrainian side trying again to 
push Turkmenistan to accept a new pricing formula. This new round started with the visit to Kiev of a 
delegation of "TurkmenNefteGaz". Yushchenko this time changed the strategy, expressing his respect for 
the controversial agreement.15 Then Naftohaz, instead of a price reduction, tried this time to change the 
frame under which payments were made to Turkmenistan: so far, Ukraine had been paying for gas 
through a mixed formula, namely, 50% of the payments in cash and the remaining 50% through obscure 
frameworks of barter. What Ukrainian negotiators were now putting forward was to make payments only 
in cash. They calculated in fact that if doing so, the real price would automatically revert to something 
similar to that prevailing in 2004. According to calculations by experts from Naftohaz, the final price that 
Ukraine paid for gas at the Russo-Ukrainian border, after costs of transportation through Uzbekistan, 
Kazakhstan and Russia were added, amounted to close to US$61tcm, when prices of origin were 
US$44tcm; with the new price at US$58tcm, final prices would amount to only around US$63tcm if 
integrally cash-based payments were introduced.16  
Turkmenistan actually also desired to move to an exclusively cash-based system of payment.17 As 
relayed by the authoritative Russian daily Kommersant on the eve of a trip to Turkmenistan by a 
delegation from Naftohaz to pursue discussions on energy, the delegation wanted to thwart the agreement 
Russia and Turkmenistan had signed in 2003 covering the period 2006-2026 and which foresaw that 
Gazprom would become the importer of all Turkmen gas production starting in 2007.18 They planned to 
propose a renewal of the current agreement between Ukraine and Turkmenistan, to expire in 2006, with 
Ukraine importing 50bcm to 60bcm instead of the current 38bcm and thus making the country fully 
independent from Russia. The project  also included the possibility of reviewing the framework of 
intermediation so far, since 2005 covered by the shady company RosUkrEnergo, which was owned 50/50 
                                                           
15
 He went as far as to say: "If someone considers, that my main duty was travelling to reduce the price, I give you my word, I 
will never deal with prices" ... "It has been settled (referring to the current price), formalized, there is a contract which has 
been agreed based on it, and there is national budget (Turkmenistan) relying on it" ... "it is not a President´s business to 
abandon this proposal" (Grivach, Alexei´: "Barternyi´ rynok. Ukraina torguetsia s Turkmenbashi" (Бартерный рынок. 
Украина торгуется с Туркменбаши), Vremia Novostei´, 1 April 2005 (Accessed on the 22 August 2011 from East View, 
Harvard Libraries); Fokina, Ekaterina: "V Focuse. Gazovaia ataka Ukrainy (В фокусе. Газовая атака Украины)", Profil´, 4 
April 2005 (Accessed on the 26th August 2011 from East View, Harvard Libraries). 
16
 Ibid.; we may doubt this price calculation, as usual calculations of transportation costs range around US$30tcm. 
17
 Butrin, Dmitrii´; Chernikov, Andrei´ and Kukhar, Mikhail: "Ukraina zakupit turkmenskii´ gaz uzhe prodannyi´ "Gazpromu" 
(Украина закупит туркменский газ уже проданный "Газпрому")", Kommersant, 4 April 2005, at 
http://kommersant.ru/doc/570127 (Accessed on the 3rd September 2012). 
18
 See: Tell, Rustem: "Turkmenskii´ gaz poi´det v Rossiiu (ТУРКМЕНСКИЙ ГАЗ ПОЙДЕТ В РОССИЮ)", Tribuna, 16 April 2005 
(Accessed on the 22nd August 2011 from East View, Harvard Libraries). This would leave Ukraine in danger of being at the 
"mercy" of Gazprom for all its shipments of Turkmen "blue gold". 
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by Gazprom and the Austria-based "Raiffeisen Investments". Besides that, the possibility for establishing 
a consortium was mentioned again with the added proposal to build a new pipeline crossing Uzbekistan, 
Russia and Ukraine which would enable Turkmenistan´s shipments to reach Europe.19  
These plans however were soon thwarted by the Head of Gazprom, Alexei´ Miller, who paid a 
visit to Turkmenistan on 15th April. The result of their talks was that, in spite of Turkmenistan having 
accepted the Ukrainian proposal as seen above, the reclusive country now renewed its support to the 
agreements signed so far with Russia (Gazprom would control the Turkmen gas market by 2007), which 
would necessarily lead to Turkmenistan´s shipments to Ukraine being monopolized by Gazprom´s 
unavoidable intermediation.20 If that was not enough, Gazprom managed to finally put an end to the 
controversy with Turkmenistan regarding their still unresolved pricing dispute and which cleared the 
resumption of shipments, stalled since Russia had refused to yield to pressure.21 Gazprom´s delegation 
agreed to make payments exclusively on a cash-based basis, favored by Turkmenistan, who in exchange 
accepted to leave prices unchanged at US$44tcm.22 As Roman Kupchinski pointed out,  the success that 
Russia had at least apparently achieved, was radically contrary to Ukraine´s plans23 and the situation was 
arguably poised to complicate the race between both of them for primacy in the market of Turkmen gas 
exports. With an expected visit by Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko to Ashgabad not materializing, this 
left Ukraine in a state of clear indecision. 24  
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 Butrin, Chernikov and Kukhar, op. cit. The weakness of this proposal was that it depended on Russia. as the Minister of 
Energy of Ukraine, Ivan Plachkov would eventually declare to the weekly Zerkalo Nedeli: "We offered Russia a new 
conception for developing a Transport Consortium through the participation of other countries apart from the Russian 
Federation and Ukraine. So far Russians have not clearly responded" (see: Eremenko, Alla: "Ivan Plachkov: glavnaia zadacha 
Mintopenergo – stabil´noe obespechenie potrebitelei´ energonositeliami i elektroenergei´ (Иван Плачков: «Главная задача 
Минтопэнерго — стабильное обеспечение потребителей энергоносителями и электроэнергией»)", Zerkalo Nedeli, 14 
May 2005, at 
http://zn.ua/ECONOMICS/ivan_plachkov_glavnaya_zadacha_mintopenergo__stabilnoe_obespechenie_potrebiteley_energono
sitelyami_i-43360.html (Accessed on the 3rd September 2012). 
20
 Rustem, "Turkmenskii´ gaz", op. cit. 
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 Because winter had been unexpectedly warm, this provided for larger volumes of gas available to close up the gap left as a 
consequence of the dispute. This probably largely explains the firm Russian attitude. 
22
 Butrin, Dmitrii´ and Karat, Dina: "Gazprom oplatit turkmenskii´ gaz dengami ("Газпром" оплатит туркменский газ 
деньгами)", Kommersant, 18 April 2005, at http://kommersant.ru/doc/570939 (Accessed on the 4th September 2012); 
Shevel´kova, Oksana: "Dogovor Dorozhe Deneg. Peregazirovka (ДОГОВОР ДОРОЖЕ ДЕНЕГ. ПЕРЕГАЗИРОВКА)", Gazeta, 18 
April 2005 (Accessed on the 24th August 2011 from East View, Harvard Libraries); Watkins, Eric: "Russia, Turkmenistan end 
gas-price stand-off", Oil & Gas Journal, vol. 103, no. 17, 2 May, 2005, pp. 37-38 (Accessed on the 4th September 2012, from 
ProQuest, Biblioteca UCM).  
23
 Kupchinski, Roman: "Ukraine and Russia in spat over Turkmen gas", Asia Times, 20 April 2005, at 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/GD20Ag01.html (Accessed on the 4th September 2012).  
24
 Beyond mentions in a telephone conversation between the President Viktor Yushchenko and his homologue ("Iushchenko i 
Turkmenbashi pogovorili, kak oni otprazdnuiut cherez nedeliu (Ющенко с Туркменбаш ипоговорили, как они 
отпразднуют через неделю)", Ukrainskaia Pravda, 29 April 2005, at 
http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2005/04/29/4387899/ (Accessed on the 4th September 2012) and during the latter´s 
official visit ("Iushchenko nagradil Niiazova posmertno (Ющенко наградил Ниязова посмертно)", Ukrainskaia Pravda, 5 
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Scarce prospects for Ukrainian diversification projects 
Failing Turkmen promises, new projects of diversification would prove even less promising. President 
Yushchenko made a visit to Kazakhstan where most attention was devoted to oil projects, as it was 
thought that Caspian oil could eventually find a new promising outlet with the inauguration that same 
month of the Pipeline Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) in the Turkish Southern coast.25 What exactly was 
sought in this visit was an agreement to establish a joint company to build a short 52 km long pipeline 
from the port of Iuzhne to Odessa in order to transport oil coming by sea (from the port of Ceyhan), while 
it was also hoped that Naftohaz would be invited to develop oil fields in Kazakhstan.26 The project would 
never materialize.  
 Later on, it was the turn for Prime Minister Timoshenko to announce another energy breakthrough 
abroad which was supposed to expand Ukrainian relations with energy producers other than Russia: a 
deal involving Azeri cooperation to build new refineries in Ukraine.27 Besides that, there was news that 
Azerbaijan was ready to build a pipeline that could eventually transport natural gas from Turkmenistan or 
Iran to Ukraine.28 At the same time, Timoshenko assured that Kazakhstan was ready to take part in the 
extension of the pipeline Odessa-Brody into Poland so as to reach either Plock or even Gdansk and 
transform it into an export outlet to Europe.29 Alexei´ Ivchenko even spoke of an already agreed upon 
consortium including Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkmenistan for the export of Caspian oil 
through the projected pipeline Baku-Supsa, which could reach Odessa through the Black Sea.30  
 Triumphant declarations coming from the government conveyed an impression of misplaced 
optimism that did not match both the fact that these projects were yet nothing but proposals and the fact 
                                                                                                                                                                                                            
May 2005, at http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2005/05/4/4387980/ (Accessed on the 4th September 2012), nothing 
materialized. 
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 "Iushchenko budet prosit´ u Nazarbaeva  nefti (Ющенко будет просить у Назарбаева нефти)", Ukrainskaia Pravda, 30 
May 2005, at http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2005/05/30/4388728/(Accessed on the 5th September 2012); However, as 
the same Ivchenko would have to acknowledge, most Ukrainian refineries were not yet ready to transform light Caspian oil 
(see: Ibid.). Besides that, oil from the Caspian happened not to be similarly priced to Russian gas: US$300-320tcm per ton for 
the former vs. US$305-310tcm for the latter, despite wishful thinking from the part of Ivchenko (see: Ibid.). 
26
 Ibid. 
27
 "Timoshenko nashla, kto mozhet postroit´ Ukraine novyi´ neftezavod (Тимошенко нашла, кто может построить Украине 
новый нефтезавод)", Ukrainskaia Pravda, 3 June 2005, at 
http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2005/06/3/4388898/ (Accessed on the 5th September 2012). This ran counter to 
Ivchenko´s preference of rather upgrading already existing refineries (see: Ibid.; "Iushchenko budet", op. cit.). 
28
 Ibid. 
29
 "Akhmetov poobeshal Timoshenko pomoch´ sniat´ zavisimost´ ot Rossii (Ахметов пообещал Тимошенко помочь снять 
зависимость от России)", Ukrainskaia Pravda, 3 June 2005, at 
 http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2005/06/3/4388936/ (Accessed on the 5th September 2012).  
30
 "U Ukrainy est plokhaia novost´ dlia Rossii (У Украины есть плохая новость для России)", Ukrainskaia Pravda, 3 June 
2005, at  http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2005/06/3/4388931/ (Accessed on the 5th September 2012). 
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of Ukraine´s geographical, "landlocked" by Russia and therefore unable to establish a direct contact with 
producing countries from either Central Asia or the Caucasus. An interview by Ivchenko for Galitskie 
kontrakti, as relayed by Vremia Novostei´  is a good example of this lack of realism: Ivchenko intended 
the planned International Consortium to construct a gas pipeline through the beds of both the Caspian and 
The Black Seas to cross the Caucasus; Naftohaz, at the same time, proposed to Russia to cooperate in the 
construction of a new gas pipeline from Aleksandrov Gai´ (Kazakhstan) to Novopskov (Russia).31  
Apparent agreement on pricing system with Turkmenistan and debt scandal  
In spite of the delicate situation for Ukraine, soon positive news came: after a meeting with Alexei´ 
Ivchenko, President Niyazov eventually agreed to revert to old prices in exchange for payments in cash 
(Gazprom´s securing of this price came after a similar change).32 According to Ivchenko, the switch to 
this new framework clearly favored Ukraine, as instead of paying US$2.8bill as in 2004, the new system 
starting from July would only demand a yearly US$2.09bill.33 An explanation of why independently of 
the reversal to a lower price, the switch in itself to the cash-based system was beneficial, seems to be 
explained, according to the Head of Naftohaz himself, by the fact that paying a fixed amount in dollars 
for transit was in fact cheaper than paying with gas, which was later sold at market prices by the 
intermediary company.34 Other accounts pointed to the benefits accruing to Turkmenistan.  
However, on 20th June, right after the first meeting with the incoming delegation from Naftohaz, 
President Niyazov declared in very harsh terms that Ukraine had incurred in a massive fraud withholding 
the due payment for gas already shipped from Turkmenistan: According to Ashgabat, there was as much 
as US$600mill that had accumulated during 2005, to which had to be added US$61.7mill of payments 
due from 2004. The system through which the Turkmen side accused Ukraine to commit fraud was by 
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 Grivach, Aleksei´: "Proekt po-kievski. "Naftogaz Ukrainy" ugrozhaet "Gazpromu" postroit´ morskoi´ truboprovod v obkhod 
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the 14th September). 
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"Rossiia obidelas´ na Ukrainu za soglashenie s Turkmenbashi (Россия обиделась на Украину за соглашение с 
Туркменбаши)", Ukrainskaia Pravda, 26 June 2005, at http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2005/06/26/4389633/ (Accessed 
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overpricing the industrial products which were provided in barter; instead of a coefficient of 1.5, 
Turkmenistan claimed that Ukraine had been applying a favorable coefficient of 2.8.35 Thanks to these 
coefficients, Ukraine had been actually paying a real price of US$30-32tcm with the nominal price of 
US$44tcm. Now, according to a calculation from Kommersant, Ukrainian companies36 would have to pay 
US$90tcm for natural gas (at the Ukrainian border, once the costs for transportation were added), 
compared to US$65tcm, as enjoyed before.37 Following assessments by Vremia Novostei´, when  Ukraine 
had accepted a nominal price of US$58tcm, the real price at the Turkmen border was still a quite 
comfortable US$40tcm thanks to the perverse effect of the manipulated coefficient.38 
 
6. 2. Russo-Ukrainian Energy Relations  
Without real prospects for Ukraine to impose a real break with the energy policies of the latest years 
under Kuchma´s Presidency and to turn away from energy dependence on Russia, Kiev´s idealism would 
prove particularly misplaced during the next months, the January 2006 gas crisis being, as we will have 
the chance to see below, the ultimate proof. In June, Ukraine witnessed the first stage of a process of 
deterioration in bilateral Russo-Ukrainian energy relations. The reasons for dispute centered on the 
existing agreements that shaped the current regime of energy relations and determined both prices of 
Russian gas and the transit tariff Ukraine imposed on gas transiting the country to the rest of Europe. 
Ukraine proposes a renegotiation of the transit tariff and Gazprom proposes new prices 
The first divergences had in fact started much earlier, when Ivan Plachkov and Alexei´ Ivchenko visited 
Moscow in late March to confer with their Russian partners from Gazprom. Ivchenko started by putting 
forward the elimination of intermediaries that managed the shipments of gas between Turkmenistan and 
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increased its benefits at the expense of Ukraine. 
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Ukraine (As already stated, since 2005 transit was monopolized by the company RosUkrEnergo) and 
proposed to place the business of intermediation in the hands of Gazprom and Naftohaz.39  
But Ivchenko also proposed changes in the regime of transit tariffs, namely (in parallel to what 
was happening with Turkmenistan), to transform the barter system of payment into one where the totality 
of payments would be made in cash.40 The concrete proposal that the delegation seems to have put 
forward, was to raise the transit tariff to US$1.75-2tcm/100km from the US$1.09tcm/100km set at the 
moment (It was calculated that the new prices Ukraine might end up paying for Russian gas could 
increase from US$50tcm to US$80tcm),41 while Yushchenko himself would later mention another price:  
US$2.73-US$2.80tcm/100km.42 Gazprom did not commit itself and welcomed the proposal regarding the 
intermediation for Turkmen gas, saying that as long as they would secure half of the transit of Turkmen 
gas, they could agree in principle with their counterparts.43 However, regarding the proposal of transition 
into a cash-based system for paying transit tariffs for Russian gas transiting Ukraine, Gazprom not only 
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 Egorova, Tatiana and Reznik, Irina: "Gazprom prosiat podelit´sia ("Газпром" просят поделиться)", Vedomosti, 29 March 
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agreed, but it also concluded that this opened the door to payments based on market prices also for 
Ukrainian imports of Russian gas; Naftohaz had opened Pandora´s box.44 
Gazprom´s countermove was far from being expected by the Ukrainian delegation. 45  Viktor 
Yushchenko himself justified the proposal as aimed against intermediaries,46 as he had already stated in 
Turkmenistan.47 However, it is at first sight difficult to link the role of RosUkrEnergo, dealing with 
Turkmen gas in transit to Ukraine (RosUkrEnergo was responsible for importing 37bcm of Turkmen gas 
to Ukraine, from which RusUkrEnergo kept 13bcm in kind as transit tariff,48 that is, 37.5% of the whole 
amount),49 to a much different matter, which is the tariff for transit of Russian gas to Europe through 
Ukraine. In any case, after the president made his declarations, according to the Russian daily 
Nezavisimaia Gazeta, Naftohaz issued a statement clarifying that whatever change there might be on the 
principles of payment for transit, it should not be done before a detailed calculation by Ukrainian 
experts.50 This move looked like an attempt by Naftohaz to stall a process that threatened to get out of 
hand. The company further pointed out that any initiative to move to cash-based payments should be 
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taken on Gazprom´s initiative, even if Naftohaz was responsible for a set of proposals that after all, it had 
itself initiated.51 The Russian daily Vremia Novostei´ pointed to possible internal divergences within 
Ukraine, as the Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko was opposed to putting an end to cheap prices for 
natural gas.52 
The stored gas controversy between Gazprom and Naftohaz and gas deficit 
Alexei´ Miller´s April visit was a rebuke to Ukrainian projects, with the Head of Gazprom stating that no 
further supplies were to be expected beyond those contracted and inviting Ukraine to maintain 
cooperation within the existing framework of RosUkrEnergo (Gazprom remained open to Ukraine´s 
recent plans to gain for Naftohaz stakes in RosUkrEnergo from the Austrian "Raiffeisen Investment").53 
However, the meeting was even more important for a new controversy that arose between Gazprom and 
Naftohaz, to unfold in the coming weeks and to further strain bilateral relations:  
Gazprom revealed that from October 2004 to March 2005, 7.6bcm of natural gas located in 
Ukrainian storage facilities owned by the Russian monopoly had disappeared.54 These volumes of gas had 
been stored in Ukraine with the goal of being later re-exported. The fact is that upon repeated requests by 
Gazprom to pump the gas out of the storages, Ukrainian authorities refused to proceed, alleging several 
reasons (which were the reasons, was not said by Kommersant´s article, the first to report on this 
incident). The mystery lay in the fact that Gazprom could certify that the amount of natural gas had not 
been exported and Naftohaz stated that it had not been transported any further. The basis for Russian gas 
to be stored in Ukraine was an agreement reached between the two state monopolies to provide a "buffer" 
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of gas to be supplied in case of consumption peaks. When this happened in winter 2004-05, Naftohaz 
failed to answer to Russian orders to pump the amount of gas in question, stored since 2003.55 Facing this 
anomalous situation, Gazprom offered to sell the gas to Ukraine as compensation.56 Even if Timoshenko 
initially rejected any responsibility and blamed this incident on the previous administration (contradicting 
Ivchenko´s excuses assuring that the amount of gas was still stored in Ukraine),57 Naftohaz finally agreed 
to buy the gas58 (it was revealed at the end that the gas stayed in place and had not disappeared as initially 
suspected) 59.  
Still, an additional complication surfaced: as this volume of natural gas was meant for exportation, 
Gazprom expected Naftohaz to pay for it at European market prices. The latter refused, so Gazprom 
offered an alternative through a complicated scheme: gas would be counted as part of the payment for 
transit for 2005, so Gazprom, instead of paying 23bcm of gas in concept of transit tariff, would only pay 
15bcm. This posed a new problem for Naftohaz, as it already faced a gas deficit for which the "missing" 
gas would be suitable.60 This deficit of 8bcm (that closely matched the gas in dispute) originated for the 
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following two reasons: Gazprom, as agreed in 2004 with Ukraine, had decided to reduce by 5bcm the 
supply for 2005 to make up for the debt Ukraine accumulated from 1999. In addition to that, 
Turkmenistan had for unknown reasons reduced its supply by 3bcm (Naftohaz would eventually agree 
with Turkmenistan to receive an additional amount of 0.5bcm in payment for works of repair and 
upgrades done by Ukrainian companies) 61. In fact, as revealed by Vremia Novostei´, Naftohaz had been 
discussing buying 5bcm from Gazprom and 3bcm from RosUkrEnergo.62 Otherwise, this deficit would be 
very difficult to close as Turkmenistan could not easily raise its extraction as a compensation, besides the 
fact that the real Turkmen gas  price was to exceed US$60tcm from June 2005 (see pp. 130-131).63 
Instead of this scheme, What Naftohaz proposed was to pay for the gas in its storage facilities in 
instalments but pegged to the current price of US$50tcm, something to which Gazprom, used to debts 
from Ukraine, was not disposed to accept. Another variant which appeared in press reports, was to return 
the gas itself in instalments with 2008 as deadline, but that also raised a frontal opposition from 
Gazprom.64 As neither Ukraine´s proposal nor two of the variants Gazprom had offered so far were 
satisfactory for any of the counterparts,65 no agreement could be reached.   
No solution is found for the gas controversy and new price proposals from Gazprom 
However, in the midst of this controversy, in the same meeting in Moscow where a solution was being 
discussed for the "disappeared gas", Gazprom stroke back with worse news: instead of an increase of 
prices from US$50tcm to US$80tcm as had been speculated, Gazprom came up with the figure of 
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US$160tcm.66 This was the price resulting from the application of the "netback" principle, as applied to 
European consumers. In the face of this unexpected offer, Ukraine retaliated threatening with correlative 
tariff increases (US$3.5tcm/100km) to make up for higher prices. 67  With prices at US$50tcm 
(Kommersant calculated the price Ukraine was paying at the time at around US$55tcm),68 Gazprom´s 
offer was the exact opposite of a progressive price transition. The problem for Ukraine, according to 
analyses by Kommersant, was that neither such an increased tariff for Russian gas would be enough to 
provide sufficient compensation. Gazprom was not likely to be flexible in this respect: it had in fact 
officially announced on 7th June that it was about to change its strategy towards former USSR countries 
and would thus start increasing gas prices towards convergence with market prices as paid by European 
customers. This would be the case with Baltic countries and as was confirmed by the state company, it 
might lead to trebled prices for Ukraine, thus confirming price estimations discussed in their bilateral 
meetings.69  
The bitter truth for Ukraine was that, as the Moscow Times announced, it was caught in a 
"spiraling gas dispute",70 with two fronts open and with scarce prospects of solution; Ukraine had to deal 
at the same time with changes in the pricing system of Turkmen and Russian gas, and with accusations of 
corruption, as in the case of undervalued deliveries to the former (see pp. 130-131) and illegal hoarding of 
Russian gas for the latter.   
A new round of negotiations with Russia on 30th June in Moscow 71  was characterized by 
persisting controversies and a threatening tone from the part of Gazprom: the meetings started with 
Naftohaz´s delegation being told that it had been unilaterally decided that the (no longer) "missing gas" 
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would be simply deducted as payment for transit tariffs to Ukraine.72  In line with such a decision, 
Gazprom announced that it would supply only 1.1bcm of gas supplies for the rest of the year for transit 
payments after having applied the discount.73 Naftohaz reacted in kind: insisting on their alternative of 
returning gas in instalments, Alexei´ Ivchenko declared that if Russia wanted to proceed as unilaterally 
decided, Ukraine would apply a different transit tariff which took into consideration the fact of its being 
planned for export.74  
Gazprom at the same time insisted on stopping payments in gas for transit tariffs and on selling 
gas at much more expensive market prices than it had been doing so far. Gazprom was open to discuss 
additional shipments to make up for any gas deficit, but this would only be considered once market prices 
were established.75 From the Ukrainian side, such proposals and impositions were matched by statements 
that loomed large in relation to what would eventually happen in January 2006, with for example, 
Alexandr Gudym, member of the Committee on Energy of the Ukrainian Rada, declaring that 
undersupplies were not a real issue, as Ukraine in its condition of transit country could "take as much gas 
as necessary",76 thus resurrecting the specter of siphoning off gas so common in the 90s. More disquieting 
was that Ivchenko went in a similar direction in recent declarations.77 In light of these declarations, 
Sergei´ Kuprianov, Press-Secretary of Gazprom, made himself clear pointing to the Belarusian example 
of 2004, when Russia also cut transit supplies to preclude any unsanctioned appropriation of gas.78   
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6. 3. Ukraine Trapped in the Triangle between Russia and Turkmenistan 
In this complex situation, with Ukraine facing unacceptable demands from both Russia and 
Turkmenistan, Naftohaz needed first to solve the problem of gas deficit. Prime Minister Yulia 
Timoshenko took the controversial decision of forbidding the export of any gas before all deficit had been 
covered and needs of the population had been satisfied.79 As explained by Vremia Novostei´, Ukraine had 
the authorization since 2002 to re-export 6-5bcm in cooperation with Gazprom and 1bcm freely by 
Naftohaz itself,80  so this decision clearly ran counter to current agreements 81  and would hardly be 
acceptable for Gazprom. 
Coping with the gas deficit in Ukraine and solving the gas controversy 
Ivchenko, optimistically declared that Naftohaz´s troubles were not so significant  (he mentioned only 
5bcm of deficit, while he himself had talked about 8bcm before it was already known that 10bcm was the 
real figure, and that, without taking into account the nearly 8bcm claimed by Gazprom) as he believed he 
would be able to make up for it with additional exports from Turkmenistan if Gazprom did not offer 
satisfactory prices for Ukraine.82 He stated that Naftohaz was negotiating with independent producers, 
even if it was not said initially who these producers were83 (Gazprom, whose agreement was necessary if 
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these independent producers had to use its facilities, stated it had not been notified).84 Naftohaz then 
provided further details: new shipments amounting to 6bcm 85 would come from Turkmenistan through a 
Russian company called "TransNafta",86 with RosUkrEnergo also selling an additional volume of 5bcm 
to close up the gas deficit.87 According to Ivchenko, not only would this close up the gap in supplies, but 
also increase the export capacity of natural gas.88 The price apparently agreed with the obscure company 
was US$59.5tcm at the Ukrainian border (this did not take into account Russian tariffs which had not 
been agreed yet).89 However, as the daily Kommersant acknowledged, Naftohaz had not reached any 
agreement with Gazprom for these new supplies to be granted access through Russian territory,90 and as 
both this daily and Vremia Novostei´ revealed, this still remained in the realm of declarations of 
intention.91 The Prime Minister ordered Ivchenko on 11th July to give a briefing of the situation at the 
current stage, but this was delayed for alleged technical reasons and at the time of Timoshenko´s 
demands, the Government was left without further details.92 A presentation by Ivchenko planned on 27th 
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July, had to be postponed again when Naftohaz´s Head went "on holiday" for two weeks.93 Nothing 
would eventually come out of these plans. 
Agreement on the "missing" gas 
The only realistic way to at least not worsen existing relations, which was to solve the dispute between 
Naftohaz and Gazprom regarding the "missing" gas, came closer,94 when the two parts managed to come 
up with a complex scheme, revealed on 17th July. Naftohaz´s version was the following: from the whole 
volume of 7.8bcm, 2.55bcm would be counted as part of the payment for transit tariffs as Gazprom had 
been insisting, so Ukraine would receive in the second semester a total of 6.35bcm instead of a meager 
1.1bcm in concept of transit tariff. Besides that, the rest (5.25bcm) would be traded by RosUkrEnergo, 
who would thus pay Gazprom around US$800mill (which meant the gas would be priced at more than 
US$150tcm, with Gazprom recovering most of the losses).95 Last but not least, Gazprom also agreed to 
increase the volumes of natural gas to be exported through Ukraine: for the remainder of the year, 
Gazprom would increase these volumes by 8bcm (and to 11bcm in 2006), from which there would accrue 
to Ukraine more gas in payment of  transit.96 
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Gazprom then contradicted some of the statements made by its counterpart: the core of the 
agreement was confirmed, but there were disagreements concerning the gas that Gazprom would export 
through Ukraine: it was made clear that this had nothing to do with the agreement to solve the issue of the 
"missing" gas and while it was being stated that Gazprom had no intention to supply any additional 
amount of gas into Ukrainian storage facilities during the current year, Gazprom informed that the 
additional gas to transit Ukraine would eventually cover 2bcm for Ukraine in concept of payments for 
transit (Not far after all from the 2.55bcm discounted, as agreed).97  
Solving the gas deficit 
After this thorny issue seemed to have been finally solved, Ukraine still had to find a way to solve the 
structural gas deficit and the Ukrainian Ministry of Justice, led by Minister Roman Zvarych, decided (at 
the behest, as he himself declared, of the Prime Minister herself) to simply nullify the deal reached the 
preceding year, which as stated above (see p. 136), had put an end to the problem of gas debts to 
Gazprom inherited from the decade of the 90s:98 under the said deal, Ukraine pledged to return Russia a 
sum of US$1.62bill over the period of 2005-2009 for a debt that corresponded to the period 1997-2000. 
The solution was to establish a discount on the transit tariffs that Russia had to pay Ukraine.99 As a result, 
and as the reader may remember, for the above mentioned period, Ukraine would receive 23bcm of gas 
every year as payment for transit instead of the 28bcm it would have received under normal 
circumstances, resulting this in a deficit of 5bcm. Instead, an alternative agreement was proposed: 
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Ukraine would return US$1.43bill (The sum agreed minus a penalty of US$190mill)100 through a credit 
taken from "Deutsche Bank".101 At the same time, Ukraine wanted to make Gazprom pledge to pump 
through Ukraine increased volumes of gas, so the latter would at least partially compensate for the 
resulting deficit through the correlative increase of payments for export tariffs,102  (this followed the 
philosophy of the agreement reached for solving the issue of the "missing gas").  
However, it seems the final solution for the structural gas deficit would come from additional 
imports from Central Asia. Ukraine had already imported in the first semester of 2005 1bcm of gas from 
Uzbekistan, 2.8bcm from Turkmenistan and 2bcm from Kazakhstan in addition to the regular volumes 
contracted; Uzbek and Turkmen gas was imported through RosUkrEnergo, while Kazakh gas was 
allegedly contracted through a joint venture between Gazprom and "KazMunaiGaz", "KazRosGaz".103 In 
the following months, the issue receded back into oblivion. This may be a sign that the issue was solved 
indeed, through additional supplies; Alexei´ Ivchenko, in fact, declared having signed an agreement to 
increase in 1bcm the energy supply from Turkmenistan for the fourth trimester of 2005.104 
Negotiations between Ukraine and Russia regarding prices for 2006 
As for negotiations with Gazprom, their weakness lay in the fact that the Prime Minister followed her 
own strategy while Naftohaz, disconnected from her initiatives, was under the control of Viktor 
Yushchenko.105 The question remained whether Timoshenko prohibited gas reexport as an element to 
confront Gazprom in negotiations (as the Prime Minister herself declared when interviewed by the daily 
Kommersant, one of her goals was to revise the 2004 agreements),106 or whether this move was aimed 
rather against Ivchenko himself, who had not satisfactorily delivered regarding the deals sought with both 
"TransNafta" and RosUkrEnergo. Declarations from the Minister of Justice hinted that RosUkrEnergo 
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could have been the target, 107  as the obscure RosUkrEnergo was a creature from the previous 
administration and which many reproached for its costs and uselessness.108  In any case, the Prime 
Minister set up a working group that tried to either exclude RosUkrEnergo outright or at least play down 
its role, with Roman Zvarych and Ivan Plachkov given preeminence over the state monopoly.109  
In the upcoming negotiations with Gazprom set for mid-August to discuss a pricing agreement for 
2006, most responsibility was assumed by Timoshenko´s team. Her working group would also try to 
review the agreement of August 2004 and find a solution for closing the gas deficit, thus fully bypassing 
Naftohaz.110 Gazprom, which through its Vice-President Alexandr Riazanov, had already expressed a 
total opposition to any revision of the 2004 debt agreement, 111 stayed firm and made clear again that it 
had already laid down the terms for a suitable agreement for 2006.112 Thus, Ukraine´s pretensions to 
review existing agreements and discuss a suitable pricing agreement for a period beyond 2006 were 
rejected.113 In spite of both sides digging in, in the meeting between Ivan Plachkov and his Russian 
counterpart Viktor Khristenko, the Ukrainian Minister of Energy, acknowledged the necessity to work out 
a formula for a transition to European prices, which sounded like a beginning of concessions to Russia.114  
Time however was not ripe yet for compromise: at a meeting between experts from both state 
monopolies in late August, positions remained in a deadlock. Gazprom insisted on imposing European 
prices from January 2006 and the Ukrainian delegation expressed its feeling that the only chances for a 
breakthrough could happen at a presidential summit. From the Ukrainian side, there was a clear feeling of 
pessimism regarding the fact that whatever satisfactory agreement might be reached, it would only 
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concern the year 2006, with progressive market prices probably kicking in from at least 2007 in the best 
of cases.115 A visit to Kiev by Alexandr Riazanov on 31st August only brought worse omens for Ukraine, 
with the high ranking official talking of US$180tcm instead of US$160tcm. That probably reflected the 
trend of increasing oil prices. In the face of such figures, Naftohaz responded that in such a case, transit 
fees would spike four times more to make up for losses.116  
In declarations by the Ukrainian President, where he criticized the barter system (supporting thus, 
until a certain degree at least, Gazprom´s positions) and made the case for ending the (in)efficiency 
derived from "gas for free" (referring to the cheap prices paid for barter gas as payment of transit fees), 
the taboo was broken too (in the previous months this had also been mentioned by the then Vice-Minister 
Anatolii´ Kinakh) of accepting a market transition to end cheap energy prices for the industry.117 This 
could explain how by mid-November, in the midst of Viktor Khristenko´s visit to Ukraine, Naftohaz was 
taking a more flexible response, proposing to increase the price to US$80tcm from US$50tcm (this meant 
reverting to the agreement that both countries had reached in 1999 and which was modified a year 
later).118 A slightly greater flexibility was also shown by the Russian side, as this time US$160tcm was 
offered instead of the latest figure of US$180tcm. Neither offer really satisfied either of both sides, and 
the rest of the meeting was lost to secondary discussions, with Ivan Plachkov demanding to establish in 
their bilateral negotiations the principle of "transport or pay"119 (Khristenko was only ready to apply this 
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principle to an amount between 50% to 75% of the whole volume to be transported),120 which led to no 
agreement in that particular aspect either.  
If hopes could only be placed on high-level summits, the cancellation of the visit by the Russian 
Prime Minister, Mr. Fradkov, for 23rd November, was probably a bad sign. The apparent reason for the 
delay, according to the Ukrainian daily Zerkalo Nedeli, was that one day prior to his arrival, the Ukrainian 
Prime Minister was forwarded a proposal to be signed upon his counterpart´s visit. Not having enough 
time to thoroughly consider the proposal and not being thus able to provide a definitive answer, the 
Russian delegation preferred to agree with their Ukrainian counterparts a postponement to the next month 
of December. Meanwhile positions kept moving, if timidly: 121   
Ukraine was trying to make Russia accept that whatever new prices were agreed, they did not 
enter into force on the 1st January 2006 but later in March or April. Ukraine, meanwhile, kept to its recent 
proposal of US$80tcm.122 According to Ivchenko, the working group at the Cabinet of Ministers was 
preparing for the Russian negotiators a proposal that would imply a cost for Ukraine of US$1mill to 
US$1.5mill, within a scheme of barter. That stood in radical contradiction with what Russia was aiming 
at, namely price increases that would force Ukraine to foot a bill of US$4bill (three times more) per year 
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and only (partly) compensated if unrealistic transit tariff increases that would earn US$3bill were applied. 
Otherwise, Ukraine would have to choose either to become indebted or worse, to reduce the volumes of 
natural gas imported.123  
Russia´s adamant position of carrying through a transition to market prices for most of the CIS 
states and thus revert the trend of years-long subsidization,124 made the margin available to Ukraine quite 
narrow: Gazprom foresaw a price increase of US$110tcm for Caucasian Republics, something between 
that same price and US$160tcm for Moldavia, to be determined yet 125 and an increase for the Baltic 
Republics too, from US$80tcm-US$95tcm to US$120tcm-US$125tcm.126 The only "privileged" country 
to keep advantageous conditions was Belarus, which would be paying US$46.68tcm. Such a discount did 
not come for free, as Belarus had to accept a commitment to upgrade the Yamal-Europe pipeline, thus 
enabling an increase of its throughput to 33bcm 127 (and reduce dependence on the more worrisome 
Ukraine) and to open the state company "Beltransgaz" to Gazprom. This was precisely the opposite of 
Ukraine´s course. 
While a delegation from Naftohaz was planning to leave for Moscow on 29th November (trip 
cancelled again), positions moved on, even if only timidly and not enough from bridging the gulf that 
kept both sides apart: Gazprom offered to establish a transit agreement according to international 
standards, namely to increase the transit tariffs Russia was paying Ukraine and then to consider a supply 
agreement separately.128 To that, Ukraine agreed in principle as it would probably enjoy better transit 
tariffs, but Naftohaz nevertheless expressed a preference for keeping the reduced tariff of 
US$1.09tcm/100km if that could avert market prices (even though Gazprom allegedly accepted the 
exorbitant transit tariff of US$4tcm/100km offered at some point by Ukraine, as a starting point for 
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discussions). 129  Gazprom seems to have preferred US$1.5tcm/100km as a transit tariff, 130  but no 
agreement could be reached on that offer either.  
Ukraine and Russia were entering December under some of the worst omens. The last rounds of 
negotiations, as we will see below, would not eventually avoid a gas dispute with the advent of the new 
year. Meanwhile, as to confirm disquieting hints in the previous months that Ukraine was ready to use 
Russian gas and divert it for its own use in order to avoid an energy crisis, sources from the European 
Commission stated that they had received from Naftohaz unofficial information that this could eventually 
happen in case of "unsettled prices".131  
Pricing negotiations between Ukraine and Turkmenistan 
While negotiations with Russia continued, Ukraine kept waging its particular war to maintain both a 
sustainable and affordable energy balance with Turkmenistan. Ivchenko announced that soon in October, 
for the occasion of Saparmurat Niyazov´s upcoming visit to Kiev, an agreement would be signed thanks 
to which Turkmenistan was to commit 60bcm every year for a period of 30 years.132 This was the second 
time that such a fantastic project, which stood in clear contradiction to that signed between the reclusive 
Central Asian Republic and Russia in 2003, was mentioned.133 The agreement to be signed in a month 
would consider the means of payment (decided on a yearly basis) and the possibility to establish a 
consortium to build a pipeline system through Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine for direct 
export to Europe. It is safe to assume that Ukraine was falling into Ashgabat´s trap of trying to exert the 
best price from competitors, a fight in which the likely loser to a better positioned Russia was inevitably, 
Ukraine. As the daily Kommersant put it: "Turkmenistan was selling its gas twice".134 
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The substitution of Yulia Timoshenko by Iurii´ Ekhanurov in October 2005, meant that 
Yushchenko and Naftohaz (under his control) would be free from interferences from the government. 
This however, could hardly brighten prospects for Ukraine in negotiations with Gazprom. A proof of the 
solid position the Russian state monopoly had in Central Asia was the agreement reached with 
Uzbekistan´s "Uztransgaz" for 5 years (2006 to 2010); this agreement ensured Gazprom´s monopoly of 
all gas transiting the Central-Asia pipeline through that country (the transit route for natural gas from 
Turkmenistan).135 Then, when Ukraine tried to establish projects with Turkmenistan, Saparmurat Niyazov 
bluntly put them face-to-face with the unsolvable dilemma: "How could we sign it (agreement) without 
Russia?". He cynically expressed his readiness to sign a long-term treaty with Ukraine, as long as it also 
involved Russia, something natural as gas pipelines would have to cross the country.136 Prospects for a 
trilateral agreement suiting every party were very dim.  
Naftohaz could not expect too much from pricing negotiations with Turkmenistan either, in spite 
of its misplaced optimism of buying as much as 44bcm of Turkmen gas (36bcm directly from 
"TurkmenNeftegaz" and 8 through the intermediation of GazpromExport).137 Ukraine had first to pay the 
debt that had piled up. Turkmenistan proposed that this would be paid along with the bill due for gas in 
the second semester, where the price had been set at US$44tcm, but in any case, "before year´s end".138 
Mr. Ivchenko explained that an agreement had been reached for US$243mill139, while the Prime Minister 
himself, Iurii´ Ekhanurov, talked of an agreement reached for US$212 mill140 (slightly different, but 
nevertheless close to what Ivchenko had declared). Then, Turkmenistan, heralding what Ukraine would 
soon have to face, started demanding from Gazprom better prices for its natural gas: the specific demand 
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was to supply gas at US$50tcm in 2006 and US$60tcm in 2007. 141  An incident provoked by 
Turkmenistan´s not fulfilling its supply commitments, shipping less gas than agreed (Mr. Ivchenko talked 
of 112tcm received the preceding day instead of the 125tcm foreseen),142 and possibly related to the still 
unsolved debt problems, was a prelude of the new price offensive: the Turkmenbashi publicly announced 
he would enforce a price hike from US$44tcm to US$60tcm in 2006 (exactly as on the 1st January 2005) 
and called its three customers, Russia, Ukraine and Iran, to reach an agreement on prices before 10th 
December.143 Turkmenistan directly challenged Gazprom declaring that the agreement signed in 2003 had 
not been yet finalized. 144  Neither Gazprom nor Naftohaz accepted Turkmenistan´s pretensions and 
pointed to existing agreements as a guarantee for preserving current and more advantageous conditions.145  
 
6. 4. Last Negotiations and Failure to Reach an Agreement: Ukraine and Russia Head to Crisis 
As the Russian weekly Tribuna accurately informed in relation to the latest events and the state of utter 
confrontation between Russia and Ukraine, the chain of events had been a cancellation of his trip by 
Prime Minister Fradkov, a subsequent cancellation by Naftohaz´s delegation of a trip to Moscow and then 
warnings from Ivchenko that Russian transit gas might suffer disruptions if prices were increased, to 
which Gazprom´s Alexandr Riazanov reacted saying that such low prices for Ukraine (US$50tcm) were 
unacceptable.146 Ukraine´s dilemma was that in the face of a dramatic increase in prices of world oil 
market (to which gas was pegged) the later Kiev managed to achieve a satisfactory agreement, the higher 
prices Ukraine would eventually have to assume if it wanted to avoid supply cuts. This danger was made 
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explicit by Alexandr Medvedev, at the time Director General of Gazexport, when he warned of even 
higher prices.147 
Trying to put an end to the spiral of cancellations, threats and hardening positions, Prime Minister 
Ekhanurov prepared a trip to Moscow with the goal of reaching a final compromise. having made its 
position regarding higher prices more flexible, Ukraine now wanted to secure an agenda of progressive 
application, something to which Russia could also agree in principle. However, Ukraine was still reluctant 
to accept prices higher than US$80tcm and Russia hardly moved from US$150tcm. With starting 
positions so apart from each other, any agreement would prove very difficult. That was especially so as 
the Russian side had already put forward a variant of what had been agreed in Belarus and which could 
never be accepted by Ukraine: a participation in the Ukrainian gas transportation system (GTS) in 
exchange for concessions.148 As if to highlight the window of opportunity that Ukraine might miss if not 
yielding to alternatives offered so far, Alexandr Medvedev warned that they would soon put forward a 
new offer, which if refused, would lead to higher prices.149  
Upon Ekhanurov´s arrival in Moscow, Vremia Novostei´ optimistically assumed that an agreement 
would be eventually found, even if negotiations lasted until the very last moment, for the sake of avoiding 
perturbations in the flow of gas to Europe and protecting common reputation.150 However, the meeting on 
5th December failed miserably: Sergei Kuprianov went as far as to denounce Ukraine´s position as 
unconstructive and dangerous for gas supplies to Europe, while Ukraine insisted on keeping the barter 
system until as late as 2013, something which Gazprom could not tolerate. In an assessment by Itar-Tass, 
the financial burden for Ukraine of switching both to market prices and cash-based payments would be 
huge, as the payments might increase as much as US$3.5bill; Ukraine was expected not to be able to 
increase payments in concept of transit tariff beyond more than US$1.5bill.151 In a similar assessment, 
Ukrainska Pravda calculated the costs of new prices to be as high as US$4bill, and considered that only 
an increase of transit tariffs to US$3.5tcm/100 km (as proposed at some point by Naftohaz)152 could 
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compensate for the impact. According to this daily, Alexei´ Ivchenko had offered a complex formula by 
which 17bcm of gas would remain at the price of US$50tcm, while the remaining 8bcm would be paid at 
US$80tcm-US$82tcm in the first semester and rise to US$90tcm-US$96tcm by the end of the year (this 
latter amount would be ensured through the intermediation of RosUkrEnergo).153 That clearly fell short of 
Gazprom´s demands. 
The stone on which both negotiators stumbled in this occasion was on their diverging 
interpretations of a series of previous agreements: Naftohaz defended the sanctity of the June 2002 transit 
contract154  and interpreted that it could not be modified before 2013, given its validity of 10 years 
(Ukraine would later add that all existing agreements also precluded any change in prices until 2009).155 
Gazprom however, pointed to article 2 of the previous intergovernmental agreement signed in October 
2001, which gave freedom to both contractors to determine on a yearly basis whether payments for transit 
would be made in barter or cash and to fix the price, feeling thus fully legitimated to demand new 
conditions for 2006 .156 The Russian side offered a new formula (probably the offer Alexandr Medvedev 
had talked about before), which consisted of a double transition, to cash-based payments and to a basis of 
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US$160tcm moderated by an "important discount" not specified.157 The Ukrainian delegation rejected the 
offer and Alexander Medvedev, venting his frustration mentioned again the creation of a consortium to 
manage Ukraine´s gas transportation system. 158  Some days later, the Secretary of the National and 
Defense Council, Anatoly Kinakh, offered his alternative: a gradual price transition with gas prices 
reaching between US$95tcm and US$103tcm in order that chemical and metallurgical industries, key for 
the Ukrainian economy, could remain profitable.159 
In spite of Yushchenko´s optimism at reaching an agreement with his counterpart Vladimir Putin 
over existing disagreements,160 the Russian President himself, after having talked to Yushchenko by 
telephone and having held a personal interview with the Ukrainian Rada´s Speaker, Volodimyr Lytvin, 
came to the conclusion that Ukraine had enough financial means to offset the impact of the increase of 
gas prices foreseen for the next year thanks to financial resources obtained from privatizations and credits 
from international institutes.161 He also pointed out that Ukraine had in fact enough reserves (from its own 
production) to ensure critical supplies for the population, imported gas being used for the industrial 
sector.162 Putin further complained that Gazprom was losing as much as US$3.6bill based on calculations 
for gas prices in 2006 for other European countries, which were according to him to reach as much as 
US$255tcm in the case of Germany (Putin was already hinting at the price Ukraine might finally have to 
pay if negotiations for a compromise ended up failing).163 That way, he managed to reinforce the message 
that Russia wanted to convey, namely that whatever offer Gazprom put forward now would be much 
better than what might come later. 
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At the same time, the Russian Minister of Energy, Viktor Khristenko, stated that in spite of 
ongoing negotiations regarding future prices, the volumes of gas to be supplied in 2006 had been agreed, 
51bcm. Mr. Khristenko did not go into details as to the breakdown of the said volume, but taking into 
account that Gazprom had pledged to help the transit of 36bcm of Turkmen gas bought by RosUkrEnergo 
and that the rest coming from Russia was to amount to 15bcm,164 this would not close the structural 
deficit of 5-6bcm Ukraine suffered since the debt arrangement of 2004.  
Russia hardens its positions regarding prices: from US$160tcm to US$230tcm 
Then soon after Putin´s new warning, and fed up with Ukraine´s uncompromising stance Gazprom fired 
again: the Russian state monopoly officially announced that Ukraine had lost the opportunity to purchase 
gas at the relatively advantageous price of US$160tcm and would therefore have to accept market prices 
ranging from US$220tcm to US$230tcm.165 With Ukraine refusing to hand over 50% of its infrastructure 
to the Russian monopoly as part of a possible compromise on the ongoing dispute,166 the only alternative 
left was to pay higher prices. Alexei´ Miller completed the picture with a new warning: Ukraine would 
see supplies stopped if no contract had been signed by 1st January of the upcoming year; the possibility in 
Gazprom that Ukraine would respond "by stealing" gas from supplies going to other European customers 
was considered seriously enough  to constitute an operational group to oversee such an eventuality.167 If 
this new turn for the worse was not enough, Ukraine was dealt a new blow when Turkmenistan 
maintained its insistence on gas prices of US$60tcm.168 One week later, a Ukrainian delegation led by the 
Minister of Energy Ivan Plachkov and the Head of Naftohaz, Alexei´ Ivchenko, hastily flew to Ashgabat 
to avert the price hike and a double crisis with both Russia and Turkmenistan;169 the stakes were high, 
with Turkmenistan having supplied 36bcm in 2005 and covered 45 % of Ukraine´s needs (Ukraine 
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expected to import 39bcm in 2006).170  Unfortunately for Ukraine, nothing could change Ashgabat's 
position. 
On 15th December Iurii´ Ekhanurov and the Minister of Energy Ivan Plachkov met with 
Gazprom´s delegation, but could hardly convince their counterparts to create a new trader by Naftohaz 
and Gazprom as parity stakeholders which would assume the import of both Russian and Turkmen gas 
(this would in fact turn such a company into the monopolist of Ukrainian gas imports). More importantly, 
neither could they agree on a calendar of progressive transition to market prices from 2006 to 2009.171 
Russia, firm in its intention of imposing a price transition to market conditions, would only offer Ukraine 
credit facilities in order to absorb the impact of the new prices.172 In the face of the Russian negative, 
Ukraine resorted again to threats. On this occasion, they threatened to change the conditions under which 
the Russian fleet in the Black See was based in the Crimean city of Sebastopol.173 President Yushchenko 
himself was to make an explicit threat some days later in the same direction, pointing to possible 
increases in payments by Russia if it wanted to maintain its rights in the base of Sebastopol. 174 
Declarations by Alexandr Medvedev to Ukrainian journalists made clear that Gazprom was seriously 
considering the worst scenario and that consequences for Ukraine would not be pleasant: "I would not like 
to present  a too tragic scenario, the reason being that even if that was to happen, we ("Gazprom". - ed.) 
would supply "Naftohaz of Ukraine" gas in accordance with our international obligations - to the extent 
necessary to meet the needs of European consumers (emphasis mine). Absence of a contract for the 
supply of gas to Ukraine would mean that gas for the needs of Ukraine will not come (emphasis mine). 
And if Ukraine illegally siphoned off gas, in other words- stole it, then Ukraine would be fully responsible 
for the reduction of gas supplies to Europe (emphasis mine)".175 
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A new round of negotiations between both Prime Ministers, Iurii´ Ekhanurov and Mikhail 
Fradkov taking place on 19th December in Moscow was equally disappointing: Ekhanurov insisted on a 
progressive transition to market prices to no avail 176  (Viktor Yushchenko reinforced the message 
advocating for a period of 2-3 years) 177. According to the daily Vedomosti, Naftohaz had been handed 
over a proposal for a transit contract (no details transpired) when only 10 days were left before New 
Year.178 Meanwhile, just before the visit by Ekhanurov to Moscow on 19th December, the Belarusian 
Prime Minister Sergei Sidorskii´ had signed the agreement whereby Belarus would enjoy a price similar 
to what Ukraine was now enjoying, US$46.68tcm, obtained in exchange of 50% of the state monopoly 
"Beltransgaz" for Gazprom.179 The former Head of Naftohaz, Iurii´ Boi´ko went in the same direction 
when he wrote in Vedomosti recommending the creation of a transportation consortium in the line of what 
had been agreed in 2004.180 Any option in this direction remained unacceptable for Ukraine. Following 
threats to review conditions for the Russian fleet based in Sebastopol181 Gazprom was now warned that it 
would be sued before the Arbitrage Tribunal of Stockholm. At the same time the approbation of a New 
Concept of Energy Security by the Ukrainian Council of Security and Defense was made public, where 
much emphasis was put on the rationalization of the use of energy through an increased use for the home 
industry of Ukraine´s own production and the use of other sources such as coal and nuclear energy.182  
As for price negotiations, The Ukrainians spoke of US$65tcm, supposed to be the median price of 
Russian gas paid by Ukraine in the past decade,183 while the Minister of Economics pointed to prices 
ranging from US$100tcm to US$150tcm as discriminatory for Ukraine.184 The set of proposals Gazprom 
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had handed over to Naftohaz in Moscow was finally revealed by Alexandr Medvedev:185 a draft for an 
intergovernmental protocol for 2006, a project for a contract for the supply of gas and an addition to the 
contract for 2003-2013 signed in June 2002 between Gazprom and Naftohaz specifying the amount and 
terms of transit of Russian gas through Ukraine. The price basis was to be US$230tcm while the transport 
fee paid to Ukraine would increase to US$2.5tcm/100km. When Ivan Plachkov persisted on the price of 
US$65tcm Medvedev readily counter-replied proposing that the difference be paid through shares in a 
transportation consortium as pledged in 2002.186  
With Ivchenko pointing to the unavoidable fact that prices had to rise for internal consumers and 
that regardless of whether and how much Russian and Turkmen prices finally increased,187 Ivan Plachkov 
made a concession and sent a proposal in which Ukraine would assume a price of US$80tcm for the first 
semester of 2006 and where the transport tariff would be raised by 60% (US$1.75tcm/100km); otherwise 
Ukraine would automatically siphon off 15% of gas transiting Ukraine towards the rest of Europe.188 
Prices around US$220tcm to US$230tcm as Gazprom was insisting were accepted in principle, but not 
before 2009. If these conditions, which had been officially sent to Gazprom on 27th December, were not 
accepted, then Gazprom would be sued before the Stockholm Court.189  
As the very last stage for negotiations had come with only a few days left before the fateful date of  
1st January 2006, a delegation from Naftohaz flew to Moscow on 27th  December trying to reach a late 
hour agreement.190 One day later came Ivan Plachkov with a new offer containing some concessions: a 
transit tariff of US$2tcm/100km and a price of US$95tcm, 191  moving thus from the threshold of 
US$80tcm which had been the maximum Ukraine had been willing to accept so far. A second instruction 
read that Ukraine would be ready in case of failure to siphon off gas transiting the country for its own 
needs at the expense of other European consumers. No agreement was reached yet, but conversations 
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were not stopped.192 Given that the Press Agency Itar-Tass still echoed the former proposal of gas at 
US$80tcm 193  and that Yushchenko himself publicly pointed to a price range from US$75tcm to 
US$80tcm194, it behoves us to consider how far the Ukrainian side was really ready to make concessions, 
independently of the fact that the latest figure of US$95tcm was quite unlikely to satisfy Gazprom. 
Instead of coming closer to the Ukrainian positions after the latest relaxation, President Vladimir Putin 
only advocated  an internationally secured credit line of up to US$3.5bill to Ukraine to assume the price 
transition.195   
Confusion in Turkmenistan as for agreements with Naftohaz and Gazprom and last negotiations 
In addition to the critical situation in which talks stood at that moment, disquieting news came from 
Turkmenistan, where the Ukrainian negotiators had reached a final agreement, but where, faithful to his 
capricious negotiating style, the Turkmenbashi had later signed another agreement with Russia which 
stood in clear contradiction with the former. The deal reached by Gazprom implied that Russia would buy 
up to 30bcm of gas at the higher price of US$65tcm.196 The agreement with Ukraine foresaw that 40bcm 
would be imported in line with the 38bcm it finally had imported during the current year,197 whereas 
although not specified initially, Ukraine was offering US$60tcm. However, unless Turkmenistan 
dramatically increased its extraction capabilities in 2006, something which was not possible at least for 
the time being,198 both contracts could not be simultaneously honored. Given both the monopsonistic 
power enjoyed by Russia and the fact that Gazprom had offered a better price, it was fair to assume that 
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Ukraine would be in the hands of Gazprom to ensure delivery of most of the gas it needed from Central 
Asia, especially bearing in mind that Russia was offering a higher price.199  
On the very eve of the New Year, Gazprom was declaring its willingness to spend the whole day 
if necessary until midnight for the sake of finding a suitable solution to finally avert a crisis.200 Naftohaz 
was invited to come to Moscow if needed (as the delegation had all of a sudden abandoned the Russian 
capital) and Ukraine was offered the chance to ship gas at 2005 prices for the first quarter of 2006 if no 
agreement could be reached by Year´s End.201 Naftohaz was said to have agreed and the Minister of 
Energy added that Ukraine was ready for market prices from the second quarter.202 Although this late 
hour news should have sufficed to calm Russian, Ukrainian and of course European consumers, the fact is 
that Russia was still warning European partners of possible problems linked to undersupply if Ukraine 
siphoned off gas.203 This stood in clear contradiction with this last compromise. Unfortunately, it proved 
that the latest warnings were closer to the truth even if Naftohaz still claimed to have accepted all the 
terms set by Gazprom in the latest proposal.204 Whatever the reason for this confusion, the fact is that no 
agreement had been reached and a dispute seemed unavoidable. 
 
6. 5. The Gas Dispute Leads to Supply Cuts: 1 January to 4 January 
On the 1st January of 2006 gas still flowed through Ukraine. However Naftohaz soon reported a lower 
pressure, even if the national distributor "Gaz Ukrainy" answered that this had not impacted on 
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consumers yet.205 These reports were in full accordance with the decision taken by Gazprom on the eve 
and duly forwarded to the Ukrainian side that at 10am supplies for Ukraine were to be suspended.206 This 
decision was later confirmed in a press conference by Mr. Kuprianov himself.207 The dispute soon led to 
controversies: The first one concerned the real volumes of gas that had been cut. Naftohaz accused 
Gazprom of having reduced gas volumes by 187mcm; Gazprom however denied this categorically and 
stated that the real figure was  only 120mcm.208 This exchange of accusations and the disagreement 
regarding the gas that was flowing were closely related to the effects the European consumers started 
feeling and which clearly pointed to a gas diversion by Ukraine to make up for lost supplies. In such 
context, Ukraine´s accusation might have been determined by the need to deny any responsibility and 
thus make Gazprom fully responsible for undersupplies in the rest of Europe.  
The energy dispute evolves into an energy crisis for European consumers 
The fact is that whoever was responsible, from the very beginning European customers started feeling the 
effects of the dispute with pressure effectively falling in those countries most dependent on Russian gas 
supplies due to their high proportion of Russian gas in their energy mix. Poland and Hungary for example 
suffered a drop in gas pressure of 14% for the former (reserves were to last for one week) and a bigger 
reduction of 25% for the latter, where the biggest firms started switching to oil.209 Apart from these two 
countries, Austria also reported a drop of 20% whereas Slovakia, which did not provide immediate 
details, also reported lesser pressure even if consumers seemed not to be affected yet. Big consumers of 
Russian gas such as Germany and France did not yet report yet any problems in supply, but Germany 
announced its readiness to eventually apply cuts to big firms if needed to protect supply to the population 
in the event supply problems.210 The fall in supplies would become even worse on the next day, with 
Poland and Hungary reporting a fall of as much as 40%, while Italy also started suffering from a reported 
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loss of 25% in its usual supply.211 The crisis also harshly affected countries like Serbia, Bosnia212 and 
Moldova. 
As the dispute easily developed into a supply crisis in many countries in Central Europe, Gazprom  
accused Ukraine of  siphoning off gas and thus provoking the reported supply problems in all the above 
mentioned countries.213 Naftohaz immediately denied such accusations,214 pointing to the fact that it had 
enough reserves to withstand the winter without having customers affected (the exact volume remained 
undisclosed as this was a state secret, although total capacity was supposed to reach 32bcm),215 even if 
Ukraine warned that the industrial sector might eventually have to be a target for restrictions if the 
situation continued.216 Gazprom, through Alexandr Medvedev, reiterated its accusations on 3rd January 
and even stated that the seizure of gas had been even greater on 2nd  than on 1st January.217 Gazprom´s 
spokesman, Sergei´ Kuprianov provided some exact details on the volumes allegedly diverted: according 
to him, Ukraine had diverted ("stolen" was the blunter termed used) 104.8mcm of gas between 10am of 
1st January and 10am of 2nd January to which 118.7mcm were to be added from the next 24 hours until 3rd 
January. His Ukrainian counterpart from Naftohaz, Eduard Zaniuk, simply denied "having stolen 
100mcm" as stated by Gazprom.218 
These reproaches played into the hands of Gazprom and Naftohaz as statements easily became 
instruments of propaganda and possibly too, disinformation. For example, Naftohaz defended its position 
when it underlined Gazprom´s recognition that it had not been supplying the full amounts of gas.219 That 
had been obvious since the very beginning and would not have led to a lack of supplies for end customers 
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in other European countries, unless either Ukraine siphoned off volumes equal to what Gazprom was 
discounting, or Russia consciously reduced supplies beyond volumes discounted for Ukraine in order to 
take other countries hostage and convincingly portray Ukraine as a robber. To reinforce their arguments, 
Ivan Plachkov stated that Ukraine was not consuming Russian gas but only gas from Turkmenistan and 
its own storages (gas from Ukraine´s own internal production).220 This went in the line of President 
Yushchenko, who had from the beginning stated that not even technical gas needed for powering transit 
flows was being taken from Russian gas, but was coming from Ukraine´s own reserves instead.221 The 
Prime Minister, Iurii´ Ekhanurov confirmed this and also announced that Russia had not stopped supplies 
from Turkmenistan. 222  If true this would confirm that Ukraine could indeed cope with temporary 
shortages, even if the Minister of Energy somehow contradictorily later warned that in case of necessity 
(extreme temperatures) they might have, entitled as they were, to collect the gas due as transit tariff.223 
However, soon doubts surfaced about the Ukrainian version. On 2nd January, Dmitry Medvedev clearly 
contradicted Ukrainian information when he stated that Ukraine was only receiving Russian gas and that 
no Turkmen gas had reached its transportation system.224 Explanations by Gazprom´s Press-Secretary, 
Sergei´ Kuprianov vaguely pointed to this: he stated that Gazprom had contracted volumes of Turkmen 
natural gas for 2006; however, the Central Asian Pipeline System having limited capacity, no 
confirmation could be given as to Ukraine´s contracted Turkmen gas.225 As the daily Kommersant was to 
report some days later, Russia had indeed stopped Turkmen supplies to Ukraine at 10am on 1st January, 
thus using its unique position as transit country for shipments from Central Asia. This would be 
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confirmed quite bluntly by Gazprom at Minister Khristenko´s press conference before international media 
days after the dispute ended.226 
Gazprom decides to deescalate the dispute and restores supply while negotiations continue 
Given the situation and faced with the dilemma of having to sustain a gas cut-off against Ukraine which 
affected Central European customers, who had become hostages to the dispute, Gazprom backpedaled 
and decided on 2nd January to increase the flow of gas and thus restore usual volumes as prior to the 
dispute.227 Gazprom announced that an additional volume of 95mcm had been pumped into the pipelines 
in the direction of the rest of Europe to make up for the fall in pressure. At the same time, Alexandr 
Medvedev announced that normal supply would have been restored by the next day228 and promised to 
take every measure to ensure that affected consumers would receive contracted supplies.229 As promised, 
on 3rd January the global volumes pumped by Gazprom reached the usual figure of 360mcm per day (as 
confirmed by Naftohaz) and full supply was fully restored to the rest of European countries,230 at the 
obvious price of Naftohaz being able to receive all the gas needed for its economy, taking in fact more 
than on the first day of the dispute, with a consumption of 118.7mcm per day instead of 104mcm.231 
With Gazprom having soon restored normal supply, the energy crisis in countries consuming 
Gazprom´s gas proved short, especially in the face of the fact that the bilateral dispute as such had not 
been yet solved. It still remained for Russia and Ukraine to find a solution that would preclude further 
cuts in the coming days. A delegation from Naftohaz was to land in Moscow on 3rd January in order to 
end the deadlock in negotiations.232 This time, negotiations were short and finally after almost a year of 
tensions and frustration, an agreement was reached on 4th January 2006. 
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6. 6. The 4th January 2006 Agreement 
The agreement, which by the way, caused a political storm in Ukraine and led to Ekhanurov´s 
government fall, was valid for five years, from 2006 to 2011 and had been signed between Gazprom, 
Naftohaz and the obscure trader RosUkrEnergo.233 This agreement put a final end to long months of 
negotiations but was distinctive complex. The confusion that derived from the many points that were 
unclear led to different interpretations, which took some days, if not weeks, to be clarified.  
Provisions of the new agreement 
The agreement appeared at first sight as an absolute Russian victory. The reason for this was that the 
agreement stated that Russia would sell its gas at the maximum price it had been insisting on at the last 
stages of the dispute, US$230tcm (article 4).234 Accordingly, the transit tariff would also rise and moved 
thus from US$1.09tcm/100 km to US$1.6tcm/100 km (article 1). This would somehow compensate for 
Ukraine the blow of a nearly five-fold price increase. Apart from that, as could be deduced from the 
agreement, the transit tariff would no longer be paid in kind but integrally in cash (article 2). The total 
amount of gas that Russia was to provide to Ukraine would be reduced to 17bcm for the year 2006 (article 
4); now that Russia no longer had to pay with low-priced gas in kind as payment of the transit tariff, the 
volumes were significantly reduced. 
Confusion regarding the new pricing scheme 
When the agreement was known, both parties hailed it as beneficial and as the normal result of their 
having stood their ground and secured their interests. Russia, as seen in the paragraph above, managed to 
bind Ukraine to a new five year agreement where payments were finally monetized and where, more 
important, market prices had been secured;235 it was claimed that prices in fact would not have to be 
renegotiated, as they would be automatically revised every quarter of a year according to the evolution of 
the oil prices to which gas was pegged.236  
                                                           
233
 See the copy, as published by the daily Ukrainska Pravda, in: "Tekst soglasheniia mezhdu "Naftogazom" i "Gazpromom" 
(Текст соглашения между "Нафтогазом" и "Газпромом")", Ukrainskaia Pravda, 5 January 2006, at  
http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/articles/2006/01/5/4395629/ (Accessed on the 5th November 2012).   
234
"Gazprom, Naftogaz Ukrainy agree on 230 dollar gas price", Itar-Tass, 4 January 2006 (Accessed on the 27th August 2011, 
from East View, Harvard Libraries). 
235
 Chai´ka, Fedor: "Rossiia dobilas´ povysheniia tsen na gaz (Россия добилась повышения цен на газ)", Izvestiia, 10 
January 2006 (Accessed on the 23rd August 2011, from East View, Harvard Libraries). 
236
 Veletminskii´, Igor´: "Evropei´skaia formula tseny (Европейская формула цены)", Rossii´skaia Gazeta, 11 January 2006 
(Accessed on the 27th August 2011, from East View, Harvard Libraries). 
    
 
165 
 
However, Ukraine also had arguments to claim this agreement as a victory for its interests: 
Ukraine insisted that the final price Ukraine would pay was US$95tcm (article 4) and hailed as very 
positive that the transit tariff would rise and be paid in cash. At first reading Ukraine´s arguments did not 
look very consistent with the provisions of the agreement. Regarding the transit tariff, Ukraine was quite 
far from having achieved a transit tariff of around US$4tcm/100km, which is the rough price for having 
fully absorbed the impact of gas prices skyrocketing from US$50tcm to US$230tcm; the reduction of 
volumes of Russian natural gas from 28-23bcm to 17bcm could be guessed as a direct consequence of a 
more disadvantageous proportion between transit tariff and gas prices. Regarding the final price of US$95 
this seemed to be the result of calculating the median price between Turkmen and Russian supplies. This 
in fact seriously seemed to distort the whole picture and easily served Ukraine to show the agreement in a 
positive light, as such a calculation could also have been made before the dispute during negotiations that 
unfolded in 2005.  
The expanded role of RosUkrEnergo and the new natural gas mix: added confusion 
However, beyond the political use that could be made from it, this median calculation was at the same 
time justified for an important fact, which is the new role that RosUkrEnergo was to acquire as 
monopolist (article 2). Henceforth all gas imports would be sold by the intermediary and all this gas, 
irrespective of its geographical origin, once bought by the trader, would be then "mixed" before being 
sold to Ukraine.  This forces us to look closer at one of the most obscure elements of the agreement, 
which is the new breakdown of gas imports. 
Regarding the origin of gas, the main question was concerned with new proportions of Central 
Asian gas which would be integrally traded through RosUkrEnergo. As we may remember, Turkmenistan 
had ended up signing two contradictory agreements with both Russia and Ukraine. The result of this was 
that Turkmenistan ended up committing excessive volumes of gas. However, as Mr. Kuprianov had 
himself hinted on the eve of the dispute, Gazprom had both offered the best price and enjoying power 
derived from its monopsonistic situation, it was considered to have contracted nearly the total of all 
available Turkmen exports through Russia. Gazprom´s position regarding Turkmen gas would now 
become more complex as a result of RosUkrEnergo´s role.  
It is safe to assume that Gazprom, which had gained  a year in advance the same monopoly that 
was foreseen for the following year 2007, would now lose a great  deal of influence over a strategic asset 
in favor of RosUkrEnergo, as most of the Turkmen gas would be contracted for Ukraine. What was even 
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more surprising is that Ukraine was not only entitled to import Turkmen gas, but also additional volumes 
from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The whole breakdown of all the gas that Ukraine was entitled to 
receive was the following: 41bcm from Turkmenistan, a maximum of 7bcm from Uzbekistan, a 
maximum of 8bcm from Kazakhstan, and a maximum of 17bcm of Russian gas (article 4).237  
This breakdown was precisely the main source of confusion (see explanation further below), and 
this for two reasons: First, the total amounted to more than what Ukraine needed for gas imports (Ukraine 
consumed in 2006 74bcm,238 with an internal production of 20.7bcm,239 so it would import 53.3bcm240). 
Second, RosUkrEnergo was supposed to export only 34bcm in the first half ot 2006 but as much as 
58bcm to Ukraine in 2007 (article 4), from which 15bcm were meant for re-exporting in cooperation with 
Gazexport (article 4).241  
As we see below, several analysts tried to tackle the task of finding an explanation for the several 
loopholes in this agreement (or at least those elements that were published) and discussed who the real 
winner in the dispute had been. 
Reactions and differing interpretations as for the controversial agreement 
Assessments from the Ukrainian side 
Many assessments coming mostly from the Ukrainian side considered that Ukraine had clearly lost in face 
of Russian pressure. The Ukrainian political scientist, Andrei´ Ermolaiev, for example considered that gas 
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in possession of RosUkrEnergo was de facto in possession of Gazprom,  Naftohaz having thus lost gas 
that belonged to it as payment for transit.242 Another political scientist, Taras Vozniak, saw the dispute 
and the subsequent agreement through the political prism and adhered to the idea of Russian political 
motivations meant to restore its position both in the CIS and among European countries.243 These two 
interpretations, either based on the economic or the political factor were the most common in Ukraine.  
Leaving aside the possible political considerations, it is worth delving into the economic aspect: 
Regarding the median price of gas sold by RosUkrEnergo, as already mentioned above, Ukraine had on 
the one hand not been able to prevent a significant price hike, as Gazprom´s gas increased to US$230tcm 
and gas from Central Asia, whose prices also increased yielded US$95tcm once all gas was mixed by 
RosUkrEnergo. On the other hand though, it must be highlighted that this price surpassed the US$80tcm 
(maximum set during pricing negotiations) by a relatively short margin, even if, as we may remember, 
US$95 was proposed at some point (see p. 157).  
Regarding RosUkrEnergo, the usual interpretation from the Ukrainian side was to see it as a tool 
of Gazprom, so its increased role supposed a victory for Gazprom. For example, if we were to believe 
specialists, as consulted by Moskovskaia Pravda, the result was a victory of Gazprom and RosUkrEnergo, 
which became the monopolists in gas transportation to Ukraine; this assessment was reinforced by the 
assumption that in the future, Gazprom and not the financially poor Naftohaz would be able to gain a 
majority in RosUkrEnergo´s stakes.244 Most scathing criticisms came from the side of the Ukrainian 
opposition, in particular former Prime Minister Timoshenko  who accused the government of giving in to 
Ukraine´s interests outright.245  
Alla Eremenko from the weekly Zerkalo Nedeli clearly attributed the victory to Russia, as the 
figures obtained from the agreement were similar to those Gazprom had been calculating for the 
company´s balance for 2006 and because Naftohaz had not been able either to achieve a price equal to or 
lower than US$80tcm and had accepted a new transit tariff of US$1.6tcm/100 km that would remain 
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unchanged for five years in spite of possible price increases over this period.246 The author also delved 
into the composition of RosUkrEnergo and linked it to both Russian and Ukrainian interests (Gazprom for 
the former and Iurii´ Boi´ko, one of the grey eminences of Kuchma´s clique for the latter), thus following 
the interpretation of RosUkrEnergo as Gazprom´s tool and highlighting the fact that Gazprom would be 
able to shut out Ukraine from direct contracts with Central Asia and keep its monopoly in that region.247  
Evgeniia Fokina from Profil´ also found in the new arrangement benefits for Gazprom, as she 
surmised RosUkrEnergo (with Gazprom behind) could pressure Naftohaz in the future regarding part of 
the Turkmen gas belonging to the company in payment of transit services (22bcm as calculated by the 
author) and resold to Naftohaz,248 while analyst Mikhail Leont´ev pointed to another advantage, which is 
that as a foreign registered company, gas exported by RosUkrEnergo would be exempted from paying 
customs duties.249 An article at the Kyiv Post by Konstantin Borodin, at the time director of the Kyiv’s 
Energy Research Center and having served as an advisor to Iurii´ Boi´ko, head of Naftohaz Ukrainy in 
2002-2005, said that the arrangement involving RosUkrEnergo was made as a means for Naftohaz to save 
face after having lost the dispute.250 It must be underlined that Naftohaz had been investigated on the 
orders of Oleksandr Turchinov, Head of the Security Service (SBU) under Timoshenko´s government 
during the summer 2005 and RosUkrEnergo´s alleged ties with the former direction under Iurii´ Boi´ko 
were one of the main targets.251 
Assessments from the Russian side 
However, other interpretations yielded totally different conclusions. In the coming days during the month 
of January, two articles which appeared in Kommersant and Vedomosti focused on Gazprom´s real yield 
from the dispute and showed a more nuanced picture: Russia had been working since 2001 to monopolize 
all Central Asian gas exports but now this position would have to be shared with RosUkrEnergo, even if 
with the ownership of 50% of the company, the trader was far from being alien to Gazprom. However, 
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that meant that at least 50% of expected earnings would have to be yielded to the obscure owners of the 
remaining half. Thus out of US$1.6bill of global benefits that RosUkrEnergo was expected to make, only 
US$800tcm mill would actually accrue to Gazprom.252  
According to the company´s representative, Wolfgang Putschek, RosUkrEnergo was supposed to 
buy Central Asian gas from Gazexport at the price of US$90tcm and then resell it to Ukraine at the agreed 
price of US$95tcm;253 RosUkrEnergo´s benefits from the first transaction would be scarce if not non-
existent as US$30tcm were the transit costs.254  The fact that to Turkmen and Uzbek gas priced at 
US$65tcm cheap Kazakh gas priced at US$30tcm could be potentially added into the mix (See Alexei´ 
Korchemkin´s analysis below),255 means that a certain margin for profits might exist, although it could 
not be clarified whether Gazexport or RosUkrEnergo would be the one benefiting. This part of the deal 
was particularly confusing at the beginning due to the two agreements that Turkmenistan had signed with 
both Gazprom and Naftohaz.  
Opposition between the late 2005 agreements signed by Turkmenistan with Naftohaz and Gazprom  
As a result, according to Novaia Gazeta, it was not clear from whom RosUkrEnergo would buy Turkmen 
gas, whether from Gazexport or from Naftohaz. The daily informed that in early February, RosUkrEnergo 
would buy Turkmen gas contracted for Naftohaz priced at $50tcm and thus sold at the Ukrainian border 
for US$80tcm (adding US$30tcm for transit, between US$25tcm and US$30 as calculated by Valerii´ 
Nesterov from "Troika Dialog", 256  or only US$19tcm if following one of Vremia Novostei´ 
assessments;257 the price of US$30tcm seems to be the most reliable),258 even if it was later reported that 
the gas sold to Ukraine would be at a higher price of US$60tcm.259  
                                                           
252
 Butrin, "Gazovaia voi´na", op. cit.; Reznik, Irina and Bekker, Aleksandr: ""Gazprom" otdal Ukrainu posredniku 
("Газпром" отдал Украину посреднику)", Vedomosti, 11 January 2006  (Accessed on the 24th August 2011, from East View, 
Harvard Libraries). Sharing profits with RosUkrEnergo happened already during the past year with Turkmen natural gas, as 
RosUkrEnergo had started working as intermediary and retained 37 % of the volume of gas (Gazprom earned only half of it) in 
payment for its services (see for the figures: Frolov, "Skhemy", op. cit.). 
253
 Belton, Catherine: "Ukraine says it will not buy any gas from Russia", Moscow Times, 11 January 2006 (Accessed on 31st 
August 2011, from East View, Harvard Libraries). 
254
 Fredholm, op. cit. 
255
 See: Korchemkin, Mikhail: "RosUkrEnergo Wins, Gazprom and NAK Lose", East European Gas Analysis, 6 March 2006, 
at http://www.eegas.com/ukrtran6.htm (Accessed on 6th November 2012). 
256
 Reznik, Irina and Kashin, Vasilii´: "RosUkrEnergo ne nuzhna Ukraine (RosUkrEnergo не нужна Украине)", Vedomosti, 
15 February 2006 (Accessed on the 31stAugust 2011, from East View, Harvard Libraries). 
257
 Grivach, Alexei´: "Sredneaziatskaia stavka dlia "Gazproma" (Среднеазиатская ставка для "Газпрома")", Vremia 
Novostei´, 23 January 2006 (Accessed on the 23rd August 2011, from East View, Harvard Libraries). According to Konstantin 
Chui´chenko, acting director of RosUkrEnergo in representation of Gazprom, costs amounted to US$25tcm, contrary to the 
figure of US$30tcm usually mentioned in most press reports (See: Gavrish, Oleg and Natal´ia Grib: "RosUkrEnergo 
obnaruzhila u sebia pribyl´ (RosUkrEnergo обнаружила у себя прибыль)", Kommersant, 13 November 2006 (Accessed on 
    
 
170 
 
As for what amount would correspond to Naftohaz and which to Gazprom, confusion reigned too: 
According to Vremia Novostei’, RosUkrEnergo would sell a maximum of 26bcm of gas at US$80tcm to 
Naftohaz, and the rest, at US$95tcm to a Joint Venture RosUkrEnergo/Naftohaz (See below);260 still, the 
author, Alexei´ Grivach, had published on January totally different figures (repeated again on 20th 
February): only 5bcm contracted to Gazprom, and 36bcm contracted to Naftohaz.261 The latest comes 
closer to alleged secret contracts signed on 4th January and unveiled by Zerkalo Nedeli and they also 
happen to nearly match the 5bcm that the JV RosUkrEnergo/Naftohaz was eventually to be allowed to 
sell within Ukraine (see below).262  
In fact, all this information was wrong, as Ukraine would not receive any direct supplies from 
Turkmenistan, even if the silence the 4th agreement kept on the second half of 2006 raised suspicions 
about  this. However,  any profits for RosUkrEnergo out of Central Asian gas derived from its position as 
intermediary were minor compared to those stemming from gas reexported. The company, which had 
been called by Moscow Times the real winner of the "war" was left with something between 10bcm to 
15bcm of gas to be freely exported to Europe263 (other sources calculated between 15bcm and 20bcm 
instead).264  
Clarifying the main point of contention in the 4th January agreement: the new gas mix 
The confusion that existed regarding how much gas RosUkrEnergo would be entitled to re-export 
(officially the contract talked of 15bcm) was related to the confusion regarding the gas breakdown. The 
only fixed volumes were those of Turkmen gas (41bcm), whereas Uzbek (7bcm), Kazakh (8bcm) and 
Russian gas (17bcm) were maxima. It was unknown what gas Ukraine would finally receive, whether 
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RosUkrEnergo would re-export all gas it was entitled to, what origin this gas would have and whether this 
gas was considered as payment for transit tariffs for its services carrying Central Asian gas 
(RosUkrEnergo had been paid 13bcm of gas during 2005).  
This question was essential, as depending on the physical origin of gas, prices could vary for 
Ukraine. For example, if all Uzbek and Kazakh gas was exported to Ukraine (56bcm resulting from 
Turkmen, Uzbek and Kazakh gas, almost 3-2bcm more than what Ukraine would eventually need for 
2006) no expensive Russian gas would be needed for Ukraine´s consumption, whereas Turkmen gas in 
addition to Russian gas would necessarily yield different prices, unless the gas mix had been already 
priced by RosUkrEnergo at US$95tcm independently of the exact origin. In fact, the price of US$95tcm 
soon led to suspicions that it was the result of a strictly Central Asian mix. The controversy soon merged 
and led to acrimonious reproaches and denials. Ukraine obviously stated that no Russian gas was 
needed,265 whereas Russia insisted on the contrary.266  
More Central Asian gas for Naftohaz and the financial consequences  
However, Russia soon recognized the rightness of Ukraine´s calculation. 267  This confirmed the 
assumption, a logical consequence of Ukraine´s only buying Central Asian gas, that Russian gas would be 
sold to Europe. Once the general picture had been clarified, it was somehow easier to calculate what were 
the benefits for Gazprom from the agreement. 
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As opposed to gas transported from Central Asia sold to Ukraine, Gazprom could obtain a much 
better deal for Russian gas. This gas would be sold at the market price of $230tcm that the company had 
been fighting so hard for. RosUkrEnergo was suspected of selling it in Central Europe where it could 
extract a final price of US$280tcm and 50% of the final benefit would go directly to Gazprom.268  
However, when it was finally confirmed that as opposed to what Russia had initially insisted, no Russian 
gas would be bought by Ukraine, the "victory" of having imposed market prices on Naftohaz stood in a 
very different light. The reason for that, as we now, is that this was done at the expense of increased 
Central Asian gas for Ukraine. Even if Gazprom after all "freed" important volumes of gas that were so 
far underpriced and linked to a very disadvantageous subsidization of the Ukrainian gas market, less 
Central Asian gas previously sold by Gazprom at market prices in Europe was made available as 
compensation.   
Calculating Gazprom´s financial losses and benefits for RosUkrEnergo 
In order to know what were the financial consequences of the new composition of gas exported to 
Ukraine which eventually enabled Ukraine to do without (at least most of) Russian gas through the 
inclusion of more Turkmen (from around 24bcm before to 41bcm with the new agreement) and up to 
15bcm of Uzbek and Kazakh gas, the new breakdown must be compared to the situation in the CIS and 
Europe before the deal to see how Gazprom´s export policy was affected in terms of benefits. According 
to an assessment by Mikhail Korchemkin, East European Gas Analysis, the up to 15bcm of Kazakh and 
Uzbek gas to be contracted by RosUkrEnergo in 2006 for Ukrainian consumption had been so far 
exported by Gazprom in Europe and the CIS. Kazakh gas had been sold to the German company ZMB 
GmbH (Gazprom´s subsidiary owned at 100%),269 to be exported to both Europe and CIS countries, 7 
bcm for the Trans-Caucasus, 9bcm to Europe and 2 bcm to Moldova.270 Following this assessment, 
Kazakh gas would mostly be detracted from volumes exported to Europe by ZMB GmbH, whereas a 
reduction of volumes to be exported by Gazprom to Europe from 109bcm to 101bcm seems to roughly 
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correspond to Uzbek volumes.271 If the 17bcm of Russian gas that would be sold by RosUkrEnergo were 
then resold in Central Europe through Gazexport as the agreement specified, it would thus compensate for 
the Uzbek and Kazakh gas lost to the export markets.  
However, in this scheme, Gazprom, though not by a wide margin, would see revenues sink. East 
European Gas Analysis assumed that under a selling price of US$230tcm to RosUkrEnergo, the total 
earnings of Gazprom would sink from US$19.141bill under the old agreements to US$18.401bill now.272 
As it was assumed that the real selling price to RosUkrEnergo would be US$170tcm instead, from 
US$19.141bill to US$18.197bill, Gazprom would most likely lose US$945mill;273  If the assessment 
assuming US$230tcm was considered, Gazprom would still lose US$741mill. In April 2008 Vedomosti 
published a second version of how Ukraine´s gas shares had been broken down in 2006. The article, 
which contained a table with both the volumes of all gas consumed in Ukraine and their origin from 1992 
to 2007, registered 9.1bcm of Russian gas as having been consumed in Ukraine. The article also talks, 
which coincides to news by Zerkalo Nedeli (see below), of more than 9bcm left for RosUkrEnergo to 
export abroad in the rest of Europe (mainly Poland and Hungary). If true, this arguably meant that 
Ukraine had not consumed all Central Asian gas and a certain share of Russian gas instead. The figures in 
the table for Central Asian gas, totaling 47.8bcm roughly coincide with the volumes resulting from adding 
Turkmen and Uzbek gas priced at US$65tcm which would then imply that Kazakh gas had not been 
consumed.274  
Mikhail Korchemkin assumed that Kazakh gas needed to reach the final price of US$95tcm for 
Ukraine; following his calculation, the average price of the Central Asian mix should have been US$83, 
so it could be assumed that RosUkrEnergo was left a margin of US$12tcm of benefits.275 Without Kazakh 
gas, US$65tcm for Turkmen and Uzbek gas to which transport costs were added actually roughly 
matched US$95tcm paid by Naftohaz, but counting in 9.1bcm of Russian gas priced at US$230tcm makes 
the price of US$95tcm impossible and indeed supports Korchemkin´s assertion that cheap Kazakh gas 
priced US$30tcm at the time was necessary for achieving the final price.  
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Simon Pirani, writing in 2009, provides the following breakdown of gas volumes: 9.1bcm of 
Russian gas, 36.5bcm of Turkmen gas, only 2.8bcm of Uzbek gas and as much as 6.5bcm of Kazakh 
gas,276 nearly the maximum allowed under the 4th January 2006 agreement. This makes sense if we follow 
Korchemkin´s assertion that Kazakh gas was needed to round up the price to reach US$95tcm. Thus, the 
figure of 47.8bcm in Vedomosti would only coincidentally match the addition of Turkmen and Uzbek 
volumes of natural gas. Pirani also provides prices that differ with what Korchemkin indicated.277 
According to him, Turkmen natural gas  was priced at US$65tcm and both Uzbek and Kazakh natural gas 
was priced at US$50tcm.278 This assessment highly differs with the fact that Turkmenistan agreed with 
Gazprom on a price of US$65tcm. 
Incoherence regarding the US$95tcm for Ukraine and the issue of costs for RosUkrEnergo 
It should also be considered whether the price of US$95tcm was real. The median price of gas for 
Ukraine in 2006 accepting the volumes given in Vedomosti would be around US$118tcm, which is much 
beyond the US$95tcm initially agreed.279 This figure is still doubtful, not only as Gazprom eventually 
recognized that no Russian gas would be sold in 2006 (which according to Vedomosti and Pirani (2009) 
only happened in 2007, when no Russian gas is registered in Ukraine´s consumption), but no criticism 
was voiced in the following years, something which many from Timoshenko´s Bloc would have 
denounced if it had finally implied higher prices.  
One option could be that RosUkrEnergo had to assume the costs itself in order to maintain 
US$95tcm for Ukraine. Therefore, maybe some of the benefits of selling natural gas abroad had to 
subsidise Ukraine´s supply. Another option is that the price was real indeed, but the gas breakdown was 
not. Although Simon Pirani confirms the volume of 9.1bcm of Russian natural gas for Ukraine in 2009, in 
his report for The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, "Ukraine´s Gas Sector" from June 2007, while also 
reflecting the same figures, he nevertheless considered that part of 9,1bcm of Russian gas was counted 
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only physically and thus had no reflection on prices, with RosUkrEnergo probably assuming the costs 
instead of Naftohaz, if some Russian gas was finally sold in real terms.280     
Gazprom´s relations with gas traders in general and RosUkrEnergo in particular 
Given the available information, it seems safe to assume that Gazprom did not make a profitable deal 
with the January 2006 agreement. However, that does not clarify suspicions that RosUkrEnergo was a 
strategic asset worth the apparent financial costs derived from the agreement.  
Gazprom´s treatment of favor to RosUkrEnergo 
As Korchemkin himself mentioned some time later, financial reports stated that Gazprom had sold gas in 
2005 to RosUkrEnergo instead of ZMB GmbH. In a letter to the Financial Times, the authoritative 
analyst stated that Gazprom had been selling gas during the first half of 2005 to RosUkrEnergo at 
US$93tcm, and even less, US$80, in the second half. This gas, later resold to Europe at US$174tcm and 
then US$205tcm in the second half, channeled huge profits to RosUkrEnergo at the expense of Gazprom 
who should have found it more advantageous to resort to ZMB GmbH.281  
Where did this gas come from? It must be remembered that under the agreement in July 2005 to 
solve the controversy regarding the 7.8bcm of "disappeared" gas, 5.25bcm of gas were sold to 
RosUkrEnergo; besides this, RosUkrEnergo earned 12-13bcm in concept for transit tariff, from which 5-
6bcm were sold to Naftohaz, to be resold later to Central Europe (see p. 138). According to Gazprom´s 
reports for the first 10 months of 2005, it had sold 15.538bcm of gas to RosUkrEnergo at prices ranging 
from US$80tcm to US$93tcm for Russian gas and US$43tcm for Central Asian gas.282 It true, this would 
mean that besides what RosUkrEnergo received in 2005, at least part of the natural gas thought to be sold 
to ZMB GmbH, as calculated by East European Gas Analysis in his March 2006 analysis, went through 
the trader.283  
                                                           
280
 Pirani, "Ukraine´s Gas Sector", op. cit., p. 37, ft. 58. 
281
 Korchemkin, Mikhail: "Why do shareholders ignore Gazprom´s Swiss link?", Letter to the Financial Times, East European 
Gas Analysis, 20 July 2006, at http://www.eegas.com/media/060720-FT.htm (Accessed on the 20th November 2012); 
"Ukraine-Russia struggle to resolve dispute", ICIS Heren, 31 July 2006, at 
http://www.icis.com/heren/articles/2006/07/31/9289270/ukraine-russia-struggle-to-resolve-dispute.html (Accessed on the 20th 
November 2012); Korchemkin, Mikhail: "Eksport gaza: zlaboe sveno (експорт газа: злабое звено)", Vedomosti, 17 July 2006 
at http://www.pressmon.com/cgi-bin/press_view.cgi?id=1653502 (Accessed on the 28th November 2006 from Pressmon). 
282
 Grivach, Alexei´: "Zavtra, mozhet, opiat´ voi´na (Завтра, может, опять война)", Vremia Novostei´, 31 January 2006 
(Accessed on the 18th August 2011, from East View, Harvard Libraries). 
283
 As Alla Eremenko and Iulia Mostovaia mentioned in an article in February 2008 in Zerkalo Nedeli, RosUkrEnergo would 
have exported 9bcm of gas in 2006 and 7bcm in 2007 (See: Eremenko, Alla and Mostovaia, Iuliia: "Poltsarstva - "Gazpromu" 
(Полцарства — «Газпрому»!)", Zerkalo Nedeli, 15 February 2008, at 
    
 
176 
 
Gazprom´s treatment of favor to EuralTransGas 
This preferential treatment was not new. Before RosUkrEnergo existed, EuralTransGas, which operated 
already in 2003 and had been granted permission by Gazprom to export Turkmen gas to Ukraine (see 
chapter 4, pp. 98-100), had allegedly served (as reported in 2004 already) as intermediary for gas sold to 
Gazprom´s intermediaries in Germany (probably ZMB GmbH). 284 If we assume that the same happened 
with RosUkrEnergo in 2005, this might be an explanation for the apparent contradiction between reports 
stating that gas had been sold to ZMB GmbH and reports which on the contrary pointed to 
RosUkrEnergo. In this case, we might state that losses incurred in the new agreement had already been 
incurred in 2005 under the previous conditions and that, voluntarily from the side of Gazprom. 285 
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Narratives regarding Gazprom´s interests in gas traders 
As for the reasons for Gazprom to support intermediaries, no authoritative answer can be easily found. 
However, two narratives exist.  
One is linked to the political interpretations that were provided by many after details of the 
agreement started to be known (see above). According to this narrative, RosUkrEnergo was a strategic 
vehicle serving Gazprom´s interests.  
The other narrative is commonly followed by Gazprom itself, and portrays RosUkrEnergo more as 
a strategic buffer meant to assure Gazprom against risks. Following this latter narrative, one reason for 
Gazprom to forego some of its profits could have been to buttress the intermediary´s financial situation as 
a buffer against payment problems from the Ukrainian side. In this respect we may consider 
EuralTransGaz´s role earlier, as it had also exported Gazprom´s gas to Western Europe in 2004. 
Clarifying, as far as it is possible, what was RosUkrEnergo´s place in Gazprom´s calculations can tell us 
much regarding whether Gazprom could be portrayed as a losing or a winning actor after the dispute. 
The hypothesis of financial losses as an "investment" in political/corruption gains 
In spite of gains like unlinked transit fees and gas prices, freed Russian gas from subsidized prices, a 
contract valid for five years where the transit tariff would remain unchanged and where prices would be 
periodically revised (that would enable Gazprom to force to assume periodic price increases from Central 
Asian producers) and the prohibition to Naftohaz to re-export gas, the financial analysis of gains, as 
calculated by Mikhail Korchemkin, shows Gazprom not only was a long way from being optimistic but 
even came out worse off than before the dispute: with Ukraine receiving more Central Asian gas (which 
was also moving to "market prices" but from a lower baseline),286  Gazprom ended up selling more 
Russian gas to Europe at the expense of Central Asian gas. Besides losing in financial terms, Gazprom 
could not fully enjoy its monopoly of Central Asian gas, which could not be exported at market prices to 
Europe while Ukraine consumed Russian gas at new market prices. However, the most important 
question was whether Gazprom gained politically from RosUkrEnergo.  
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The nature of RosUkrEnergo 
The Russian / Gazprom connection 
Oleksandr Turchinov, Head of the Security Service (SBU) under Timoshenko´s government, had stated 
back in June 2005 that RosUkrEnergo ´s approval could not have taken place without the approval of both 
the former Ukrainian government and Russia.287 Such a statement does not in itself clarify what the 
reasons for Russian approval were. A favorable narrative for Gazprom is that RosUkrEnergo, which was 
created as a result of the agreements between Russia and Ukraine on 29th July 2004 in substitution of 
EuralTransGaz,288 was approved by Gazprom because of misgivings with the latter,289 rather than having 
a direct interest in a deal which still created much opacity; RosUkrEnergo was probably not an 
improvement in itself, but an improvement in relation to EuralTransGaz, maybe not so much in terms of 
transparency, but mainly because Gazprom gained a participation of 50%.290  
Russian interests regarding RosUkrEnergo 
As seen in chapter 4, Russia had had a long relation with intermediary companies, that in the 90s worked 
as a buffer to guarantee gas exports from Central Asia by way of their better chances at liquidity,291 a 
solution for constrained circumstances. This arrangements were nevertheless controversial and always 
prone to corruption; in the case of Itera, it served as a vehicle for the self-enrichment of Gazprom´s 
directors at the time of Rem Viakhirev´s leadership, in total opposition to the company´s real business 
interests.292  
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In the case of EuralTransGaz, the decision raised questions in 2003 as to whether Gazprom was 
just following the same patterns of corruption but with new actors, especially after Gazprom had 
promised to get rid of intermediaries.293 Gazprom asserted that EuralTransGaz would benefit both the 
Russian monopoly and its Ukrainian counterpart.294 Although sources from Naftohaz denied this and 
referred to the obscure trader as the strict competence of Gazprom,295 Iurii´ Boi´ko, at the time head of the 
Ukrainian company, would later talk of plans for Naftohaz and Gazprom to become 50% owners 
respectively of the trader.296  
If eventually this did not happen, the emergence of RosUkrEnergo nevertheless reflected this 
project. The emergence of this new player was explained by Gazprom as a consequence of the latter´s 
recovery of control of the pipeline "Central-Asia-Centre" planned for 2005.297  
The importance of intermediaries in relation to Central Asian supplies should not be 
underestimated: RosUkrEnergo enabled Russia and Ukraine not to compete for supplies and thus play 
into the hands of Turkmenistan which started in late 2004 to demand higher prices.298 It could also, as 
explained by Gazprom, attract loans for upgrading the transport network in Central Asia for additional 
outlets.299 Explanations in this direction can be found in the two following examples:  
Regarding the necessity of an intermediary, Alexandr Riazanov provided the following 
explanation in an interview in February 2009: "It is a more transparent and fair structure tan the former 
intermediary EuralTransGas. I think RosUkrEnergo earned its positive role, as Ukraine withheld 
payments. RosUkrEnergo acted as a buffer, in order not to fall under the Ukrainian legislation on taxes 
and customs  duties."300 
Much earlier than that, Konstantin Chui´chenko in an article to Vedomosti in August 2006, 
followed the same line writing that RosUkrEnergo had helped Gazprom recover a big part of the debt 
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accruing from the 7.8bcm of gas Naftohaz owed Gazprom, by buying the biggest part thereof and then 
reselling it to Europe.301 Chui'chenko expanded in an interview to the journalist Natal´ia Grib, this time in 
the daily Kommersant in January 2007: he stated that a monopolistic intermediary in itself was needed to 
avoid competition between Ukraine and Russia in favor of Central Asian producers (mainly 
Turkmenistan) 302  and that regarding RosUkrEnergo in particular, not only did it represent Russian 
interests (which previous schemes did not) but was supposed to be able to expand the transportation 
infrastructure,303 while he also added (even if that was a reflection a posteriori), that RosUkrEnergo had 
proved its stability in three years in face of abrupt political changes in Ukraine.304  
From the Ukrainian side, Iurii´ Boi´ko, the actual father of RosUkrEnergo´s enthronement in the 
Ukrainian market, put forward similar arguments in his interview for Moskovskii´ Komsomolets, where he 
stated the necessity for contracting intermediaries given that they could allay animosity with and between 
Central Asian countries better than Naftohaz would by itself.305 
Gazprom´s contradictory position regarding RosUkrEnergo 
It could perfectly be that Gazprom did not want to assume responsibility for a shady company thought to 
have links to corruption and delinquency and would not confess obscure reasons for supporting the 
intermediary. For example, regarding RosUkrEnergo ´s new expansion in the January 2006 agreement it 
was initially acknowledged that the initiative came from Russia. Indeed, declarations from the Russian 
Minister of Energy Viktor Khristenko confirming previous ones by the Ukrainian Prime Minister,306 who 
said Russia had taken the initiative of presenting RosUkrEnergo as a solution,307 seemed to support the 
thesis.  
However, Gazprom soon started either downplaying its role as the sponsor of RosUkrEnergo, or 
voicing misgivings regarding its presence: Sergei´ Kuprianov for example asserted that the arrangement 
involving both EuralTransGas and RosUkrEnergo had been the prerogative of the Ukrainian 
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government. 308  Khristenko also allegedly showed misgivings as to the real composition of 
RosUkrEnergo.309 The Russian Duma soon after the signature of the agreement (on 13th January 2006) 
sent a request to discover the real composition of RosUkrEnergo. 310  Gazprom´s subsequent (and 
eventually successful) attempts to gain hold of Arosgas (real owner of 50% of RosUkrEnergo)311 that 
would ensue in the next months,312 could also be seen as a proof of Gazprom´s tenuous influence on 
RosUkrEnergo. Gazprom´s chairman of the board of directors (and future President of the Russian 
Federation from 2008 to 2012), Dmitrii´ Medvedev, said that the optimal arrangement should rather 
involve Naftohaz and Gazprom313 (something, by the way, reiterated some days later by Alexei´ Miller,314 
and plainly acknowledged by Vladimir Putin himself in a press conference in Spain),315 thus casting some 
doubts as to whether the Russian side was satisfied with the deal achieved. Alexei´ Miller would later in 
February accuse the Ukrainian side for having allegedly rejected a direct contract, leaving them with no 
other alternative to expanding RosUkrEnergo´s role.316 
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Did all these statements merely serve as devices for face-saving? This may be suspected as some 
other elements pointed at Gazprom´s satisfaction: after Putin´s sincerity at the Spanish press conference, 
the Ukrainian government jumped at the occasion and declared its intention to scrap the intermediary.317 
The Russian side on the contrary backtracked and closed this episode in a way which stood in severe 
contradiction with its previous statements: The Russian Minister of Energy, Viktor Khristenko refused to 
revisit the current agreements to avoid "creat(ing)extra difficulties for both sides" and thus postponed 
RosUkrEnergo´s replacement for the moment when "there is another structure, understandable to the 
parties".318 Gazprom did offer an alternative to Naftohaz, which consisted of the latter trying to gain the 
50% of RosUkrEnergo (controlling the holding Centragas) which was controlled by Ukrainian interests. 
Naftohaz being financially unable to assume the costs involved, the matter was left to rest. This offer, and 
the lack of interest from Gazprom to change the status quo, could serve as a basis for the narrative of 
RosUkrEnergo as Gazprom´s strategic vehicle. 
Gazprom´s eventual rejection of RosUkrEnergo  
In the next year, occasional declarations from the Russian side went in the same direction its earlier 
declarations after the dispute as seen above: in March 2007 the new deputy chairman of Gazprom´s 
management committee, Valerii´ Golubev hinted that RosUkrEnergo´s arrangement was "not optimal" 
and Dmitrii´ Medvedev further suggested that in 2008 Gazprom would try to get rid of intermediaries 
(which eventually happened in 2009 after a new gas dispute).319 This seemed to point to a good deal of 
dissatisfaction. The importance this time of such declarations is that they were to  have a continuity as 
soon as a window of opportunity to remove RosUkrEnergo from the scene opened in 2008 and 2009, as 
we will see in the next two chapters. 
In the light of the eventual agreement to wipe away RosUkrEnergo reached in March 2008 and 
executed after January 2009, Gazprom´s initial reluctance to change the status quo after RosUkrEnergo ´s 
role had been expanded in January 2006 could in fact fit the company´s narrative of the intermediary as a 
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strategic buffer. A situation similar to that of weeks after the January 2006 agreement would happen 
around December 2007, when the second Timoshenko government was inaugurated (see next chapter), 
with Gazprom rejecting plans for revising the status quo, including RosUkrEnergo´s suppression, if that 
also implied unfavorable economic conditions.  However, when Gazprom could secure (at least 
relatively) favorable conditions, it did agree on the intermediary´s suppression, 
It is probable Gazprom had similar concerns back in 2006; it is interesting to consider 
Ekhanurov´s declarations stating that in case of changing the intermediary, documents should be revised 
(emphasis mine)320, or that the compromise reached in January could still be cancelled (emphasis mine)321 
which Gazprom was most loath to accept. Timoshenko´s policy after two years clearly exemplified what 
were the dangers for Gazprom of opening Pandora´s box through the revision of current agreements, as 
the Prime Minister in her political comeback used RosUkrEnergo as an excuse for not honoring Ukrainian 
debts. It is safe to assume that Gazprom preferred not to negotiate any further changes in an agreement, 
which, as unsatisfactory as it might have looked in the beginning, was nevertheless positive in many 
aspects, if not for the benefits it secured, at least for avoiding more headaches in complicated energy 
relations with Ukraine.  
The Ukrainian connection 
Apart from doubts regarding Gazprom, it must be stated that the onus of proof was not placed exclusively 
on Gazprom. As investigations started by Turchinov in 2005 had revealed, there were obscure interests 
behind RosUkrEnergo, linked to corrupt schemes inherited from the Kuchma administration. The reason 
for the Timoshenko government focusing on this company was that it seemed to be a perfect example of 
the corrupt Ukraine the new Orange Revolution was supposed to reform. The fact that apart from 
Gazprom´s role no one seemed to know who was behind the remaining half of the company, again caught 
everybody´s attention when RosUkrEnergo came out reinforced from the January 2006 agreement. Initial 
suspicions were that these interests were linked to the former leadership and in that respect many 
speculated that these might be close to Gazprom too.  
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However, in a surprising move Timoshenko´s government attempts at investigating the company 
were stopped by the President Yushchenko himself, 322 who was credited for protecting Dmitro Firtash, 
one of the main Ukrainian businessmen and later discovered to be the main owner of Centragas, the 
company that controlled 50% of RosUkrEnergo, along with Arosgas (owned by Gazprombank) and who 
was credited for having approached Yushchenko already on the eve of the 2004 elections. It seems thus 
warranted to speculate that the Ukrainian side might have had some interests in involving RosUkrEnergo 
in the new agreements and that Russia might have again followed as before their counterparts´ 
initiative.323  
RosUkrEnergo´s true nature was disclosed by the daily Izvestiia, close to Gazprom´s interests, 
possibly in order to forestall another scandal like that which happened with EuralTransGaz when its real 
owners were disclosed. Zerkalo Nedeli published a report based on internal information from 
RosUkrEnergo where its complicated composition was explained.324 Yushchenko´s government apparent 
incapacity at finding information325 seemed inconsistent with rumours that linked the President with 
Dmitro Firtash. These rumours resurfaced when in early 2008, the Communist Party accused the 
President of having direct links to UkrGazEnergo through the company "PetroGas", headed by his own 
brother Petro Yushchenko,326 and would continue for years to come: in 2009, rumours surfaced which 
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accused Yushchenko of being the direct or indirect owner of 27% of RosUkrEnergo´s shares.327 As 
Kommersant also informed, Yushchenko had been discovered to be one of the founders of the bank 
"Kliringovii´ Dom", where Ivan Fursin (minor partner of Dmitro Firtash and owner of 10% of Centragas) 
owned 33%; the information had then been classified328 and other interesting personal connections can be 
found in the Syrian born Yussef Hares, a businessman linked to Firtash and politically close to the 
President himself.329 These recurrent rumours regarding the Ukrainian links of RosUkrEnergo give credit 
to the idea that beyond Gazprom, there were many interests in Ukraine, not only from the entourage of 
Yurii´ Boi´ko, to protect the controversial intermediary.  
The establishment of the JV UkrGazEnergo and Gazprom´s interests 
The last stage to fulfill the 4th January agreement was the establishment of a JV between RosUkrEnergo 
and Naftohaz to control the internal market of Ukraine. This gave credence to another interesting 
narrative in Ukraine, according to which the JV would be used by Gazprom to penetrate into the 
Ukrainian market and most importantly, bankrupt Naftohaz.  
UkrGazEnergo would be owned by RosUkrEnergo and Naftohaz. The company was supposed to 
hold the monopoly within Ukraine to sell imported gas, with Gazprom thus having an indirect 25 % of 
this market. It is questionable whether this put Gazprom in a position with real prospects of gaining  
control of the internal Ukrainian gas market. Gazprom would indeed receive some benefits to round up a 
deal which in general involved financial losses, even if barely any details as for UkrGazEnergo´s 
revenues transpired.  
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However, this can be linked to another narrative usually put forward in Ukraine, which is that the 
scheme involving RosUkrEnergo was devised as a means to gain control of the Ukrainian transportation 
network. According to Iuliia Mostovaia from Zerkalo Nedeli, once Ukraine was prohibited under the new 
agreement from selling either Russian or Turkmen gas, its subsidizing of gas might drive her to 
bankruptcy and force her to sell part of the network. Thus, the prohibition of Naftohaz re-exporting gas 
under conditions of the new agreement (article 2) which deprived the Ukrainian monopoly additional 
revenues, would have been intended to bankrupt Naftohaz from Gazprom so as to gain control of part of 
its assets could be related to and the fact that Naftohaz would have to share the market with 
RosUkrEnergo through UkrGazEnergo, thus splitting revenues.330  
The justification for such a narrative is mostly based on the fact that, if Gazprom seemed to be 
losing in financial terms, Naftohaz did not gain either, with RosUkrEnergo being the real and indisputable 
winner as a result of this short dispute. Considering again the figures presented by Mikhail´ Korchemkin, 
Naftohaz would lose US$196mill from the new pricing and transit tariff, to which US$50mill from 
sharing the internal market with RosUkrEnergo through UkrGazEnergo should be added. But in addition 
to US$246mill lost, there had to be added losses from not being able to re-export gas to Central Europe 
any more. 
 
6. 7. Epilogue: Negotiations on the Establishment of UkrGazEnergo 
The 4th January agreement contained the seeds of future disagreements in some of its provisions: the 
periodic renegotiation of prices, the complete monopoly of an obscure intermediary, and the 
establishment for 1st February of UkrGazEnergo, the JV between RosUkrEnergo and Naftohaz for the 
distribution of imported gas in the Ukrainian gas market.331 In fact, the rest of the month was to be mired 
in controversies as to how this JV would be constituted:  
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Talks resumed on 13th January with the goal of setting up the JV by 20th January and signing a 
supply contract five days later.332 But things proved more difficult and by 16th January, as opposed to 
initial intentions, nothing had been yet agreed. The Ukrainian side used the occasion to change the 
agreement and to bind Gazprom to a five- year supply contract to guarantee the price of US$95tcm. This 
would force the Russian monopoly to assume further pricing changes from Central Asian suppliers 
(Turkmenistan actually was already hinting at higher prices between US$80tcm and US$85tcm) and thus 
subsidize the Ukrainian economy, whereas it was supposed that fixing the price would yield no benefits to 
RosUkrEnergo if the costs of Central Asian gas was hiked beyond US$70tcm. 333  This being an 
impossible suggestion, neither talks on 18th January  334 nor on 20th January335 were successful.  
A new hurdle was that the Ukrainian Anti-Trust Commission did not give its permission for 
setting up the JV in the face of allegedly insufficient documentation from the side of Naftohaz and 
RosUkrEnergo.336 In the meantime, new items for confrontation, such as Russia´s decision to stop imports 
of Ukrainian livestock products,337 accusations that Ukraine was again siphoning off gas in the midst of a 
cold spell338 with new effects on supplies to the rest of Europe,339 further marred bilateral relations in a 
still delicate moment. No agreement had been signed by the 25th January340 and negotiations continued 
until the very deadline, so the agreement opening the door for the constitution of the JV between 
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Naftohaz and RosUkrEnergo could not happen. According to Konstantin Chui´chenko, Head of 
Gazprom´s Juridical Department and Co-Executive Director of RosUkrEnergo, disagreements existed as 
Naftohaz wanted to see its subsidiary Gaz Ukrainy enter the JV, whereas RosUkrEnergo itself preferred 
Naftohaz.341 The main agreement was possible only when the Ukrainian Anti-Monopoly finally gave its 
approval on 31st January:342 
UkrGazEnergo was formed with equal shares by Naftohaz and RosUkrEnergo and would only 
start selling to the internal Ukrainian market from 1st March. More significant than this one-month delay 
was that instead of the 32bcm of imports initially planned, it would be allowed to sell only 5.4bcm of gas 
per year (that for a license valid for five years).343 With the creation of the new company, the energy 
dispute was finally over  a month after   the final agreement was signed, which  had put an end to cut-offs. 
As for Ukraine´s pretension to fix the price of US$95tcm as agreed on the 4th January and provisionally 
valid for at least the first month before the constitution or the JV, there was a certain confusion: as 
opposed to what Naftohaz wanted, Gazprom only had agreed in principle to keep the price of US$95tcm 
until 1st July 2006,344 otherwise RosUkrEnergo would suffer losses if supplies from Central Asia became 
more expensive.345  RosUkrEnergo Executive Director Chui'chenko was explicit when he stated that 
prices would have to move if Central Asian suppliers increased prices,346 something which matched 
Gazprom´s  statement that the contract would be the object of renegotiation in the event of "changes 
independent of the parties" (read, suppliers´ new prices).347 
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6. 8. Preliminary Conclusions 
The preliminary conclusions we may extract from the January 2006 energy dispute is that it´s being a 
victory for Gazprom remains an arguable interpretation. Many interpretations, as seen above, saw it as a 
defeat outright, while from the Ukrainian side, interpretations tended to differ radically, putting Ukraine 
as the loser in this dispute. The problem of the agreement reached is probably the fact that there are 
elements for considering the dispute´s outcome as both a defeat for Gazprom and Naftohaz; both clearly 
lost in financial terms, with the latter arguably ending up worse off. As we have seen, the obscurity of 
RosUkrEnergo´s allegiance makes difficult to consider whether Gazprom obtained gains from the trader´s 
expanded role.  We may advance here that elements point to either a limited defeat for Gazprom for the 
sake of saving face and putting a stop to a dispute that went out of hand or at least a compromise, short in 
any case of the initial objectives.  
The year 2005 was beyond any doubt a year where the situation changed for Russia in what 
regards energy issues with Ukraine. The starting point for Russia probably was the decision by the 
Ukrainian side to reconsider the current agreements in its favor, raising the transit tariff. Russia jumped 
into the occasion to demand higher prices too, and try to make Ukraine converge with the upward trend in 
oil prices, which were pushing up natural gas prices in Europe. The attempts at revision from the 
Ukrainian side came in a context of increasing energy subsidies for Ukraine, in comparative terms, as oil 
prices increased, and along with them, natural gas prices sold at market prices beyond the FSU countries. 
In addition, the clash between Putin´s Russia and the new Orange leadership in Kiev arguably made these 
subsidies more unpalatable.  If not enough, there was a clear competition between Russia and Ukraine 
during 2005 to obtain favourable pricing conditions from Central Asia and in the case of Gazprom, to 
reinforce its monopsony and suppress direct relations between Ukraine and Turkmenistan. These changes 
offer a possible explanation for Russia to have forced Ukraine to accept a set of conditions (higher prices) 
which eventually led Russia to stop gas supplies in the face of Ukraine´s negative. 
Once these conditions, in a lesser or bigger degree led to the energy dispute of January 2006, the 
sequence of events, reflecting a process of escalation, were the following: on 1st January, Gazprom 
stopped supplies to Ukraine; as both supplies for Ukraine and the rest of European consumers depending 
on Ukraine as transit country flow together, Gazprom simply reduced volumes according to Ukraine´s 
consumption. However, Ukraine escalated the dispute when it started disrupting the flow of natural gas 
and provoked that a bilateral energy dispute translated into an energy crisis in Central Europe, as supplies 
started falling. If we may trust press reports, it seems that Naftohaz siphoned off more natural gas than 
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justified for sheer technical needs. Once Ukraine had taken this step, Gazprom decided to deescalate the 
dispute, taking the decision on late 2nd January, made effective the next day, of restoring normal supplies. 
Negotiations continued during that day and in early 4th January the agreement was reached. 
Why did Gazprom deescalate the dispute? The obvious answer of the Russian side having reached 
its goals, as we have had the opportunity to see in the pages above, when the agreement was analyzed, 
cannot be sustained. In the best of cases, Gazprom and the Russian government above preferred a 
compromise, where even financial losses were assumed, while complete control of Central Asian 
resources could not be achieved, whereas the added value of RosUkrEnergo for Gazprom is not obvious, 
especially in sight of its suppression, as we will see in chapter 8, after the January 2009 dispute. This 
assessment, which will be taken up anew in chapter 9, opens the door for using prospect theory to 
interpret Russian decision´s in the dispute.  
Russia seemed to behave as a classical risk-averting actor, likely not wanting to assume further 
reputational damages caused by the a dispute which was affecting from the very first day most dependent 
consumers in Central Europe. A prospect theory based interpretation would fit with Russia´s behavior as 
a risk-avert actor, not willing to assume further risks for the sake of winning the energy dispute it had 
started with Ukraine. Thus, assuming a compromise, or even a losing agreement for the sake of 
preserving the elements of the status quo with which Gazprom and the Russian government were 
arguably satisfied, would have been the most reasonable move. 
Our conclusions in chapter 11 will devote more space to determine the potentiality of this 
explanation, as well as to determine which were the economic and political factors that influenced and 
what was their relation between each other.    
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Chapter 7: Russia-Ukraine Energy Dispute of March 2008 
 
7. 1. New Tremors from Central Asia in 2006 and the Complex Triangle between Russia, 
Turkmenistan and Ukraine  
As we saw in the previous chapter, Russia and Ukraine had put an end to their energy dispute in January 
2006 with the signature of an agreement on 4th January 20006. That agreement expanded the role of 
RosUkrEnergo and made Ukraine totally dependent on Central Asian gas. This meant that Ukraine would 
henceforth be even more dependent on Turkmenistan´s energy policy at a moment when the Central 
Asian republic insisted on higher prices for its gas. The agreement subscribed by Russia with 
Turkmenistan (see previous chapter, p. 157), secured for the former an amount of 30bcm of gas priced at 
US$65tcm. It was thus supposed that at least for the first months of 2006, Ukraine, through the 
intermediation of RosUkrEnergo, would be dependent on the agreements reached by Russia and 
Turkmenistan. 1  In fact, when negotiations were still continuing on how the JV of Naftohaz and 
RosUkrEnergo, the future UkrGazEnergo, would be established, parallel negotiations were taking place 
between Russia and Turkmenistan. Turkmenistan was trying again to raise prices. 
Russia seemed to be interested in managing that prices would also go up for Ukraine,2 as it needed 
Ukraine to absorb the increase. Turkmenistan initially sought prices ranging between US$80tcm and 
US$85tcm.3 However, Ashgabat soon proposed US$100tcm instead, to be effective by the end of the 
year. 4  In this context, Russian and Ukrainian interests went in hand, as both needed to contain 
Turkmenistan´s ambitions. This is why Alexei´ Miller´s delegation in February was accompanied by that 
of his Ukrainian equivalent, Ivan Plachkov. The tandem was unfortunately not very effective, as the 
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Ukrainian delegation had neither margin of decision nor credibility; Plachkov´s delegation met with a 
harsh rebuke from their Turkmen counterparts when reminded about the outstanding debt, now 
amounting to US$159mill.5 Sergei´ Ivchenko, Naftohaz´s head, retaliated declaring that Ukraine would 
have to stop imports of Turkmen gas if prices were to be increased.6 That was a threat that sounded void 
due to Ukraine´s dependence on Turkmen gas.7  
Turkmenistan led Ukraine to believe that a direct agreement was still possible. It may be suspected 
that Ashgabat´s goal was to entice Kiev to pay its debts. Thus in March there was talk of an agreement to 
sell gas to Ukraine at a price of US$60tcm (US$10tcm more than US$50tcm as agreed in the frustrated 
agreement before the gas dispute, but still less than US$65tcm agreed with Gazprom)8, as long as Ukraine 
paid back US$59.6mill (leaving US$28.7mill for later) out of its outstanding debt in cash, while the debt 
corresponding to the barter payment was reduced from US$67.3mill to US$12.2mill through the sale of 
steel pipes.9  
However, Turkmenistan persisted in its mistrust of Ukraine, of whose solvency it publicly 
doubted; the postponement of the Ukrainian Prime Minister´s visit from March to May, which soured 
mutual relations, was a reaction to the Turkmen attitude. 10  The Ukrainian side complained that 
Turkmenistan refused to discount from the debt US$88mill that had been paid in January for Turkmen 
gas that never ended up being supplied,11 since direct supplies between Turkmenistan and Ukraine were 
terminated and all gas sold to GazExport instead.12 Thus, statements by President Yushchenko back to 
February hoping for prices of US$60tcm, dwelt in the realm of wishful thinking. Neither could Ukraine 
really believe Prime Minister Ekhanurov´s declaration saying that prospective prices of US$100tcm for 
Turkmen gas would not affect end prices for Ukrainian consumers, 13  (the government had recently 
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decided to cap prices for gas sold by UkrGazEnergo at US$110)14, irrespective of further increases from 
suppliers. 
The permanent character of the framework approved in January was confirmed in June 2006: all 
of Turkmen gas in the first half of the year, around 21bcm, had been sold to RosUkrEnergo by Gazprom 
in accordance with the latest agreement in December when the Russian monopoly purchased 30bcm of 
Turkmen gas.15 According to Vedomosti, despite having signed in January an agreement with Ukraine to 
sell 40bcm, priced at US$44tcm for the first half of 2006, to be increased to US$60tcm for the second 
half, Turkmenistan remained faithful to the other agreement signed with Gazprom but at the more 
favorable price of US$66tcm (an additional US$1tcm had been added). 16  In June 2006 Naftohaz´s 
marginalization was sealed when Gazprom announced the sale of the remaining 20bcm of gas for 
consumption in Ukraine to Gazexport. In addition to that, Ashgabat was to propose that Gazprom should 
set a price for a yearly supply of 50bcm of gas for the period 2006-08 (the amount was unrealistic, as 
owing to the real transit capacity of the "Central Asia-Center" pipeline, hardly more than 41-42bcm could 
be transported).17 The Ukrainian side belatedly proposed now a price of US$65tcm,18 but, as seen above, 
Turkmenistan was targeting much higher prices around US$100tcm and Gazprom aimed at a compromise 
between US$80tcm to US$85tcm.19 Naftohaz was out of the game and Gazprom faced tough negotiations. 
Miller´s June visit to Turkmenistan failed to reach a satisfactory agreement for the second half of 
the year. Gazprom insisted on a price of US$65tcm but Turkmenistan did not move from its goal of 
US$100tcm.20 If Gazprom refused to budge, Turkmenistan responded with even higher figures: taking 
advantage of alleged Kazakh plans to sell gas at US$150tcm, Ashgabat now wanted prices between 
US$110-125tcm.21 This spiral raised concern in Ukraine, the end consumer of all this Turkmen gas. 
Following Valerii´ Nesterov from "Troika Dialog", final prices could end up amounting to US$140tcm-
                                                           
14
 Matarykin, Vitaly: "Ukraine permits Urkgaz-Energo to sell gas at price not over $110", Itar-Tass, 8 February 2006 
(Accessed on the 31st August 2011, from East View, Harvard Libraries). 
15
 Grivach, Alexei´: ""My dogovorimsia" ("Мы договоримся")", Vremia Novostei´ , 16 June 2006 (Accessed on the 22nd 
August 2011, from East View, Harvard Libraries). 
16
 Bekker, Alexandr, Reznik, Irina: "Turkmeniia prosit dvoi´nuiu tsenu (Туркмения просит двойную цену)", Vedomosti, 20 
June 2006 (Accessed on the 19th August 2011, from East View, Harvard Libraries). 
17
 Grib, Natal´ia and Gavrish, Oleg: ""Gazprom" lishit Ukrainu turkmenskogo gaza ("Газпром" лишит Украину 
туркменского газа)", Kommersant, 16 June 2006 (Accessed on the 23rd August 2011, from East View, Harvard Libraries). 
18
 Ibid. 
19
 Grivach, "My dogovorimsia", op. cit.  
20
 Grib, Natal´ia: ""Gazprom" poluchil udar po tsenam ("Газпром" получил удар по ценам)", Kommersant, 22 June 2006 
(Accessed on 22nd August 2011, from East View, Harvard Libraries); Grivach, Alexei´: "Prai´s-list ot Turkmenbashi (Прайс-
лист от Туркменбаши)", Vremia Novostei´, 22 June 2006 (Accessed on the 24th August 2011, from East View, Harvard 
Libraries). 
21
 Bekker and Reznik, "Turkmeniia prosit", op. cit. 
    
 
194 
 
US$150tcm,22 which, according to Vremia Novostei´, would be US$130tcm at the border if Turkmenistan 
went back to US$100tcm.23 Compared to the current prices of US$95tcm, this represented 50% more. 
Attempts by Yushchenko, who personally called Turkmen President Niyazov and proposed a direct sale 
of an additional 11bcm for the second half of the year, were useless. The Turkmen president simply 
insisted on negotiations with Gazprom, which as transit country was the necessary interlocutor,24 and 
dismissed the Ukrainian partner reminding him of the debt of US$63mill still due.25 According to sources 
from the Turkmen Ministry of Energy, Turkmenistan would be ready to sell 11bcm directly to Ukraine 
only in the event of a previous agreement by Naftohaz with Gazprom and the rest of transit countries. 
Besides this, Turkmenistan reminded him it would not sell gas cheaper than US$100tcm.26  
The impossibility of  reaching an agreement between Russia and Turkmenistan led to such 
acrimony that the latter went as far as to declare the cancelation of all previous agreements with Gazprom 
after a new visit by Miller showed a staunch rejection of Turkmen conditions.27 Given Turkmenistan´s 
threats to stop supplies to Russia, Ukraine tried to outsmart Gazprom and tried to buy that additional 
11bcm Yushchenko had been lobbying for recently;28 Ukraine was again confronted with US$100tcm.29 
Nevertheless, Gazprom decided to involve Ukraine in negotiations30 and profited to revive the old idea of 
a transport consortium: Gazprom would facilitate gas transit if Ukraine granted a participation in the 
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Ukrainian pipeline network (GTS). 31  The Ukrainian side agreed in principle 32  and both countries 
established a common front against Turkmenistan. Gazprom ensured that prices for the third quarter of 
the year (other news sources talked of a promise for the rest of the year)33 would remain at US$95tcm.34 
This new spirit of cooperation led Gazprom to show some flexibility regarding the existing debt Naftohaz 
was accumulating with RosUkrEnergo and other problems regarding gas in storage facilities for the 
upcoming winter. 35  However, negotiations remained deadlocked during most of the summer and 
uncertainty persisted as to which prices Ukraine would have to pay by late 2006. 
 
7. 2. The New Relation between Naftohaz and RosUkrEnergo and Derived Problems 
While both Gazprom and Naftohaz had to face the threat of ever changing Turkmen energy policies, 
problems were already originating from the complex scheme stemming from the 4th January agreements.   
Ukraine tries to revise agreements and guarantee stable prices 
The main controversy centered on the validity of the price of US$95tcm. Naftohaz wanted to fix that 
price for five years, which was in fact the period of duration of the agreement, whereas Gazprom 
obviously wanted to determine the price depending on prices established by Central Asian suppliers. 
Naftohaz thus took the decision to cap prices at US$110tcm, so RosUkrEnergo could never sell gas 
beyond that price.36 Whether this was meant to guarantee acceptable prices for Ukraine at the expense of 
Gazprom or RosUkrEnergo, or whether this was part of a policy to put pressure on Gazprom, could not be 
ascertained. However, when the Ukrainian Minister of Economy, Arseny Yatseniuk, warned against those 
(emphasis mine) aiming at bankrupting the Ukrainian economy,37 he was expressing Ukrainian suspicions 
as to Gazprom´s real intentions.  
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The fact is that the Ukrainian economy was having troubles already to absorb the latest price 
increases, so unfavorable compared to US$44tcm (Turkmen gas) and US$50tcm (Russian gas obtained as 
payment of transit tariffs). That easily raised suspicions in Ukraine that US$95tcm were "political" prices 
meant by Gazprom to punish the Orange Revolution and/or to bankrupt the country to eventually 
penetrate into its market.  
Naftohaz´s opposition to RosUkrEnergo and UkrGazEnergo  
Naftohaz´s next moves targeted RosUkrEnergo and UkrGazEnergo directly.  
RosUkrEnergo 
At least rhetorical declarations from the Russian side in favor of seeing Naftohaz become 50% owner of 
the controversial trader (See previous chapter, pp. 180-182), spurred the Ukrainian side to propose to 
scrap RosUkrEnergo outright. This, Prime Minister Ekhanurov did when he sent a letter to the Russian 
Minister of Economics, Mikhail Fradkov.38  
In parallel with this initiative, President Yushchenko ordered his government to obtain as much 
information as possible on the mysterious ownership of Centragas, which constituted half of 
RosUkrEnergo (besides Arosgas, owned by Gazprom Bank).39 The price increases that Turkmenistan was 
seeking at that moment were an additional reason for Ukraine to scrap RosUkrEnergo, which as an 
intermediary, was seen as spurious at best.40 Naftohaz´s (somewhat cynical) argumentation was that since 
prices had been fixed at US$95tcm for the next five years (which in fact was Naftohaz´s wishful 
interpretation), any increase would automatically destroy RosUkrEnergo´s profits and make its presence 
useless. A JV between Naftohaz and Gazprom to manage transportation was thus found more suitable.41  
The Russian response was to reject the Ukrainian proposal.42 Instead, Gazprom again encouraged 
Naftohaz to take control of that other half of the intermediary. This was an option hardly acceptable for 
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Naftohaz for mere financial reasons, especially when the value of the company had skyrocketed as a 
result of its improved position after the January agreement. The Russian side did not provide any financial 
help to Naftohaz. The request for a common JV was reiterated later in March, through National Security 
and Defense Council Secretary, Anatoly Kinakh,43 but to no avail. 
UkrGazEnergo 
In the face of the Russian refusal to change the status quo, Naftohaz turned to the other controversial 
company, UkrGazEnergo. Expected to start operating at the beginning of March, the government was still 
casting doubt on whether it would become operative at all. Iurii´ Ekhanurov demanded that the company 
provide banking guarantees to the value of US$300mill and complained that such a demand had not been 
fulfilled. 44  The Ukrainian government demanded from Gazprom that it cover US$75 of this sum 
(equivalent to the quarter that indirectly corresponded to the Russian gas monopoly). Gazprom plainly 
refused, alleging that enough guarantees had been already provided.45  
Then in an attempt to nullify the company´s role, the NKRE decided to restrict its sales in the 
Ukrainian internal market to only 5.4bcm (see previous chapter, p. 188).46 That would allow Naftohaz to 
retain the biggest part of the lucrative market of private companies, now in the hands of UkrGazEnergo. 
In addition to that, it was decided that UkrGazEnergo would pay value added taxes (VAT) equivalent to 
20% of the value of the selling price, which would dent the company´s competitiveness (Naftohaz paid no 
such taxes).47 In a more drastic move, the Industrial Federation of the Donbass went to the tribunals to 
cancel the agreements that had led to higher internal prices, 48  moving in fact from US$80tcm to 
US$115tcm.49 
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Naftohaz´s indebtedness problems 
Since new prices were agreed in January 2006, Naftohaz started indebting itself towards RosUkrEnergo, 
leading to the classical debt spirals. This led RosUkrEnergo to warn Naftohaz of a 50% supply reduction 
starting on 10th April as a result of non-payments.50 RosUkrEnergo also said it was ready to extract half of 
the gas from underground storage facilities (equivalent to its share as 50% owner of UkrGazEnergo) and 
sell it at any moment to Europe. According to the Director of the Center of Energy Research in Kiev, 
Konstantin Borodin and as stated by Vremia Novostei´ too, the debt amounted to US$700mill.51  As 
reported by Zerkalo Nedeli at the end of the following month, the debt amounted by April 2006 to less 
than that, US$400mill, but had jumped to US$900mill by the time of the publishing of the article one 
month later.52  
Naftohaz insisted on the figure of US$400 mill, whereas Gazprom (indirectly affected as 50% 
owner of RosUkrEnergo) calculated that the debt hovered at US$500mill-US$600mill and had to be 
repaid before May´s end (in correspondence between Naftohaz and the government, discovered by 
Zerkalo Nedeli, the exact figure provided was US$581.9mill as of 8 of June).53 Naftohaz responded 
blaming Gazprom for not having paid transportation services as the reason for the debt. The Russian 
monopoly obviously rejected this accusation.54 Gazprom´s spokesman Sergei´ Kuprianov clarified that 
these debts were not debts owed directly to the company, with which Naftohaz had no direct relations 
anymore, but to RosUkrEnergo.55 Gazprom, as Alexandr Riazanov explained, was affected due to its 
partial ownership of the intermediary.56  
One of the explanations for the origin of this new debt is that it had accumulated in January and 
February due to insufficient payments to Naftohaz from its industrial consumers. It appeared that 
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Naftohaz had not duly prepared documentation for the NKRE so prices had not been updated on time; 
payments made under older (and cheaper) tariffs necessarily created a deficit.57 In addition to this debt, 
new difficulties for Naftohaz stemmed from Deutsche Bank´s restrictions for its financing, the prohibition 
of reselling gas to Europe and as some voices argued, mismanagement inherited from the government of 
Timoshenko that left the company financially weak.58  
As an immediate solution, it was known that Naftohaz would request a loan of US$400mill to 
repay the debt.59 It was later clarified that it would ask for US$300mill, to which US$200mill already 
requested to the ABN Amro Bank had to be added.60 Pending the resolution of the debt issue, it was 
discovered in late May that RosUkrEnergo, true to its previous warning, had stopped shipments to 
Naftohaz since the beginning of May. Instead, RosUkrEnergo bypassed the Ukrainian monopoly and sold 
all of its gas to UkrGazEnergo directly.61 At the same time, UkrGazEnergo, which started operating in 
April 2006,62 asked Naftohaz to pay in advance for needed supplies.63 Otherwise, it refused to provide any 
supplies.64 When contracts were finally signed between Naftohaz and UkrGazEnergo, it transpired that the 
former was also indebted to the latter (US$25.5mill).65 At such stage, it was not clear whether this debt to 
UkrGazEnergo was also part of the debt to RosUkrEnergo. Mr. Riazanov declared that he wished that the 
debt of US$370mill would be reduced to US$100mill before the 1st of July,66 whereas the new Head of 
                                                           
57
 Grivach, "Delo na 700 millionov", op. cit. As later acknowledged by Naftohaz, this, along with the impossibility of 
obtaining  enough loans, was the main reason (see: Eremenko, "Naftogaz" – Kambinu", op. cit.). 
58
 For this latest version, see for example: Grivach, Alexei´: "V kosmos ne letat´! (В космос не летать!)", Vremia Novostei´, 
20 April 2006 (Accessed on 18th August 2011, from East View, Harvard Libraries). 
59
 Matarykin, Vitaly: "Naftogaz Ukrainy to take 400-mln-dollar loan to pay off gas debts", Itar-Tass, 24 May 2006 (Accessed 
on the 29th August 2011, from East View, Harvard Libraries). 
60
 "Vkrattse (вкратце)", Vedomosti, 15 June 2006 (Accessed on the 17th August 2011, from East View, Harvard Libraries). 
61
 Grivach, Alexei´: "Predpriiatie osobogo naznacheniia (Предприятие особого назначения)", Vremia Novostei´, 31 May 
2006 (Accessed on the 17th August 2011, from East View, Harvard Libraries); it begs the question whether the fact that 
RosUkrEnergo started selling integrally to UkrGazEnergo, which as it seems (see ftn. below), only started operating in April 
(by then, according to Simon Pirani, it had contracted 17bcm of gas to a series of industrial customers (see: Pirani, Simon: 
"Ukraine´s gas sector", Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (June 2007), p. 61, at http://www.oxfordenergy.org/pdfs/NG21.pdf 
(Accessed on the 5th November 2013), was not the logical consequence of the January agreement, which foresaw 
UkrGazEnergo as the company responsible for marketing within Ukraine imported gas, instead of a measure of retaliation. The 
fact that it was not clear what were the exact proportions of gas marketed by Naftohaz and UkrGazEnergo, at least in the first 
months, makes it difficult to clarify this issue.  
62
 The company had been established in March, but it seems that for whatever reasons, it only managed to start operating one 
month later. This could be related to its restrictions at selling about 5bcm only and that most of the gas contracted for March 
went through Naftohaz. 
63
 Naftohaz was henceforth only responsible for the regulated market. Naftohaz would sell cheap domestic gas to residential 
consumers and it would also provide gas to district heating companies. This latter category was supplied with a mix of 
domestic gas, the same as with residential consumers, and imported gas (see: Pirani, "Ukraine´s gas sector", op. cit., pp. 54, 64. 
Since the emergence of UkrGazEnergo, imported gas for district heating companies had to purchase from UkrGazEnergo.   
64
 Eremenko, "Naftogaz" – Kambinu", op. cit. 
65
 Ibid. 
66
 "Chego vy zhdete ot nedeli? (Чего вы ждете от недели?)", Kommersant, 26 June 2006 (Accessed on 24th August 2011, 
from East View, Harvard Libraries). 
    
 
200 
 
Naftohaz substituting Alexei´ Ivchenko, Alexandr Bolkisev, promised to solve the debt problem before 
the end of August.67 
Stored gas controversy 
Besides the debt problem, a transitory new controversy arose with gas stored in Ukraine for the winter.68 
This new controversy somehow was a reminder that regarding 7.8bcm of "disappeared" gas one a year 
before.69 According to calculations by Zerkalo Nedeli, due to unspecified limitations of the system, no 
more than 16.5bcm of gas could be pumped after June,70 compared to 18-24bcm that had been pumped in 
last year.71 Naftohaz argued that 4.6bcm had already been stored before June,72 so a sufficient volume 
could be guaranteed. However, (contradictory) figures were not very reassuring. According again to 
Zerkalo Nedeli, 4.8bcm was the amount of gas that was planned to be pumped during the period April-
October, barely more than the meager 4.6bcm, which according to Naftohaz, had been pumped already. 
This represented a striking difference with the year before, when Naftohaz had pumped 13bcm of 
Ukrainian gas in the same period.73  According to Mr. Riazanov, the real volume of gas stored was 
3.6bcm, therefore, 15bcm to 16bcm had to be supplied before October to reach the usual volumes.74 In 
order to avoid such problems in the future, Gazprom now demanded to be either sold or granted in form 
of rental three of the storage facilities and refused at the same time Naftohaz´s decision to raise from 10 to 
30 hryvnia (US$6tcm) the price charged for using these deposits.75 In fact it seemed that this was the main 
disagreement which explained why pumping of Russian gas had not been carried out as scheduled.76  
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RosUkrEnergo stepped in to ensure that in case Naftohaz could not fulfill its obligations it would 
pump in any gas necessary to maintain uninterrupted supply of gas to Europe. 77  Soon however, an 
agreement was announced with UkrGazEnergo, where the latter pledged to pump 16.3bcm as needed (in 
fact this meant that half would be coming from Naftohaz and the other half from RosUkrEnergo)78. Added 
to 4.8 pumped by Ukraine and all the technical gas, this would amount to a total of 23bcm of gas.79 
RosUkrEnergo´s ownership and the role of Ukrainian private interests 
While both negotiations with Turkmenistan and problems with UkrGazEnergo piled up, one of the big 
mysteries of RosUkrEnergo was disclosed in April: the real owners of Centragas, the holding which 
controlled 50% of the company, were revealed. These happened to be the businessmen Dmytro Firtash 
and Ivan Fursin, both Ukrainian citizens. After vain efforts from the Ukrainian side during 2005 to 
disclose RosUkrEnergo´s ownership and in the face of Russian assurances that they did not have 
information beyond the fact that it represented Ukrainian interests, the obscure company revealed its true 
nature.  
The trigger seems to have been an investigation by the US secret services, which concerned by the 
potential dangers to energy security, were trying to discover the identity of the controversial trader. This 
happened at the same time when Russia informed how the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
security services of the FSB had been unable to find out further information. The Russian side claimed 
the identity was protected by Swiss legislation and by Raiffeisen Investment itself.80 The Russian Duma 
asked the Office of the General Attorney to demand from Gazprom copies of the agreement/s signed in 
January.81  
According to the Wall Street Journal, while US secret services started investigating the 
composition of RosUkrEnergo,82 a thorough report by the British NGO Global Witness, specialized in 
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corruption in the energy and mining field, published an article devoted to the Turkmen-Ukrainian 
relations and the history of trading services offered by intermediaries.83  Among the flow of new data that 
the NGO offered, the name of Dmytro Firtash surfaced as one of the businessmen behind the founding of 
EuralTransGaz (see chapter 4).84 However, neither the NGO nor US secret services needed to delve much 
deeper for the truth on RosUkrEnergo to be revealed: on 26th April, the Russian daily Izvestiia, partly 
owned by Gazprom, 85  disclosed the real ownership. Apart from identifying the two businessmen of 
Centragas, the article indicated that they held 90% (Dmytro Firtash) and 10% (Ivan Fursin). They were 
thus indirect owners of 45% and 5% of RosUkrEnergo respectively.86 Ivan Fursin, the minor partner, was 
known to be linked to Serhiy´ Levochkin, ex-aide of former President Leonid Kuchma,87 whereas Dmytro 
Firtash, who as seen above, had played an important role in EuralTransGaz, was very well known in 
Ukraine among elite circles. 88  The article based its information on an audit undertaken by 
Pricewaterhouse Coopers.89 Raiffeisen Investments from its side, declared one day after the publication 
that after two to three months, it would disclose the identity of owners (which was not necessary 
anymore) and then withdraw from RosUkrEnergo as trustee of the 50% under discussion.90 
It seems fully justified to wonder whether Izvestiia did not take advantage of its relation with 
Gazprom to disclose RosUkrEnergo´s ownership. In that case, the main question is to consider why 
Gazprom had withheld the information for so long and then decided precisely now to make it public. It 
seemed reasonable to proceed this way as Firtash´s role would be known sooner or later, since US secret 
services were actively involved. Thus the longer Gazprom withheld the information, the more harmful 
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this could be to its interests. Konstantin Chui´chenko himself in an interview to Kommersant in early 
2007 acknowledged that the audit had taken place before determining the contracts of 2006 (in 2005 
Pricewaterhouse Coopers substituted KPMG as the official auditor of RosUkrEnergo) and had accepted 
the role of the two private investors, even if they were in principle interested in seeing Naftohaz instead.91 
This probably dispelled allegations at the time that Pricewaterhouse Coopers was not at the origin of the 
information,92 and that news about the real composition of RUE came "in the past 10 days or so".93 
Gazprom therefore, knew of Centragas´ true nature since a long time.   
Did the Ukrainian side have the same information that Gazprom had? With Naftohaz not involved 
in RosUkrEnergo, it could be argued that it was more difficult for the Ukrainian government to find out. 
However, the presence in Naftohaz of a person like Ihor´ Voronin, closely linked to Iurii´ Boi´ko, former 
Head of Naftohaz and who had represented RosUkrEnergo in the agreements of July 2004, is a justified 
ground for suspicion. Efforts to disclose the ownership of Centragas from the side of Ekhanurov´s 
government were likely to be stymied by a President who had allegedly opposed the SBU investigations 
at the time of Timoshenko´s government. Even worse, if we are to believe Alexandr Riazanov´s words to 
Vedomosti (as reported by Iuliia Mostovaia´s article in Zerkalo Nedeli), none other than Firtash himself 
attended meetings representing Naftohaz to discuss conditions for gas supplies in 2006.94 He was also said 
to have been present in late April 2006 in Naftohaz´s headquarters (Naftohaz insisted that Firtash did not 
work with the new leadership in the company).95 If that was the case, Naftohaz´s duplicity was obvious. 
The entourage of the President only reacted with skepticism upon the information, waiting until "further 
documentation supporting this assertion could be found".96  Dmytro Firtash himself claimed to have 
concealed his own identity in order both "to win the business with Russian gas monopoly OAO Gazprom 
and to avoid political pressure in Ukraine". Indeed, according to the Wall Street Journal, Firtash was 
introduced to Gazprom only as technical expert by Raiffeisen´s Wolfgang Putschek.97 
Regarding doubts about the trustworthiness of both Russia´s and Ukraine´s efforts to disclose 
information, Mr. Herbert Stepic from Raiffeisen Investment stated that the ownership was known to both 
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governments´ intelligence services. It is quite unlikely that at least Gazprom, as an indirect member of 
RosUkrEnergo´s owners, did not know it before. The same can possibly be said of the Ukrainian 
government. Probably neither Gazprom nor Naftohaz were interested in diffusing information about a 
deal that involved such obscure individuals and which would have discredited them.  
 
7. 3. Yanukovich Government and Gas Relations with Russia  
In an ironic twist of destiny, the March 2006 elections led to Viktor Yanukovich´s nomination five 
months later in August as Prime Minister. This was the outcome of disagreements among the Orange 
leadership, which could not form a coalition together. Instead, the Socialist Party "betrayed" its former 
partners and joined the Communist Party and The Party of Regions. This had a clear consequence for 
energy relations with Russia, as the "old guard" under Kuchma made its comeback, mostly exemplified 
by Iurii´ Boi´ko´s nomination to the post of Minister of Energy (He headed Naftohaz until his substitution 
by Alexei´ Ivchenko in 2005). As for policy, the most immediate consequence was the resurgence of the 
concept of a transport consortium to manage the Ukrainian gas infrastructure, with the inclusion of 
Gazprom, as had been planned under Kuchma´s last years. 
Ambiguous relations regarding the January agreement and RosUkrEnergo  
The new government inherited a difficult legacy indeed. In early August RosUkrEnergo was threatening 
to sue Naftohaz at the Stockholm´s Arbitrage Tribunal if a remaining debt believed to amount to 
US$371,789mill was not paid by 15th August 2007. 98  RosUkrEnergo had already accumulated 
US$390mill in losses and had a great need to recover badly needed money. The explanation for this new 
episode was quite complex and added a new factor: RosUkrEnergo was supposed to have sold some of 
the Russian gas (more expensive, US$230tcm), which was destined for Europe to Ukraine instead. This 
happened because a cold spell in the early weeks of the year had required additional consumption.99 
According to sources reached by Vremia Novostei´, Naftohaz was responsible for having left around 
3.9bcm of Russian gas unpaid.100  RosUkrEnergo´s threat paid, as Naftohaz sent a first batch of debt, 
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US$46.9mill, in the third week of August.101 Boi´ko later mentioned mid-October as the most likely 
deadline for completing the payment of all debts.102 
However, in a first sign of reversal of the previously tense relations, the new Minister of Finances 
and Deputy-Prime Minister, Mykola Azarov, welcomed RosUkrEnergo for the role it was playing, also 
declaring that cooperation would be sought with Russia.103 After having derided the January agreements 
some months ago, the new Prime Minister, Viktor Yanukovich, stood now in favor of them in 
appreciation of the significant discount Ukraine was granted.104 Still, Azarov himself had to acknowledge 
that Naftohaz was de facto bankrupt,105 talked of reforming the credit and gas policies,106 while in the 
meantime, companies indebted to Naftohaz started being shut out of supplies. 107  Boi´ko´s new 
declarations, criticizing the former government for leaving Naftohaz deprived of any rights to re-export 
gas to Europe,108 were also an implicit criticism of the agreements in force since January. Many indeed, 
saw in Naftohaz´s current predicaments the door for RosUkrEnergo´s penetration as Gazprom´s Trojan 
horse.109 It was feared that RosUkrEnergo would demand compensation for debts in the form of shares in 
the company. As for example reported by Vedomosti, while Ukrainian legislation precluded any 
privatizing of Naftohaz, there existed the possibility of privatizing the shares of Naftohaz in subsidiary 
companies such as "Ukrnafty", "Ukrgazdobychi" and "Ukrtatnafty".110  
Price negotiations and debt issues 
Prime Minister Yanukovich´s trip to Sochi, Russia to confer with his Russian counterpart, Mikhail 
Fradkov did not bring any breakthrough neither regarding debt nor regarding the issue of gas prices. An 
agreement was reached in relation with gas storage, as Ukraine committed to increase stored volumes to 
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24.5bcm by year end,111 but President Yanukovich´s confidence of keeping gas prices at US$95tcm into 
2007 did not seem very realistic. 112 Rumours about what Ukraine  might offer to Russia in the energy 
sector in exchange for price reductions prompted the Minister of Energy to publicly reject the option of 
privatizing the GTS. 113  However, Boi´ko´s proposal, on the eve of a trip to Moscow, 114  to allow 
UkrGazEnergo to penetrate into the market of OblHazy in exchange for the company´s right to enter 
production projects in Russia,115 arguably justified such rumours. The Prime Minister stepped in (either 
warning their Russian partners before negotiations or reassuring internal opinion) when he announced that 
everything would be undertaken in order to keep current prices, even if that meant reviewing 
RosUkrEnergo´s actual role, catering thus to the anti-RosUkrEnergo narrative.116 Boi´ko himself after his 
trip to Moscow had to support RosUkrEnergo to defend the status quo.117 It seemed that regarding this 
controversial option, there were contending points of view within the majority. 118 
Regarding Ukraine´s margin of maneuver for gas prices, it was necessarily determined by what 
happened in Central Asia. And news from there was not particularly good. Gazprom had signed a contract 
to buy each year up to 50bcm of Turkmen gas until 2009. The price contracted was a clear cession to 
Turkmenistan: US$100tcm as initially wanted by Turkmenistan. Worse, the new price would apply from 
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October 2006. Final prices at the border with Ukraine were to reach US$130tcm. Naftohaz could only 
determine in triangular conversations with Gazprom and RosUkrEnergo minor details, but had necessarily 
to accept such prices.119 When news of this came, Ukraine looked for ways to avert either a dramatic 
increase of prices for Ukrainian end consumers or bankruptcy of Naftohaz  (in a dire situation already 
since it paid US$95tcm), if it kept subsidizing internal prices.  
The government had been toying already with the idea of reinforcing the presence of 
RosUkrEnergo at the expense of UkrGazEnergo, as the former was credited for being a guarantor of low 
prices.120 As RosUkrEnergo´s margin of action was equally determined by Central Asian gas prices, it is 
difficult to know what the government really intended. Another tactic was to impose on the trader all 
costs derived from price increases, under the vague promise of being eventually compensated by 
Naftohaz later.121 As RosUkrEnergo made substantial profits out of gas exported to Europe, there was a 
margin for this, indeed, but it was not realistic to force a private actor to give up profits. Whatever the 
eventual consequences, the only realistic option for Ukraine was acknowledged by the Ukrainian Prime 
Minister in a visit to Moscow: to accept higher prices. The government did however try to postpone the 
price increase to 2007.122  
Apart from this limited revisionism, other long-term mechanisms were tried out: Iurii´ Boi´ko 
proposed a progressive calendar for the next three years, with the transit tariff increasing whenever prices 
were raised. Gazprom did not find this option attractive and preferred to maintain the transit tariff fixed at 
1.6tcm/100km for the whole period covered (five years, from 2006 to 2011) by the January agreements.123 
If revising contracts was not crowned with success, Naftohaz nevertheless agreed with RosUkrEnergo 
and Gazprom in late September to keep prices unchanged for the fourth quarter of 2006.124 Whether 
resulting losses would be absorbed by either Gazprom or RosUkrEnergo was not revealed. Izvestiia 
speculated that RosUkrEnergo would charge with the costs and would be later compensated with 
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increased export licenses 125 (that would inevitably come at the expense of gas sold directly to Europe by 
Gazprom). 
Once Naftohaz achieved this small victory, next rounds were devoted to determining final 
conditions for 2007. The formula that Ukraine had accepted allowed  prices to be retained at a more  
favorable rate than would have been the case if only Russian gas was consumed instead.126 Thus, it was 
confirmed that for 2007 only a portion of Russian gas would be consumed in Ukraine: if as planned, 
RosUkrEnergo sold 14bcm of Russian gas to Europe,127 that left only 3bcm for Ukraine.128 There was still 
uncertainty regarding prices for the "third leg" of the January 2006 agreements, namely, for Uzbek and 
Kazakh gas. Boi´ko seemed to be counting on prices of US$106tcm.129 In any case a final agreement was 
reached in mid-October that secured for Ukraine 55bcm of gas for 2007 (and offered the possibility of as 
much as 60bcm for 2008-09)130 at the expected price of US$130tcm.131 A parallel agreement was at the 
same time reached between RosUkrEnergo and UkrGazEnergo,132  valid for the three next years and 
planning that annual revisions of both prices and volumes would be determined by an additional 
protocol.133 Some criticism was raised in Russia against the concessions made to the Ukrainian side, 
which obtained "favorable" prices.134 Vorob´ev and Grivach in Vremia Novostei´, negatively compared 
the 35% increase to 100-150% which it " might be otherwise" (emphasis mine). 135 The authors considered 
what prices would be if Ukraine were to buy all of its gas from Russia at market prices and were thus 
indirectly criticizing the agreement of January 2006.  
Some questions were left unanswered concerning the final "cocktail" of Central Asian gas and 
regarding whether RosUkrEnergo or Ukrainian end-consumers would assume the new prices. According 
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to latest reports, as much as 10bcm of gas would be purchased from Uzbekistan and 8bcm from 
Kazakhstan.136 This meant in fact that RosUkrEnergo would not sell Russian gas to UkrGazEnergo. As for 
the profit margin of RosUkrEnergo, the company itself confirmed that it would not sell at a loss,137 as the 
new price represented roughly the costs the company had to assume after purchasing gas from 
Turkmenistan and transporting it to the Ukrainian border.138 RosUkrEnergo secured a situation similar to 
2006, when prices at US$95tcm covered costs related to Central Asian gas, while it could make sizeable 
profits from Russian gas sold to Europe. Vremia Novostei´ supported what was reported earlier by 
Izvestiia, namely, that costs of preserving US$95tcm for the last quarter of 2006 would be assumed by 
RosUkrEnergo.139 Whether RosUkrEnergo could sell more Russian gas in 2007 as suspected by Izvestiia 
as a compensation,140 was not confirmed.      
Concerning Naftohaz and UkrGazEnergo´s remaining debt, the Ukrainian Minister of Energy 
blamed the former management for having sold imported gas to households instead of cheaper domestic 
gas.141 By mid-November half of the total debt seemed to have been repaid, while Boi´ko promised to pay 
the remaining half before year´s end.142  Itar-Tass reported that US$14mill had been handed over in 
November and US$306mill on  December 1st.143 Considering previous payments in June of US$200mill 
and US$111mill in November, the whole debt seemed indeed to have been covered.144 Regarding the 
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financial situation of RosUkrEnergo, the company reported ending the year with profits of US$780mill 
derived from 7.8bcm of gas sold to RosUkrEnergo by Gazprom145 and from a slight profit margin  from 
transporting Central Asian gas, explained by transportation costs representing US$25tcm instead of 
US$30tcm, as usually reported by the press.146 RosUkrEnergo´s situation thus seemed to be somewhat 
better than reported, even if that probably was due to huge profits from 2005. 
Projects for an international natural gas consortium  
Once price and debt issues had been solved, 2006 ended with renewed expectations that the new 
government would introduce changes in the energy sector of Ukraine. There was talk again of 
privatization of energy networks and penetration into the internal energy market of Ukraine by 
RosUkrEnergo and Gazprom. According to Vedomosti, Ukrainian officials had offered Russia  
participation in the privatization of the sector of electricity in exchange for reduced prices; this opinion 
was subscribed to by Vladimir Saprykin from the Ukrainian "Center Razumkov".147 Saprykin said that 
Gazprom might purchase regional gas networks, known as Oblhazy for the global amount of 
US$500mill.148  
In a similar direction, a document prepared for the convening of the first (Russia-Ukraine) 
bilateral economic committee since 2004, agreed to review and analyze previous intergovernmental 
agreements in order to submit proposals for changes by the 1st of June 2007.149 This could open the door 
to the signature of an intergovernmental agreement to create an international gas consortium. Boi´ko 
himself declared not to fear a monopoly by UkrGazEnergo and did not oppose RosUkrEnergo´s purchase 
of assets in the secondary market of OblHazy either.150 In an interview for the Ukrainian weekly 2000 (as 
relayed by Vedomosti), he reiterated his conformity with RosUkrEnergo´s plans to obtain shares in the 
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regional electrical market of Ukraine.151 Kommersant in fact, following what the same daily had suspected 
back on 11th September,152 reported that RosUkrEnergo´s profits would go to the acquisition of shares in 
the market of OblHazy.153 Some days later, Chui´chenko, representative of Gazprom in RosUkrEnergo, 
cryptically hinted that both Russo-Ukrainian relations and internal Ukrainian factors were very important 
(emphasis mine). In fact, on December, 6 OblHazy publicly accused the ruling government of pressuring 
them through investigations by security services at the behest of RosUkrEnergo, in retaliation for 
rejecting to sell their shares.154  
2007 started the same way as 2006 had ended, namely, with movements by RosUkrEnergo to 
penetrate the Ukrainian energy market. There were news that Naftohaz was to rid itself of some of its 
non-core investments. 155  This could improve its delicate economic situation but also played into 
RosUkrEnergo´s hands. It was soon reported that Naftohaz would sell its shares in several OblHazy.156 In 
addition to that, Russian President Vladimir Putin himself referred in February to a scheme where 
Naftohaz would receive the right to enter the Russian upstream market as a compensation for opening 
Ukraine´s GTS.157 The Russian President was explicit in his mention of the project of an International 
Consortium.158 There seemed to be a clear convergence of purposes: the Ukrainian Prime Minister had 
already stated in early December 2006: "the $230 price is but a respite" (emphasis mine).159 Following up 
on his previous declarations, he now said: "Our goal is to receive cheaper gas. The market price of gas is 
impossible for Ukraine at present (emphasis mine). We still cannot come around after the twofold price 
increase. The participation in the development of deposits will make gas cheaper".160 Whether that would 
really guarantee lower prices is debatable. However, he was echoing Putin´s scheme. The daily 
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Kommersant identified the Ukrainian Ministry of Energy under Iurii´ Boi´ko as the origin of the 
proposal.161 The proposal in question contained three variants, one of which represented a strong version 
of integration: an International Consortium to manage the Ukrainian network, with the participation of 
Gazprom and in exchange for access to the Russian downstream sector.162 This is precisely what Putin had 
already mentioned and his preferred option163 was clearly what the government was ready to promote too. 
However, there were many difficulties ahead. 
In fact, the whole project would end up in fiasco. The strong divergences within the ruling Party 
of Regions and the belligerence of the opposition played in favor of this outcome. 164  Vice-Prime Minister 
Andrii’ Kliuiev was quick to remind all that changes in the ownership of energy infrastructures required a 
constitutional amendment (337 out of a total of 450 seats). That clearly overcame the 246 representatives 
the Party of Regions could count on.165 It may also explain Putin’s readiness to meet with President 
Yushchenko, it being much easier to deal with his party "Nasha Ukraina" than with the more radical 
"Iulia Timoshenko´s Bloc".166 Timoshenko was adamant  in her opposition, indeed, declaring that she 
would: "not allow the parliament to work until a bill is adopted that will ban any manipulations with the 
Naftohaz of Ukraine company".167  
In consequence, she submitted a bill in support of the current status of Naftohaz, which was voted 
on 6th February 2007 and which gathered an almost unanimous approval (430 out of 450 
representatives).168 The bill banned any transfer of Ukraine´s GTS to foreign countries.169 Subsequent 
declarations from government officials rejecting any kind of participation by third parties,170 were either a 
face-saving device or an acknowledgement that themselves were from the very beginning opposed.171 In 
                                                           
161
 Grib, Natal´ia and Gavrish, Oleg: "Ukrainskie truby podtianut k rossii´skim nedram (Украинские трубы подтянут к 
российским недрам)", Kommersant, 2 February 2007 (Accessed on the 24thAugust 2011, from East View, Harvard Libraries). 
162
 Ibid. 
163
 Ibid. 
164
 "Opposition readying to block Ukraine parliament building", Itar-Tass, 6 February 2007 (Accessed on the 31thAugust 2011, 
from East View, Harvard Libraries). 
165
 Grib and Gavrish, "Ukrainskie truby", op. cit. 
166
 Ibid. 
167
 "Opposition readying to block Ukraine", op. cit. 
168
 "Ukraine parliament anxious over gas consortium with Russia", Itar-Tass, 6 February 2007 (Accessed on the 30th August 
2011, from East View, Harvard Libraries). 
169
 "Ukraine law protects", op. cit. See a further analysis in: Ivzhenko, Tat´iana and Kashin, Vasilii´: "SP s "Gazpromom" pod 
zapretom (СП с "Газпромом" под запретом)", Vedomosti, 7 February 2007 (Accessed on the 18th August 2011, from East 
View, Harvard Libraries); Zygar´, Mikhail: "Rossii dali gazootvod (России дали газоотвод)", Kommersant, 7 February 2007 
(Accessed on the 23rd  August 2011, from East View, Harvard Libraries). 
170
 Ibid.; Grivach, Alexei´: "Nikomu nichego (Никому ничего)", Vremia Novostei´, 7 February 2007 (Accessed on the 22nd 
August 2011, from East View, Harvard Libraries). 
171
 The Cabinet of Ministers had actually issued a statement refusing any responsibility in the proposal altogether (see: 
"Kambin otkreshchivaetsia ot initsiativ Putina po povodu ukrai´nskoi´ GTS  (Кабмин открещивается от инициатив Путина 
    
 
213 
 
the next days after this defeat, there was talk about a downsized alternative: to swap UkrGazEnergo´s 
shares in exchange for investments in Russian downstream sector.172 This was never given any continuity. 
Interlude: reduced tensions and increased harmony for most of 2007 
After this convulsed beginning, the next months were surprisingly uneventful: Gazprom, after making 
clear that non-subsidized gas would be provided after 2011,173 unsuccessfully tried to resurrect projects 
similar to that recently defeated in the Rada.174 Boi´ko preemptively reassured the public that Ukraine 
would only see prices grow within an acceptable range of 7-10 % the next year.175 Mr. Robert Shettler-
Jones, share-owner in the chemical sector within the Group DF (headed by Dmitro Firtash), went in a 
similar direction and also forecast only slightly higher prices for 2008.176 An article by Ukrainska Pravda 
in August 2007 gathered the assessment by several specialists, who stated that in the context of increasing 
world energy prices, a 10% percent hike would be the minimum to assume. 177  Therefore, prices of 
US$143tcm for 2008 could be considered a success.178 If Ukraine still believed in bypassing Russia, as 
actively sought under Timoshenko´s government (see chapter 6) Russia´s recent agreement with 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan in the summit of May 2007  cast even more shadow on an already 
unrealistic project: that agreement foresaw building the Caspian Pipeline (this project competed with the 
European and US-supported project Nabucco, which other countries from the FSU, such as Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, Lithuania and Ukraine supported).179  
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As for the "internal front", UkrGazEnergo unsuccessfully attempted in May 2007 to charge higher 
prices to the metallurgical industry. UkrGazEnergo was thus trying to pass on to the consumers the costs 
of gas that was being stored in underground facilities since June 2006.180 Meanwhile, RosUkrEnergo and 
Gazprom reached a new agreement on cooperation for sales in Europe: RosUkrEnergo would be selling 
up to 4bcm every year of gas to Gazprom at US$250tcm (or as some experts expected for the end of the 
year, at US$270-90tcm), which the latter would then resell in Europe at market prices. From these 
volumes, one third would come from Central Asia (Kazakhstan and/or Uzbekistan) at US$95tcm, another 
third from Turkmenistan at US$130tcm and the rest from Gazprom at US$160tcm. In exchange, Gazprom 
could have access to  (RosUkrEnergo´s) gas stored in Ukrainian storage facilities, which enabled the 
Russian company to respond more quickly to changes in demand.181  
New debt dispute sets the scene for next dispute 
This situation of relative impasse that had prevailed during most of the year changed abruptly in October: 
a new debt issue exploded between Russia and Ukraine. On 3rd October Gazprom´s press service 
laconically stated that in a meeting with their Ukrainian counterpart, it was agreed to pay the debt for gas 
no later than by November 1st.182 An earlier statement and several press reports offered some more details: 
Gazprom referred to an accumulated debt of US$1.3bill for natural gas consumed during the year and 
warned that failing to pay would result in reduced supplies.183 It is worth remarking that Gazprom´s 
response was particularly harsh, as the problem of debt was linked this time with a suspension of gas 
deliveries.  
The first reactions from the Ukrainian side were contradictory. In fact, they came from 
RosUkrEnergo and Naftohaz: RosUkrEnergo acknowledged the debt and named the figure of more than 
US$1bill.184  Naftohaz on the contrary, questioned it and expressed its surprise regarding Gazprom´s 
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calculations. 185  Vice-Prime Minister Azarov chose a middle way, considering these figures to be 
inflated, 186  but nevertheless acknowledging the existence of the debt, blaming UkrGazEnergo and 
RosUkrEnergo. 187  A source from Naftohaz ended up acknowledging that around US$500mill (which 
according to Vremia Novostei´ equaled 3.5bcm of gas) had accumulated from non-payments to 
UkrGazEnergo by private companies.188 Sources from RosUkrEnergo seemed to point to UkrGazEnergo 
as the source of the whole volume of debt.189  
It seemed fairly clear at this stage that at least part of this debt came from consumers indebted to 
UkrGazEnergo. This debt had moved up the ladder and then affected RosUkrEnergo and Gazprom as a 
result. Some days later, sources from Gazprom clarified the breakdown of the whole debt, which proved 
more complex than initially assumed, as Naftohaz was involved too: according to Gazprom, US$700mill 
were owed by Naftohaz to UkrGazEnergo, US$300mill were owed by UkrGazEnergo to RosUkrEnergo 
and an additional sum of US$300mill owed by RosUkrEnergo directly to Gazprom.190 The first figure 
might have been related to the US$500mill which were reported by the Ukrainian daily Delo.191 This was 
in any case the only debt Naftohaz acknowledged.192 In fact, the Secretary of the Ukrainian Presidency, 
Aleksandr Shlapak, did acknowledge a debt of US$700mill.193 This breakdown was confusing and would 
be later clarified with additional information.  
Besides the objective economic reasons, this new row coincided with the results of anticipated 
parliamentary elections in September 2007. These elections happened to throw up an "orange" majority 
and thus announced a change of government. Therefore, speculations necessarily abounded over 
supposed political reasons that could account for the timing. Valerii´ Nesterov from "Troika Dialog" 
acknowledged this possibility, but still considered that given the (economic) substance of the problem, the 
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debt dispute would have nevertheless surfaced sooner or later. 194  However, it is true that some 
declarations by Gazprom before the elections were undisguised attempts at political manipulation. This 
clearly was the case when affordable prices (US$145-175tcm) were offered, but only if the current 
leadership remained; otherwise, US$230tcm were to be expected.195 The Russian ambassador and former 
Prime Minister Viktor Chernomirdin expressed himself along similar lines before the elections.196 An 
article by Andrew Neff from Global Insight theorized about the possible use by Russia of its position as a 
transit country for Central Asian gas to Ukraine to blackmail the prospective new government of 
Timoshenko with higher prices.197 Such declarations were probably linked to the elections rather than 
representing a real negotiating position. Now that the elections were over and its political results could 
not be changed, the priority for Gazprom was to solve the debt issue.  
Iurii´ Boi´ko met with his Russian counterpart on 3rd October 2007 to settle the debt issue by  
November 1st. At a follow-up meeting on 8th October both parts discussed the scheme for paying back the 
debt and the next day, during a visit by Prime Minister Yanukovich to Russia, documents were signed 
between Naftohaz, Gazprom and UkrGazEnergo. Boi´ko anticipated that the scheme would involve both 
financial repayments and repayments in kind. 198  Thus, 4.5bcm of gas worth US$600mill would be 
returned to Gazprom by UkrGazEnergo.199 The rest would be repaid through financial transfers on the 
basis of Naftohaz and UkrGazEnergo capitals. According to RosUkrEnergo the agreements ensured that it 
could reduce supplies to Ukraine if payments were not made on time.200 Then, declarations by Russian 
Prime Minister Viktor Zubkov blurred the whole picture pointing to a (erroneously) higher debt of not 
US$1.3bill as said earlier, but US$2bill. 201  He further specified that most of the amount would be 
integrally repaid through gas transfers by RosUkrEnergo. A remaining volume of US$929mill would be 
repaid financially through transfers between Naftohaz and UkrGazEnergo.202  
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A complex barter scheme was indeed devised between RosUkrEnergo and Gazprom, which in fact 
left a volume of gas equivalent to US$1.2bill in deposit as a guarantee for the debt.203 The Russian daily 
Nezavisimaia Gazeta then rightly suspected the Russian Prime Minister was wrong,204 as President Putin 
kept mentioning only US$1.3bill.205 However, the figure of US$929mill Zubkov had mentioned was real 
and represented the exact debt owed to RosUkrEnergo by UkrGazEnergo. This figure came after it was 
revealed that US$100tcm had been already paid by October 1st, which reduced UkrGazEnergo´s debt of 
US$1.029mill that had accumulated by September.206 An additional US$200mill were to be paid by 22nd 
October 2007.207 During his trip back from Moscow, the Ukrainian Minister of Energy clarified how the 
scheme to transfer gas between RosUkrEnergo and Gazprom would work: 4bcm which RosUkrEnergo 
had marked for export would be sold to Gazprom at US$156tcm; Boi´ko calculated that this sale would 
bring RosUkrEnergo US$1.3bill, which nearly matched the outstanding debt.208 If adding 4.5bcm that 
UkrGazEnergo returned to Gazprom, presumably at the price of US$130tcm,209 this made up the sum of 
8-8.5bcm that was being mentioned.210  It must not be forgotten that these volumes were transferred 
transitorily as a guarantee in case payments in cash were not made and the debt remained unsolved. 
Otherwise, these transactions would not take place. In addition to it, it was announced that Gazprom 
would pay Naftohaz in advance for transit tariffs.211 That would enable the latter to solve its immediate 
debt problems.212  
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In the next days the debt issue evolved satisfactorily. A first batch of US$200tcm owed to 
RosUkrEnergo was paid on time,213 and the remainder of US$729mill was transferred by the deadline of 
31st October.214 Debts between UkrGazEnergo and RosUkrEnergo also seemed to be fully settled by 6th 
November 2007.215 However, problems still persisted, as the origin of money for the final batch raised a 
good deal of confusion: US$500mill came from transfers made by Gazprom to Naftohaz in concept of 
advanced payments of transit tariffs as announced earlier; US$170mill came directly from 
UkrGazEnergo; a minor sum of US$60mill was paid by Naftohaz owing to a loan from UkrGazEnergo.216 
The Russian daily Nezavisimaia Gazeta explained the complex chain of payments as follows: Naftohaz 
owed UkrGazEnergo a total of US$680mill, so adding this to the US$249mill the latter also owed, 
RosUkrEnergo would receive a payment of US$929mill. Then RosUkrEnergo would transfer to Gazprom 
the total sum of more than US$1.2bill after adding its own debt to Gazprom totaling US$317mill.217  
The sequence of events obviously provided ground for new speculations on allegedly spurious 
Russian motivations, and it is reasonable to suspect that had a "friendly" government held the upper hand 
in the latest Ukrainian parliamentary elections, Russia could have been more tolerant. That said, this does 
not clarify whether Russia was acting for purely political reasons, for the sake of undermining 
Timoshenko´s future government, or whether it wanted to secure the payment of the debt before 
Timoshenko became Prime Minister. The latter´s statements in fact made clear she endeavored to put an 
end to the existence of intermediaries between Russia and Ukraine.218 If we are to follow the assessment 
by Vedomosti and Trud, these prospects arguably worried Russia for the consequences this might have on 
debt repayment if the new government stepped in and waived any responsibility.219 Gazprom´s latest 
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actions could respond to a preventive move to secure payments before Timoshenko could use the debt as 
a weapon against RosUkrEnergo.  
New price hikes from Turkmenistan 
In parallel with the debt dispute, news came again from Turkmenistan regarding new price hikes. 
Turkmenistan allegedly demanded 50% more than the current US$100tcm.220 Gazprom did not provide 
any details, just declaring that prices for Ukraine would be fair.221 In a meeting taking place on 9th of 
October, it was agreed that transit tariffs would not move from the current tariff of US$1.6tcm/100km.222 
Prices for 2008 were not discussed yet. The Ukrainian Presidency aimed at securing prices no higher than 
US$160tcm for the next year,223 as had been already calculated in the budget for 2008.224  
In the following  days, Gazprom stated that depending on negotiations with Turkmenistan, 
US$180tcm (See ft. 224) might be the price Ukraine would end up paying in 2008.225 At the beginning of 
November, Yanukovich, still acting Prime Minister, declared that he would consider acceptable a price 
ranging from US$150tcm to US$160tcm.226 This was the price which the acting Minister of Energy Iurii´ 
Boi´ko most likely proposed in the latest round of negotiations in Russia in early November.227 However, 
on 25th November Gazprom agreed with Turkmenistan to hike prices to US$130tcm in the first half of 
2008, and US$150tcm in the second half. 228  In exchange for this, Turkmenistan pledged to build a 
pipeline along the Caspian coast that would direct supplies towards Russia.229 In spite of this defeat, the 
Ukrainian side quickly acquiesced in exchange for  being compensated by a slightly higher transit tariff, 
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US$1.7tcm/100km, applied not only to Russian supplies through Ukraine but also to supplies from 
Central Asia. It was determined that the exact price at the Ukrainian border for 2008 would be 
US$179.5/cm.230 
Coincidences between Russia and the new Ukrainian government as for intermediaries 
In the last months of 2007 there were hints at an unexpected coincidence in interests between Russia and 
Ukraine which included not only the acting government but also the incoming government of 
Timoshenko: Suddenly both Russia and Ukraine expressed their preference for establishing strictly 
bilateral relations between Gazprom and Naftohaz. Timoshenko´s interest in ridding Ukraine of any 
intermediaries was well known and she abundantly expressed her intentions on the eve of becoming 
Prime Minister for the second time. However, Dmitri Medvedev, at the time Russian Vice-Prime Minister 
and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Gazprom, was the one who expressed this more clearly: "We 
will most probably revise in the next year the terms of our mutual relationship and put an end to the 
existence of any intermediaries which cannot be properly explained".231  
These statements were welcomed by the acting Ukrainian Minister of Finance Mykola Azarov 
(who was not related to Dmitro Firtash as his Minister of Energy Iurii´ Boi´ko),232 and were also, as could 
have been reasonably expected, by Iulia Timoshenko herself.233 Dmitri Medvedev reiterated Gazprom´s 
preference for direct relations without intermediaries in mid-November, although somehow subtly leaving 
the decision to the Ukrainian side.234 Still, Gazprom did not agree with further suggestions to return to the 
barter system that prevailed before the agreement of January 2006, as had been put forward from the 
"Orange" camp.235 This timid exchange prefigured what would eventually happen in the coming months, 
with both points of convergence, but more importantly, divergence too. 
 
                                                           
230
 "Gazprom, Ukraine agree on new gas price of nearly 180 dlr", Itar-Tass, 4 December 2007 (Accessed on the 31st August 
2011, from East View, Harvard Libraries). 
231
 Grivach, Alexei´: "Oboi´demsia bez posrednikov (Обойдемся без посредников)", Vremia Novostei´, 16 October 2007 
(Accessed on the 19th August 2011, from East View, Harvard Libraries). 
232
 Elder, Miriam: "Gazprom may sell gas direct to Kiev", The Moscow Times, 17 October 2007 (Accessed on the 31st August 
2011, from East View, Harvard Libraries); "Azarov gotov otkazat´sia ot RusUkrEnergo (Азаров готов отказаться от 
РосУкрЭнерго)", Ukrainskaia Pravda, 16 October 2007, at 
http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2007/10/16/4425886/ (Accessed on the 22nd January 2013).  
233
 Grivach, Alexei´: "Podarok dlia Timoshenko (Подарок для Тимошенко)", Vremia Novostei´, 17 October 2007 (Accessed 
on the 22nd August 2011, from East View, Harvard Libraries). 
234
 "Gazprom doubts expediency of RosUkrEnergo in gas supply", Itar-Tass, 20 November 2007 (Accessed on the 31st August 
2011, from East View, Harvard Libraries). 
235
 Grib, Natal´ia and Gavrish, Oleg: "Gaz v obmen na transport (Газ в обмен на транспорт)", Kommersant, 23 October 2007 
(Accessed on the 23rd August 2011, from East View, Harvard Libraries); Grivach, Alexei´: "Nazad k barteru (Назад к 
бартеру)", Vremia Novostei´, 23 October 2007 (Accessed on the 22nd August 2011, from East View, Harvard Libraries). 
    
 
221 
 
7. 4. Timoshenko Government: New Debt Problems Lead to a Dispute   
In spite of the resolution of the debt dispute of late 2007, 2008 started with a new one with much worse 
consequences.  
The first element of this new episode was related to winter temperatures in Central Asia which 
happened to be much lower than usual. As a result, more gas was needed for domestic consumption, so 
normal supplies for Ukraine decreased in the magnitude of a daily 40mcm 236  in mid-January. 237  As 
supplies were nevertheless guaranteed by RosUkrEnergo, more gas was purchased from Gazprom and no 
shortages whatsoever had to be reported.238 The problem however lay in the issue of pricing, as instead of 
Turkmen gas priced at US$179.5tcm, Russian gas costing US$314.7tcm had to be used as a 
complement.239 In a sign of the extreme distrust the new Ukrainian government had towards Russian 
authorities, declarations from the Executive Director of RosUkrEnergo exposing the situation and 
mentioning the price the company was paying for additional Russian gas were interpreted as a measure of 
pressure on Ukraine.240  
The second element was an (already) classic episode of debt accruing through the complex web of 
relations between Naftohaz, UkrGazEnergo, RosUkrEnergo and Gazprom. As some months ago, 
UkrGazEnergo was indebted again to RosUkrEnergo, by a figure of around US$830mill.241 A tentative 
explanation for this new incident was given, which identified additional amounts of gas that had been 
pumped from RosUkrEnergo´s storage facilities by UkrGazEnergo as the origin of the debt;242 officially 
this had been intended  to ensure supplies for the next heating season 2008-09. 243  In any case 
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UkrGazEnergo had not been able to pay yet. In another similarity to the debt dispute of October 2007, 
there also seemed to be a sum of US$1.2bill which Naftohaz owed to UkrGazEnergo.244 
First reactions by the Ukrainian authorities bode ill for the outcome of this new dispute. As feared 
by Gazprom (see previous section), the existence of this debt was used as an occasion to revise the status 
quo in general and the presence of intermediaries in particular. The Energy market regulator swiftly 
ordered an investigation of UkrGazEnergo.245 At the same time, former Minister of Energy, Iurii´ Boi´ko, 
tried to defend the record of Naftohaz under his management,246 now also under scrutiny. Naftohaz had 
been already investigated some days before as it was suspected of  being on the brink of bankruptcy.247 
With Naftohaz allegedly having torn up early negotiations to solve the debt problem in the face of 
disagreements with RosUkrEnergo,248 the road ahead promised to be rough.  
New data were soon released, where a more detailed breakdown of the debt was provided: 
UkrGazEnergo owed US$598mill to RosUkrEnergo and Naftohaz owed US$215mill to UkrGazEnergo.249 
This figures, as so often happened, did not match earlier reports. As reported some months later by 
Nezavisimaia Gazeta from sources within Naftohaz, it was suspected that intermediaries had intentionally 
failed to undertake the normal procedures for payments, leading to this new debt episode. This would 
have been used as a means of pressure against a new government which barely concealed its intention to 
remove any intermediary.250 Compounding this new debt dispute, the new leadership in Ukraine was 
putting forward far-reaching changes that necessarily put it at odds with Russia.  
The new Timoshenko government tries to revise current energy relations 
In the first place, the new government wanted to revise the pricing agreements of December 2007. Its 
intention was to review the transit tariff of US$1.7tcm/100km, the first proposal voiced being an 
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extremely steep increase to no less than US$9.32tcm/100km.251 None of this was mentioned in the first 
meeting between Alexei´ Miller and his new counterpart Oleg Dubina, but the latter nevertheless insisted 
on revising the tariffs.252 The expressed reason for this was that Naftohaz needed to offset the impact of 
increasing gas prices. However, Miller did not meet Dubina´s expectations and reversed the argument, 
explaining that higher transit tariffs would in fact translate into even higher prices. The baseline for 
Miller´s argumentation was that US$179.5tcm was a much lower price than market prices charged to 
Europe close to US$314.7tcm.253  
This discussion was the occasion for a new factor that was to play a significant role in the 
upcoming dispute of March 2008: divergences within Ukrainian politicians belonging to the Orange 
coalition. The Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko, now one of the most bitter foes of his Prime 
Minister, decided to intervene in the ongoing discussions by drawing the National Security and Defense 
Council, under his control, into the debates on energy policy.254 Thus, Yushchenko surprisingly expressed 
his disagreement with the government and opposed any change to the transit tariff. In his understanding, 
Ukraine also benefited from this low tariff in the sense that it was also charged on Central Asian gas 
transiting to Ukraine through Russia and did not allow Timoshenko to perform a planned trip to Russia to 
pursue her policy.255 Yushchenko was aligning himself with Alexei´ Grivach´s arguments, who wrote in 
Vremia Novostei´, that Kiev actually benefited more than Russia in terms of earnings, as both the volume 
of Russian gas and the transit distance through Ukraine were bigger than Central Asian gas for Ukraine 
transiting Russia.256 This led Ukraine to earn four times more than Russia, and while Europeans countries 
usually charged bigger transit tariffs, the difference laid mostly in the fact that this was charged on gas 
priced following market mechanisms.257  
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Secondly, the new government, as already known, wanted to eliminate intermediaries. Besides 
economic reasons, political aversion of Timoshenko to her antagonist Dmitro Firtash played a major role. 
Thus, in the above mentioned meeting with Miller, Dubina made clear the government´s intention to seize 
full control of the internal gas market and to reduce the share of UkrGazEnergo to 7% from 70% the 
company controlled so far.258 The rift between the President and his Prime Minister cast some shadows on 
the government´s margin of action in this area too. In fact, Yushchenko´s position on transit tariffs came 
at the moment when scandal broke out regarding the President´s family´s alleged corrupt links to 
UkrGazEnergo. 259  Timoshenko was quick to make the link between the recently detained Semion 
Mogilevich and Dmitro Firtash himself, who was very often linked to him,260 to  make the case in her 
campaign for transparency in energy trade,261 and as it had happened before, signs from Russia were 
positive: Valerii´ Draganov, Deputy Chairman of the State Duma´s Energy Committee, accepted in 
principle the establishment of direct relations.262 the Vice-Speaker of the State Duma, Valerii´ Iazev went 
in the same direction when he stated that "The less intermediaries in such major projects the better (…) 
Russia has repeatedly said that it would be right if founders of this joint venture were Gazprom and 
Naftohaz Ukrainy".263  
So paradoxically when there was at least a certain convergence between Ukraine´s and Russia´s 
interests, more than external, it was internal obstacles that came in Timoshenko´s way. Her unilateral 
decision to restrict UkrGazEnergo to a market share of only 5.04bcm per year was cancelled by a 
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judiciary decision. 264  After a meeting with the National Security and Defense Council the President 
approved the removal of RosUkrEnergo but only progressively, so as to avoid destabilizing the energy 
market.265 This ran counter to the more radical agenda of Timoshenko, who some days later launched a 
new attack on the company saying that RosUkrEnergo had not been supplying gas since November 2007, 
forcing Naftohaz to use its own reserves instead.  
This in fact was totally false. Quite the contrary, it was Naftohaz who had not registered its 
purchases with UkrGazEnergo, thus letting a significant debt build up. 266  Timoshenko targeted both 
intermediaries, but sometimes in quite haphazard ways, as when she proposed RosUkrEnergo to bypass 
UkrGazEnergo altogether.267 However, some days later, the cabinet was reportedly preparing a similar 
move, this time targeting RosUkrEnergo instead, in order to establish direct relations between Naftohaz 
and Gazprom.268  
Gazprom Threatens to Cut Supplies and Yushchenko Temporarily Finds a Truce 
Timoshenko´s drive to revise the current status quo and the new debt issue revealed itself as an explosive 
combination.  
To begin with, when the debt of Naftohaz to UkrGazEnergo (and which affected Gazprom) by 
early February was revealed and quantified by a member of the board of trustees of the latter company to 
be as much as US$1.5bill, 269  Gazprom´s reaction was immediate and much more assertive than in 
previous cases: the Russian gas monopoly issued an ultimatum demanding the immediate payment of the 
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outstanding debt, fixing the 11th of February as the final deadline; otherwise gas supplies to Ukraine 
would be stopped.270  
Confusion still prevailed regarding the exact volume of the debt and its relation to non-payments 
from the side of Naftohaz to UkrGazEnergo and to the additional purchase of more expensive Russian 
gas, which by 6th February amounted to 1.5bcm. 271  As it seemed, US$500mill accrued from 
RosUkrEnergo´s purchase of Russian gas, while the remaining sum of US$1bill resulted from Naftohaz´s 
non-payments to UkrGazEnergo for regular supplies. 272  An initial confusion also concerned which 
supplies Gazprom was to cut in case of non-payment, as it seemed from Sergei´ Kuprianov´s statement 
(Gazprom´s Spokesman), that only additional Russian supplies were targeted.273 In that case the threat to 
Ukraine´s energy security was not so significant.274 However, Alexei´ Miller soon warned that supply of 
Central Asian gas was also included in the prospective cut-off.275  
Vremia Novostei´ on  8th  February provided more detailed information on the breakdown of the 
debt: Naftohaz owed US$400-500mill for Central Asian gas not paid in late 2007, a further sum of 
US$370mill corresponded to gas supplied in January, while in addition, there was an officially 
acknowledged debt of US$250mill to UkrGazEnergo. The whole debt to UkrGazEnergo was said to 
amount to US$600mill by mid-January, resulting in a final debt of US$1.023mill owed by RosUkrEnergo 
to Gazprom. The Executive Director of Naftohaz, Igor´ Didenko, had earlier surmised that debt to 
RosUkrEnergo had its origin in the former leadership´s artificial accumulation of debt with the political 
goal of burdening the upcoming government.276 
What could account for Russia´s reaction being so harsh? More than the volume of the debt itself, 
this could be related to the intentions to remove RosUkrEnergo.277 As Mikhail Korchemkin assessed, 
Gazprom´s reaction was related to its fear of losing gas that RosUkrEnergo owed, in case the company 
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was unilaterally removed. 278  Naftohaz´s and the Prime Minister´s negotiating position consisted in 
systematically denying accusations, blame intermediaries instead and finally accept the debt on condition 
that intermediaries were removed.279 Vice-Prime Minister Oleg Turchinov made this strategy very clear: 
debt problems could be solved only if contracts were signed directly with Gazprom and RosUkrEnergo 
removed in the process.280 This did not put Gazprom in an easy position. When Igor´ Didenko and his 
Russian counterpart Valerii´ Golubevii´ met, Naftohaz proposed to sign a direct contract on the basis of 
US$179.5tcm, including not only Central Asian, but more expensive Russian gas too; 281  the exact 
mechanism to pay back debts as proposed by the Ukrainian monopoly, was to do it through a loan from 
Deutsche Bank to be repaid in the next seven to eight weeks.282 This was utterly rejected by Gazprom. 
However, the situation took an unexpected turn on 12ve February 2008 when Yushchenko met with 
his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin. A meeting the day before between Oleg Dubina and Alexei´ 
Miller had led to the postponement of the deadline to 18:00pm of the next day. That left enough time for 
the presidents to find a temporary solution: debt from 2007 would be repaid from Thursday 14th at prices 
(as  seemed obvious) equivalent to those agreed for the year before.283 A first batch of US$100mill would 
be paid,284 with a second payment of US$178mill to UkrGazEnergo  to follow on 20th February. 285 The 
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deadline for full payment was set on 14th of March.286 No agreement could be found though, regarding the 
US$500mill owed for Russian gas, as Oleg Dubina refused to pay for any Russian gas and refused any of 
his counterparts´ arguments, namely, that deliveries of Russian gas in compensation for undersupply from 
Central Asia were included in the January 2006 agreement.287 
Second, and more importantly, as it partly met the Ukrainian government´s wishes, two new joint 
ventures (JV) jointly owned by Gazprom and Naftohaz would be established instead of RosUkrEnergo 
and UkrGazEnergo.288 From the Russian side, there was readiness to change intermediaries immediately if 
there was a guarantee that bills would be duly paid.289 It was understood though, that Gazprom would not 
risk neither legal problems with RosUkrEnergo nor it would preclude the company from its contracted 
sales to Europe, which by the way, benefited the Russian monopoly as a means to cover debts.290 The 
transition for the suppression of RosUkrEnergo promised thus to be progressive one. Sources from 
Naftohaz themselves admitted it would be difficult to introduce any changes before 2009, as volumes 
were already contracted for the whole year.291 However, UkrGazEnergo would be substituted earlier.292 A 
deadline was set for April 1st to establish the new scheme for gas delivery and to agree on the two new 
JV.293  
At first sight, it seemed that the presidential agreement went in line with Timoshenko´s policy. 
With the Prime Minister proposing on the eve of the meeting that Naftohaz should pay for the US$1bill 
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debt (nothing was said about the US$500mill owed for Russian gas) directly to RosUkrEnergo and skip 
thus UkrGazEnergo altogether,294 it could be concluded that her objectives were fully satisfied.  
However, there was a concession to Gazprom in exchange for the agreement  that stood on the 
way of the Prime Minister´s acquiescence: henceforth, Gazprom could increase its share in the internal 
Ukrainian market for gas imports, from the (indirect) 25% it already had through its participation in 
UkrGazEnergo, to 50%.295 This was interpreted as a violation of Ukrainian energy sovereignty and fueled 
the worst speculations regarding Gazprom´s intentions.296  For Timoshenko, intermediaries which she 
made responsible for all the debt accumulated from late 2007 were now being substituted for something 
much worse: a direct penetration of Gazprom into Ukraine´s energy market.297  
Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko takes back the initiative: the road to a new gas dispute 
Although the expected liquidation of private intermediaries was in itself very enthusiastically hailed by 
the Prime Minister,298 the latest agreement nevertheless appeared as Yushchenko´s victory at the expense 
of his Prime Minister. Timoshenko´s more radical proposals seemed to have been thwarted in favor of 
Yushchenko, who could now appear as the peace-maker who extricated Ukraine from a difficult situation, 
for which Timoshenko could now be held responsible.299 Gains in the Ukrainian political arena made at 
the expense of the adversary may be the main explanation for this divergence.  
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The fight between Yushchenko and Timoshenko continued in the next days. The Prime Minister 
was scheduled for a visit to Moscow on 21st February. Yushchenko then thwarted her plans again and 
went himself instead. 300  However, disagreements existed between the Russian and Ukrainian sides 
regarding the application of the latest agreement: it was proposed from Russia that Naftohaz should buy 
assets in UkrGazEnergo, while in Ukraine, the preference was to suppress UkrGazEnergo outright and 
then establish a new JV. At the same time, Gazprom intended that the new JV (where Gazprom 
presumably would own 50%) should also include Ukrainian gas sold to the population at subsidized 
prices.301 An additional point of contention was whether Naftohaz would recover the right to re-export gas 
which RosUkrEnergo had assumed in January 2006 in its stead. 302  Ukrainska Pravda reported the 
existence of a draft agreement which secured reexport rights for Gazprom Export and which foresaw that 
the new JV would market all gas supplies in Ukraine, as Gazprom had been demanding.303 Meanwhile, the 
controversy of Russian gas supplied since the beginning of the year promised to complicate talks.304   
With these disagreements impairing the application of Yushchenko´s agreement, a door of 
opportunity seemed open for Timoshenko to strike back. In fact, her first step was made when she 
managed to travel to Moscow on 20th February, against the Head of State´s wishes and a day before 
Yushchenko himself.305 This was the beginning of her counteroffensive leading eventually to a short gas 
dispute. Even before this trip, Naftohaz had already tried to bend Yushchenko´s agreements in its favor 
and proposed to accept price hikes for internal consumers and Gazprom´s use of its storage facilities in 
Ukraine in exchange for the immediate establishment of Gazprom´s direct supplies on the basis of 
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US$179.5tcm (in spite of Russian gas being priced at US$314.7tcm) while it proposed to extend the 
deadline for paying the debt to the 1st April from 14th March as agreed earlier.306 However, Vice-Prime 
Minister Oleksandr Turchinov had already announced that talks should start from a "clean slate". The 
unrelenting revisionist drive by the government was manifest when the latest proposal by Naftohaz was 
known: to return the debt due to Gazprom for additional supplies of Russian gas, priced at either 
US$130tcm and US$179.5tcm, depending on whether it had been supplied in 2007 or 2008.307 Naftohaz 
also referred to the two new JV to be soon approved,308 surprisingly accepting Gazprom´s presence in the 
internal market too, which was precisely the most controversial point.309  
Against this background, the meeting between Timoshenko and her Russian counterpart Viktor 
Zubkov did not achieve anything concrete: The Russian Prime Minister diplomatically referred to 
agreements reached earlier and insisted on the repayment of debts.310 He reportedly tried to resurrect the 
proposal rejected already one year ago in Ukraine, of swapping downstream assets in Russia for shares in 
the transport system of Ukraine.311 In accordance with her policy, Timoshenko hailed the suppression of 
any intermediaries as already agreed, and perplexing as it may be, she broached plans similar to that of 
Zubkov, and which she so strenuously opposed one year before, namely, to establish a gas consortium in 
exchange for access in the Russian downstream sector. 312  The Ukrainian Prime Minister also 
unrealistically proposed direct contracts with Central Asia,313 running counter to the Russian side´s firm 
strategy of establishing an unchallenged monopsony on Central Asian supplies.  
The good harmony both sides showed in Moscow was obviously only apparent. Timoshenko´s 
intention not to bend to Russian demands became manifest thereafter. Probably for mere propagandistic 
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reasons,314 as there was a manifest incoherence in her purposes, she stated that Gazprom had accepted to 
get rid immediately of intermediaries and establish direct supplies; she later had to clarify that direct 
supplies would automatically imply more expensive Russian gas instead of cheaper Central Asian gas.315 
She further clarified that such scheme would only be valid for the 1st quarter and that the condition of 
establishing new intermediaries for the next quarter was firm.316 Timoshenko seemed to be lobbying for 
direct supplies for the transition period when UkrGazEnergo and RosUkrEnergo had been suppressed and 
before new JVs approved. Much of this looked like contrived arguments to force through her political 
agenda of eliminating RosUkrEnergo.   
Gazprom now saw Yushchenko´s agreements blocked by disagreements on its interpretation and 
nullified in practice by the government´s insistence on reviewing them. Therefore, it warned that if 
Naftohaz did not pay the outstanding debt it would stop any supplies from Central Asian and sell 
expensive Russian gas instead.317 Gazprom decided to ratchet up pressure against Naftohaz in the face of 
the latter´s unwillingness to move forward with the 12ve February agreement: if it had earlier hinted that 
supplies would be cut on 7th of April in case the deadline for a final agreement on new intermediaries was 
not respected (1st of April),318 the deadline was now moved back to 3rd of March, 10:00 am. If not met and 
debt remained unpaid, supplies would be cut by 25%.319  
Gazprom had thus made clear that repaying the debt was the most urgent matter. Naftohaz had 
reportedly made a new payment and claimed the whole debt to be repaid. Gazprom disagreed and stated 
that only US$280mill had been transferred so far (while nearly US$1bill had accumulated from 
November and December 2007).320 In addition to this,321 the complete refusal to abide by the 12ve February 
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agreement and the constitution of a substitute for UkrGazEnergo,322 made the situation explosive. This 
verbal escalation was followed by new payments made to UkrGazEnergo, who received an additional 
amount of US$337mill 323  or US$484mill 324  according to the sources. However a minor sum of 
US$271mill still remained to be paid. For this latest payment Naftohaz shunned responsibility and 
pretended to charge it exclusively on UkrGazEnergo for allegedly unpaid dividends for 2006-07.325 This 
new argument was plainly rejected by RosUkrEnergo.326 Timoshenko showed no flexibility on the issue 
of intermediaries and unilaterally decided that no intermediary would be allowed to work in the Ukrainian 
market after 1st of March,327 issuing orders to put a legal end to UkrGazEnergo in the internal market.328 
Given the circumstances, Gazprom was left with no other alternative than to escalate and carry out its 
recent threats. 
 
7. 5. The Gas Dispute and Eventual Agreements 
After a latest round of negotiations had failed,329 Gazprom, as already warned some days before, reduced 
on 3rd March 2008 the flow of gas corresponding to Ukrainian consumption by 25%.330 Naftohaz´s Head 
of the public relations department, Valentin Zemliansky, stated the company could easily make up for the 
reduction through its own reserves.331 As he declared, reserves were sufficient for a whole month in case 
the gas cut-offs continued.332  
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The next day, with solutions out of sight, Gazprom decided to cut supplies by another 25%. 
Ukraine was thus left with only 50% of its normal supplies.333 If the situation persisted, Gazprom warned 
that further reductions would ensue.334 However, far from backtracking, the Ukrainian side seemed ready 
for a similar strategy as that of January 2006, namely to siphon off gas in transit to Central and Western 
Europe and thus further escalate this new dispute. As Sergei´ Kuprianov declared, Naftohaz had 
published a press release informing that such step would be taken if Gazprom did not restore normal 
supplies.335  The wording of the press release made intentions quite clear: "If Gazprom continues to 
crudely violate technical agreements between the two countries and reduce the delivery of Central Asian 
gas to Ukraine, Naftohaz Ukrainy reserves the right to take proportionate and asymmetric action to 
protect the interests of Ukrainian consumers".336      
Naftohaz nuanced this warning when it asserted that such a measure would be taken only in the 
event of Ukraine´s energy security being  endangered,337 but Gazprom quite probably understood that 
there was a real danger. The fact that Naftohaz did not allow experts from SGS, the Swiss-based 
consulting company that had been contracted to monitor the flow of gas from Ukrainian pumping 
stations, raised suspicions that Ukraine was ready to carry out unsanctioned off-takes.338 Gazprom even 
claimed that Ukraine had already illegally extracted 104mcm of Russian gas 339 and Naftohaz at some 
point seems to have warned that 60mcm of gas would go missing for Europe on the 5th of March. 340 
Gazprom´s claim was never confirmed and no restriction was ever reported from Europe,341 whereas 
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Naftohaz´s announcement was denied by both the Ukrainian President and his Prime Minister.342 These 
were false warnings, but disruptions of Russian gas appeared very likely with some experts claiming that 
Naftohaz had not stored gas enough for coping with eventual restrictions.343 
Gazprom decides to deescalate the dispute and restores supply while negotiations continue 
Then, Gazprom decided to deescalate the gas dispute, restoring supplies and going back to conversations 
with Naftohaz to solve all outstanding points. An apparent reason for this sudden decision was that 
Naftohaz and Gazprom had agreed to pay for the Russian gas delivered since  January 1st.344 However, 
this looked more like a generic statement. A date was fixed on 11th March to celebrate a bilateral 
meeting,345 while Mikhail Korchemkin, asked by The Moscow Times, suggested that Gazprom had agreed 
to backtrack and eventually accept that all gas supplied for January-February would be priced at 
179.5bcm.346  
If to believe the Ukrainian Prime Minister herself, her position had not moved substantially in 
spite of the dispute. She made clear she would not fulfill the President´s February agreement and insisted 
on direct supplies without intermediaries.347 She actually went as far as to send a decree to the President 
announcing the government´s decision to cancel the agreement.348 The main point of contention was, as in 
the days before the dispute, the substitution of UkrGazEnergo. Timoshenko suggested ways to 
compensate Gazprom in a new agreement, which raised at that moment some doubts: one interpretation 
was that 25% of the Ukrainian import gas market would be open for Gazprom (the equivalent of its share 
in UkrGazEnergo), while another was that Gazprom could only sell as much as 5bcm. The latter volume 
was coincidentally the same as Timoshenko´s proposed restriction for UkrGazEnergo, defended earlier in 
2006. Still another interpretation was that Timoshenko proposed Gazprom a scarce 25% of these 5bcm, 
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which yielded a meager 1.25bcm.349 At the same time, the Head of the National Regulatory Commission 
for Energy proposed to offer Gazprom as much as 26bcm, which he identified as the equivalent of 35% of 
the Ukrainian (presumably, whole) gas market.350   
President Yushchenko also intervened in this new phase, supporting his Prime Minister. While 
disavowing Timoshenko´s recent statements, probably just for political reasons, he nevertheless expressed 
doubts as to the convenience of the agreement he had himself approved in February. Yushchenko now 
said the agreement considered imports of more expensive Russian gas, which in fact was incorrect, as 
Russian gas only referred to volumes exceptionally purchased to cover undersupply from Central Asia. 
He also claimed that no deal had been closed to establish JVs, something which again was not true. 
Yushchenko´s effort to backtrack was probably related to the agreement´s unpopularity. Since 
Timoshenko went on the offensive to revise it and "survived" the short gas cut-offs,351 the President 
seemed to have no other alternative but to side with his political foe. He thus issued a directive for the 
new upcoming round of negotiations, where he supported a scheme of direct relations between Gazprom 
and Naftohaz, even if he still acknowledged that a JV between the two state companies might be 
necessary.352     
An agreement is reached between Ukraine and Russia 
The controversy of Russian natural gas 
As already announced, Naftohaz´s delegation went to Moscow on 11th March. First among the items in 
discussion, was the controversy surrounding Russian gas. The Ukrainian side agreed to pay for its real 
price, that is, US$321tcm. It was revealed at that moment that in fact, this might have been agreed in 
secret as early as on 6th March in trilateral negotiations between Naftohaz, Gazprom and 
RosUkrEnergo. 353  Once this had been agreed, the exact amount of Russian gas sold in January and 
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February had to be determined. Sources from Gazprom talked of a minimum of 4bcm,354 while others 
wrongly reported that all the gas provided in January-February was exclusively Russian.355 Press reports 
thereafter reduced volumes to 1.9bcm,356 and the total volume was finally confirmed to be only 1.4bcm. 
But the most important element in this long-drawn-out disagreement was the modality of payment agreed: 
gas would be paid for not in cash, but through barter instead.357 This solved the controversy whether 
Gazprom wanted to abuse Naftohaz by selling more expensive Russian gas and that had caused an uproar 
in Ukraine. If gas was simply swapped, as soon as Ukraine received from Central Asian the volumes of 
gas it should have received back in January and February, Naftohaz could then easily return the volumes 
in dispute to Gazprom.358 The pricing issue that had been at the very center of the controversy, appeared to 
be irrelevant. 
The suppression of UkrGazEnergo and the appearance of "Gazprom Sbyt Ukraina" 
The other big item, the re-organization of gas import market in Ukraine, was also the object of an 
agreement, modifying what had been agreed back in February by the two presidents: UkrGazEnergo, for 
which Naftohaz and Gazprom had planned in February a new JV, would be simply eliminated. Naftohaz 
would thus regain complete control of imported gas in the internal market. 359  Gazprom would be 
compensated for losing its share of UkrGazEnergo: it gained the right for direct sales of up to 10% of the 
Ukrainian gas market through a new filial, "Gazprom Sbyt Ukraina";360 Gazprom could thus sell as much 
as 7.5bcm.361 According to a press release from Gazprom: "From April 1, 2008, a Gazprom subsidiary or 
affiliated company will annually effectuate direct gas deliveries to Ukrainian industrial consumers in the 
volume of no less than 7.5 b.c.m".362 As the reader may be used to seeing, a great deal of confusion 
remained as to the exact meaning of this agreement.  
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Some, initially, suspected that what this solution foresaw was the creation of an emergency 
mechanism to avoid any disputes whenever Ukraine temporarily needed Russian gas to cover demand, as 
had happened recently. Leonid Grigoriev (at the time president of the Energy and Finance Institute, 
Russia) explained that Gazprom would be allowed to sell a maximum of 7.5bcm in case Russian gas was 
exceptionally needed. 363  If true, this arrangement was nothing more than a face-saving devise for 
Gazprom. Whatever real utility this arrangement might eventually have as a real insurance against non-
payments, it did not secure for Gazprom a permanent presence in the Ukrainian energy market. The 
reason for suspecting this was that enough gas had been already contracted from Central Asia (49.8bcm 
for the rest of the year) at more advantageous prices of US$179.5tcm.364 It was easy to conclude that 
"Gazprom Sbyt Ukraina" would only sell gas in the Ukrainian market in cases of emergency. 365 
Kuprianov´s declarations, as relayed by the press, where he just talked of a mere "possibility" when 
referring to the new volumes agreed for Gazprom´s filial,366 and the fact that the reference was to a 
maximum volume, arguably supported this interpretation.  
However, it was later acknowledged that the agreement did provide for 7.5bcm to be sold to 
"Gazprom Sbyt Ukraina" directly by Naftohaz on a permanent basis. It seemed that contrary to the initial 
interpretation, "Gazprom Sbyt Ukraina" would not sell Russian gas to Naftohaz. Instead, "Gazprom Sbyt 
Ukraina" would simply become a trader in the internal market of Ukraine, with a right to purchase 
7.5bcm of gas from Naftohaz (imported from RosUkrEnergo), to be sold to consumers in the industrial 
sector. The trader would thus obtain its profits from selling to end-consumers in Ukraine. In spite of this, 
when discussions started on how to apply this provision, disagreements and reinterpretations generated 
new controversy.  
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The Ukrainian government took the unilateral step of restricting the license for Gazprom´s 
controversial filial: "Gazprom Sbyt Ukraina" could only operate during the current year and it was 
confirmed that 7.5bcm was the maximum and not the minimum, as some suspected.367 However, when 
negotiations between Gazprom and Naftohaz in early April led to "Gazprom Sbyt Ukraina" being granted 
a license, Gazprom agreed on the maximum volume while Naftohaz granted the licence not for one, but 
for five years.368 "Gazprom Sbyt Ukraina" would start servicing from  May1st. The concession of a license 
for five years was interpreted by some as an attempt to influence Gazprom in ongoing pricing 
negotiations.369 Rumors even pointed to President Yushchenko as the initiator of such concession in the 
face of the Prime Minister´s opposition.370  
The margin of profits that Vremia Novostei´ calculated for the new company ranged from 
US$6tcm to US$7tcm. That would translate into US$40mill-US$50mill for the rest of the year.371 Elena 
Mazneva from Vedomosti calculated a similar profit margin : "Gazprom Sbyt Ukraina" could gain as 
much as US$41mill-US$61mill per year.372 This calculation assumed the trader would sell as much as 
7.5bcm. However, as it had been agreed, this was only a maximum. And indeed, that maximum would not 
be reached: as it was revealed some months later, the trader only sold 3bcm of gas in 2008.373 It is 
therefore safe to assume that the figure of 7.5bcm per year might have served Gazprom to save face. 
The status quo regarding RosUkrEnergo 
Regarding RosUkrEnergo, the new agreement remained secret. If the February agreement did not foresee 
its disappearance before 2009, the March agreement did not modify anything. In fact, nothing was said of 
its fate beyond 2008 either.374 Iurii´ Boi´ko, former Minister of Energy (linked to RosUkrEnergo through 
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his close relations to Dmitro Firtash), simply confirmed that the trader would operate until the end of the 
year.375 It seems that in this respect, both parts preferred to maintain the status quo and leave the matter to 
rest until negotiations for gas prices in 2009 started. Timoshenko could boast a clear victory over 
UkrGazEnergo, but she had not forgotten RosUkrEnergo, which could still become the target of unilateral 
modifications suddenly announced by the Ukrainian government:  
The Prime Minister decided that RosUkrEnergo´s services would be valid only for the period of 
January-March,376 besides prohibiting the trader from exporting gas to Europe through Ukrainian territory 
and thus depriving RosUkrEnergo of its biggest share of profits.377 Nezavisimaia Gazeta suspected that 
Naftohaz might try to immediately assume RosUkrEnergo´s commitments to European customers, which 
could be made by way of forcing the trader to repurchase gas from Naftohaz at the Ukrainian-Polish 
border.378 Negotiations regarding the status of RosUkrEnergo continued well into April, but soon the 
Ukrainian side gave up on its attempts to get rid of RosUkrEnergo before the end of 2008. Naftohaz had 
to accept the presence of the intermediary and refrained from unilateral moves.379 This final "victory" by 
RosUkrEnergo initially raised doubts whether Naftohaz´s leadership had decided to disobey the Prime 
Minister,380 but it soon appeared that the Prime Minister herself, who tightly held control of energy issues, 
had conceded in that point.381 
Interpretations of the new agreement  
Most assessments tended to characterize Gazprom as the loser in this latest dispute. Kommersant bluntly 
explained de-escalation as a response to the threat of supply disruptions to European customers, 
considering that Gazprom resumed supplies to Ukraine without any concession from Naftohaz.382 Experts 
consulted by Nezavisimaia Gazeta also agreed with that assessment and thought Gazprom backtracked as 
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it feared to lose reputation among European customers.383 The newspaper found new proof of Ukraine´s 
feeling of victory in the fact that Timoshenko´s negotiating position after the resumption of supplies did 
not move and tried on the contrary to exploit Russia´s apparent weakness.384 Another assessment by 
Novaia Gazeta also considered Timoshenko as the winner, in contrast to what they considered the 
Ukrainian defeat of January 2006. This assessment highlighted the fact that in spite of much talk of 
Timoshenko´s concession to pay "European prices" for Russian gas, Ukraine successfully managed to pay 
by barter instead.385  Moskovskaia Pravda also thought that Ukraine had won the dispute, even if the 
victory had been pyrrhic, as it considered that Ukrainian assessments of prospective gas consumption in 
Ukraine for 2008 were wrong, so Central Asian gas would not suffice and some expensive Russian gas 
would have to be purchased.386  Izvestiia on the contrary, rang a rather positive tone of the agreement, 
understandably given Gazprom´s indirect ownership. It assessed that "through minor concessions, 
(Gazprom) had gained guarantees for debt clearance and a more transparent framework of relations",387 
highlighting the share of 10% of Ukraine´s internal gas market that Gazprom had gained through  its new 
subsidiary .388 
 
7. 6. Preliminary Conclusions 
This episode may appear indeed, as Gazprom´s defeat. It must nevertheless be pointed out that the stakes 
were not as high as in January 2006 or as they soon would be in January 2009. As opposed to the two 
"big" disputes (see previous and next chapter), this dispute happened because of a debt problem, not a 
major issue as pricing agreements are. It must also be borne in mind when assessing this latest dispute, 
that Gazprom received a guarantee for repayment and thus averted losses. Nevertheless, a puzzle is why 
Russia escalated this debt dispute and cut off gas instead of pursuing negotiations as with other debt 
disputes in the past. Most probably this was linked to the perspective of a new government headed by 
Timoshenko. In fact, this had happened already the year before. 
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When the debt dispute of October-November 2007 took place (as analyzed above), Gazprom had 
already threatened to stop supplies if debt was not repaid. This happened after an "orange" majority had 
been voted in the parliamentary elections of 30th September, but while Yanukovich was still Prime 
Minister. The threat to cut off gas supplies for a simple debt issue was made for the first time. The 
coincidence with new political changes raised the suspicion that the expected election of Yulia 
Timoshenko as Prime Minister (she was elected by the new parliament on the 18th of December 2007) 
had something to do with this surprising hardening of Russian positions. As Gazprom did not escalate 
verbally when Timoshenko reached the post of Prime Minister, but while Yanukovich was head of the 
government and as tension defused when an agreement was reached, it does not point to a political use of 
the debt issue. It rather points to a preventive move by Gazprom to solve the problem before the new 
government was formed. As Timoshenko promised to enforce radical changes in the energy market, 
Gazprom´s move seems logical. 
The sequence of events when debt issues resurfaced in February 2008 seems to follow the same 
logic. On this occasion, Gazprom stepped up and threatened more clearly to reduce supplies. Timoshenko 
was now head of the new government and tried thus to push forward with her plans of eliminating any 
intermediaries. Her government denied any responsibility and blamed RosUkrEnergo and UkrGazEnergo 
for the debt, even if Ukraine was at the origin of this new episode of indebtedness. Gazprom could 
perceive that the debt dispute was being used as an argument to blame intermediaries and thus push for 
the government´s unilateral policy of establishing direct supplies in Russia-Ukrainian energy relations. 
The dispute reached its apex when Timoshenko attempted to nullify the 12ve February agreement and 
threats translated into action: Gazprom imposed two days of partial cuts, 25% of normal supplies to 
Ukraine the first day and 50% the next day. Gazprom might have started the dispute, either because 
Timoshenko´s policy worsened Gazprom´s position or because improvements in the 12ve February 
agreement raised the stakes involved. However, the relevant fact is that Gazprom had already set a clear 
deadline for gas cut-offs and only modified it to give more room to negotiations with Yushchenko. It is a 
credible assumption that gas cut-offs were already planned not as a simple threat, but as a real warning 
too.  
The reasons for Gazprom not to further escalate the dispute into a total cut-off could be answered 
in two different ways:  
Either Gazprom fulfilled its target, with losses averted or gains achieved, or deescalated the 
dispute as risks of losses it did not want to assume were too high. Most analyses, as seen above, tended to 
    
 
243 
 
respond negatively to the first interpretation. It is reasonable to think so: when Gazprom decided to de-
escalate, no agreement had been reached beyond generic promises from the Ukrainian side to go back to 
negotiations. This will be further assessed in chapter 9, where the result of the three disputes will be fully 
analyzed. 
The second answer, namely that Gazprom behaved as a risk-averting actor, seems more promising 
and opens the door to a prospect theory-based analysis. Gazprom deescalated the dispute when the 
Ukrainian side hinted at gas disruptions. As Gazprom arguably did not want to risk its reputation as in 
January 2006, it made sense to revert to negotiations. The agreement which was eventually reached in the 
next did not represent a victory for Gazprom: Gazprom had its debt repaid and reached its main 
objectives, arguably averting losses. However, the new agreement represented an important concession 
regarding gains achieved in the 12ve February agreement, as Gazprom´s share in Ukraine´s internal 
market was reduced to a mere testimonial presence. Russia apparently preferred to forsake some gains 
made in the first agreement, in exchange for averting the potential loss of reverting to the risk of gas 
disruptions. As stated in our previous chapters, conclusions in chapter 11 will expand a prospect-theory 
based interpretation , determining at the same time the balance between economic and political factors.    
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Chapter 8: Russia-Ukraine Energy Dispute of January 2009 
 
8. 1. Introduction: Again, Pricing Changes from Central Asia 
While Russia and Ukraine were in the midst of a debt dispute which escalated into the short gas cut-off of 
March 2008, new tremors were coming from Central Asia. We must not forget that Central Asia had been 
the main source for most pricing changes to date. It had strongly contributed to tensions in recent years 
between Russia and Ukraine (See chapter 6) and since 2006, only Central Asian gas was consumed by 
Ukraine. Therefore, prices for 2007 and 2008 had depended on price changes from these regions (mainly 
Turkmenistan) (See chapter 7) and new prices for 2009 would necessarily be raised again if the same 
trend continued. It may be argued that this would have a sizable influence on the energy dispute of 
January 2009, which was to last as much as three weeks and  lead to a severe supply crisis in most 
dependent countries of Central Europe.  
In March 2008, the three Central Asian republics of Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan 
that had been supplying gas to Ukraine, made a joint declaration demanding that from 2009 market prices 
be established for exported gas. Under the term "market prices", it was understood that the objective was 
to determine gas pricing following international oil prices. This was essentially the same system Gazprom 
used for its European customers (and wanted to impose on Ukraine too) and was very similar to what 
Kazakhstan had been using from 2008.1 If applied, this would immediately translate into higher prices for 
Ukraine.  
According to Vedomosti´s estimate, prospective prices of Central Asian gas would range between 
US$270-US$300tcm at the their respective borders (that is at Turkmen, Uzbek and Kazakh borders):2 if 
Turkmenistan chose prices ranging from US$250tcm to US$270tcm and Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan 
pushed for US$200-US$220tcm, 3  the final price for Ukraine might result in something around 
US$320tcm. This was in fact close to what Gazprom charged for its gas exports. 4  Other analysts 
calculated different prices: Deutsche Bank estimated the likely price for Ukraine would exceed US$250 
                                                           
1
 Mazneva, Elena: "Aziia trebuet doplatit´ (Азия требует доплатить)", Vedomosti, 12 March 2008 (Accessed on the 23rd 
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2
 Ibid. 
3
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4
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and analysts from MDM Bank calculated a range from US$275tcm to US$320tcm. 5  Former Prime 
Minister of Energy Iurii´ Boi´ko was particularly pessimistic: he predicted, as the best of prospects, a 
price for Ukraine at US$370tcm.6 
Whatever the exact price, it was certain that Ukraine would henceforth lose advantageous prices it 
had been enjoying. The only hope for Ukraine was that Gazprom exerted as much pressure as possible on 
the three Central Asian gas producers in order to prevent such price increases. However, Gazprom did not 
in fact have much margin for negotiating. As the analyst Mikhail Zanozin from Zobinbank explained, in 
the face of European and Chinese competition for Central Asian resources, accepting more expensive 
prices was in fact the best guarantee for Gazprom to nip in the bud attempts at lowering Russian 
monopsony in favor of competing consumers like China.7 
There was therefore a clear dilemma for Gazprom and only two options: either Ukraine accepted 
higher prices to absorb price increases, or Russia ended up assuming the price differential and subsidizing 
the Ukrainian energy market. Only the first option looked realistic and corresponded to what Ukraine had 
done successively in 2006, 2007 and 2008, namely, to reflect price hikes from Central Asia. It was 
therefore most unlikely that Gazprom would now accept an exception hurting both its financial position 
and its policy of market transition for gas prices. As  an importer of exclusively Central Asian gas, 
Ukraine was a full target of these changes.8 Thus, the recent announcement from Central Asia forebode 
new troublesome negotiations between Gazprom and Naftohaz, as the latter would not readily accept new 
and higher prices. 
 The danger was that if Ukraine did not accept new price increases, both Russia and Ukraine 
entered a conflict spiral with each of them using their "weapons". As we had the occasion to see earlier, 
Ukraine could use transit tariffs and fees for storage facilities, either to nullify price increases or in order 
to use them to apply pressure in negotiations. Valentin Zemlianskii´, Naftohaz´s press secretary, 
mentioned this in direct relation with the expected price increases from Central Asia.9 But with Gazprom 
making it clear that Ukraine should be prepared for adapting to new prices,10 Ukraine´s best strategy was 
                                                           
5
 Medetskii´, Anatolii´: "Moscow promises tough gas talks", Itar-Tass, 17 March 2008 (Accessed on the 30th August 2011, 
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6
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Gazeta, 28 April 2008 (Accessed on the 23rd August 2011, from East View, Harvard Libraries). 
7
 Kulikov, Sergei´: "Gazprom" gotov poi´ti navstrechu Kievu ("ГАЗПРОМ" ГОТОВ ПОЙТИ НАВСТРЕЧУ КИЕВУ)", Nezavisimaia 
Gazeta, 22 May 2008 (Accessed on the 24th August 2011, from East View, Harvard Libraries). 
8
 "Ukraine to suffer most from higher price of Central Asian gas – view", Itar-Tass, 12 March 2008 (Accessed on the 30th 
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to ensure that the transition to market prices was as progressive as possible. Thus, in a new round of talks 
in April (after weeks devoted to the implementation of the March agreements), Naftohaz proposed a 
framework of cooperation for the period 2009-2012.11 However, here there appeared the most deleterious 
element in the upcoming negotiations: the linkage of debt resolution with pricing discussions. As an 
example of this dynamic, in this same round of talks, Gazprom balked at Naftohaz´s proposed framework 
and simply insisted on discussing first a final payment for outstanding debts and the issuance of a license 
to Gazprom Sbyt.12 We will have the chance to track this dynamic below.  
 
8. 2. Naftohaz Tries to Secure an Agreement with Gazprom and Debt Problems Persist 
With the latest debt problems solved by May (apparently, as will be seen below), the Ukrainian side 
seemed to have the road open for further negotiations on the dreaded price transition. After the framework 
proposed in April, the Ukrainian government now instructed Naftohaz to sign a delivery and transit 
agreement valid for 15 years with Gazprom, where RosUkrEnergo would be removed and where a five-
year transition to market prices was to be agreed.13 The perspectives for Naftohaz were not particularly 
negative, as Gazprom also accepted in principle a progressive calendar. Gazprom intended to set 2011 as 
the final year for the introduction of market indexation and for putting prices in the CIS space on a par 
with those in Europe.14 This had already been agreed with some CIS countries like Belarus, Moldova and 
Armenia.15 There was thus no obvious mismatch between Gazprom´s strategy and this latest offer from 
the Ukrainian side. However, this was probably only a starting position to prepare for negotiations. In 
fact, Naftohaz´s Head, Oleg Dubina had not specified yet which would be the transit tariff demanded. He 
simply tied it to subsequent negotiations 16 while mentioning the current price of US$179.5tcm as the 
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 Ivzhenko, Tat´iana: "Voi´na ul´timatumov (война ультиматумов)", Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 24 April 2008 (Accessed on the 
18th August 2011, from East View, Harvard Libraries). 
12
 Ibid. (As it may be remembered, Gazprom Sbyt was the trader from Gazprom supposed to have direct access to the 
Ukrainian energy market). 
13
 "Ukraina dogovoritsia s Rossiei´ po gazu na 15 let (Украина договорится с Россией по газу на 15 лет)", Kommersant, 8 
May 2008 (Accessed on the 17th August 2011, from East View, Harvard Libraries). 
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 Mazneva, Elena and Kashin, Vasilii´: "Zamorozit´ tseny (Заморозить цены)", Vedomosti, 8 May 2008 (Accessed on the 17th 
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starting price for such transition.17 The fact that both Gazprom and Naftohaz agreed on a progressive 
calendar was in itself very positive. 
In line with its strategy, Gazprom communicated in mid-May that it expected Ukraine to assume 
market prices by 2011-12.18 This was relatively positive for Ukraine as it confirmed Gazprom´s flexibility 
(see paragraph above). This also reduced fears of any steep price increase resulting from Central Asian 
suppliers´ new pricing policy.19  However, any progressive calendar depended on the margin left by 
Central Asian supplies, something that was not known yet in firm. That same month, a CIS Summit at 
Minsk took place: Timoshenko´s claim to have agreed with Gazprom an early start for discussions fed 
expectations that a long-term agreement might be reached in summer. A positive disposition also seemed 
to be shared by the now Prime Minister Putin (Dmitry Medvedev having taken over the presidency), who 
in principle accepted something dear to the current politicians in charge in Kiev: future supplies would be 
direct without RosUkrEnergo´s intermediation.20 However, Putin also made clear the condition sine qua 
non for reaching an agreement on this issue: to solve any debt issues.21 
The curse of debt problems resurfaces: the linkage is established with pricing negotiations 
If we wrote a page above, that debt issues deriving from the recent dispute in February-April were already 
solved, debt in fact emerged again: the Russian side stated that neither prepayment for May had been 
made yet nor had Naftohaz fully paid for April. There was talk of a rough figure of more than US$1bill of 
new debt.22 If Russia did not push too hard on this issue, some suspected it was because Gazprom might 
be ready for concessions in order to avoid Ukraine´s obstruction of Russian accession into the WTO,23 but 
the issue would soon become central. 
One month later, in June, a meeting took place between the heads of Gazprom and Naftohaz, and 
the debt that had been "discovered" some weeks ago made its comeback: Gazprom presented Naftohaz a 
bill of US$700-US$800mill of gas (for April and May) and made explicit the linkage between its 
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immediate payment and any talks regarding new contracts for future supplies.24 Besides that, it appeared 
that the payment for Russian gas supplied early that year remained unsolved. The reason was that the 
swap that had been agreed before as a mechanism for payment depended on the clarification of the 
ownership of gas located in Ukraine´s storage facilities. It was suspected that the ownership of as much as 
15.5bcm of gas could not be fully ascertained.25  
Trying again to untangle the doomed Russia-Ukraine-Central Asia triangle 
With this new debt issue blocking negotiations, the new Russian President, Dmitry Medvedev (With 
Gazprom providing support), threatened with new prices around US$400tcm for next year. 26  In an 
informal meeting of CIS leaders in Saint-Petersburg on 6th June 2008, Medvedev warned of an  
impending rise for 2009, due to new Central Asian prices and referred to final prices for Ukraine 
amounting to US$350-US$360tcm, roughly double what Ukraine was paying for 2008 (US$179.5tcm).27 
This contrasted with information published on 7th June 2008 by Gazeta, where there was talk of a more 
acceptable price range secretly agreed between Gazprom and Turkmenistan at around US$200-
US$230tcm.28 However, the truth is that an agreement on Central Asian gas would not happen until the 
very end of the year. Back to uncertainty and  maximalism, Alexei´ Miller reiterated on the eve of a 
meeting between Vladimir Putin and Yulia Timoshenko in Moscow the possibility of prices going well 
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beyond US$400tcm.29 The average price expected for European customers at market prices was suspected 
as likely to reach as much as US$500tcm by the end of 2008.  
There were new speculations regarding Central Asian gas when President Medvedev travelled to 
Turkmenistan in early July. It was leaked that Gazprom would have offered prices at US$360tcm. More 
optimistically the analyst Maksim Shein from Broker Investment calculated this proposal only as a 
starting position in negotiations. He calculated that the final price would in fact be around US$280-
US$300tcm.30 If true, even these prices might not provide a suitable solution, as roughly at the same time 
Naftohaz was fixing US$250tcm as the maximum price acceptable for the next year.31 As a result of a 
visit to Ukraine by Alexei´ Miller where no tangible results transpired, Timoshenko was to claim a 
progressive timetable for prices had been agreed. 32  Many commentaries at the time pointed to the 
seemingly good relations between Putin and Timoshenko. This arguably reinforced the credibility of such 
announcement. This also fed, by the way, rumours from the entourage of President Yushchenko 
according to which, plans existed between Timoshenko and Gazprom to recreate the international gas 
consortium from Kuchma´s times.33 Particular episodes like this, manifesting the opposition between the 
Ukrainian President and Prime Minister and so conspicuous in the previous dispute (See chapter 7) are 
worth mentioning,  as they might have played a determining role in the genesis of the dispute, as we will 
see later.  
But in fact, what could really be said of these positive signs? The joint trip to Germany to meet the 
President of Deutsche Bank, Joseph Ackerman by both Alexei´ Miller and Oleg Dubina suggested after 
all that the thaw staged by the two heads of government might be real. This trip opened up very good 
prospects for Naftohaz, as a credit line by the German bank could solve many of the financial problems 
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the Ukrainian monopoly was facing.34 That this trip was made in cooperation with Gazprom spoke of a 
possibly substantial change in its attitude. A new credit line coincided after all with the Russian 
monopoly´s interests: as the Prime Minister Timoshenko herself acknowledged, talks with DB pursued 
the goal of securing financial means for Naftohaz to purchase gas to guarantee that Ukrainian storage 
facilities were correctly filled to face demand.35 This seemingly good course might have been further 
confirmed by Oleg Dubina´s declarations to Bloomberg: Dubina dropped the threat of raising the transit 
tariff, "as these would translate into higher prices for Ukrainian consumers" and showed confidence that 
prices in 2009 would not be higher than in the three previous years (as prices increased in 2006, 2007 and 
2008, it can be surmised that he meant that prices would increase at a similar rate to these three years).36  
Back to the contentious debt issue, and with talks not moving further than generic promises and 
the usual threats and counter-threats, new controversies surfaced. The complexity of relations between 
Gazprom, Naftohaz and the web of intermediaries was easily used as an excuse for blaming others. This 
was the same that had happened before the March 2008 dispute. As an example, Oleg Dubina fallaciously 
stated that Naftohaz was not to blame; on the contrary RosUkrEnergo was the sole guilty party for the 
existing debt to Gazprom. RosUkrEnergo obviously claimed a debt exceeding US$2bill (former Head of 
Naftohaz, Evgenii´ Bakulin, calculated that the whole debt, including the new figures raised in June 
regarding non-payments for April and May (US$700-US$800mill), amounted to as much as US$2.5 
bill)37 had its origin in Naftohaz.38 Naftohaz in fact would eventually at least acknowledge a total amount 
of US$897mill owed to RosUkrEnergo (that corresponding to April and May).39  
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Things seemed to become even worse when Gazprom claimed Ukraine had been extracting gas 
volumes beyond those contracted between the 1st and the 7th of July.40 This occurred precisely in the 
context of persistent concerns by Gazprom about Naftohaz´s fulfillment of the previous agreement from 
March  regarding the return of 1.4bcm of Russian gas consumed in the first quarter of the year and 
RosUkrEnergo´s complaints that  though acknowledged, Naftohaz seemed to refuse to pay for the latest 
debt of US$890mill.41 This announcement by Gazprom was certainly not a trivial one: according to 
information from Kommersant, the total amount of gas extracted above contract in July amounted to more 
than 1bcm.42 Sources from Gazprom on which the daily relied, pointed to this as a strategy to accumulate 
gas before prices skyrocketed in 2009.43 The daily revealed that restoration of normal extraction happened 
in fact only on 18th July.44 More detailed reports later talked of a total of 1.14bcm of gas extracted above 
contract. 45  Luckily, it was reported in August that Naftohaz finally returned 1.3bcm of gas to 
RosUkrEnergo,46 which according to the Ukrainian Minister of Energy Iurii´ Prodan, corresponded  to 
Russian gas consumed in the first months of the current year. 47  As for the outstanding debt of 
US$890mill, it still seemed to remain unsolved. 
With this latest improvement in the "debt front" and with the hype of an agreement Timoshenko-
Putin nurtured by good news during the summer, the agreement that was actually reached in October and 
with which starts the epigraph below, looks like an obvious outcome. However, as I have already pointed 
above, with neither debt issue fully solved and without a final agreement in Central Asia, these efforts 
came to nil. The pages below will show on the contrary a continuous worsening of the situation until gas 
is cut off on the 1st January 2009.  
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8. 3. The October Memorandum Illusion and the Trap of Debts 
Prime Minister Timoshenko made her latest visit by early October and declared she wanted to secure gas 
prices for 2009 lower than US$400tcm.48 That was in itself an improvement from  maximalist positions. 
The visit took place on 2nd October and seemed to be crowned by success: Ukraine and Russia signed an 
inter-governmental memorandum on cooperation  in the sphere of natural gas transit and supplies. The 
agreement was intended as the prelude to a final agreement fixing prices for the next years. The Ukrainian 
Prime Minister announced that Naftohaz would be the sole importer from 2009, which meant that 
RosUkrEnergo would be removed. She also announced that a three-year timetable had been agreed to 
carry out a progressive transition to market prices.49 As Zerkalo Nedeli informed at the end of October 
(the daily posted on its web page a copy of the memorandum), it was foreseen that by 30th October the 
final agreement would be signed.50 
At the end, no agreement was signed (probably because debt issues resurfaced, as we will see 
below) and the issue was postponed for the following month: the next round of negotiations was 
scheduled for 11th November.51 In declarations to Kommersant, sources from Gazprom talked of a five 
year contract, with a transition period lasting three years as previously agreed.52 Prices were not (and 
could not) be determined yet, but Gazprom allegedly offered Naftohaz to keep the scheme of paying for 
Central Asian gas with added transport costs. Thus, both Russia and Ukraine were to agree that as in 
2006, 2007 and 2008, Naftohaz would buy Central Asian and not Russian gas.53 It was not clear that 
Central Asian gas would still be cheaper than Russian gas for export at market prices by 2009. However, 
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if a certain difference could be preserved in favor of Ukraine, and if falling oil prices (due to the 
devastating financial crisis setting in at the moment, the Brent cost US$58 per barrel as opposed to 
US$140 six months earlier)54 restrained price hikes by Central Asian gas producers, Gazprom might have 
been confident that prices satisfying Ukraine were possible.  
As for future prices, what were analysts predicting at the time? The following assessments were 
provided, which considered either Central Asian or general Russian prices. Jonathan Stern from the 
Oxford Institute of Energy Studies predicted an increase of US$40tcm-US$100tcm from what prices were 
at that moment (US$179.5tcm), whereas Peter Keller from Troika Dialog, Kiev, pointed to lower figures 
put forward earlier, namely, US$250-US$260tcm as final prices for Ukraine.55  Iurii´ Korovin, from 
Olgaz-Investa, Kiev, stated that given the general fall of energy prices, Ukraine might end up paying at 
the most US$360tcm.56 Sergei´ Cheplanov from Gazprom had predicted at the beginning of November 
that prices for Western Europe in the first quarter of 2009 would drop from US$460tcm-US$520tcm to 
US$360tcm-US$400tcm.57 According to Kommersant, deducting the transit costs would yield for Ukraine 
a price no higher than US$300tcm.58 However, analysts could at the present stage only speculate. 
Squeezed by Central Asia and debts, the Russian side hardens its position 
Then Miller specifically harked back to previous threats and warned that failing to agree to a non-
progressive transition to market prices would force Ukraine to pay US$400tcm.59 We could see such 
threats as a window through which to perceive Gazprom´s dilemma: the Russian monopoly was squeezed 
between the Ukrainian economy´s dependence on cheap energy and the fact that Turkmenistan, 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan no longer seemed to be ready to "play the game" of either offering cheap gas 
to Gazprom to be resold at market prices to Europe or to subsidize Ukraine´s economy. Gazprom 
probably needed Ukraine only to compromise to Central Asian prices. But failing to secure such 
compromise, it seemed ready, as in 2005, to yield the stick of even higher prices for Russian gas.  
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However, as Natal´ia Grib from Kommersant pointed out, the explicit reason in Gazprom for this 
harshness was the immediate loss to the company that might accrue from Naftohaz´s incapacity to pay its 
outstanding debts.60 We should not underestimate an issue like this that had been linked for the first time 
to gas cut-offs as early as late 2007 (see chapter 7, p. 215), that had led to real cut-offs in March 2008 (see 
chapter 7, pp. 234-236) and that was arguably more important now that Gazprom was suffering the 
consequences of the financial crisis.  To reinforce this impression, we may see in the next pages that 
Gazprom remained adamant against starting any negotiations regarding pricing for the next years before 
debts were finally cleared. The linkage would be maintained until the very end of the dispute and this 
threat is thus understandable in the context of Gazprom´s reduced patience for Naftohaz´s dismal 
financial performance. 
Ukraine´s energy security trapped in the latest debt issue  
In November Gazprom started claiming a debt of around US$2bill.61  Where did this debt come from 
now? As usual, there would be contending versions during the whole process, as when Gazprom 
demanded US$2.4bill while Naftohaz only accepted a figure of US$2.25bill.62 Somehow foreseeable was 
that Oleg Dubina should state, as he did in an interview to Nezavisimaia Gazeta, that the debt was mostly 
owed by RosUkrEnergo to Gazprom,63 ruling out any responsibility by Naftohaz. Foreseeable too, was 
that Timoshenko would support Dubina´s line two weeks later.64 In line with Miller´s harshness on 
pricing issues, President Dmitry Medvedev himself instructed Gazprom´s head to exact from Naftohaz 
the outstanding debt by either voluntary or compulsory procedures (emphasis mine).65  
 Alexei´ Grivach from Vremia Novostei, in line with Natal´ia Grib´s article,66 explained this sudden 
hardening of the Russian position as a preventive move to forestall the risks of a default in the face of the 
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catastrophic financial situation of Naftohaz. 67  Besides this, Ukraine was at the moment cast into a 
situation of political paralysis due to the process of dissolution of the Rada, which according to Dmitrii´ 
Boiarchuk from the Ukrainian think-tank CASE, might block compensations from the state budget 
Naftohaz.68 Vitaly Varishchuk of Dragon Capital investment pointed to the fact that in any case, given 
the financial situation, such payment would simply impose a huge burden on Ukraine.69  
In the meantime, contradictions regarding the amount of the debt persisted: contradicting 
dismissive statements by his superior, the Vice-Chairman of the board of Naftohaz, Vladimir Trikolich, 
acknowledged there did exist a debt owed to RosUkrEnergo, but still disagreed with Gazprom, as he only 
acknowledged US$1.26-US$1.27 bill.70  In a press release as reported by Itar-Tass, the exact figure 
acknowledged by Naftohaz was US$1.267bill.71 RosUkrEnergo from its side presented the following 
breakdown of the debt: Naftohaz´s calculation, as presented by Trikolich took into consideration 
US$400mill from September and US$900mill from October. If adding non-payment for November which 
also amounted to US$900mill and taking into account both US$200mill of fines for past months and an 
additional US$100mill for November if the situation persisted, this matched Gazprom´s figures.72 Zerkalo 
Nedeli provided further clarifications for the debt controversy: the weekly reported through sources in 
Naftohaz that the company did acknowledge the debt figures presented by Gazprom. The article provided 
details on the breakdown presented by RosUkrEnergo: US$400mill for September as Naftohaz had only 
paid US$285mill that month to RosUkrEnergo; US$798.8mill for the whole month of October; then 
finally came US$835mill corresponding to November and US$250mill for delayed payments from the 
beginning of the year.73 These whole figures accounted for the US$2.25bill the company sources had 
admitted earlier and differed from the US$2.4bill Gazprom demanded. At this stage it seemed that the 
crux of the contending figures was based on two elements: the exact amount of fines and the outstanding 
payments that could be counted as debt. In fact, Kommersant criticized Gazprom for counting as debt 
payments for October and November. According to the Russian daily, the existing rules stated that gas 
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could be paid until the 25th of the next month after its purchase, so neither of these could be computed as 
debt yet.74  
To unblock the situation, Gazprom was supposed to have offered its Ukrainian counterpart a deal 
to pre-pay transit services for the period 2009-2010.75  Naftohaz would have rejected this deal. The 
apparent reason was that the offer came with a condition: to maintain US$1.7tcm/100km as transit tariff 
for the next two years.76 It is understandable that Naftohaz did not want to relinquish one of the weapons 
it had to put pressure on Gazprom. After having rejected Gazprom´s offer to deduct the debt from 
payments due in concept of transit tariffs, Prime Minister Timoshenko announced that a request had been 
submitted to be granted a delay in payments.77 Gazprom remained adamant. Naftohaz then proposed a 
complex scheme to pay US$2.2bill and to acquire at the same time from RosUkrEnergo 11.5bcm at 
US$200tcm, but the latter rejected the offer.78 The Ukrainian delegation at least obtained from Gazprom a 
slight delay for payments for September,79 pushing the deadline to the first of December 80 in exchange 
for also paying US$550mill corresponding to October. 81  The vicious circle deriving from the dire 
financial situation of Naftohaz led to fears that payments for December would soon add up (including 
new fines) to the total debt figure, which would thus amount to as much as US$3bill.82 In fact, after the 
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agreed deadline of  December 1st, full payment as agreed did not ensue: RosUkrEnergo claimed to have 
only received US$268.7 mill.83  
Pricing agreements are clearly linked to debt resolution and gas cut-offs loom in the horizon 
The company´s spokesperson, Sergei´ Kuprianov had made clear before what was the alternative to a 
non-agreement when he expressed hopes that Gazprom would not have to resort to gas cut-offs (emphasis 
mine) (Gazprom eventually also threatened with turning to the International Arbitration Court in 
Stockholm)84.85 And indeed, the fact that any pricing and transit agreement depended on the  resolution of 
the debt issue,86 made the possibility of gas cut-offs as in January 2006 the more possible as the debt 
dispute influenced the course of gas pricing negotiations. Even if it remained unknown how much Central 
Asian gas would cost, apparently both sides were ready to agree on a text that had been finalized in a 
previous meeting in Moscow and which Naftohaz planned to sign by late November.87 It clearly seemed 
that the debt problem had come to monopolize negotiations.  
 
8. 4. December and the Blockage of Debt Issues: the Prelude to an Impending Dispute 
New rounds of negotiations were taking place by mid-December and Gazprom, after seeing its former 
proposal of advanced payments (see above) rejected for a second time,88 offered now concessions in 
exchange for an increased market share (20-50% of Ukrainian energy market) for Gazprom Sbyt.89 This 
new offer was also rejected by Naftohaz, who refused to let Gazprom take advantage of its financial 
troubles.  
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Naftohaz moved substantially forward when it managed to transfer US$800mill on 18th December, 
while promising to further transfer US$200mill more some days later.90 This ensued some days after the 
Ukrainian Rada had changed the budget and transferred to the state company a total of US$630mill.91 At 
the same time, trying to avoid the worst, Naftohaz started taking extreme measures in order to end 
consumers paying back outstanding debts. Although payments for September and October had already 
been made, there still remained a huge debt for November and December amounting to around US$2bill. 
President Yushchenko´s declarations, stating that the debt problem was solved after the latest payments 
incensed the Russian side, who made it clear that only full payment of the debt would avoid gas cuts from 
January 1st.  
In order to avoid any backlash from European customers in January 2006 Gazprom proceeded 
with advance warnings through a prepared charm offensive. Blame was mostly laid on Ukraine while 
Gazprom´s commitment to guarantee transit of gas through Ukraine was duly highlighted.92 According to 
Gazprom, and in the face of strong denials from their Ukrainian counterparts, Naftohaz´s Head, Oleg 
Dubina, would have confirmed orally that no more payments could be carried through until New Year´s 
Eve.93 
Thus, the fateful deadline of  January 1st was drawing nearer and latest negotiations aimed at 
finding a solution looked more like desperate attempts with no real prospects. A new row of acrimonious 
reproaches happened, when Yushchenko proposed first to return gas that could not be paid (as the crisis 
lowered consumption, part of that gas might be of no use) and then hinted at another rescheduling of the 
debt.94 This was met by absolute refusal from Gazprom, who declared to be open to using part of the 
supplied gas to clear debt, but never if that was returned to Russia (the scheme would involve its reselling 
to third countries). This suggestion was found intolerable for Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko. 95 
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Gazprom did not conceal that it did not expect to see debts repaid and thus referred again to the 
alternative of advanced payments for transit.96 Ukraine would have none of this. 
Uncertainty as for Central Asian prices remains  
Meanwhile, negotiations concerning new prices for 2009, which were stalled as the debt problem 
remained unsolved, moved in uncharted waters. From one side, the uncertainty regarding prices from 
Central Asia persisted by late December. This clearly contrasted with previous occasions in 2007 and 
2008, when the conditions were fully known, so Gazprom could more easily negotiate with Naftohaz. The 
memorandum of October 2nd aimed to secure prices for Ukraine for 2009 that would match, as in the three 
previous years, price increases originating in Central Asia. This time, as Mikhail Gonchar, Director of the 
Program on Energy of the Center Nomos, pointed, negotiations could not move substantially on the side 
of pricing, as Gazprom had failed to agree on a price for Turkmen gas (the most substantial item).97 From 
the other side, Gazprom, which had threatened Ukraine with market prices as charged in the rest of 
Europe in the event of no agreement being reached by January 1st, kept toying with prices around 
US$400tcm. The truth is that circumstances, determined by the devastating financial crisis rather favored 
Ukraine, as oil prices in free-fall had to translate into gas prices. Gas prices being usually indexed to oil 
prices with a 6-9 month delay, gas prices in 2009 necessarily had to fall. Thus, when there was talk of the 
fateful figure of US$400tcm, such high prices could only involve the first quarter.98 Gazprom´s Vice-
Chairman Aleksandr Medvedev calculated that new prices in Europe would range from US$260-US$300 
depending on transport prices.99 There was no indication of whether these were average annual prices or 
not, but taking into account US$179.5tcm Ukraine was paying at the moment, Olexandr Shlapak, first 
Deputy Head of the Ukrainian Presidential Administration, seemed justified to guess that prices for 
Ukraine should in any case be much lower than the maximum prices mentioned by Gazprom if the 
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country ended up accepting Russian gas.100 Sergei´ Kuprianov himself announced in Ekho Moskvy, that 
prices for Belarus, as well the Baltic states and Moldova, should be lower, the same way he stated that it 
would also happen for other partners.101  
The debt issue seems to be solved at the last moment 
However, on the eve of 2009, the situation had become critical. Gazprom kept insisting the figure of 
US$400tcm as a means to exert further pressure on the Ukrainian negotiators. The exact figure mentioned 
on 29th of December was US$418tcm.102 Frantic negotiations on debt pursued a late hour deal to avert a 
new gas cut-off. Thus, it was reported on 30th December that the Ukrainian negotiating team was ready to 
pay US$1,5bill103 (75% of the whole outstanding debt), thanks to a loan from the two main state banks, 
Oshchadbank and Ukreksimbank and in line with what the Ukrainian Minister of Energy had announced 
one day earlier.104 Gazprom remained silent as money had not been received yet. Then finally, on 31st 
December, it was reported that RosUkrEnergo had received from Naftohaz the said sum of US$1,5 bill.105 
As a sign that this might be enough for the time being for Gazprom to unblock price negotiations, the 
Ukrainian presidential envoy on international issues of energy security, Bogdan Sokolovsky, said that 
prices on Central Asian gas might be signed immediately.106 In utmost confusion, Alexandr Medvedev 
claimed the Ukrainian side had rejected a "super-profitable" offer, not disclosed for the time being so as 
to avoid making their Ukrainians partners "feel ashamed"107. Sokolovsky had been counting on prices as 
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low as US$130tcm, assuming a base price of Russian gas for Ukraine around US$260tcm (which went in 
line with previous assessments), to which a 50% discount (was that the "super-profitable" offer allegedly 
discussed?), would be applied.108 At this stage, it was not known anymore whether Ukraine was supposed 
to receive either Russian or Central Asian gas in any prospective agreement. In fact, after the free-fall in 
world oil prices, Russian and Central Asian gas might end up being priced similarly.109 
Desperate late-hour efforts to avert gas cut-offs: why could no agreement be reached? 
Then a few hours later it was revealed that Gazprom was offering a price of US$250tcm while keeping 
the same transit tariff of US$1.7tcm/100km.110 This would have been a quite manageable price (in line 
with price increases Ukraine had undergone in 2007 and 2008), which Vladimir Putin himself justified as 
a "token of solidarity to a fraternal people as the Ukrainian was and out of humanitarian reasons in the 
face of the critical economic situation".111 As it transpired the next day (when the dispute had already 
started) Naftohaz was ready to pay US$235tcm and raise the transit tariff to US$1.8tcm/100km.112 
However, no agreement was reached when the deadline of  December 31st was over. This was 
unfortunate, as the transfer of US$1.5bill to RosUkrEnergo, in spite of a punctual declaration by Alexei´ 
Miller some hours after the announcement, that Gazprom "had not yet seen any money",113 seemed to 
have satisfied Gazprom enough to restart negotiations on prices. Besides this, Gazprom was offering 
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surprisingly low prices and the gap between the latest positions by Gazprom and Naftohaz was quite 
small. It is true that the window of opportunity was very small, as the debt problem was only solved at the 
very latest. Sergei´ Kuprianov in fact went as far as to accuse Naftohaz of intentionally "dragging their 
feet", to pay as late as possible and then leave negotiations for the last hours.114 However, as already 
stated, positions had been moving during the last days, so no lengthy negotiations should have been 
necessary. What had then happened in these last crucial hours to make negotiations founder and waste 
this last window of opportunity? In the coming days, many versions started transpiring:  
Prime Minister Timoshenko´s moves prevented the final agreement     
Iurii´ Boiko, former Minister of Energy of Ukraine declared that the fault lay in Timoshenko´s insistence 
on establishing  a new intermediary, based as RUE in Switzerland, called "FKRtt Universal Swissland" 
and supposedly linked to the Prime Minister herself. Russia having rejected the offer, this would have 
brought the end to negotiations.115 In his critique, Boi´ko went as far as to link her with persons from the 
Kuchma clique, as Ihor´ Bakai´ and Viktor Medvechuk.116 Such an accusation seemed to come as a direct 
answer to Timoshenko´s own version, which was the exact opposite to what her political rival stated: 
according to Timoshenko, Boi´ko himself and Serhiy´ Levochkin had been making the utmost efforts to 
preserve the existence of RUE as intermediary.117   
A somewhat confusing version by Konstantin Borodin,  Head of the Center for Energy Research 
(Kiev) and close to Iurii´ Boi´ko, also blamed Timoshenko and provided more details:118 on 31st of 
December Naftohaz had apparently reached an agreement on US$235tcm and a transit tariff of 
US$1.8tcm/100km in Moscow (the last known position of Naftohaz, as written above). Then Timoshenko 
manifested her intention to fly to Moscow,119 which, for whatever reason, upset Gazprom´s negotiators, 
who threatened to scrap the agreement (as  in fact eventually happened).120 Contrary to the version above, 
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some sources close to the negotiating process stated that it was actually the President´s position that made 
the final trip impossible.121  
Fault lays at President Yushchenko´s side, as he hindered efforts conducing to the final agreement 
A more convincing version, even if complex in the chain of incredible mishaps, is available in an article 
by Iuliia Mostovaia in Zerkalo Nedeli from 17th January, when the dispute was nearing its end: according 
to this version, an agreement had been reached indeed on the price of US$235tcm and a transit tariff of 
US$1.79tcm/100km and the Ukrainian Prime Minister had simply to fly to finalize the agreement putting 
her signature. As if any doubt at this respect persisted, the Russian ambassador, Viktor Chernomirdin, 
confirmed to the Ukrainian daily that Ms. Timoshenko was indeed waiting. However, according to 
sources close to Timoshenko herself, Oleg Dubina conveyed at 11:00 of 31st December that the 
agreement would be ready later at 14:00.  
Then, in the meantime communications between the Prime Minister and Naftohaz´s Head were 
interrupted. The former heard that some late-hour complications were occurring and that Naftohaz had 
presented its Russian counterpart with an ultimatum. Alexei´ Miller would have informed Prime Minister 
Vladimir Putin about the latest ultimatum and the latter then took the final decision to put an end to 
negotiations.122 Following again sources from Timoshenko´s entourage, during the crucial interruption of 
communications with Dubina and while negotiations with Miller continued, Dubina would often leave 
negotiators in order to hold telephone conversations. At the other end Yushchenko was trying to avert the 
nearly agreed deal in order to keep RosUkrEnergo in business (See the version below, which is also 
supported by Mostovaia´s article).123 This goes in line with what Alexei´ Miller would later say, namely, 
that Oleg Dubina had  received a direct order from the President to break up negotiations.124  
Oleg Dubina blames Gazprom 
Oleg Dubina himself presented a different version, blaming Gazprom instead: according to him, it was 
Gazprom who retreated from the 235/1.8 agreement and came back proposing US$250tcm and a transit 
tariff of US$1.6tcm/100km. Facing such proposal, Dubina said Ukraine could not accept it and neither 
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could it guarantee Russian gas transit in the absence of agreement. This latest statement apparently was 
interpreted by Gazprom as an ultimatum, which led to the end of negotiations.125 
RosUkrEnergo´s role in squatting negotiations: Ihor´ Bakai´s versions  
Another interesting version of the end of negotiations and the start of the dispute puts RosUkrEnergo at 
the very center. Timoshenko declared on 17th January, that "during the last two days of the year, 
Ukraine's all political forces corruptly (sic) connected with the shadow intermediary RosUkrEnergo took 
part in it (negotiations)... they prevented signing of all the contracts and destroyed the negotiating 
process settled with such difficulty".126  
 Ihor Bakai´, first Head of Naftohaz closely associated with Leonid Kuchma and who had left 
Ukraine for Russia fleeing from justice offered an explanation also centered on RosUkrEnergo: according 
to him, a dispute emerged between RosUkrEnergo and Naftohaz concerning the ownership of gas in 
storage in Ukraine. The dispute centered on a volume of 11bcm127  and was followed by a strange 
maneuver by RosUkrEnergo, who directly intervened in negotiations offering higher prices than those 
accepted by Naftohaz. Instead of US$235tcm, which was the highest Naftohaz was ready to agree to, 
RosUkrEnergo offered as much as US$285tcm,128 even more than the US$250tcm Gazprom demanded at 
the final stages of negotiations.129 Bakai´ provided many details in his interview with Zerkalo Nedeli: 
President Yushchenko himself  torpedoed an agreement for US$235tcm and a transit tariff of 
US$1.76tcm/100km for the first quarter of 2009, simply assuring that given the existing reserves of gas, 
there was no need to rush for agreement. Then, it was thought that the debt would be paid thanks to gas 
owned by RosUkrEnergo through a complex scheme. 
Versions from the Russian side: Miller and Putin 
Both versions, that by Iuliia Mostovaia and the one by Ihor Bakai´ put Yushchenko in a rather bad 
picture. In both versions he was directly blamed for the final breakdown of negotiations precisely when 
an agreement had mostly been reached.  
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Alexei´ Miller confirms Yushchenko and RosUkrEnergo´s deleterious roles in negotiations  
A third testimony, this time by Alexei´ Miller, interviewed by Itar-Tass in the aftermaths of the dispute, 
also blamed Yushchenko: Miller confirmed RosUkrEnergo´s insistence at offering US$285tcm instead of 
US$235tcm, as initially agreed and blamed Yushchenko for having recalled Naftohaz´s delegation in 
spite of the manifest interest from the Russian side to continue negotiations.130  Timoshenko also referred 
after the dispute to this episode in an interview to Zerkalo Nedeli: she did not offer any new details but 
confirmed both RosUkrEnergo´s role as a saboteur and the Presidential Administration´s prominence in 
its strategy of supporting the presence of the infamous gas trader in direct opposition to the 
government.131  
Clarifications from the side of Vladimir Putin 
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin himself did on the contrary provide some interesting details: on the eve of 
the final agreement that put an end to the dispute in January he told Novaia Gazeta that he was at the time 
surprised that the price of US$250tcm was not accepted.132 He also mentioned that during negotiations 
there was insistence from at least some in the Ukrainian side on keeping RosUkrEnergo.133 Why did not 
Putin refer to the US$235tcm agreed on the eve of the dispute as the two versions above state? Might this 
in fact lend credence to Dubina´s version of US$250tcm and US$1.6tcm/100km as the final offer? Not 
necessarily. Putin also provided the following information: the Russian negotiating team had offered 
US$285tcm with a right to re-export, which the Ukrainians deemed too expensive. Then Gazprom made a 
new offer: US$250tcm with the same right to re-export. However, this last offer was again refused by the 
Ukrainians.134 Interestingly, Putin stated that in practical terms US$250tcm with a right to re-export 
amounted to a real price of US$235tcm.135 Whether this latest version is just tailored to justify post-
factum Gazprom´s gas cut-off and to simply put in unfavorable light the Ukrainian team (and the 
politicians behind), is hard to tell given the secrecy of negotiations. Still, this is the best candidate to 
provide a clarification for the confusion between US$250tcm and US$235tcm as the final Russian offer. 
What is interesting in this version of the facts is that the obscure proposal of US$285tcm did not come 
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last but before the final offer, which contradicts previous versions. In this respect, only speculation is 
possible.  
 
8. 5. The January 2009 Energy Dispute Starts: Gazprom Imposes Total Gas Cut-Offs 
On the January 1st 2009 Gazprom decided, as three years ago, to stop supplies to Ukraine in the face of 
the absence of any pricing agreement. The decision was carried out at 10.00 am. Expecting gas 
disruptions, Vladimir Putin mentioned a transit contract signed in April 2007 (valid until 2010) warning 
the Ukrainian side against any attempt at disrupting the gas transit in retaliation.136 Legal issues were 
relevant as there was a particular element which remained contentious: the responsibility for supplying 
gas to maintain the transit of the rest of gas, known as technical gas and which is consumed in order to 
power the transit system. Ukraine claimed it was Gazprom´s responsibility and that it had the right to use 
a daily volume of 21mcm from Gazprom´s gas transiting Ukraine. 137  Gazprom, through Sergei´ 
Kuprianov, strongly rejected Ukrainian arguments stating that ensuring transit was Naftohaz´s 
responsibility.138 As a joint declaration by both Yushchenko and Timoshenko made clear, there was no 
physical need to use this source of gas for Ukraine´s consumption, as owing to their own gas reserves 
Ukrainian customers were protected from any disruptions, and that, for the whole heating season.139 
These two elements need a short explanation: 
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The controversy of technical gas 
Given the secrecy of the agreements signed between Gazprom and Naftohaz, it is still not known who 
really bore responsibility for technical gas. The fact is that if the volumes required for technical needs 
were included in the gas supplied by Gazprom to Ukraine as consumer, Naftohaz had the ultimate 
responsibility for this. However, if Gazprom supplied it in addition with gas for Ukraine, namely, 
alongside the volumes exported for other consumers through the country, then Gazprom should not have 
failed to provide this gas. This of course is not relevant for the analysis of the dispute, as it is important to 
know how Gazprom would react to gas disruptions, which in fact, due to this (intended or unintended) 
confusion, unavoidably took place. However, the fact that volumes disrupted coincided with those 
calculated for technical needs lends credence to Ukraine´s pretension of not being siphoning off gas as a 
strategic weapon.140    
However, the initial pretension by Naftohaz that during the 1st of January it had been using 
17mcm from its own reserves, 10mcm for consumption in Europe and 7mcm as technical gas was 
somehow contradictory.141 Suspicions regarding Naftohaz were not dispelled by news of an alleged letter 
sent by Naftohaz and published by Ekho Moskvy, warning (if not actually threatening) of a possible 
confiscation of all gas transiting Ukraine.142 Kuprianov provided some details when he claimed Gazprom 
had requested permission for 303mcm to transit on the 3rd of January. The Ukrainian side allegedly only 
accepted 296.2mcm.143 Was this an intended attempt to provoke disruptions and blame them on Gazprom? 
Unfortunately, it is still at this stage hard to know which version is correct. Even if we do not know who 
bore ultimate responsibility from a strictly legal point of view, Alexandr Medvedev claimed that after 
having ratified the Energy Charter Ukraine had obligations regarding transit.144 This cannot be fully 
ascertained unless we have a clear picture of what the contracts stated and how the Energy Secretariat 
would have judged Ukraine if it had proceeded in good faith in the face of Gazprom´s alleged 
irresponsibility.  
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The geographical location of gas storage facilities in Ukraine  
Some days later into the crisis that was to unfold, Valentin Zemlyansky, Naftohaz´s spokesman, provided 
a technical justification for Naftohaz to siphon off gas: as stores were located in the West, it would have 
been impossible to pump gas in reverse mode to the East as Russian gas was flowing from the opposite 
direction; the only solution was to take it from the incoming volumes of gas.145 Unfortunately, whether 
this explanation was correct or not, it did not ultimately clarify whose fault this was from the legal point 
of view. It is nevertheless an opportune way to link up to the second contentious element, the existence of 
Ukraine´s gas reserved. 
Indeed, and as we may have had the opportunity to point out already in the two previous chapters, 
the issue of filling up storage facilities in Ukraine before the start of winter was of utmost importance and 
had provoked some tensions already. Most of the Ukrainian storage facilities are located in Western 
Ukraine and are filled with gas bought by Naftohaz during the previous year. However, this gas is not 
consumed by Ukraine, it is always consumed by countries further West, clients of Gazprom. The 
explanation for this is that in winter a swap between Gazprom and Naftohaz takes place: Gazprom can 
use the stored gas for its other consumers West of Ukraine and gives additional amounts to Ukraine in 
exchange directly from Russia. The reason for having established this system, inherited from the Soviet 
Union, is to guarantee a simultaneous supply to both Ukraine and other customers that need Ukraine as a 
transit country in peaks of low temperature. In order to avoid all supplies for Ukraine and the rest of the 
European customers having to transit the Ukrainian pipelines simultaneously, which might challenge its 
total capacity, gas is extracted from the deposits when needed and Ukraine is compensated for whatever 
volume extracted, as it is the legal owner. 
This system represents an opportunity for Ukraine as soon as a protracted gas cut-off happens. As 
this gas is owned by Naftohaz, in the event of no supplies from the part of Gazprom, it can simply use 
them in reverse mode. In such cases, instead of flowing westwards, gas would flow eastwards for 
Ukrainian consumers. However, this is not compatible with any gas flowing westwards. Therefore, the 
emergency use of stored gas for Ukrainian consumers implies closing the pipeline system for any Russian 
gas and thus precludes the delivery of gas for other customers in Europe. This means two things: first, this 
might already have happened with technical gas, so the explanation by Zemliansky is totally plausible.146 
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Second, when Timoshenko and Yushchenko explained that Ukraine had enough resources to weather the 
storm they only said half of the truth they were interested in telling. They failed to mention that using 
pipelines in reverse necessarily involved closing the whole pipeline system to westward flows from 
Russia. This means that guaranteeing Ukraine´s energy security implied leaving the rest of Europe, 
dependent as it is on Gazprom´s gas transited through Ukraine, devoid of Russian supplies. As  will be 
shown below, Ukraine in fact activated the reverse mode, but did not have to stop westward flows as 
these had been already stopped by Gazprom. However, the activation of the reverse mode might have 
prolonged the dispute, as Gazprom claimed it could not resume normal westwards supplies because 
Ukraine kept all main trunks busy with gas flowing in reverse mode from its storage facilities in Western 
Ukraine.     
Frustrated attempts at continuing negotiations in the mist of the dispute 
With the gas cut off by Gazprom and the first disturbance in the normal flow of gas happening due to the 
controversy of technical gas, the energy dispute had started. In this first moment of the dispute, the fateful 
threshold had been overstepped. However, in light of some statements, it seemed that the door might still 
be open to further negotiations and an eventual agreement.  
In this line, Valentin Zemlianskii´ stated that a new delegation  might go to Moscow on January 1st 
to continue negotiations, while Alexei´ Gudyma, the Prime Minister´s advisor on fuel and energy 
problems, said that Timoshenko herself could travel to Russia in the coming days.147 From the side of 
Bogdan Sokolovskii´, Ukrainian President's representative for international affairs of energy security, it 
was stated that the Ukrainian side had in fact sent a petition in this direction for continuing negotiations 
on the eve of the New Year and was now awaiting a reply from Gazprom. According to the Russian 
embassy in Kiev, the response was in the process of being drafted.148 Such statements in fact went in line 
with Sergei´ Kuprianov´s invitation for Naftohaz to come "at any time".149  
However, real negotiating positions did not warrant much optimism. Gazprom now only insisted 
on market prices, moving in fact farther and proposing a price of US$450tcm instead of US$418tcm as 
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earlier.150 The Ukrainian side also lowered the threshold of acceptable prices. Depending on the sources, 
Yushchenko had put forward either US$201tcm or something between US$204tcm to US$210tcm along 
with an increased transit tariff of US$2tcm/100km to compensate for the price increase.151 These new 
prices went in fact much farther than the US$235tcm and US$1.8tcm/100km that represented the highest 
offer at the very last stage of negotiations. Oleg Dubina himself reinforced this proposal pointing to the 
US$210tcm Germany was supposed to be paying at the moment for Russian gas,152 and calculating prices 
for Ukraine ranging from US$201tcm to US$202tcm once transport costs were discounted.153 MP Arseny 
Yatseniuk, making similar calculations and taking into account the dramatic fall of oil prices did accept 
higher prices of US$250tcm, but only under the condition of a rise of transit tariffs to as much as 
US$2.8tcm/100km.154  
An analysis by Ukrainska Pravda went as far as to determine that due to the absence of any 
international protocol for transit, both countries should automatically revert to contracts valid in 2005; 
Ukraine would thus be entitled to receive 23bcm of gas in payment of transit tariffs and to raise the transit 
tariff to US$9.14tcm/100km if Gazprom insisted on prices of US$450tcm.155 Along this line, Dubina in 
fact proposed Gazprom to return to the very framework of 2005. Besides positions on pricing, Gazprom 
started stressing again that part of the debt over which both countries had been haggling in the preceding 
weeks, remained unpaid. The remaining sum was of US$614mill according to Sergei´ Kuprianov. 
Ukraine declined any responsibility for this sum and refused to pay. The reason for this is that most of the 
remaining debt was constituted by fines amounting to as much as US$450mill Gazprom wanted to impose 
for late payment and which Naftohaz did not acknowledge.156  
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As a result of this situation, respective positions became entrenched. By 3rd January 2009, 
Naftohaz was declaring that it did not foresee traveling to Moscow to resume talks157 and both sides 
threatened to resort to justice. On 2nd January Naftohaz had forwarded to the European Commission the 
message that it planned  to appeal for international arbitration to reject Gazprom´s pretension to be paid 
US$450mill in fines for delayed payment.158 Gazprom for  its own part,  had taken the decision to sue 
Naftohaz for not providing the necessary technical gas and for siphoning it off from Gazprom´s 
supplies. 159  In addition to that, RosUkrEnergo also decided to sue Naftohaz for not paying the 
US$614mill it still owed.  
The energy dispute provokes, as in January 2006, a supply crisis in Central and Western Europe 
But as had happened in January 2006, this strictly bilateral dispute involved from the very beginning 
customers in Western and mainly Central Europe. As seen some pages above, the issue of technical gas 
provoked reduced supplies from the first day of the dispute. It is for this reason that Gazprom used many 
of its statements to influence European customers which might (and which would eventually) be affected 
by the dispute.  
The Russian representative to the European Union, Vladimir Chizhov, clearly expressed 
Gazprom´s concern for its European customers and declared that the Russian side was ready to send any 
delegation to Brussels and to provide for any explanation necessary.160 The company´s discourse was 
reinforced by the announcement of measures to make up for the lack of supplies. For example, when 
Kuprianov explained the reduction of 110mcm of gas per day (the equivalent of Ukrainian consumption 
not supplied since January 1st) he also announced that Gazprom would increase by a daily 236mcm its 
export deliveries to other customers to compensate for any disruptions the dispute might possibly 
cause.161  As relayed by Interfax-Ukraina, who relied on sources from the energy sector in Belarus, 
Gazprom had indeed started using alternative routes to increase supplies.162  Gazprom was therefore 
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supplying an additional volume of 25mcm per day through Belarus.163 Sergei´ Kuprianov himself later 
mentioned a figure of 20mcm.164 As Gazprom was already expecting there might be a dispute before, it 
seems the decision to supply additional volumes had been taken before shortages were actually reported. 
In fact Gazprom was only following the same "charm offensive" it had already undertaken before the start 
of the dispute. It also took advantage of the occasion to promote projects like Nord-Stream and South-
Stream to bypass Ukraine (see chapter 10). This, Alexandr Medvedev did in an interview to the BBC on 
the 2nd of January165. Foreshadowing the future initiative by the EU, Gazprom also proposed the European 
Commission to send an independent monitoring group to monitor the flow of gas.166 
In any case, on 2nd January, with part of the gas not transiting through Ukraine as planned, some 
Central European countries were reporting lower pressure: Gazprom itself was one of the first sources to 
report that some Balkan countries were not receiving the full contracted volumes.167 Hungary and Poland 
also reported lower pressure (6% for Poland); in the case of the former, the situation was yet far from 
critical, whereas the latter managed to compensate with the additional gas that Gazprom was supplying 
through Belarus.168 As  "Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL)" reported the next day, the fall in 
pressure for Poland had reached 11% and 25% for Hungary; more critically, there was a reported fall of 
as much as 33% of normal supplies for Bulgaria.169 According to "The British Broadcasting Corporation", 
as relayed by Itar-Tass, a similar situation could be found in Romania with gas pressure dropping between 
30% to 40%170 (the Romanian "Transgaz" itself put the figure at the upper 40%)171. The situation could 
worsen as time went by, although Hungary´s local company "Földgázszállító Zrt" reported as late as 4th 
January, that previous information regarding lower pressure was wrong, with gas flowing normally and 
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further transiting into the Balkan region.172 Valentin Zemlianskii´ also stated that normal supplies of gas 
were being supplied to the Balkan region.173 This in fact would be understandable if the gap caused by the 
siphoning-off of technical gas remained constant. Naftohaz kept accusing Gazprom of having consciously 
reduced the volumes of gas shipped in order to blame Ukraine for the consequences.174 However, it seems 
that Ukraine had not accepted into its transit system all the supplies Gazprom had requested.175 This puts 
Ukraine in quite a bad light, especially if that confirms that Gazprom tried to correct the mismatch of the 
technical gas and Naftohaz consciously averted this.  
With the dispute continuing, further falls in gas pressure were reported in new countries. 
According again to RFE/RL, the Czech Republic had experienced by 4th January a slight drop of 5%. 
Turkey was also reporting similar problems regarding an equivalent drop of 5%.176 On 5th January, a new 
country, Croatia, reported experiencing a fall of 7% in its supplies of Russian gas.177 The general situation 
was quite confusing. Ferrán Tarradellas, The European Commission´s spokesman, had reported the day 
before, that in spite of supply problems reported over the weekend in Hungary, Slovakia and Romania, 
the situation seemed to be even improving.178 It is quite likely that these latest episodes of undersupply 
were either a delayed consequence or just the product of late reporting. It is thus reasonable to assume 
that at this stage, the situation remained stationary. However, the situation was to take a turn for the worse 
on 5th January, as Russia decided to further escalate the dispute. 
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Gazprom does not deescalate in the face of the supply crisis as in January 2006; it escalates the 
dispute and establishes an embargo, stopping all supplies through Ukraine 
On the 5th January in a carefully managed mise en scène, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin was filmed in a 
meeting with Alexei´ Miller, Gazprom´s chief executive, on Russian state television.  The latter reported 
on the general situation regarding the gas dispute with Ukraine and suggested to the Prime Minister that 
Gazprom starts reducing supplies according to the amount that was being "stolen" by Ukraine.179 As 
could be expected, Putin approved the initiative. In a nutshell, this meant that if Ukraine persisted in 
siphoning off gas, Gazprom would eventually cease any supply through Ukraine and thus impose a de 
facto embargo on every European customer depending on this line of supply. Gazprom simply wanted to 
progressively reduce supplies equivalent to what Naftohaz had (allegedly)180 been siphoning off illegally. 
If added on a daily basis, this would translate into what eventually happened, namely, a total freeze of 
supplies through Ukraine. Even if not responsible for the bilateral dispute, all consumers would suffer the 
consequence of Gazprom´s relinquishing any responsibility and laying the blame exclusively on 
Naftohaz. As 80% of gas supplies sold by Gazprom to Western and Central Europe transited through 
Ukraine, this translated into an almost absolute embargo for those countries, especially for those 
depending on a 100% on Russia for their supply and which could hardly be fully compensated for by any 
increase through alternative routes like Belarus or Turkey. Europe was thus heading towards a real energy 
crisis to a much worse degree than had been the case in the short supply crisis in January 2006. 
What is puzzling in this decision is that it contrasted with Gazprom´s intention one day earlier. As 
mentioned above, on 4th January Gazprom proposed to increase supplies through Ukraine in order to 
make up for those volumes siphoned off by Ukraine and thus solve the problems of undersupply that were 
being experienced in Central Europe. Gazprom stated it had requested  Naftohaz to accept an additional 
volume of 15mcm per day, with the latter refusing.181 The Ukrainian side of course, denied this had taken 
place at all,182 but whatever really had happened, the fact is that Gazprom then took a radically different 
course: instead of ensuring the energy security of all its customers (apart from Ukraine, of course) it 
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decided to take them de facto hostage. Namely, it was using them to punish Ukraine. The contrast with 
Gazprom´s steps as taken in the two previous disputes is absolute.  
Gazprom calculated the total amount of gas extracted by Ukraine since the January 1st, which, as 
reported by Miller to its Prime Minister amounted to 65.3mcm. Consequently, this was the exact amount 
of gas it was decided to cut on 5th January. The next day a new factor added confusion as to who was to 
blame for the current situation. As supported by declarations from both Alexei´ Miller and Alexandr 
Medvedev, the former in a session with Prime Minister Putin183 and the latter at a press conference with 
the German minister of economic affairs, Michael Gloss,184 Ukraine was supposed to have completely 
closed certain transit gas entries, thus further depriving much of Europe of needed gas. According to 
Medvedev, three were the entries that Ukraine had decided to close, whereas Miller stated that Ukraine 
had blocked all supplies to the Balkan Region. The confusion lay in the fact that it could not be clarified 
whether Naftohaz´s move was a consequence of Gazprom´s decision to reduce the flow of gas or whether 
Naftohaz had unilaterally taken this measure to worsen the effect of Gazprom´s latest cut-off. It could 
also be surmised at the time that Gazprom was simply trying to blame Naftohaz in the psychological war 
that was being waged, especially after having taken a decision that threatened to tarnish its reputation. 
However, Ukraine might also have nothing to lose in aggravating the energy crisis after Gazprom had 
exposed itself with a very risky move. Naftohaz´s press service mentioned that three (out of four) transit 
gas entries to Ukraine had ceased to receive any supply, so the question remains whether the shutting 
down of outlets out of Ukraine was not the logical consequence from this situation rather than a conscious 
strategy by Ukraine.185 In declarations by Valentin Zemlianskii´, this was precisely the argument put 
forward.186 
As in the previous days, Gazprom again carefully planned how to respond to the European 
customers and appear as a partner concerned with their interests. Alexandr Medvedev reiterated 
Gazprom´s efforts to increase supplies through alternative routes, as Yamal-Evropa (Belarus), Blue 
Stream (Turkey) and even gas stored in storage facilities in Europe. However, Gazprom kept reducing the 
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flow of gas transiting trough Ukraine in accordance with the new policy. On 6th January, the volume 
reduced had reached 92mcm.187  The next day, gas flows had ceased altogether. As the day before, 
Gazprom and Naftohaz engaged in a new row of reproaches accusing each other of the outcome. 
Medvedev intervened again calling on Ukraine to open its pipelines to transit for Russian gas; according 
to him, Ukraine had indeed stopped accepting any flow of gas at the only entry point that still remained 
open the day before, Sudzha.188 The Ukrainian version was the opposite, as it notified that "at 7:44 local 
time gas supplies through the only operating gas measuring station Sudzha were completely stopped".189 
In parallel, Naftohaz again claimed its right to use 21mcm of gas per day, not for Ukraine´s consumption 
but as technical gas.190 Gazprom´s response to these exchanges seemed to be intended as a means to 
further blame Ukraine and win the battle of nerves (and possibly for prestige too). Kuprianov surmised 
the reasons for provoking the dispute lay in the fact that Ukraine wanted to preserve intermediaries in 
their bilateral energy relations.191 Attacking in such a direction, Gazprom was in fact aiming at one of the 
most obscure elements of their bilateral dispute, the need for intermediaries, which had been so often 
from the side of the Orange coalition blamed on Russian interests 
Stalemate persists and the EU attempts at breaking the deadlock 
In the face of the absence of not only any basis for agreement but of any hint at negotiations, only the 
European Union could be able to broker an agreement by way of facilitating negotiations. The EU 
represented most of the countries that were suffering the consequences of the dispute. However, it had 
assumed a neutral role, shying away from directly blaming either Russia or Ukraine. The EU preferred to 
consider the dispute officially as a commercial dispute and to call both actors in dispute to agree. Out of 
this position, both through the Commission or the Czech Republic´s Presidency it established itself as a 
facilitator. This was relatively easier as the EU side kept a fluid dialogue with both partners while 
Naftohaz and Gazprom constantly forwarded  messages and sent delegations to Brussels in an attempt to 
win the PR war that was unfolding in parallel with the energy dispute. 
The potentially positive role the EU could play became manifest when a meeting in Brussels on 8th 
January of both delegations from Naftohaz and Gazprom was announced. No tripartite meeting between 
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the EU, Gazprom and Naftohaz would eventually take place, thus belying the information originating 
from Oleg Dubina, who was indeed planning  to make a trip to Brussels on that day and try to meet the 
delegation from Gazprom too.192 Ukrainian sources blamed the Russian side for canceling it, while the 
Russian Permanent Representative to the EU, Vladimir Chizov, simply stated no meeting had been 
planned at all. 193  This was understandable as positions remained unchanged. However, a phone 
conversation had taken place between Presidents Yushchenko and Medvedev at the Ukrainian initiative. 
It is known that the Russian position remained inflexible, namely, that Naftohaz should sign a new 
contract based on European market prices without any discounts or privileges whatsoever,194 and nothing 
transpired from a meeting between Naftohaz and Gazprom in Moscow in the night from 7th to 8th 
January.195 This meeting might have been the prelude for the bilateral meeting that seemed indeed to have 
taken place in Brussels.196 Even if results were still non-existent, the prospects for the EU´s neutrality 
playing a positive role were significant.  
The EU soon assumed a more proactive role and jumped on an initiative by Gazprom and which 
Naftohaz was keen to accept. Gazprom had been insisting that observers be sent to all entry points to 
monitor the flow of gas in order to determine who was to blame for the disruptions.197 In the face of 
Naftohaz´s refusal, Gazprom moved on and proposed an international team of experts to perform the task 
of monitoring. In Brussels, Alexei´ Miller proposed that this team be composed of ten countries, 
including Russia. Only the presence of Gazprom in this team was a reason for Ukraine to continue 
rejecting the initiative.198 Naftohaz´s counter-initiative was a pledge to allow henceforth uninterrupted 
Russian gas transit on the sole condition that Gazprom provided technical gas. This time, it was 
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Gazprom´s turn to remain adamant and to insist on its idea of a monitoring team.199 As most positions 
during those days, they were not auspicious. However, Brussels discrete but proactive position did pay 
off. On 9th January Brussels announced that an agreement had finally been reached on the issue of 
monitoring. That would allow a team of experts to be deployed in order to carry out monitoring so 
Russian supplies could be restored.200 Both Russian and Ukrainian monitors would have full access to the 
opposite side of the pipeline system, while a third team of European monitors would be present to 
guarantee objectivity and to avoid the risk of manipulation by any of the two parts.201 It was confirmed 
that around 10 to 12 European monitors would be part of the whole team,202 sent as the first group of a 
whole team of 22 monitors.203 
This (arguably the first) positive news since the start of the dispute was followed by hints of 
solution for the commercial dispute that was at the core of the gas dispute. First, there was news that 
Miller and Dubina might continue negotiations after the meeting in Brussels. Second, Vladimir Putin´s 
press conference on 8th January, in spite of its aggressiveness towards Ukraine,204 introduced a potentially 
promising element: Putin maintained its insistence on market prices, but he also opened the door for an 
increase in transit tariffs ranging from US$3tcm/100km to US$4tcm/100 km. Third, the Czech Prime 
Minister Mirek Topolanek, in a joint press conference with the Ukrainian President, suggested that any 
upcoming agreement be trilateral, thus also including the European Commission.205 This new proactive 
move from the part of the EU could allay mutual suspicions between Russia and Ukraine. Topolanek 
went as far as to make a direct contribution, suggesting a concrete pricing solution while mentioning the 
fact that market prices might soon become as low as US$250tcm.206  
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After the Ukrainian authorities had given their oral consent to the agreement  Topolanek traveled 
to Moscow on 10th January to secure Moscow´s signature. However, there were disagreements, as 
Moscow complained that Ukraine rejected the team of observers and excluded any representation by 
Gazprom.207 Ukraine explained that the mission, as constituted so far (EU observers were already located 
in Kiev)208 was too cumbersome. Some analysts pointed to Ukraine´s fear of seeing the EU and Gazprom 
representatives ganging up against Naftohaz. 209  Then, when the Russian side duly signed the 
agreement,210 obtaining Ukraine´s signature proved more difficult. The Russian Foreign Ministry had to 
refute a Ukrainian statement claiming Russia did not accept the access of international experts to its 
territory,211 while Sergei´ Kuprianov pointed to the fact that Ukraine had not yet signed the protocol.212 
Gazprom´s spokesman complained that in spite of the documents having been supposedly signed in Kiev 
no copy had reached Gazprom. 213  Monitors, both from Naftohaz and from European companies 
composing the whole team were deployed already in the metering station of Sudzha on the Russian side 
(the others being Sokhranovka, Pisarevka, Valuiki and Platovo and from the Ukrainian side Orlovka, 
Tekovo, Beregovo, Uzhgorod and Drozdovichi).214 However, Gazprom made clear that no gas would 
flow unless Kiev finally proceeded with the signature of the protocol. When a copy was finally sent to the 
Russian side, it contained new conditions, which led the Russian president himself to declare on 11th 
January the protocol void. 215  Kuprianov explained that Ukraine had added a demand to guarantee 
technical gas in order to prevent disruptions occurring again.216 Only after the President of the European 
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Commission himself, Manuel Barroso, convinced the Ukrainian Prime Minister herself to withdraw the 
addendum,217 was  the last hurdle removed. The next day the Ukrainian authorities signed again, this time 
the original document and the final signature by the EU Energy Commissioner, Andris Piebalgs, was 
made on 12th January in Brussels.218 As the Russian and Ukrainian delegations were attending a meeting 
of EU energy ministers in Brussels, an informal trilateral meeting of the three parts was organized and 
assurances were given that gas would start flowing on 13th January 2009.219 
The monitoring agreement flounders and the dispute continues 
13th January was the date for the resumption of Russian supplies through test deliveries to check 
feasibility for a global resumption.220 However, the long fought for protocol floundered from the very 
beginning. President Vladimir Putin called Manuel Barroso to inform him that in spite of Gazprom 
having proceeded with the resumption of supplies, these could not enter the Ukrainian Gas Transportation 
System as Ukraine had apparently not opened the trunk pipeline yet.221 Gazprom initially wanted to ship 
76.6mcm towards the hard-hit Balkan countries and Moldova, but this volume could not cross the 
Ukrainian border.222  
Controversy regarding gas flows 
Ukraine soon offered a explanation for this anomaly: the system had been redirected for domestic needs 
(eastwards from the storage facilities in Western Ukraine) and could not serve flows coming from an 
opposite direction (westwards);223 sending emergency supplies to the rest of the country involved  using 
the transportation system left empty after Russia had cut all supplies and letting Gazprom resume gas 
supplies westwards would leave (at least the Easternmost part of) Ukraine freezing the same way as the 
Balkans. Ukraine contended that a solution could be found and put the blame on the Russian side. As 
Bogdan Sokolovskii´ explained, Gazprom had decided to ship its supplies through an unusual and more 
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complex route and which forced the closing of  Eastern regions from Ukraine who relied on supplies in 
reverse mode.224 Sokolovskii´ claimed that Gazprom had consciously avoided the traditional route of 
Belgorod and Rostov regions in order to make internal supply impossible.225 Besides that, Sokolovskii´ 
also explained that  the pressure of those volumes of gas offered by Gazprom was too low to fire up the 
system.226 Naftohaz stated that before any supply was resumed, technical aspects should be discussed 
beforehand between both parts in order to proceed in a correct and coordinated way.227 As a solution, 
Naftohaz sent a letter putting forward another route Pisarevka - Valui´ki.228  
The authoritative analyst Mikhail Korchemkin supported Naftohaz´s technical arguments and 
considered Gazprom was indeed to blame, suggesting at the same time that the Russian side was acting in 
bad faith. According to him, if gas was to flow to the Balkans it had to be pumped through the route 
proposed by Naftohaz.229 From Gazprom, Alexandr Medvedev counterattacked and said that the pipeline 
system being geared towards domestic consumption, all available routes were disabled for normal supply 
to Europe.230 Medvedev also criticized the route proposed by Naftohaz as not fit for export.231 The daily 
Vedomosti supported Gazprom´s version and claimed to rely on sources from Naftohaz itself to support 
its case.232 Gazprom explained its preference for the outlet of Sudzha as being located at the main export 
pipeline in direction to Europe, whereas Valuiki could not be used because of Ukrainian domestic gas 
flows (the same argument Naftohaz used against Sudzha), and Pisarevka was unsuitable if gas was to be 
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exported in the direction of the Balkans.233 Interfax also claimed to rely on sources from Naftohaz, who 
supported the feasibility of gas transit through the station of Sudzha, as demanded by Gazprom.234 Itar-
Tass provided further details: Kuprianov stated that Gazprom had received a letter from Naftohaz where it 
was confirmed that transit through Sudzha was technically possible, but not possible yet pending a final 
political decision.235 The Head of Naftohaz soon blamed an official of the company for "rushing" and 
denied the information.236 However, according to the daily Nezavisimaia Gazeta a conversation between 
Dubina and Miller revealed that Naftohaz could perfectly deliver Gazprom´s requests from the technical 
point of view, but that it needed some "conditions" from the side of Gazprom for transit to be finally 
resumed.237  
Naftohaz insists in being provided technical gas and last attempts fail 
Naftohaz in particular demanded a protocol detailing technical conditions for transit. Gazprom rejected 
such argument and pointed to the transit agreement from 2002 to 2013, which could perfectly cover the 
absence of such a protocol.238 Gazprom stated that the non-signature of annual protocols of this kind was 
not a real obstacle, as for example none had been signed in 2007 and no serious consequences accrued at 
all.239 The EU commissar of Energy, Andris Piebalgs, in a clear exception of the EU´s position to date, 
offered its limited support to Ukraine in this latest episode. He found support in his own experts who 
stated that indeed, the route chosen by Gazprom was technically very complicated, if not impossible.240    
Therefore, Gazprom submitted a new request to send a similar volume of gas (76.6mcm). 
However, it insisted again on the same route in the direction of the Balkans. Gazprom also added a minor 
volume of 22.2mcm to Slovakia through the route Sudzha-Uzhhorod.241 As before, this request could not 
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be fulfilled for the same reasons.242 At this stage, after Presidents from Moldova, Slovakia and Bulgaria 
travelled to Moscow in search of explanations, the Vice-Prime Minister,  Igor´ Sechin, publicly offered 
Ukraine to fulfill themselves requests from Europe from their own deposits if transit of Russian gas 
remained impossible,243 a variant also supported by the Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico.244 Every 
attempt to unblock this situation was to no avail. 
The last stage of the dispute and the way to its final resolution 
With a temporary agreement for resumption of gas transit failing at its very beginning, the need to find a 
quick agreement was the only solution to put an end to the supply crisis in Europe. The focus was thus 
necessarily back on negotiations and both the involvement of the EU and the unsustainable situation in 
the rest of Europe were probably putting the necessary pressure on Ukraine and Russia to either force a 
compromise or to lead to the capitulation of any of them.  
Maybe as a result of this general situation, a round of negotiations had been agreed for Saturday 
17th in Moscow, on the invitation of the Russian President Dmitri Medvedev. EU representatives were not 
initially intended to attend what was expected to be a strictly bilateral meeting. However, both a Czech 
representative in the person of the Minister of Trade and Industry as well as the Energy Commissar 
Andris Piebalgs decided to be present.245 Given respective positions between Russia and Ukraine, with 
the former inflexibly insisting on the price of US$450tcm and Ukraine sticking to prices similar to those 
offered at the last stage of negotiations before the dispute started, there should not have been any 
particular reason for optimism. As for Ukraine´s position, recent declarations by Bogdan Sokolovskii´ 
were quite revealing: Ukraine should pay between US$192.6tcm and US$218.8tcm in the first quarter, 
with transit tariffs of US$2.2tcm/100km to US$2.47tcm/100km.246 Price ranges close to what Gazprom 
was offering before the dispute: namely between US$235tcm to US$250tcm would be acceptable only 
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with transit tariffs of US$3.6tcm/100km-US$4tcm/100km. 247  This was in fact a less compromising 
position than the transit tariff Ukraine was ready to accept in December which was US$1,8tcm/100km for 
gas prices of US$235tcm.248   
The conference was held not only with representatives from Ukraine, the EU and the Czech 
Republic, but with representatives too, from a group of countries, among which, some affected at 
different degrees by the dispute: Armenia, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kazakhstan, Moldova, 
Serbia, Turkey and Slovakia were present; leading the Ukrainian delegation was Prime Minister Yulia 
Timoshenko herself. 249  The high profile of delegations and the internationalization of negotiations 
reasonably raised expectations about a final end of this energy crisis.  As already hinted the day before, 
positions did not change. At the beginning of the conference, Gazprom was insisting on access for its gas 
through the contentious Sudzha station and had its demand consequently denied.250 This controversy 
continued along with the same sort of arguments and counterarguments: this time Ukraine justified its 
refusal  saying that instead of the daily 100mcm that Russia wanted to start shipping, Ukrtransgaz needed 
at least 265mcm for the transit system to operate properly.251  
However, the well known pattern happened this time to be deceitful. Given the secrecy of 
negotiations it was hard to track progress (or lack thereof) and to know whether these acrimonious 
exchanges were mere posturing or reflected that things remained unchanged. The announcement by 
Sergei´ Kuprianov on Saturday 18th that Gazprom and Naftohaz were drafting at that moment documents 
for a treaty determining both gas supplies and gas transit according to an agreement reached the night 
before surprisingly belied any pessimism, reasonable as it may have been. This announcement bore the 
promise that gas flows would be soon restored, as was indeed to happen.252 The core of the agreement 
could not be known yet, but Gazprom´s spokesperson anticipated that it would determine conditions both 
for 2009 and 2010 and offer a discount of 20% on the price basis agreed for Ukraine in exchange for 
preserving transit conditions for Gazprom as in 2008.253 The discount  was understood to be valid only for 
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2009, as full market prices (as in the rest of Europe) were to be established on 1st January 2010.254 
Sources close to the negotiating team stated that the European price basis would operate retroactively 
from the 1st January 2009.255 This version was confirmed by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin after the end 
of talks with his Ukrainian counterpart.256 Did the formula "market prices" mean that Russia had won this 
dispute? As the exact price basis for Ukraine had not been revealed yet, this might still be part of the 
information war. However, if Gazprom felt confident to talk of market prices it was safe to assume that 
prices were close to what Russia had been insisting on since the breakdown of negotiations, namely, over 
US$400tcm. Kommersant went as far as to mention the high figure of US$470tcm,257  basing itself 
supposedly on earlier declarations by Mr. Kuprianov in such direction.258   
 
8. 6. The 19th January 2009 Agreement 
The final agreement was signed on 19th of January by both Prime Ministers, putting thus an end to the 
worse energy dispute to date. Its full content was disclosed to Ukrainska Pravda only two days later.  
Market prices and higher transit tariffs and suppression of RosUkrEnergo 
The agreement involved the approval of two new contracts, determining  price and transit, valid for 11 
years, from 2009 to 2019.259 The price agreed for the first trimester appeared to be US$360tcm for 
Ukraine and the transit tariff only slightly rose to US$1,9tcm/100km from US$1,7tcm/100km in 2008. 
Both figures responded to the application of a 20% discount for 2009, as had been revealed by Sergei´ 
Kuprianov before. Thus, the transit tariff would rise further in 2010 and it was announced at the time that 
it would reach US$2.5tcm/100km, following declarations by Aleksandr Medvedev;260 prices by 2010 
were supposed to be full market prices, namely, Ukraine would pay according to the price basis agreed, 
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although it seemed at the moment that a reduced discount of 10% would be kept.261 US$360tcm being a 
discounted price, the price basis was significantly higher. In fact, it was the same figure Gazprom had 
been threatening with since negotiations entered their last stage and which had become non-negotiable 
since the dispute started: US$450tcm. This price resulted from taking into account the European median 
price from January-September 2008.262 Gazprom was thus applying to Naftohaz the classical market 
formula of linking gas pricing to the evolution of median oil prices in the 9 previous months. In 
accordance with contracts Gazprom had signed with most of clients in the rest of Europe, prices would be 
recalculated every trimester.263  
As planned in the March 2008 agreements and  agreed in the memorandum of October, no 
intermediary would be present and RosUkrEnergo lost its privileged status as monopolist. Naftohaz 
would be thus tied to Gazprom for every supply related to the new agreement. It was also decided that 
Naftohaz would be supplied 11bcm as technological gas priced at the very advantageous price of 
US$153tcm.264 As would be revealed soon and as explained below, Gazprom´s generosity came at the 
expense of RosUkrEnergo, not only dumped as intermediary but now seemingly dispossessed too.265 This 
transfer would prove controversial, but now most questions were busy considering the way Gazprom 
managed to offer a discount to Naftohaz. Was this related to the mix of gas decided? 
Puzzles regarding new energy prices and mix of Central and Russia natural gas 
As the reader may remember, up to the very last negotiations the issue of pricing of Central Asian gas had 
been crucial. However, the reader may also remember that the issue fell into partial oblivion, not only 
because of the preeminence of the issue of debt claimed by Gazprom, but also because no agreement 
seemed to have been reached. Now that the dispute was over and prices between Gazprom and Naftohaz 
agreed, the issue necessarily came back to the fore. Vedomosti indeed thought that discounted prices 
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might be the result of the presence of Central Asian gas in the final mix.266 In support for this assumption, 
some reports revealed the price that Gazprom and Central Asian producers had (quite silently, may we 
add) agreed in the very end of 2008. Gazprom was supposed to have agreed on a price of US$340tcm. 
Accounting for transport costs, this nearly matched US$360tcm for the first trimester.267   
The fact is that whatever the origin of the gas to be supplied henceforth, new prices for the first 
semester sounded like very unwelcome news for Ukraine. US$360tcm was much higher than 
US$235tcm-US$250tcm being discussed on the 31st of December. However, the large picture shows 
brighter prospects for Ukraine. As already mentioned, oil prices had been diving during 2008. This 
guaranteed a substantial fall of gas prices during 2009. Every time that quarterly revisions took place this 
trend necessarily would be reflected. The crux of the question was thus what Naftohaz would end up 
paying as a median price for the whole year. Vremia Novostei´ made a tentative calculation based on the 
current prices in East Europe and deduced that by the second quarter Ukraine might already be paying a 
lower price of US$330-US$320tcm; if the tendency persisted, then gas might be priced US$240tcm in the 
third quarter.268  Owing to the agreed discount, what Ukraine ended up paying in the third quarter, 
US$198tcm269 was barely higher than prices for 2008, US$179.5tcm. However, calculations predicting 
that gas prices would eventually fall to only US$150-US$160tcm after oil prices had fallen to as little as 
US$50tcm per barrel by the end of 2008,270 proved overly optimistic.271  
Gazprom´s own calculation of the median price for European gas for the whole of 2009 was 
US$280tcm and US$224tcm for Ukraine, 272  close to Naftohaz´s calculation of US$235tcm-
US$250tcm.273 Naftohaz soon provided further details and offered the following prices for each of the 
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trimesters: US$360 for the first, as already announced, US$270tcm for the second, US$219tcm for the 
third and US$162tcm for the fourth.274  Naftohaz had decided that gas would be sold to consumers 
according to a median price of US$228tcm.275 Alla Eremenko from Zerkalo Nedeli talked of a second 
calculation according to which, prices per trimester would be as follows: 276 US$360tcm; US$323.03tcm; 
US$241.5tcm and US$152.12tcm.277  
Reception and interpretation of the new agreement 
Political reactions 
News of the new agreement shocked many in Ukraine: the leader of the Party of Regions, Viktor 
Yanukovich, declared that whatever price over US$250tcm would lead the Ukrainian economy to a 
crash.278 Opposition from the part of Yanukovich was logical, but the Party of Regions did not necessarily 
represent the most acrimonious expression of opposition to the new agreements. As quite often in the 
past, most active against the government was the Presidential Administration. On the eve of the official 
announcement of the agreement, in the Presidential Administration expectations were that prices would 
rise to US$200tcm with a transit tariff of US$2tcm/100 km.279 Bogdan Sokolovskii´, who complained that 
the contracts had not been agreed with the President,280 questioned the price basis agreed on the basis that 
European customers paid US$300tcm. He thus deduced that once the discount was applied, prices should 
range from US$220tcm to US$240tcm.281 He also complained that prices for Hungary at the current 
moment were US$403tcm, lower than the US$450tcm basis applied to Ukraine.282 With Hungary´s price 
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basis he calculated US$199tcm as the median price for 2009. Globally, Sokolovskii´ considered Ukraine 
would lose US$1bill as a result of the new agreements.283 
Yushchenko also criticized Naftohaz for calculating a median price of US$228tcm. The Ukrainian 
President doubted that prices might fall as low as US$132tcm in the fourth quarter (and he was right) for 
Naftohaz´s median price to be possible. 284  When Naftohaz announced that price, the Presidential 
Secretariat, this time through its First Deputy Head Olexandr Shlapak, counterattacked and proposed 
US$258tcm as the most likely price.285 Controversy came along with policy proposals that threatened the 
agreement: for example, when the transit tariff for 2009 was known, Yushchenko simply proposed that 
the Head of Naftohaz should unilaterally raise it (something which Timoshenko had tried herself to no 
avail), incensed as he was that Gazprom kept the same transit tariff as in the previous year.286 However, it 
soon was acknowledged that the signature of the latest contracts was valid, 287  and the President´s 
entourage simply started calling the government to renegotiate the agreements in summer.288 Therefore, 
the 19th of January agreement was mostly used as a weapon to launch personal attacks within the realm of 
internal politics of Ukraine. This, the Head of the Presidential Secretariat, Viktor Baloga, did when he 
assumed corruption was at the center of Putin and Timoshenko´s agreement and that on the basis that no 
specific price had been immediately provided. He suspected that secrecy guaranteed that opaque kick-
backs remained unknown.289  
Analysts´ assessments of the agreement 
But this agreement did not just elicit opposition among the ranks of the Ukrainian political class. Analysts 
and specialists on energy issues also joined the fray. This agreement was definitely much clearer than the 
mindboggling one of January 2006. However, some of its provisions remained controversial. Among 
these the price basis that Gazprom had chosen for Naftohaz was the main one. The analyst Mikhail 
Zapozin considered the price basis of US$450tcm for Ukraine not correct for the simple reason that prices 
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for the current quarter in Western Europe were US$400tcm.290 This was clearly unfair for Ukraine due to 
the obvious differences of distance.291 Another analyst, Dmitrii´ Aleksandrov from "Financial Bridge" 
calculated that the median East European price for the first quarter of 2009 would amount to a little more 
than US$400tcm, possibly US$418, which is a price that had been mentioned in the course of 
negotiations.292  In a similar vein was Denis Borisov from the Financial House "Solid", who stated that 
the median price of European gas was lower than the US$450tcm agreed in the contract as a basis and 
hovered between US$430tcm and US$440tcm.293 If comparing with spot prices as Mikhail Korchemkin  
did, the difference was even more unfavorable for Ukraine: he pointed to prices of US$350tcm paid in 
Belgium, Germany and Holland in the first half of January and poised to drop further.294 Since then, 
Ukraine has not been able to renegotiate this beyond being granted further discounts.295 
Epilogue: solving the remaining debt, spoils from RosUkrEnergo and further political 
disagreements  
In addition to the pricing and transit agreements, Naftohaz´s debt still remained to be solved. Gazprom 
calculated the debt as US$614mill,296 corresponding to debt inherited from December in addition to fines. 
Naftohaz rejected these, so disagreements persisted.297 However, on 20th January, the day after the dispute 
had been solved and when normal supplies had been restored, Gazprom's Deputy CEO Alexandr 
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Medvedev simply said that all debt problems had been settled.298 The unknown part was what exactly had 
been agreed.  
As for RosUkrEnergo, the controversial trader and the main loser in this dispute, it saw Naftohaz 
confiscate all its gas located in the storage facilities of Ukraine. The volume in question, 11bcm had been 
contracted for companies in Central Europe with whom supply contracts were signed. However, Naftohaz 
declared these volumes of gas had been transferred to them and would be spent as technical gas. What 
type of transaction was carried out for this transfer? Was it really meant as technical gas? The daily 
Kommersant had mentioned in the course of the dispute that 6.5bcm was the amount Naftohaz needed for 
technical needs for the whole year.299 This belies the official version provided by Naftohaz, at least 
partially. As for the transaction, confusion reigned at the beginning. Gazprom had provided the 
explanation that RosUkrEnergo´s gas would be "returned" to Naftohaz in payment of  transit tariff.300 
This raised Vedomosti´s perplexity as to Gazprom´s right to transfer gas to which it could only claim half 
(Gazprom owned 50% of RosUkrEnergo).301  
Then Ukrainska Pravda acquired a copy of a directive from the Ukrainian government where the 
following version was offered: it confirmed Gazprom sold the gas to Naftohaz in payment  of  the transit 
tariff in order to be used as technical gas.302 The directive, a reflection of a parallel agreement reached on 
19th January, instructed Naftohaz to acquire from Gazprom the right to have available up to 10.3bcm of 
gas belonging to RosUkrEnergo, paid by the Russian monopoly as an advance of transit tariffs.303 It could 
be deduced from this complex transaction that the price paid by Naftohaz was US$154.6tcm. This was 
only slightly more than US$153.9tcm, which, as announced by Timoshenko, Naftohaz would pay for the 
technical gas.304 Vedomosti provided further details which added more complexity to the transaction: 
according to the Russian newspaper, rights to a total debt of US$1.7mill owed to Gazprom by 
RosUkrEnergo305 were transferred to Naftohaz. Naftohaz in fact paid Gazprom for the right to claim this 
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debt through an advance payment by the Russian monopoly of transit tariffs. RosUkrEnergo now owed 
Naftohaz and paid through its gas reserves.306 While both Gazprom´s and Naftohaz´s version differed in 
other details,307 the main problem in the whole agreement was the fact that it could hardly be justified for 
either Gazprom or Naftohaz to freely use RosUkrEnergo´s assets without having agreed with the trader 
before.308 The lack of legal basis for this fraudulent transaction was exposed when in 2010 the Stockholm 
Arbitrage Court gave reason to RosUkrEnergo and forced Naftohaz to return all the gas improperly 
obtained from Gazprom.309  
Once the gas transfer to Naftohaz was approved,310 it still remained to know what would be the 
exact use of the gas acquired by Naftohaz. Since Timoshenko confirmed the previous figure of 6.5bcm of 
gas required for technical needs,311 that yielded 4.5bcm of free gas. She stated that this gas would be used 
for internal consumption and thus lessen the dependence on Russia in a moment of very high prices.312 
The transfer in any case posed a serious problem for consumers in Poland and Hungary, where 
RosUkrEnergo had signed supply contracts. In Poland for example, the state company PGNiG had 
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contracted with RosUkrEnergo 2.5bcm of gas every year for the period of 2006-2009.313  Soon the 
company announced it was not receiving needed supplies as contracted, with only half of expected 
supplies from RosUkrEnergo flowing.314 
As an epilogue to the dispute, we may mention that controversies, both within the Ukrainian 
political class and between Russia and Ukraine, were resurfacing. In spite of having (apparently) accepted 
the agreement, The Presidential Secretariat was soon advocating to contest it on the ground that Dubina 
(who was ailing at the hospital undergoing heart surgery) had signed the agreements under undue 
pressure. 315  Timoshenko declared she planned to obtain additional discounts for 2010-11, 316  and 
maintained her fierce opposition  to any possibility of establishing a transport consortium with Gazprom. 
Besides that, adding controversy to the point of the contracts signed some days ago, she rejected the 
presence of Gazprom Sbyt in Ukraine, to which 25% of the imported gas sold in the internal market 
would be reserved,317 a share similar to that agreed in the midst of the March 2008 agreements.318 As  was 
already stated in the previous chapter, at the end only 3bcm were sold,319 less than 10% of the gas import 
market and slightly less than 5% of the whole gas market.320 Among the chorus of critics of the recent 
agreement, President Viktor Iushchenko did not relent in his criticism, even if this time he conceded that 
the agreement  had  to be accepted, but revised in the summer. 321  Either efforts from the part of 
Timoshenko to revise the agreements or attacks directed by her opponents, were in fact to be read as a 
factor of internal infighting. The Russian factor faded into the background and became rather a tool for 
this internal instability that had characterized the orange coalition from the very beginning.   
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8. 7. Preliminary Conclusions 
The dispute of January 2009 stands in stark contrast with both its predecessors. It may be lumped together 
with January 2006 because of the common feature of having led to an energy supply crisis. However, 
whereas the energy supply crisis in January 2006 was very short, the long-drawn effects of the crisis in 
January 2009 were brutal. The decision taken by Russia to escalate to a new stage, imposing an energy 
embargo for all supplies is probably the single element that sets the contrast to January 2006 and March 
2008. In parallel with the difference between this dispute and its two predecessors, the agreement that was 
reached in 19th January 2009, seems to leave little space to contradictory interpretations and can easily be 
termed as a Russian victory, with RosUkrEnergo removed from the stage of Russo-Ukrainian energy 
relations, the linkage between Central Asian supplies to Ukraine suppressed and with Ukraine accepting 
market prices for once. 
The panorama in the energy market  was suffering significant changes during the period going 
from March 2008, when the former dispute took place and January 2009. As we had the chance to see, 
new price increases were being demanded from Central Asian, with all producers, Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan and mainly Turkmenistan demanding that market prices be paid. This represented new 
renegotiations ahead and the fact that Ukraine would eventually have to accept these new prices, 
something which entailed in itself the usual danger of disagreements, even if talks in 2007 and 2008 were 
relatively harmonious. However, the main problem in the context was that oil prices were diving, driving 
natural gas prices in Europe downwards and along with them, Gazprom´s profits. This coincided with a 
new debt dispute in late 2008. This dispute was not intrinsically worse than others that Gazprom had had 
to face earlier, but the financial situation and the fact that a debt issue had already led to a dispute in 
March 2008 might have exacerbated the situation and the importance for Gazprom to recover that debt, 
establishing a strong linkage between debt resolution and pricing negotiations. Doubts regarding 
Gazprom´s agreements with Turkmenistan are also candidates that could account for the level of tensions 
that was reached.  
Once disagreements led to a new cut-off of supplies to Ukraine, the sequence of events started 
exactly as in January 2006, including disagreements regarding technical gas, whose consumption led to 
the first stage of a new energy crisis in those countries most dependent on Gazprom´s natural gas. With 
the first step having been taken from the Russian side in a new process of escalation, we may consider 
that as three years before, Ukraine decided to escalate siphoning gas off; if it seems that this time the 
volumes extracted matched technical needs, as opposed to what happened in January 2006, the difference 
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this time was that Gazprom did not backtrack to deescalate; it further escalated imposing a total gas 
embargo: not only gas supplies matching Ukrainian consumption were cut, but also the rest of natural gas 
exported through Ukraine for the rest of consumers. As seen above, Gazprom´s argument was that the 
embargo was needed to avoid gas being siphoned off by Naftohaz. This situation was maintained until a 
final agreement was reached on 19th January 2009.  
As opposed to the agreements reached in January 2006 and March 2008, the agreement in January 
2009 seems to leave less space for interpretation, with most assessments at the time considering that 
Gazprom had managed to win the dispute. Although, as with the two previous disputes, our assessment 
will be taken up and completed in chapter 9, we may advance here that indeed, Gazprom seems having 
been the clear winner in this dispute, as Ukraine would henceforth have to purchase Gazprom´s natural 
gas at market prices, with a linkage to oil prices and without the intermediation of RosUkrEnergo, so 
henceforth Gazprom would be fully free to dispose of Central Asian natural gas.  
What accounts for the Russian attitude in the face of an energy dispute this time? This sudden 
change in Gazprom´s management of an escalation process, going as far as to risk its reputation for the 
sake of winning the dispute, may be matched to what prospect theory would predict for risk-assuming 
actors. Indeed, this time, the Russian side did not deescalate when either the energy dispute translated into 
an energy crisis affecting other European countries or when the danger of this eventually happening 
loomed in the horizon; on the contrary, Gazprom escalated consciously knowing that its decision were not 
only provoking that energy crisis, but worsening it to a degree not seen to date. If Gazprom considered 
risks in reputational costs involved in this move, as uncertainty necessarily remained as to how long this 
dispute would last and in what measure reputational costs would accumulate, it was behaving in a 
strongly risk-taking attitude. As we have seen, and as will be further analysed in chapter 11, the context 
represents a strong candidate for worsened status-quo, so Russia could be easily presented as a risk-taking 
actor bent on preventing losses.    
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Chapter 9: Assessing the outcome in the three energy disputes  
 
9. 1. Introduction 
The chapters dealing with the three energy disputes analyzed in this research provided the reader with 
valuable information on what were the stakes involved and how diverse factors would accumulate and 
eventually provoke energy disputes leading to gas cut-offs as in January 2006 and January 2009. In this 
respect, a conscious effort has been made to provide as many details as possible in order that the reader 
can understand the elements necessary to know how the path towards an energy dispute is laid. Many of 
the events that are narrated do not necessarily have a direct link to the disputes. This is the case for 
example with the dispute regarding stored gas in July 2005. However, events such as this should have had 
a valuable didactic dimension for the reader, as they introduce elements that are consubstantial to the 
energy relations between Russia and Ukraine. In any case, issues revolving around debt and pricing of gas 
are manifestly at the core of the disputes and may easily appear as necessary, even if not necessarily 
sufficient, factors to understand how disputes happen. The virtue of the empirical data presented in the 
three chapters before, is thus obvious. 
In this respect, these three chapters provide something more than mere raw information. They also 
answer one vital question: who won the disputes. This chapter deals with this question. As already 
mentioned above at the end of each of the three former chapters, the answer to this question opens the 
ground to considering the question regarding Russia´s risk-attitude and the degree of risk, to which the 
final chapter is devoted. The importance of the first question is thus manifest when it comes to 
considering the patterns of escalation: if energy disputes escalated to a different degree, this could easily 
be due to Ukraine´s degree of resistance. We could hypothesize that Ukraine yielded in March 2008 
simply with a partial cut-off, yielded in January 2006 with a total cut-off, whereas a total embargo was 
needed in January 2009 to break its resistance. If the answer is negative, then Russia should be the focus 
of our attention, justifying our further discussion regarding Russia´s risk-attitude and changes in the risk 
factor. The analyses we drew in each chapter clarified that this was indeed not the case, and that the 
different patterns of escalation clearly lay in Russian decisions in each dispute. This chapter therefore 
sums up the analyses made at the end of each of chapters 6, 7 and 8. 
 
 
    
 
297 
 
9. 2. Dispute of January 2006    
As seen in the thorough analysis of the 4th January 2006 agreement in chapter 6, which put an end to the 
dispute, many of the provisions of the agreement were controversial and were not fully clarified. Besides 
this, much did not unfold as foreseen. Our assessment was that the agreement was at best a compromise 
and that it could not be seen as a victory from the side of Gazprom, even if it did not represent a victory 
for Ukraine either. Below comes a summing-up and expansion of our analysis as made earlier. 
New Pricing System  
The first controversy concerned the price Ukraine would pay for 2006 and the price Russia would sell its 
natural gas; in theory, the latter should match the former. However, this was not exactly the case: Ukraine 
would buy natural gas for US$95tcm, whereas Russia would sell its natural gas at US$230tcm. The 
reason why this mismatch occurred was because the price for Ukraine was in fact the median price of all 
gas supplied to the country. As we had the occasion to see in chapter 6 Ukraine consumed both Russian 
and Turkmen natural gas. The reason for lumping all natural gas supplied to Ukraine into a sole category 
was that henceforth, sales of all natural gas would be centralized in one single supplier, the intermediary 
company RosUkrEnergo, to which we come back below. Even if this was justified, it was nevertheless 
confusing. As far as Russian gain was concerned,  instead of a median price of all gas supplied to 
Ukraine, the reasonable benchmark to determine whether Russia won the dispute, at least in economic 
terms, was the price agreed for Gazprom´s gas. In this respect, Gazprom´s victory was apparently clear, 
as US$230tcm was the price Gazprom had been insisting on, after its first offer of US$160 had been 
rejected. If we could add to that the increased role of RosUkrEnergo and the creation of the new company 
UkrGazEnergo, assuming their role was beneficial for Gazprom, then its victory was absolute. However, 
a further analysis would show that there was more to this than met the eye. 
New Supplies Balance 
The key to determine the economic gains for Gazprom lay in the new balance of natural gas that Ukraine 
would be supplied with. The agreement foresaw that instead of 23bcm of natural gas, as Gazprom had 
been supplying in 2005, the volume would be reduced to 17bcm. Gazprom would make less money in 
Ukraine, but if freed volumes could henceforth be traded in Europe, where market prices prevailed, then 
the trade-off was beneficial. The problem for Gazprom lay in the volumes of natural gas that would make 
up for reduced supplies from Gazprom. Ukraine would import more natural gas from Central Asia. The 
exact figures from the agreement, as leaked, were: 41bcm from Turkmenistan and as much as 7bcm from 
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Uzbekistan and 8bcm from Kazakhstan. The problem lay in the fact that more Central Asian gas for 
Ukraine meant less Central Asian gas for Russia, as Gazprom relied on Central Asian supplies to make up 
for insufficient production. Therefore, gains from freed Russian natural gas could happen to be either 
nullified or at least limited. Mikhail Korchemkin´s assessment from East European Gas Analysis, on 
which we mostly relied as the most complete attempt to date to calculate Gazprom´s gain, in fact 
interpreted that Gazprom would lose outright. 
According to Korchemkin´s calculation, Gazprom would end up losing between US$945tcm and 
US$741tcm per year. Oddly enough, the analysis assumed no natural gas from Gazprom would be 
consumed by Ukraine at all. However soon after the agreement had been signed, doubts surfaced indeed, 
as to whether any Russian natural gas at all would be sold to Ukraine, which would confirm 
Korchemkin´s analysis. Data from Vedomosti,1 as well as Simon Pirani´s report on Ukraine´s energy 
sector from 2007,2 and his chapter on Ukraine from the book "Russia and CIS markets and their impact 
on Europe", pointed to this. For 2006, all three sources agreed on a volume of Russian gas supplied to 
Ukraine significantly lower than 17bcm: 9.1bcm. The fact is that even this was doubtful. Russian sources, 
months after the agreement had been signed, would claim that in fact no Russian gas at all had been 
supplied to Ukraine. Our own calculation showed that even this reduced volume of Russian gas would 
have increased prices for Ukraine beyond US$95, which reinforces the assumption that no Russian gas 
was consumed. In fact Simon Pirani himself assumed that this figure, at least in part probably represented 
Russian gas, only in physical but not financial terms. As for 2007, Pirani shows that 4.5bcm of Russian 
gas were imported, even if none of it is referred to in Vedomosti. There is a high probability that this may 
be, again, gas only in physical terms. Otherwise, this represented very low volumes, so Russian gas was 
marginal. In general terms, Gazprom saw any potential gains nullified by the new redistribution of 
volumes and probably lost outright in strictly financial terms. 
Gazprom´s "Political" Benefits 
However, as for the interpretation of Gazprom´s gains in financial terms, losses did not necessarily mean 
that the agreement was a defeat for Russia. Political elements should also be taken into account. It should 
not be forgotten that Gazprom owned 50% of RosUkrEnergo and that there were probably close interests 
between Gazprom and the owners of the other half. As was soon revealed, Dmitro Firtash and Ivan Fursin 
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controlled that other half. As was explained, RosUkrEnergo had already entered the natural gas business 
in Ukraine in 2005, when the Minister of Energy, Iurii´ Boi´ko, under Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich, 
mediated. Besides this, Firtash was behind the former experiment as an intermediary, EuralTransGas,  
after the suppression of Itera, in 2003. Suspicions regarding RosUkrEnergo´s alliance with Gazprom were 
fully justified. Besides this, it was soon revealed that in 2005 already, when RosUkrEnergo was only 
involved in Turkmen gas, Gazprom had sold in Europe around 10bcm of natural gas through the 
intermediary, in what represented a clear intention to divert profits for the benefit of this obscure 
company. RosUkrEnergo would soon start acquiring participations in the local companies, OblHazy, so 
the company could be seen either as a corrupt devise for the benefit of Gazprom´s allies or better, a 
vehicle to penetrate Ukraine´s market and open the door to Gazprom. 
 Besides this, the creation of UkrGazEnergo, the new joint venture between Naftohaz and 
RosUkrEnergo in the internal market of Ukraine, and which was to assume the most lucrative part of its 
market (even if it would not mean huge financial benefits for Gazprom), could be seen  the same way as 
RosUkrEnergo, namely, as part of Gazprom´s strategy of penetration into the Ukrainian market. 
However, besides the direct interest Gazprom may have had in the company, the creation of 
UkrGazEnergo represented a heavy blow to Naftohaz, as the former would concentrate its business in the 
lucrative industrial sector, where prices were not regulated. In addition, Naftohaz was henceforth 
forbidden to re-export Russian gas in Central Europe, a role exclusively reserved now to RosUkrEnergo, 
in coordination with Gazprom. Thus, along with the positive interest of Gazprom in penetrating the 
Ukrainian market, another possibility was that Gazprom sought the financial bankruptcy of Naftohaz as 
an indirect way for the takeover of the Ukrainian GTS.  
RosUkrEnergo and Gazprom 
Our analysis cast doubts on the value RosUkrEnergo had for Gazprom. In the first place, it must be borne 
in mind that RosUkrEnergo had been favored as an intermediary in substitution of EuralTransGas, during 
Kuchma´s administration. As the agreements subscribed in August 2004 foresaw, Ukraine was to import 
eventually only Turkmen gas, indeed and RosUkrEnergo was to participate in the development of 
upstream projects in Central Asia. The ultimate goal of Gazprom was to establish a consortium for the 
management of the Ukrainian GTS, even if Kuchma´s administration resisted this. It seems plausible that 
Gazprom favored financially a company that was to play an important role in this scheme. The 
rebalancing of gas supplies as a result of the 4th January agreement fulfilled this, which as we analyzed 
above, should have borne economic losses for Gazprom. However, favoring Ukraine under Kuchma is 
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definitely not the same as favoring Ukraine under the loathed Yushchenko. One has therefore to be 
cautious when linking the favors made to RosUkrEnergo already in 2005 to the even more advantageous 
position it started enjoying from 2006. More elements complicate the whole picture: the same way Firtash 
was on good terms with the previous administration, the truth is that it maintained very good relations 
with Yushchenko´s entourage too. Firtash skillfully moved to ingratiate himself with the new authorities 
and his move seems to have worked: Yushchenko protected RosUkrEnergo against his Prime Minister 
Yulia Timoshenko, who tried to uncover the obscure dealings of the trading company; Timoshenko, by 
the way, was sacked in September 2005. The interests of Yushchenko himself to favor RosUkrEnergo 
should not be underestimated.  
From another side, Russia´s relations towards intermediaries are interesting when the progression 
from the establishment of Itera to the elimination of intermediaries in the agreement of 19th January 2009 
is considered. Itera, which brought prejudice to Gazprom as a company, but responded to the corrupt 
schemes of its leadership, was removed in 2003. In its stead, the obscure EuralTransGaz, where Firtash 
already played a leading role, was established. The obscurity of its management revealed, both Ukraine 
and Russia decided in 2004 to bring to the fore the no less obscure RosUkrEnergo, whose importance lies 
at the very center of our research. However, RosUkrEnergo did represent a certain modicum of 
rationalization: instead of the entirely private interests involved in EuralTransGaz, RosUkrEnergo, as 
mentioned above, was owned 50% by Gazprom and 50% by Ukrainian private interests in the persons of 
Dmitro Firtash and Ivan Fursin. The fact is that from the side of Russia, there had been an attempt at the 
time to establish a joint venture between Gazprom and Naftohaz instead. The Russian interest for 
sidelining private interests seems to be reinforced by the fact that in 2008, as analyzed further below, 
there seemed to be no objections to agreeing with the manifestly anti-Russian Yulia Timoshenko the 
eventual elimination of intermediaries. RosUkrEnergo´s exclusion from Russo-Ukrainian energy relations 
was effected in January 2009, when Gazprom clearly imposed itself after a bitter dispute. This pattern 
arguably reinforces the suspicion that Gazprom accepted an increased role for RosUkrEnergo as a 
compromise to solve a dispute that soon escaped from its control.   
The Process of Escalation in January 2006  
One last clue to refute the intuitive narrative of RosUkrEnergo´s being an active vehicle for Gazprom and 
part of a strategy to maximize gains out of the gas dispute in 2006 is the pattern of escalation of the 
dispute itself. Again, this cannot constitute in itself conclusive evidence, but nevertheless increases the 
plausibility of our explanation for gains and losses in this energy dispute.  
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The fact is that when Gazprom decided to stop all supplies to Ukraine, namely, reducing pressure 
in the pipeline running through Ukraine in accordance with volumes contracted to Ukraine, supplies 
started failing for consumers further West. In the center of the dispute lay the issue of technical gas, 
remaining to date unclear, whether either Naftohaz or Gazprom (or both) were responsible for this. It does 
not seem surprising that such supply problems should have happened. The question whether Gazprom 
shrewdly expected Naftohaz to be blamed for supply disruptions or naively expected Naftohaz to use 
technical gas from the general flow of natural gas and compensate consumers in the rest of Europe with 
emergency supplies from gas stored at the Western Ukrainian border, unfortunately remains unanswered. 
However, the fact is that volumes extracted by Ukraine did not correspond, in contrast to what was to 
happen three years later, to technical gas. This probably corresponded to strategy to create havoc with the 
goal to let Gazprom be blamed as ultimately responsible for natural gas supplies. In addition, the reaction 
in Europe was generally negative towards Gazprom and the Russian leadership. 
Gazprom´s reaction of taking the decision to restore supplies on 2nd January already, becoming 
effective on 3rd January is coherent to a correction after a miscalculation. This element supports the 
interpretation of the 4th January agreement as a compromise in view of its avoidance of further problems. 
This does not mean that Gazprom submitted to Naftohaz outright. Naftohaz had to accept higher prices 
(even if not as high as if the supply balance from 2005 had been maintained under higher prices from 
Gazprom), saw its participation reduced in the internal market and could not re-export natural gas 
anymore, which clearly affected the company´s financial situation. It might be tentatively assessed that 
comparing the initial positions and the stakes involved, Ukraine ended up in a better position compared to 
Russia, whereas comparing financial losses for both Gazprom and Naftohaz, following Korchemkin´s 
calculation, the latter ended up worse off. In any case, it cannot be stated that Russia and Gazprom 
reached their objectives in this dispute. 
 
9. 3. Dispute of March 2008 
The analysis of the second energy dispute is equally confusing at first sight, even if it leaves arguably 
fewer doubts compared to its predecessor. As explained in chapter 7, our assessment was also that the 
dispute´s outcome could not be determined as a victory for the Russian side. Below comes a summing up 
of our reasoning. 
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The February Agreement 
As was thoroughly analyzed in chapter 7, a debt dispute was at the center of this new energy dispute 
which led to partial gas cut-offs. The issue of Russian gas that had been shipped to Ukraine in order to 
guarantee normal supplies after a cold spell in Central Asia increased domestic consumption at the 
expense of supplies for Ukraine and a classic debt problem, compounded a situation where these factors 
were used by recently re-elected Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko in an aggressive move to revise 
current agreements with Gazprom. 
To offset the threat this new situation posed for Russia, Gazprom set a deadline for 12th of 
February. In case no payment was received, Gazprom would start reducing supplies in retaliation. The 
fact is that a meeting between Yushchenko and Putin that very day, managed to avert this. The agreement, 
as usual, raised controversy in Ukraine, as beyond offering a solution for the debt dispute, it introduced 
modifications into mutual energy relations: in line with Gazprom´s already expressed desire to establish a 
joint venture to Naftohaz, this would be now effected, with RosUkrEnergo and UkrGazEnergo 
substituted. Even if this sounded as good news for Ukraine, the agreement apparently opened the door to 
increase Gazprom´s presence in the Ukrainian internal market. As usual in such agreements, this might 
also be either the result of misinformation and distortions, possibly sought as a device to save face. 
Whether true or false, the fact is that Timoshenko quickly moved to nullify this agreement. 
 The March Agreement 
As Timoshenko refused to abide by the Yushchenko sponsored agreement, the tension finally led to two 
days of partial cut-offs from 3rd to 5th March. With (not so) veiled threats to disrupt normal supplies, 
Gazprom soon restored full volumes to Ukraine. Negotiations continued until a new agreement was 
signed with the Ukrainian Prime Minister on 14th March. While solving the debt issue, this agreement 
proposed a new reorganization of energy relations, which confirmed some of the previous agreement´s 
provisions, while it substantially changed other aspects. As already agreed in February, UkrGazEnergo 
would be eliminated, leaving the stage as soon as April, while silence prevailed regarding RosUkrEnergo, 
in spite of the frontal opposition professed by Timoshenko. As foreseen in the agreement of February, it 
was eventually to disappear in 2009. Indeed, it is fair to assume that Putin and Timoshenko were 
implicitly confirming the former dispositions and sealing its fate. The important fact is that the 
compensation to Gazprom for UkrGazEnergo´s suppression was more meager than in the agreement in 
February. 
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Gazprom lost its indirect share of 25% in UkrGazEnergo, but would henceforth trade directly a 
volume of as much as 7.5bcm in the internal market of Ukraine. This would happen through a subsidiary 
company, "Gazprom Sbyt Ukraina". Controversy raged again, as there were doubts as to whether that was 
a minimum or a maximum. As in fact "Gazprom Sbyt Ukraina" eventually sold in 2008 only around 
3bcm, it is probable that there was much of face-saving in these obscure provisions. 
In general, this agreement represented a stalemate that solved the most pressing issues regarding 
debt while it introduced innovations in the status quo. In strict financial terms, it seems that Gazprom lost 
financially, while making no gains in political terms. Even if such a low scale dispute could hardly be 
decried as Gazprom´s defeat, it is fair to use such denomination. Again, looking at the escalation pattern, 
Gazprom did not go beyond a partial cut-off of 50% of contracted volumes of natural gas and backtracked 
to continue negotiations. This behavior pointed to a high degree of care in the management of this 
dispute. 
 
9. 4. Dispute of January 2009      
We know already in full detail how the dispute of January 2009 unfolded and what were the fateful 
consequences for those countries engulfed in a supply crisis in the midst of a severe winter. This was 
explained in detail in chapter 8. The harshest dispute of all three analyzed is paradoxically the easiest to 
analyze when it comes to determining gains and losses for Gazprom. The dispute was a clear victory for 
Gazprom, even if both the financial and (potentially) reputational costs of the dispute itself were higher 
than ever. 
As we saw in chapter 8, the dispute was the result of an unfortunate conjunction of debt issues and 
pricing discussions. Controversy remains regarding what happened exactly in the last hours of 
negotiations, but the fact is that the deadline was reached before a solution could be found for the price 
Ukraine would pay for natural gas in 2009. As had happened in negotiations both in 2007 and 2008, final 
prices had to be revised after Central Asian producers decided to raise prices for their natural gas sold to 
Gazprom (and later to RosUkrEnergo). If negotiations before went smoothly, the decision to reach 
"market prices", taken by Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan back in April, and which had to 
impact necessarily on Ukraine, represented this time an excessive increase for Kiev. Even if information 
is scarce, the truth is that new prices from Central Asia, as agreed by Gazprom, should have been set at 
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US$330tcm. Gazprom was offering in the last negotiations prices around US$250tcm to Ukraine, while it 
threatened to impose US$410tcm instead if Ukraine rejected this offer. 
After having imposed a gas cut-off to Ukraine first, and in the face of new flow disruptions 
harming European consumers, Gazprom progressively imposed a gas embargo, whereby the whole 
volumes of Gazprom´s natural gas dried up during two weeks until an agreement was found on 19th of 
January. The agreement was valid for a period of ten years. According to the agreement, RosUkrEnergo 
was wiped out and as a corollary of this a confusing (and illegal) agreement was reached that enabled 
Naftohaz to take hold of RosUkrEnergo´s reserves. The presence of RosUkrEnergo did not seem to be 
needed anymore, while Gazprom managed to impose prices of US$410tcm, with Ukraine henceforth 
consuming Gazprom´s natural gas from whatever geographical source the Russian monopoly deemed 
opportune. Prices would not be fixed to specific negotiations anymore, as had been done before 2006 and 
as had been renegotiated on a yearly basis until 2009 depending on prices in Central Asia. Pricing for 
natural gas would be based on the usual formula used in most of Europe for long-term contracts: natural 
gas prices were pegged to oil prices and would be recalculated every quarter of the year. Thus, prices 
announced were those valid for the first quarter of 2009.  
As was natural, transit tariffs, which had been raised to 1.7tcm/100km in 2008, were now raised to 
2.1tcm/100km (effectively 1.9tcm/100km for 2009 in virtue of the discount whose mention follows). 
However, the most substantial compensation for Ukraine was a discount of 20% for Ukraine, so the 
effective price for the first quarter was US$360tcm. It is worth noting that this was exactly the price of 
natural gas imposed by the three Central Asian natural gas producers after the addition of transportation 
costs. We may surmise that Russia had modulated the price according to the margin left by these 
countries in order to enable a certain compromise with Ukraine and provide an easier escape from the 
protracted and harmful dispute. Still, this compromise was relative, as the discount was to be applied only 
to 2009. Besides this, in the long term, Ukraine had to fully accept market-based pricing imposed by 
Gazprom. Worse, Naftohaz had had to assume a calculation basis that was in every respect abusive: 
discounted prices made Russian natural gas supplied to Ukraine more expensive than the same volumes 
supplied by Gazprom to Central European countries, despite the obvious fact that these countries were 
geographically more distant. Once the discount was removed, and owing to fluctuations in oil prices, 
natural gas for Ukraine could in fact be even more expensive than in the far-away Germany. 
As we know with the benefit of hindsight, discounts were renewed and even increased to 30% in 
April 2010, with Yanukovich as President of Ukraine, but in exchange for an extension of the lease 
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contract for the Russian Black Sea Fleet in the Ukrainian base of Sebastopol in the Crimean Peninsula, so 
instead of expiring in 2017, the contract was extended to 2037-42. Even under these new prices, prices 
were more expensive than natural gas in Central Europe. It is thus fair to state that Gazprom won this 
dispute, as it imposed all its conditions. 
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PART IV: PIPELINE POLITICS AND THE RISK FACTOR 
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Chapter 10: Pipeline Politics between Europe and Russia 
 
10. 1. Introduction 
As was considered in previous chapters, energy relations between Russia and its natural gas consumers 
are characterized by Gazprom´s overwhelming dependence on European customers (at the time of 
writing, Europe´s share of Gazprom´s exports still dwarfs that of Asian countries, which is symbolic). 
This dependence is complemented by two more factors: first, most of the European countries consuming 
Gazprom´s natural gas are part of the European Union´s normative space. The EU´s legislation, as we 
shortly reviewed in chapter 5, increasingly collides with Russia´s normative philosophy. Second, and 
most relevant to our three case studies, transit of natural gas in the period 2005-2009 was overwhelmingly 
dependent on two countries: Belarus and Ukraine. This transit dependence was unbalanced: Belarus only 
played a marginal role, while Ukraine´s share of Gazprom´s transit of natural gas remained very high over 
the whole period. These circumstances greatly determine the context surrounding the three energy 
disputes analyzed in the preceding chapters. 
Gazprom´s natural gas exports and its dependence on Europe and the EU 
As Gazprom´s 2013 annual report shows, in 2013, Gazprom exports to the "European market", including 
Turkey (the report equates this area with the broad category of Far-Abroad)1, represented 30% of these 
countries´ natural gas consumption and 64,3% of their total imports.2 If we put the EU market in a 
separate category, the figures were 29.3% and 43.1% respectively.3 However, as for Gazprom, there 
exists a clear unbalance, such that, as reviewed in chapter 2, has led many analysts to talk of asymmetrical 
interdependence in favor of the EU.4   
Gazprom usually groups its sales into three categories: Russia, Former Soviet Union (FSU) and 
non-FSU countries. The latter category represented in 2013 32% of the total natural gas sales, and 55% of 
                                                           
1
 In Russia there is usually a distinction between two terms in order to identify countries abroad: Near and Far Abroad. This 
distinction is necessary in order to distinguish between countries belonging to the former Soviet Union (FSU), which fall into 
the category of Near Abroad, and the rest which falls into the Far Abroad.  
2
 Gazprom (2013): "Annual report", p. 63, at http://www.gazprom.com/investors/reports/2013/ (Accessed on the 6th October 
2014). 
3
 Ibid., Idem. 
4
 One of the best references to analyze the real nature of Europe´s dependence on Gazprom and the limited character thereof, 
something quite often overlooked by many analysts and mostly, by un-careful press reports, is Pierre Noël: "Beyond 
dependence: how to deal with Russian gas", European Council on Foreign Relations, Policy Brief (7 November 2008), at  
http://ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR-09-BEYOND_DEPENDENCE-HOW_TO_DEAL_WITH_RUSSIAN_GAS.pdf (Accessed on the 
6th October 2014). This report, from six years ago, has not lost much of its actuality. 
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the sales revenue. 5  If excluding Russia, and thus considering only sales abroad, sales to non-FSU 
represented 79.9% of the total.6 When we analyze the breakdown of the non-FSU category (Far-Abroad), 
which has an overwhelming importance within the general category of exports, we see that Europe in 
general, and the EU in particular, represent the major bloc of Gazprom´s natural gas sales abroad. Most 
importantly, the presence of Asia is still marginal. 
Gazprom´s annual report states: "Projects to supply up to 68 bcm of Russian natural gas per year 
to China along the western and eastern routes are among Gazprom Group’s key business priorities".7 As 
the same report highlights, a memorandum of understanding was signed in March 2013 to supply as much 
as 38bcm per year through a new route from Eastern Siberia.8 The route to China had been delayed for 
many years, mainly, as James Henderson explained, because of pricing disagreements, as Russia became 
trapped in the successful diversification efforts by Central Asia to China, so the latter did not need to 
yield to Gazprom´s conditions. As for Russia´s desire to activate the Western route first, which enables 
Gazprom to reroute Europe´s imports and offers an additional tool of pressure,9 China finally agreed on a 
second deal in November 2014.10 The situation in Ukraine since late 2013,11 arguably explains why 
Gazprom approved two projects where pricing rather reflects China´s and not Russia´s initial conditions. 
In any case, supplies to China will become possible only in the next years. At the time of writing, 
Gazprom´s only access to Asia, mainly Northeast Asia, is through LNG. As Henderson and Stern show, 
LNG exports, mainly from Sakhalin II, are the only resources from either Eastern Siberia or the Russian 
Far East that are commercialized abroad, with 2bcm of LNG per annum exported in 2013, and those go 
                                                           
5
 "Annual report" (2013), op. cit., p. 64. 
6
 Calculation by the author from: Ibid., p. 63. 
7
 Ibid., p. 70. 
8
 Ibid., Idem. 
9
 Henderson, James: "The pricing debate over Russian gas exports to China", Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, NG 56 
(September 2011), p. 2, at http://www.oxfordenergy.org/2011/10/the-pricing-debate-over-russian-gas-exports-to-china-2/. 
10
 Cunningham, Nick: "Russia in weak position for new gas deal with China", CS Monitor, 12 November 2014, at 
http://www.csmonitor.com/Environment/Energy-Voices/2014/1112/Russia-in-weak-position-for-new-gas-deal-with-China 
(Accessed on the 12ve January 2015). For a thorough analysis on the power correlation between Russia and China regarding 
pricing policy, see: Belyi, Andrei´: "Russia´s gas export reorientation from West to East: economic and political 
considerations", Journal of World Energy and Law, 12 January 2015, at 
http://jwelb.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2015/01/12/jwelb.jwu037.full?keytype=ref&ijkey=r0CQFlQrtLYu8RD#abstract-
1 (Accessed on the 13th January 2015). 
11
 A thorough review of the events surrounding the "Euromaidan" and its aftermath, namely, Crimea´s annexation and ongoing 
civil war in Donetsk and Lugansk, can be found in the following works: Wilson, Andrew (2014): Ukraine Crisis: what it 
means for the West, New Haven; London, Yale University Press; Sakwa, Richard (2015): Frontline Ukraine: crisis in the 
borderlands, London, IB Tauris and Howard, Colby and Pukhov, Ruslan (2014): Brothers armed: military aspects of the crisis 
in Ukraine, East View Press, CAST, Moscow. 
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almost exclusively to Eastern Asia.12 Compared to the whole volume of natural gas exports to non-FSU 
countries, this represents a marginal 1.1%.13 
Regarding the rest (98,9%) of non-FSU countries, natural gas exports are exclusively concentrated 
on the European market. As stated above, Gazprom includes one of its biggest consumers, Turkey, in this 
category. Turkey imported 26.7bcm in 2013, according to Gazprom´s annual report.14 This represents a 
sizable share of 15.3% of all non-FSU exports in 2013. Thus, the bulk of Gazprom´s exports within the 
non-FSU category goes to the EU market. If excluding LNG exports in the Far-East, Turkey´s 
consumption and the minor volumes imported by Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia and Macedonia, which 
account for not even 2.25bcm,15 the EU market represents 82.31% of non-FSU markets. To this should be 
added volumes corresponding to consumption in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, which are included as 
FSU countries and which consume a total of 4.5bcm.16  The EU´s share of total exports, according to its 
volume is 63.26% and 32% of total sales by Gazprom (that is, including Russia´s internal market). 
However, given the price differential between non-FSU, FSU and Russian markets, the EU´s share is 
higher when taking Gazprom´s revenues into account. Both Non-FSU and the FSU market are based on 
market prices, as most countries already pay advantageous (unsubsidized) prices for Gazprom. The 
Russian market, on the contrary, is subsidized. Based on revenues, the Non-FSU (where, as we earlier 
saw, the EU represents 82.31% of all sales), accounts for 58.4% of Gazprom´s revenues of natural gas 
sales (the bulk of its business); excluding Turkey, the Far East and America and the three non-EU Balkan 
consumers, while adding the three Baltic Republics, the EU market yields a total share of Gazprom´s 
revenues, which is much higher than its share in volume of natural gas, which accounts for only 32%.17  
 
 
                                                           
12
 "Annual report" (2013), op. cit., p. 71. It is interesting to note here, that Henderson and Stern provide a radically different 
figure: 14.6bcm only from Sakhalin II (Henderson, James and Stern Jonathan: "The potential impact on Asian gas markets of 
Russia´s Eastern gas strategy", Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (February 2014), at 
http://www.oxfordenergy.org/2014/02/the-potential-impact-on-asia-gas-markets-of-russias-eastern-gas-strategy/, which 
according to Gazprom´s Annual report, sold only 0.8bcm ("Annual report" (2013), op. cit., p. 71). This is surprising as until 
late 2013, Gazprom had an exclusive right to export natural gas (see: Cunningham, Nick: "Russia takes steps to increase LNG 
exports", Oil Price, 23 November 2013, at http://oilprice.com/Energy/Natural-Gas/Russia-Takes-Steps-to-Increase-LNG-
Exports.html (Accessed on the 7th October 2014). 
13
 Calculation by the author from: "Annual report" (2013), op. cit., p. 64. Besides East Asia, some of the volumes are exported 
to America, as Gazprom shows for 2012: http://www.gazprom.com/about/marketing/ (Accessed on the 8th October 2014). 
14
 "Annual report" (2013), op. cit., p. 64. 
15
 Serbia consumed in 2013 2bcm, Bosnia-Herzegovina 0.2bcm, whereas Macedonia is credited for having imported less than 
0.05bcm (see: Ibid., Idem.).  
16
 Estonia consumed in 2013 0.7bcm, Latvia 1.1bcm and Lithuania 2.7bcm (see: Ibid., p. 69). 
17
 Calculation by the author from: Ibid., pp. 62-70. 
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Gazprom´s natural gas exports to Europe and its dependence on transit countries 
The figures above clearly show how the EU´s normative may represent a threat for Gazprom. However, 
they also clarify Russia´s dependency on transit countries like Belarus and Ukraine. These two countries 
are the necessary transit route for most exports of natural gas further West. Thus, Russia is trapped in a 
pattern of double dependence, for which it searches double diversification, from Europe as the main 
geographical area of consumption, and from the transit countries that lead to it.18 The picture that has 
been presented above is similar to what prevailed in the period 2005-2008, which corresponds to the three 
case studies analyzed in chapters 6-8. LNG exports from Sakhalin II had not begun yet, as the LNG 
export terminal was inaugurated in February 2009, one month after the 2009 January energy dispute. 19 
Thus excluding the marginal deliveries of natural gas to East Asia, the balance was almost the same as 
showed above.  
In this section we do not focus on the balance of Gazprom´s exports of natural gas to the EU, 
which we already discussed in chapter 5. On the contrary, here will be considered the impact of transit 
countries on Russia as a gas exporter. As has been showed, no other region (apart from the FSU and 
Russia itself) can balance the preeminence of Europe within the category of non-FSU natural gas sales. 
Then, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the former Soviet republics of Belarus and Ukraine became 
independent, and Russia had to start relying on them as transit countries for all natural gas sales by 
Gazprom to Western and Central Europe and Turkey. The relevance of these two countries in general, 
and the enormous importance of Ukraine as opposed to Belarus, is manifest. More than the reliance on 
these two countries, the most troublesome element for Gazprom was the imbalance between Belarus and 
Ukraine. In fact, as a transit country, Belarus was marginal. The downside of relying on Ukraine had 
already become manifest during the 90s energy crisis (see chapter 4).  
The pipeline infrastructure that was built during the Cold War privileged Ukraine over Belarus.20 
Four main gas trunks serving the bulk of European consumers, transit Ukraine: Bratstvo, Soyuz, Urengoi-
                                                           
18
 See: Götz, Roland: "Mythos Diversifizierung. Europa und das Erdgas des kaspischen Raums", Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 
Auslands informationen (September 2007), p. 40, at http://www.kas.de/wf/de/34.5/ac.archive/.  
19
 The LNG terminal in Sakhalin II was a project that had nothing to do with the disputes between Russia and Ukraine in 
previous years. However, a link was made, at least at the rhetorical level, between Russian calls to geographically diversify its 
energy exports and the heavy  publicity that was granted to this inauguration (see: Pardo, Eric: "Northern territories and Japan-
Russia relations: latest developments under Prime-Minister Taro Aso", UNISCI Discussion Papers, no. 20 (May 2009), p. 229, 
at http://pendientedemigracion.ucm.es/info/unisci/ .  
20
 For a general picture of the pipeline system that was built over this period through Belarus and Ukraine (and Moldavia), and 
which is briefly explained below, see: Yafimava, Katja (2011): The transit dimension of EU energy security: Russian gas 
transit across Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova, Oxford; New York, Oxford University Press, Map 4.1., p. 77. For a very 
illustrative explanation of the "cursed" inheritance of the USSR for both Russia and Ukraine, see: Balmaceda, Margarita 
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Uzhgorod and Progress: Bratstvo paradoxically developed out of Ukraine when this republic was the 
main producer of natural gas and it contributed to its overexploitation as its resources were needed to 
cover international demand, given the delay in exploiting Siberian fields.21  Starting from 1966 and 
expanding until 1980, mostly to Central Europe, but also to Western Europe,22 this pipeline became the 
first export outlet for Soviet gas and was later supplemented by the Soyuz pipeline.23 Thereafter came the 
controversial construction of the second main route,24 the Urengoi-Uzhgorod pipeline, also known at the 
time as Yamal, or "East-West", among those Western European countries who cooperated, as they were 
the customers for gas contracted through it. The pipeline was inaugurated in 1983, and was later 
supplemented by the parallel pipeline "Progress", built in cooperation with the CMEA countries.25  
In contrast to Ukraine, Belarus assumed a much more modest role, with the construction of the 
pipeline "Northern-Lights".26 However, while much of the gas transported by this pipeline is meant for 
internal consumption of Belarus, the main export line that continues beyond the territory of the nowadays 
independent republic turns south into Ukraine´s territory to join the main pipeline trunk.27 Small pipelines 
branch out directly to Poland, Lithuania and even as far as Latvia, but represent very limited supplies. 
Thus, besides pipelines crossing Ukraine, with the end of the Soviet Union, Russia´s Gazprom depended 
only on the small capacity of Northern Lights and the direct link to Finland, the "Finland Connector". 
Ukraine´s preeminence, coupled with the great capacity for underground storage it possesses in 
the Western part of its territory,28 with a total capacity of 32bcm,29 led to a share of 90% of Russian gas 
                                                                                                                                                                                                            
(2013): The politics of energy dependency: Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus between domestic oligarchs and Russian pressure, 
Toronto, Buffalo, London, University of Toronto Press, chapter 2. 
21
 Heinrich, Andreas (2014): "Introduction: export pipelines in Eurasia", in Heinrich, Andreas and Pleines, Heiko (eds.): 
Export pipelines from the CIS region: geopolitics, securitization and political decision-making, Stuttgart, Ibidem-Verlag, pp. 
33-34.  
22
 The first country to receive Soviet gas was Austria, neighbor to Czechoslovakia, the main recipient of the pipeline. This 
episode is thoroughly described in: Högselius, Per (2013): Red Gas: Russia and the origins of European energy dependence, 
New York, Palgrave MacMillan, chapter 4. 
23
 Heinrich, "Introduction: export", op. cit., pp. 33-34. 
24
 For the controversy it generated among Western allies, see chapter 5, p. 108 (ftn. 17). 
25
 Heinrich, "Introduction: export", op. cit., pp. 35-38. 
26
 Ibid., p. 35. 
27
 Paradoxical as it may seem, the option of re-orienting some of the export lines through Belarus and Poland was excluded in 
itself for reasons similar to which today push Russia to avoid Ukraine. During the 80s, it was not considered politically safe to 
use the route of Poland, given its political instability and the danger of US sanctions if this was interpreted as support to the 
Polish regime (see: Victor, David & Victor, Nadejda Makarova: "The Belarus connection: Exporting Russian gas to Germany 
and Poland", Geopolitics of Gas Working Paper Series, Baker Center, Stanford (August 2004), pp. 28-29,  
http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/20603/Yamal_final.pdf).  
28
 Balmaceda, "The politics of energy dependency", op. cit., p. 94. 
29
 As seen in the previous chapters devoted to the energy disputes, gas stored in these facilities is vital for Gazprom´s exports 
to the rest of Europe. For details on the underground storage capacity in Ukraine, see: IEA (2006): "Ukraine: energy policy 
review", pp. 208 (Box 6.2); 2012 (Table 6.1), at 
http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/ukraine2006.pdf. 
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transited to Europe.30 Depending on whether Turkey is included or not in the category of Europe, this 
percentage is sometimes higher. However, as it is important here to take into account all customers who 
depend on transit countries, the inclusion of Turkey seems natural. 
Gazprom´s efforts to diversify away from Ukraine: the Yamal Pipeline and the Blue Stream    
The extreme imbalance between Ukraine and Belarus as transit countries and the troublesome energy 
relation Russia had with the former, in sharp contrast to Belarus, made of the latter a suitable alternative 
to reduce dependence on Kiev and thus to mitigate the impact of the constant energy disruptions Gazprom 
had to suffer during that period. 
Yamal Pipeline through Belarus and Poland 
The project of building the Yamal Pipeline,31 or Belarus Connector,  saw the light during the decade of 
the 90s. The project was born out of mostly commercial reasons, namely, to cover an increasing demand 
in Germany (and eventually Poland too), for which crossing Belarus and Poland represented the most 
direct and sensitive alternative. In addition, all the troubles that dependency on Ukraine caused, provided 
an additional argument for the spur´s construction,  aimed at reaching a capacity of as much as 67bcm per 
year.32 However, it was downsized as a response to lesser demand than initially planned. Therefore, 
instead of two spurs, only one was built. This spur reached an initial capacity of 20bcm,33 with the 
potential to reach 33bcm if additional compressor stations were built.34 The maximum was reached in 
2006, six years after its going online.35   
Since then, this pipeline has not expanded its capacity. Russia favors the project of Yamal II,36 
which would add at least 15bcm (half of the second spur´s capacity as originally planned). 37  This 
expansion was revived in 2013 and provoked a great deal of controversy in Poland: The Polish 
government disavowed a memorandum signed by EuroPolGaz, owner of the Polish section of the Yamal 
pipeline, to build the second pipeline. The goal of this pipeline was to serve Poland, Slovakia and 
                                                           
30
 Yafimava, "The transit dimension of EU energy security", op. cit.,  p. 78, ftn. viii. 
31
 As had happened with the "Urengoi-Uzhgorod" pipeline, which was originally called Yamal, the Belarus Connector was 
supposed to extract resources from the peninsula of Yamal, hence its original denomination. It suffered in this respect the same 
fate as its predecessor, as it remained too costly to tap resources from this region. 
32
 Ibid., p. 21. 
33
 Ibid., Idem. 
34
 Ibid., pp. 26-27. 
35
 Heinrich, "Introduction: export", op. cit., p. 42. 
36
 See: Heinrich, Andreas: "Poland as a transit country for Russian natural gas: potential for conflict", KICES Working Papers, 
no. 9-10 (September 2007). 
37
  Heinrich, "Introduction: export", op. cit., p. 43. 
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Hungary through Belarus instead of Ukraine,38 reviving a project considered from 1992 to 1995, where a 
spur from "Northern Lights" would go directly to Slovakia and avoid Ukraine.39 Since that rejection, the 
project remains abandoned. 
Blue Stream from Russia to Turkey by the Black Sea 
The other pipeline that was laid down recently and which strongly contributed to reduce Russia´s 
Ukraine´s share as transit country for Gazprom´s natural gas exports, was the pipeline known as Blue 
Stream. Its reason to be, derived from the rate of increasing consumption in Turkey of natural gas, which 
during the 90s jumped from 6bcm in 1993 to 10,3bcm in 1998; according to assessments at the time, 
Turkey´s consumption was to reach as much as 45bcm in 2005.40 
Blue Stream was the first underwater pipeline built by Gazprom, linking Russia directly to Turkey 
through the Black Sea. It was built in cooperation with the Italian ENI, who mastered the technique to 
build underwater pipelines. Russia and Turkey signed an agreement in December 1997.41 Its capacity was 
designed to cover a yearly volume of as much as 16bcm. The classic fears regarding energy cooperation 
with Russia and the possible dangers of dependency on Gazprom made the project controversial from its 
very beginning.42 However, the option of a direct link through the Black Sea still seemed better than 
laying the new pipeline through the troublesome Caucasus.43 
Its positive aspects may explain why the pipeline was finally built after all, in spite of initial 
reservations. However, the road to full implementation remained far from a quiet one. Initial 
disagreements started surfacing from the very beginning regarding prices and contracted volumes. 
Therefore, instead of 2003, when the pipeline was already fully operational, the inauguration ceremony 
took place only two years later.44 Since then, far from 16bcm, the Blue Stream´s capacity has remained 
underused.45 It must be said that Blue Stream was projected and eventually built against the background 
                                                           
38
 "Poland: government plays down Gazprom-EuRoPol memo",  Natural Gas Europe, 8th of April 2012, at 
http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/gazprom-europol-yamal-pipeline-two (Accessed on the 10th October 2014). 
39
 Victor & Victor, "The Belarus connection", op. cit., p. 29. 
40
 "Iuzhnyi´ Potok (ЮЖНЫЙ ПОТОК)", Neftegazavaia Vertikal´, 31 May 2008 (Accessed on the 18th April 2013, from Integrum, 
Helsinki University). 
41
 Bacik, Gökhan: "The Blue Stream project, energy cooperation and conflicting interests", Turkish Studies, vol. 2, no. 2 
(Autumn 2001), p. 85. 
42
 Ibid., p. 89. 
43
 Krauer-Pacheco, Ksenia: "Turkey as a transit country and energy hub: the link to its foreign policy aims", Forschungsstelle 
Osteuropa, no. 118 (December 2011), p. 34. 
44
 Ibid., Idem. 
45
 Heinrich, "Introduction: export", op. cit., p. 43. 
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of mistrust between Russia and Turkey. Once Blue Stream´s construction had been decided, Turkish 
officials´ unease in regard to dependence on Russia played in favor of other alternative projects.46  
The entrance on the scene of the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) Pipeline, also known as "Caucasus 
Pipeline", provided an additional source of gas for Turkey which arguably made unnecessary some of the 
supplies foreseen in Blue Stream. The BTE Pipeline was considered as soon as in 1999, when massive 
gas reserves were discovered in the Shah-Deniz field off Baku.47 Negotiations on this new diversification 
route were finished in 2003, precisely when the Blue Stream had become operational. It was at the time 
considered the BTE pipeline would deliver 6bcm of gas to Turkey per year.48 Deliveries to Turkey began 
in July 2007.49 This competition between Blue Stream and the BTE pipeline has therefore greatly limited 
the former´s relevance. As for projects to expand Blue Stream and add a second pipeline, Blue Stream II, 
both to expand supply to Turkey and supply other countries, as Greece and Italy, or even the Middle East, 
with Israel as the main customer,50 these have not progressed since then.  
Effects of Russia´s Diversification on Ukraine´s Share as Transit Country 
With Yamal-Europe and Blue Stream, the period 2005-2009 saw a certain reduction of Ukraine´s role as 
transit country, down from its share of 90% during the decade of the 90s. 
As the report "Natural Gas and Ukraine’s Energy Future", from the consulting company IHS 
CERA, shows, Ukraine´s share as transit country for the category of Europe, hovered by 2004, already 
around the usually mentioned figure of 80%; the exact percentage for that year was 78%.51 From 2004 to 
2008, a progressive reduction in Ukraine´s share took place. This, however, did not rob Ukraine of its 
preponderance in terms of percentage: In 2006, only two years later, the percentage dipped below 70%, 
with 68%, while the year 2008 finished slightly over 70%.52 During this period, as explained above, 
                                                           
46
 Winrow, Gareth T.: "Turkish National Interests", in Kalyuzhnova, Yelena; Jaffe, Amy Myers; Lynch, Dov and Sickles, 
Robin C. (2002): Energy in the Caspian region: present and future, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Palgrave, p. 235, 244 
47
 Babali, Tuncay: "Implications of the Baku-Tbilisi Ceyhan main oil pipeline project", Perceptions, vol. 10, no. 4 (Winter 
2005), p. 50. 
48
 Cornell, Svante; Tsereteli, Mamuka and Socor, Vladimir: "Geostrategic implications of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline", 
in Starr, S. Frederick and Cornell, Svante E.: "The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline: oil window to the West", Central Asia-
Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program (2005), p. 22. 
49
 Heinrich, "Introduction: export", op. cit., p. 67. 
50
 Socor, Vladimir: "Gazprom, Turkey revive and reconfigure Blue Stream two", Jamestown Foundation, Eurasia Daily 
Monitor, vol. 6, no. 154 (2009 August 11), at 
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=35394&no_cache=1#.VD02nRbp_FY (Accessed on the 13th October 
2014). 
51
 IHS CERA: "Natural gas and Ukraine´s energy future",  Ministry of Energy and Coal Industry of Ukraine (February 2012), 
p. 2-3 (27), Figure 2-3 "Transit of Gas Through Ukraine, 2004–10", at  http://s05.static-shell.com/content/dam/shell-
new/local/country/zaf/downloads/pdf/research-reports/Ukraine-Policy-Dialogue-report.pdf. 
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Yamal-Europe expanded its capacity, while Blue Stream started operating, providing an additional source 
of gas for Turkey. Ukraine´s share further sank in 2009, reaching as little as 62%.53 The long-drawn 
energy dispute of January 2009 probably offers an explanation for this lower percentage. However, 
reduced consumption due to the financial crisis in Europe might also have played an important role: 
Gazprom could have prioritized Yamal-Europe over the export pipelines running through Ukraine, 
instead of reducing pressure proportionally in all export routes. The report though, does not specify which 
countries are included within the generic category of Europe. The obvious question is whether Turkey is 
included or not. This is relevant, as the inclusion or not of Turkey determines whether only Yamal-
Europe, or Blue Stream too, is a cause for Ukraine´s share variations.  
In that respect, data from the IEA may be of some help.54 According to both IHS CERA and the 
IEA (IEA Ukraine Policy Review 2006), in 2004 and 2005, the figure for total transit volume is slightly 
below 140bcm.55 While no discrepancy on this figure exists, both reports, however, disagree on the 
percentage of natural gas that transits through Ukraine to Europe: 84% for the IEA,56 versus 78%-76% for 
IHS CERA.57 However, the IEA report from 2012 does provide more details on the destiny of supplies of 
gas transiting through Ukraine; instead of establishing the generic category of Europe, the 2012 Ukraine 
Energy Policy Review distinguishes between EU-27 and the rest, where Russia, the Balkans and Turkey 
are included.58 Between 2005 and 2006, the volumes of natural gas for EU-27 transited through Ukraine 
suffer a sharp reduction, from slightly more than 120bcm to only above 110bcm, in what is roughly a 
reduction of 10bcm. 59  This coincides with the percentage calculated by IHS CERA, where 2005 
corresponds to 76% and 2006 to only 68%.60 A calculation of percentages from IEA data, equating the 
volume of 2005 in IEA to the percentage for 2005 provided by IHS CERA, yields a near coincidence 
when extrapolating to 2006.61 This may be an indication that the share calculated in IHS CERA under the 
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denomination of Europe, corresponds to EU-27 and Yamal-Europe is responsible for the reduction. If this 
is so, the higher percentage by the IEA 2006, may account for the inclusion of Balkan and Turkey into the 
category of Europe. 
It seems clear that the period 2005-2009 did see a reduction in Gazprom´s dependence on Ukraine 
as a transit country. However, Ukraine´s role as transit country remained important enough as for Ukraine 
to retain its importance. The entrance in action of Yamal-Europe and Blue Stream did not arguably lessen 
the perception of dependence of Russia on Ukraine. Blue Stream only contributed to Turkey´s energy 
security, as only Ankara would henceforth enjoy the new pipeline´s spare capacity to make up for 
eventual cut-offs in volumes transiting through Ukraine. As for the EU, its energy security slightly 
improved but not equally for all its members, as it was Poland and Germany, who by the inclusion of 
Yamal-Europe, enjoyed the most. Russia could not extricate itself from its dependence on Ukraine as the 
main transit route for its natural gas exports to Europe. The immediate and devastating effects of natural 
gas cut-offs may clearly appear after having read chapters 6 and 8, where the energy disputes of January 
2006 and January 2009 led problems in energy supply.   
This explains why Russia and Gazprom were eager to promote other projects to bypass Ukraine. 
Alternative Diversification Routes for Gazprom before the period 2005-2009: the Baltic Option 
As Victor and Victor show, at the time of planning the construction of the Yamal-Europe pipeline, the 
Russian side was also considering other options. One of them, as mentioned above, was to partly bypass 
Ukraine through Slovakia (see pp 313-314). This served as inspiration for the project of Yamal-II, which 
never saw the light of day. 
Before the Orange Revolution in 2004, it is true that Gazprom even considered reinforcing  
Ukraine´s role as transit country. It must be remembered that, as we analyzed in chapter 4, energy 
relations between Russia and Ukraine improved with the nomination by President Kuchma in 2000 of 
Viktor Yushchenko as Prime Minister and Yulia Timoshenko as Vice-Prime Minister for Energy Issues. 
Massive natural off-takes ceased, for which the entrance in service of Yamal-Europe in 2000 has been 
                                                                                                                                                                                                            
percentage only slightly changes when assuming other similar values (122 +/- 2 or 112 +/- 2). Differences may account for 
imprecision or for the inclusion of European countries that enjoy direct supplies, namely, Finland and Estonia. Analyzing data 
from Gazprom (Annual Reports from 2005 (p. 54) and 2006 (p. 50), at 
http://www.gazprom.com/investors/reports/2005/ and http://www.gazprom.com/investors/reports/2006/),transit through 
Ukraine would yield 79,8% in 2005 and 71,02% in 2006. Although different, they do show a similar variation as that seen 
comparing IEA and IHS CERA reports above. The percentage should increase if we add other countries, whose gas transits 
Ukraine, specially Turkey´s substantial share. 
    
 
317 
 
credited as a disciplining element. Then after Yushchenko was fired, the pro-Russian turn taken by 
Kuchma led to the revival of talks concerning an energy consortium.62   
We had the occasion earlier to review every project of consortium considered in the 90s and we 
already know that each of them ended up coming to nil. The energy consortium discussed under Kuchma 
was the most promising project to date, even if a great deal of distrust still prevailed. Gazprom initially 
proposed an international consortium with the inclusion of Germany, which at the time was eager to 
increase gas sales. Germany´s presence could serve to either increase Ukraine´s trust, fearful as it was of 
seeing its energy infrastructures under Gazprom´s control or boosting Russia´s confidence that western 
interests would put pressure on Ukraine to avoid any disruption of natural gas flows.63 The initiative of 
establishing a gas consortium and increasing gas flows through Ukraine was fostered indeed by the 
improved performance of Ukraine as transit country, but also by the state of decay of its infrastructures, 
which sorely needed investments. Any eventual gas consortium, prior to adding new capacity to 
Ukraine´s GTS, would have to invest to avoid reduced capacity in the future.64 At the initial stage, every 
partner was thought to have convergent interests. However, as we know, the Orange Revolution put the 
project back on the shelf. 
The Baltic Option and the Birth of the Nord Stream Project 
The limited potential of any added capacity of the Yamal-Europe project and the unrealistic prospects of 
establishing a gas consortium in Ukraine gave ground to consider other alternative projects. Chief among 
these was the so-called Baltic Pipeline, later renamed Nord-Stream, eventually built in 2011, and which is 
one of the three pipeline projects whose development during the period 2005-2008 is analyzed below. 
The paradox was that while failure, or at least limited success (as was the case with Yamal-
Europe) of previous by-pass projects, opened up the ground for new options, the same obstacles that 
accounted for their poor achievements, remained. Prospected consumption in Germany had proved less 
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than expected (which led to the building of one instead of two spurs in the Belarus Connector). Neither 
could Russia convincingly make the case of increased production of natural gas to justify its new projects 
(The Belarus Connector as we know, only reached full capacity thanks to gas flows diverted from 
Ukraine). This was compounded, in the case of the Baltic option, by the ambitious scope of the project, 
which foresaw the construction of an underwater pipeline. This implied higher costs which made the 
project less competitive.  
As had been the case with the Urengoi-Uzhgorod pipeline in the 80s, 65 and the Yamal-Europe 
later, resources from the region of Yamal,66 challenging in terms of technical exploitation, had been 
promised as a supply basis. As the massive fields in the Yamal Peninsula were not developed on 
schedule, the Uzhgorod-Urengoi and Yamal-Europe pipelines had to draw natural gas from other sources. 
To date, the resource-rich region is fully explored but has not been developed yet.67 If neither increased 
consumption nor new developments could be forecast and with limited potential already covered by 
Yamal-Europe, the prospects for the Baltic Option could only improve if a strategic choice for massively 
diverting gas flows from Ukraine was made. In fact, this is what eventually happened to Nord Stream 
when it came online from 2011-12: it remains underused and feeds mostly from gas previously transited 
through Ukraine. However, although the Ukraine- bypass option was probably considered in secret as the 
most reasonable option, Nord Stream would again brandish the promise of Yamal gas to reinforce its 
candidature.  
In its very initial conception, Gazprom played on the expanded possibilities that the Baltic option 
could add. An underwater pipeline through the Baltic Sea offered a wider geographic reach compared to 
continental options like the Belarus Connector. Thus, already in 1990 (still under the Soviet Union), a 
British-Russian joint venture called Sovgazco, planned to service a large share of UK´s demand which 
was expected to double (which in fact it mostly did) from 55bcm.68 The project floundered, but the Baltic 
route had  started nurturing new projects. Back in the 90s, after the fall of the Soviet Union, Gazprom was 
trying already to revive similar projects. The Russian state monopoly had in 1997 joined the Finnish 
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Neste Oil and it created a joint venture to lay a pipeline across the Baltic Sea. German Ruhrgas soon 
joined them.69  
Improving relations with Ukraine in the first years of the 2000s decade, however, reduced the need 
for diversifying and the Baltic option lost momentum. According to Per Högselius, the worsening of 
relations with Belarus, the very country that had appeared as the most viable alternative to Ukraine and 
with whom Gazprom had an energy dispute in January-February 2004, encouraged Russia to reconsider 
the Baltic option.70 The start of what would soon be known as the Nord Stream project (renamed so in 
2007), thus happened in 2005, some months before the momentous gas dispute between Ukraine and 
Russia in January 2006. In September 2005 an agreement was signed for the construction of the North 
European Gas Pipeline Co. (NEGP), which would be initially formed by Gazprom (51%), Ruhrgas-E.ON 
(24.5%) and BASF (24.5%).71 The project was favorably received in the European commission, which in 
fact had already named the NEGP pipeline as a project of interest back in 2000.72  
The "anti-Gazprom" diversification alternatives: the trans-Caspian route and Nabucco 
Not only Gazprom and the Russian government were moving to eliminate or at least reduce insecurities 
derived from dependence on Eurasian energy tremors. If from the perspective of Russia excessive 
dependence on transit countries is troublesome, especially given the experience of the 90s with Ukraine, 
dependency in general is not wanted by any actor involved in complex energy relations. Russia has, as 
analyzed in this chapter, a heavy degree of dependency on EU countries and can hardly expect to remove 
that dependency, at least in the short term. However, from the perspective of European consumers, 
dependency on Russia can also be seen as troublesome in itself, either through fear of an eventual 
political use of its natural resources, or as a result of the very same problems that stem from the troubled 
Russia-Ukraine energy relations.  
Diversification from Russia thus had already become a very current topic in the 90s, when 
problems became manifest. Central Asian and Caucasian natural gas resources soon appeared capital as a 
basis for diversifying away from Russia. EU countries, complementary to Russia as consumers of 
Gazprom´s gas, thus  became  potential competitors of Russia for the control of resources in the former 
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Soviet space.73 Turkey was also as much a partner as a competitor of Russia, as it was a consumer and the 
necessary transit country both for Gazprom´s projects like Blue Stream and South Stream and for Trans-
Caspian projects.   
Diversification projects from Central Asia 
Diversification started with oil resources from the Caspian Sea, in what was known as the new "Great 
Game". Western oil companies rushed to the region as soon as the fall of the Soviet Union opened up the 
access to new hydrocarbon resources. As Pavel Baev shows, much of the hype was based on fantastic 
assessments of real resources and on equally flawed assumptions of profit margins.74 However, a certain 
success was reached with the creation of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) and the inauguration of 
the Tengiz-Novorossiisk pipeline from the Caspian Sea to an export terminal in the Black Sea, operative 
since 2001. This pipeline, the only one in Russian territory not owned by Transneft, benefits Russia, as it 
does not bypass it. The eventually limited resources in the Caspian region reduced the danger for Russia 
to see its monopsony challenged. However, The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline, agreed on 
between 1999 and 2000,75 and inaugurated in 2006, in parallel to the above-mentioned Baku-Tbilisi-
Erzurum (BTE) gas pipeline (inaugurated that same year), did challenge Russia to a larger extent. These 
new pipelines started supplying international markets with Azerbaijan´s resources through Georgia and 
Turkey in avoidance of Russia. The same as with oil, natural gas was the object of similar games, 
focusing on the main producers of natural gas in the region, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan.  
The great new natural gas game 
From the very beginning of post-Soviet independence, Russia understood that Turkmenistan, the main gas 
producer from Central Asia, represented a dangerous competitor. Even if it remained an important 
independent supplier of gas to Ukraine until 2006 (see chapter 6), Gazprom had already closed in October 
1993 the door to direct supplies to Europe, after they had been initially allowed.76 Consumer countries 
within the post-Soviet space, such as Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Armenia became the only alternative for 
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Turkmenistan.77 This tied Ashgabad to Russia, whose territory was essential for accessing these countries, 
and worse, to Ukraine as its main consumer. Finding new outlets and escaping the devastating 
consequences of depending on such an unreliable customer as Ukraine, became imperative. From the 
other side of the Caspian Sea, Europe and Turkey were also sensing the opportunity. 
The idea of transporting natural gas from the Middle East through pipelines appeared first in the 
70s. Back then, the project was to export Iran´s gas through Turkey all the way west to Europe.78 The 
project floundered after the Iranian Revolution, but the fall of the Soviet Union opened promising new 
prospects. Thus, in the early 90s, a project was already being considered to lay a pipeline from 
Turkmenistan to Turkey through Iran, in order to transport 15bcm of natural gas for Turkey´s domestic 
market.79 Funds however, could not be found, as the US remained adamantly opposed to any form of 
energy partnership involving Iran.80 This shattered the project´s prospects. In the meantime, Turkey also 
favored a technically more complicated route crossing the Caspian Sea underwater and which would 
remove any possible inconvenience from the Iran side. Henceforth, most of the projects in the region 
necessarily involved the Caspian as the most suitable route. To reinforce its prospects, newly discovered 
resources from Azerbaijan´s huge deposits of Khan Deniz soon appeared.  
An additional factor which imposed celerity was that the window of opportunity might be closing 
as other actors entered the fray. Turkmenistan´s position made it the object not only of Europe, Turkey 
and Russia´s competition. Knocking on the door were also Iran, Pakistan and China.81 Before China 
reached an agreement in 2009 and changed the whole energy equation in the region,82 only Iran had 
offered so far a modest option for diversification to Turkmenistan. This happened with the Korpedzhe-
Kurt-Kui pipeline, built in 1997 and where limited volumes of natural gas (the pipeline remained below 
capacity) were exported.83 This diversification outlet further developed its potential in the coming years 
with the construction of two more pipelines, Artyk-Loftabad in December 2000 and Dauletabad-Sarakhs-
Khangiran in 2010.84 Before the appearance of China in the complex game and given the impossibility of 
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building any pipeline through Afghanistan which might reach Pakistan, the turf remained, though, mostly 
in the hands of Russia from one side and Europe/Turkey from the other. 
A variant of the initial Turkmenistan-Iran-Turkey project resurfaced in the late 90s, which more 
ambitiously, would have transported gas beyond Turkey to Bulgaria and further into Europe, to 
potentially reach the German market. 85  If this time the US administration, eager to promote 
diversification routes from Central Asia, seemed to be favorable, the eventual fall in demand by the 
Turkish market, beset by a financial crisis in 1999, and the increase of supply (see Azerbaijan and Russia) 
reduced the whole project to a single pipeline of Iranian gas to Turkey, inaugurated in 2001.86 Eventually, 
the Korpedzhe-Kurt-Kui pipeline was upgraded in 2006, so finally 6bcm of Turkmen gas could be 
exported to Turkey through Iran.87 
The birth of Nabucco 
The flurry of projects that had been planned in the  90s and that either failed or materialized in downsized 
versions, was only the beginning of the Trans-Caspian dreams and the precursors of the most defined 
version, in competition with parallel Russian projects as Nord Stream and eventually South Stream, the 
Nabucco pipeline. 
The idea of Nabucco was voiced first by the US in 1996.88 However, it was not until 2002, that the 
project received its current name. It was at the time, the Austrian OMV and the Turkish Botas who had 
the idea to name the future pipeline from Verdi´s homonymous opera.89 Soon after this, along with the 
Austrian and Turkish companies, gas companies from Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary joined the project 
and signed a declaration of intent to build the pipeline.90  As had been the case with Nord Stream, 
Nabucco attracted the interest of the European Commission as a project of diversification, in line with the 
spirit of the Green Paper published two years before on the security of energy supply.91 The Green Paper, 
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among other objectives, focused on diversifying the geographic origin of energy sources and sources of 
supply.92 
Three years later, in June 2005, the five shareholders signed an agreement to establish a joint 
venture, and more importantly, they started contacting potential suppliers, such as Azerbaijan and Iran.93 
As we will see below, Nabucco´s ambition was to open up for Europe´s market natural gas resources 
from the Middle East and Central Asia. However, it would soon face a set of problems that were clearly 
almost unsolvable. Among these were the impossibility of securing enough resources for its first stage, 
where Azerbaijan was to be an essential piece and the difficulty to link up with Turkmenistan, both for 
geographical and political reasons: laying an underwater pipeline through the Caspian Sea was complex 
and onerous, while Turkmenistan was developing a very fruitful multivectorial energy diversification 
policy, in which both Russia and mainly, China, were better positioned. However, the main obstacle, from 
which derived the two previous ones, was the US obduracy at allowing energy cooperation with the most 
promising potential partner: Iran. Iran´s participation in the Nabucco project would have enabled, not 
only substantial resources, but also allowed a much easier connection with Turkmenistan. In addition to 
difficulties with suppliers, Nabucco´s partners, paradoxically concerned with dependency on Russian 
natural gas and disruptions related with transit countries like Ukraine, had to face the disadvantage of 
cooperation with a potential transit country, Turkey, far from being a comfortable one. 
In any case, Nabucco was to receive a clear boost as a consequence of the January 2006 energy 
dispute, which played into the narrative favorable to diversification.   
 
10. 2. Pipeline Projects from the Post-Soviet Space from 2006 to 2009: Competence between 
Nabucco and Nord and South Stream 
This section will review the evolution of three major pipeline projects, Nord Stream, South Stream and 
Nabucco, which were developed partly during the period 2006-2008, from the beginning of the January 
2006 dispute (chapter 6), to the last dispute in January 2009 (chapters 7 and 8). As shown above, Nord 
Stream and Nabucco existed already as potential projects, even if still at very early stages, before the 
beginning of the whole period 2006-2008. The interest of a detailed analysis exclusively concerning this 
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period, lies in the influence these diversification projects might have had on the genesis and course of the 
disputes. 
As was already explained in the introductory chapter, we choose these three pipelines for their 
explicit character as either (in a simplified fashion) pro- or anti-Russian. This is enabled by the fact that 
from one side, Nord Stream and South Stream, reinforce or at least maintain dependency on Gazprom, 
while offering routes that reduce Ukraine´s importance as a transit country, either adding new natural gas 
(thus reducing Ukraine´s share) or diverting gas previously transited instead. In this respect, both 
pipelines, which we can identify as diversification projects from transit countries, fit into the narrative of 
producers (Russia and Gazprom in this case) and consumers (EU countries in this case) having a common 
interest in avoiding Belarus and Ukraine. 
From the other side, Nabucco instead of reinforcing or consolidating EU´s energy relations with 
the Russian Federation, pursues the creation of a new route from the Middle East and Central Asia. If 
initially focusing on Iran, Nabucco soon took in its inception a more challenging turn to Russia, when it 
started mainly targeting Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan´s natural gas resources. Nabucco thus became a 
challenger of Gazprom´s monoposony in the post-Soviet space. In this respect, Nabucco perfectly fits into 
the contrary narrative of avoidance of Gazprom as a troublesome partner.  
Nord and South Stream from one side and Nabucco from the other, represent opposite lessons 
drawn from energy disputes between Russia and transit countries such as Belarus and Ukraine.94 We will 
start our analysis from 2006 and not from 2005, as in chapter 6, for two reasons: first, the stage of 
development of both Nord Stream and Nabucco during 2005 was still very embryonic, while the project 
of South Stream did not even exist. Second,  it is reasonable to consider the progress of these projects as a 
direct feedback of what "lesson" was extracted after January 2006 and to see whether Russian 
management of the two following disputes in March 2008 and January 2009 has a correlation with their 
progress. 
Of course, diversification policy is not the only element that can be considered as a sign for the 
Russian federation of what direction the European Union in general, and its members in particular were 
moving to and to assess the existing risk of a backlash as a result of disputes with transit countries, where 
Russia might be held responsible. As we briefly reviewed in chapter 5, these years witnessed an 
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increasing opposition between the EU integrationist and market-based approach and the Russian the 
bilateral and state-based approach. An increasing gap regarding the Energy Charter Treaty, the deepening 
of EU energy integration through its successive energy packages and the expansion of the Energy 
Community (Ukraine became a member in 2011) was steadily developing during these years.  
Neither do we have to look exclusively at the EU´s responses in the energy realm. Some of the 
Russian Federation´s actions may be enlightening in themselves. The Russian demand in the G8 Summit 
in Saint-Petersburg, 15-17 July 2006, which was devoted to energy security, to broaden the concept of 
energy security to include along with security of supply for consumers, security of demand for producers, 
as well as the proposal at the Summit with Germany in October of that same year to establish an energy 
partnership between Moscow and Berlin, were moves aimed at securing a suitable position as an energy 
partner. The Russian project of creating a natural gas OPEC was clearly more proactive and aggressive, 
as it was intended to nullify the margin of action of the EU countries to diversify away from Gazprom in 
the international market.95   
However, many of these initiatives failed to concretize beyond mere declarations. As for the 
implementation of real diversification, not just the promotion of policies of diversification, tracking the 
progress of the pipeline development remains the best indicator. It must be pointed out that while neither 
Russia managed to escape dependence on the EU (see pp. 308-310), nor did Europe significantly 
diversify its imports of consumed natural gas or started prioritizing other energy sources. In the period 
comprising the three years between 2006 and 2008, the EU´s consumption of Gazprom´s energy sources 
remained stable; in fact, it even increased in 2007 from 166.4bcm to 173.8bcm.96 Besides, whatever 
reconsideration of the Russian Federation as a suitable partner would hardly have happened so swiftly in 
any case. Thus, between general guidelines and declarations on diversification and energy security from 
the part of the EU, and concrete steps of geographical diversification in natural gas supply that may be 
tracked through progress on pipeline development, we will choose a detailed analysis of the latter. It must 
also be taken into consideration that these pipelines retained a non-negligible geo-political importance for 
the Russian Federation´s foreign policy beyond its immediate energy consequences, eager as Moscow 
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was to maintain and improve bilateral ties with key partners in Western Europe (see: Germany and Nord 
Stream) and to avoid foreign penetration of its Near-Abroad (see: Nabucco and Turkmenistan). The 
importance that Moscow attributed to these pipelines fortunes as signal was probably quite high.  
Below zed in three different sections, the development of Nord Stream, South Stream and 
Nabucco are analyzed.  
Nord-Stream 
As we had occasion to mention above, Nord-Stream had already been shaped before the January 2006 
dispute happened. Then, after remaining dormant for a long period, it found a significant boost in the new 
conditions created by the turbulences of Russia-Ukraine energy relations in the period that concerns us. 
Nord Stream and the January 2006 Dispute 
The backlash from most European countries, outraged by the supply disruptions that ensued for a period 
of three days as a result of the January 2006 dispute, was a blow to Gazprom´s prestige, as Russia was 
generally blamed instead of Ukraine. However, Gazprom could also seize the occasion to blame Ukraine, 
promote another narrative and call for either explicitly bypassing Ukraine or for complementing that 
dependency with new and direct supplies. This was what the Baltic pipeline offered, namely, an 
alternative devoid of any worrisome transit countries. It is interesting to consider that, while the effects of 
the dispute, discursively negative for Gazprom, spurred Nabucco´s raison d´être (see below), a substantial 
interest for Nord Stream remained. More than that, the European Commission, one of the main supporters 
of Nabucco, nevertheless had to acknowledge, in the face of the outspoken opposition from the part of the 
Baltic Republics and Poland, that it could not influence private interests promoting the Baltic option.97 
True to the previous commitment by the EU to support the NEGP, the Commission would confirm in 
February 2007 the status of Nord Stream as a priority project,98 which, as mentioned already, had been 
granted back in 2000.99 
The particular dimension of private interests created a second layer, where geopolitical priorities 
derived from the interpretations of the dispute of January 2006 were put aside in favor of strictly 
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economic interests. It is in this respect interesting to consider the support provided by the Minister of 
Energy from the UK to the Baltic project, eying the potential for additional consumption of Russian gas 
to the current energy mix100 and the fact that the Dutch "Gasunie" signed with Gazprom in November 
2006 to join Nord Stream.101 After this, the breakdown in Nord Stream was arranged as follows: Gazprom 
51%, E.ON 20%, BASF 20% (both down from 24.5%) and Gasunie 9%.102 Successes in the coming 
months in 2007 with "unexpected" partners continued, as when for example, the British "Centrica" 
expressed the possibility of creating a joint venture with Gazprom, eyeing precisely 2010, the year when 
Nord Stream´s first spur was to be inaugurated.103   
Cooperation with Gaz de France (GDF)-Suez, one of the key partners for Gazprom (France being 
an important consumer of Russian natural gas),104 was reinforced when supply contracts were renewed 
before expiry and subsequently extended until 2030. In exchange for exports from the future Nord 
Stream, Gazprom gained direct access in the upstream market in France.105 This was a good sign, as in 
fact GDF-Suez would eventually become a partner in the project. Wintershall (BASF energy subsidiary) 
made a promise to invest in Nord Stream in March 2007 represented an additional and clear support to the 
project. 106  Further, Wingas Transport (Wintershall-Gazprom JV) pledged to build two pipelines to 
connect Nord Stream with the German network: OPAL and NEL. 107  RWE would later start the 
construction of a pipeline in the Czech Republic which connected the country to Nord Stream.108 
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For sure, cooperation at the private level was not devoid of obstacles, though. A clear sign of this 
was when Gazprom showed how far it was ready to yield to its partners in order to increase the whole 
project´s attractiveness: in an agreement signed on 29th August 2006 with its main partners (when the 
name of the North European Gas Pipeline Company (NEGP) was officially changed to "Nord Stream"), 
Gazprom accepted that its subsidiary "GazExport" would pay Nord Stream all costs of transporting the 
maximum of 27,5bcm of the first tranche´s total capacity, and that independently of whether buyers were 
found or whether any gas actually flowed.109 Gazprom was ready to subsidize Nord Stream directly.   
In the summer 2007, then, Gazprom faced certain difficulties with both E.ON and Gasunie. The 
main contention with the former concerned the way active assets would be swapped in the "Yuzhno-
Russkoe" natural gas field. This field had to supply the future pipeline: Gazprom claimed that in 
exchange for the shares it was offering to E.ON, the German company offered in exchange underpriced 
assets in E.On Foldgaz Storage, E.ON Foldgaz Trade and E.ON Hungaria.110 E.ON´s permanence in Nord 
Stream was even called into question by this disagreement. Confirming the entrance of the Dutch Gasunie 
in Nord Stream was thus crucial to exert credible pressure on E.ON. However, problems with Gasunie 
also surfaced: Gazprom was not satisfied with the shares Gasunie offered in the pipeline Balgzand Bacton 
Line (BBL), which connected the Netherlands with the United Kingdom in exchange for its participation 
in Nord Stream.111 E.ON, by the way, proposed to complement its assets in Hungary with part of its 
shares in electric infrastructures in the UK.112 
In November 2007, after initial disagreements during the summer, the definitive entrance of 
Gasunie into Nord Stream was decided.113 This clearly reinforced the project of Nord Stream, increasing 
the support from one additional European country, precisely in a moment in which the offensive from the 
Baltic countries was very strong (see below), securing financial investments for the pipeline too. At that 
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time, there was also talk of the possible entrance of British Petroleum (BP).114 Gasunie became officially 
holder of 9% of Nord Stream in June 2008.115 
Nord Stream, and the delicate balance of Gazprom in the EU 
However, the essential piece in any possible success of Nord Stream was the first geopolitical layer. Here 
the determining factor was the interplay between Russian and German interests. Unfortunately for Russia, 
relations with Germany were not necessarily as friendly as they might have appeared. Several changes 
had happened in Berlin that cast doubt on the resilience of the staunch German-Russian partnership. As a 
result of parliamentary elections in September 2005, Germany was henceforth ruled by a grand coalition 
between the CDU/CSU and the SPD, with the Christian-democrat Angela Merkel as chancellor. The 
former chancellor Gerhard Schroeder became Chairman of the Shareholders Committee of Nord Stream, 
while the more Russia-friendly SPD remained in the government. However, whether relations under the 
new conservative chancellor would not undergo significant changes, remained to be seen. Putin had 
offered his German counterpart an energy partnership that would cement the good energy relations that 
both countries had sustained to date. Instead, Angela Merkel proclaimed an energy alliance with France 
and insisted Russia signs the Energy Charter (see chapter 5).116  
This move was troublesome, as it put the two main Western European partners of Russia on the 
side of the EU integrationist approach, especially at a moment of acrimonious anti-Russian campaign 
from the side of Poland, which went as far as portraying Nord Stream as a security threat outright.117 
Besides this, the energy dispute between Russia and Belarus from January to February 2007, when oil 
supplies through Belarus were cut for two months, drew a clear condemnation from the side of the EU,118 
whose new energy policy clearly warned against excessive dependency on single suppliers.119 Poland´s 
more immediate worry was probably not as much security as economy-based: the construction of Nord 
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Stream would definitely bury any prospects for Yamal-II.120 Warsaw could not block Nord Stream as the 
pipeline would not cross its exclusive economic zone, while the EU had already earmarked Nord Stream 
as a project of strategic interest. However, the European Bank of Investments (EBI) announced that if 
Poland maintained its opposition, the institution could not provide any financial support to Nord 
Stream.121 This decision by the EBI (in the wake, by the way, of the European Bank of Reconstruction 
and Development´s (EBRD) decision not to finance Sakhalin-II), threw doubts on the readiness of private 
investors to eventually step in,122 as it might have covered as much as 30% of the project´s costs.123 This 
happened amid doubts of the costs of Nord Stream, as the impression was that Gazprom was hiding the 
real costs of the project.124  
The rising costs of Nord Stream always lurked in the background and posed a significant threat. 
This for example, was the case when Gerhard Schroeder announced that, as opposed to €5bill, Nord 
Stream´s total costs would amount to €8bill.125 He specifically pointed to costs related to ecological 
adaptation, 126  even if some analysts were skeptical that the modifications demanded by the Baltic 
countries could really have such a big financial impact.127 This was worrying news, as even if additional 
environment-related costs could not be blamed for these new figures, the fact was that the German BASF 
(partner through E.On) had recently talked of as much as €9bill. Soon more details transpired, which 
confirmed that instead of environmental issues, Gazprom´s own assessments were to blame: the section to 
be built within Russian territory to the Baltic coast, jumped from US$1.1bill. to US$3bill.128 Some even 
assessed that the whole project might amount to as much as US$15bill.129 
However, Nord Stream boasted that in spite of Polish comments regarding the non-participation of 
the European Investment Bank (EIB), they would not need any investment from there, as the company 
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had already agreed all necessary financing in late 2007 with Société Générale, ABN Amro and Dresdner 
Kleinwort. 130 After this news, Gazprom announced that Nord Stream would cost €7,4bill. 
(US$11,7bill.).131 Analyst Mikhail Korchemkin assessed this price as realistic.132 According to Gerhard 
Schroeder himself, this was related to ecological costs.133 The ecological environmental argument was 
reiterated in June by the Financial Director of Nord Stream, Paul Corcoran.134 
The informal meeting in Riga, Latvia, in April 2007, in the context of the expiration of the EU-
Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, perfectly exemplified the competing poles in Europe, 
with Germany and Poland playing opposite roles in relation to Russia and holding different concepts of 
energy diversification in Europe: Poland wanted to raise again its opposition to Nord Stream and to 
actively lobby Nabucco instead.135 Germany, from the other side, showed strong support to Gazprom´s 
project, when its Minister of Economy, Michael Glos, stated that Nord Stream was not directed against 
anyone and was necessary if Europe wanted to cover its future demand of gas. 136  As the Russian 
ambassador to Germany stated in May, in the Conference "Energy Dialogue Russia-EU: Gas Aspects", in 
Berlin, "Poland vetoed Nord Stream fearing to lose gas transit".137  
In spite of the negative news from the "Baltic front" that ensued in late 2007 (see section below), 
Russia secured the support of Germany´s Angela Merkel for Nord Stream, dispelling the fear that the end 
of Schröder´s era would lead to worsened relations between Berlin and Moscow and confirming that the 
support by the German business partners was shared politically.138  However, even from the German side, 
where Gazprom could be sure to receive due support, problems eventually happened and this because of 
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the German legislation; the problem that appeared in October 2007 did not relate to Nord Stream as such, 
but to the two secondary pipelines, OPAL and NEL, that were to connect Nord Stream´s natural gas with 
the downstream markets:139 the issue was that according to German legislation, every company should 
have access to pipelines within the German territory.140 However, OPAL and NEL were supposed to be 
connected to Nord Stream, from where only Gazprom´s gas would be received. Nord Stream thus needed  
an exception to be made to this legislation. 
Given the staunch opposition by Poland, the Russian decision to suspend the embargo on Polish 
meat,141 could be seen as an attempt to reduce Warsaw´s opposition to Nord Stream, and this may also be 
related to Donald Tusk´s (Poland´s Prime Minister) announcement that Poland was ready to consider 
Nord Stream in trilateral consultations between Germany, Russia and Poland. 142  The Polish Prime 
Minister, in a state visit to Moscow in February 2008 was to reiterate its support for laying Nord Stream 
through Poland (as well as the rest of the Baltic Republics) instead of the Baltic Sea.143 In this respect, 
Poland did not seem to be moving in favor of Russia´s project. The fact that it signed together with other 
Baltic Republics a petition to suspend Nord Stream was in itself quite clarifying that the Baltic front as it 
had formed in the past year was far from disappearing.144 
In its relation to Germany, Nord Stream played another important role apart from the benefits it 
would bring to German energy companies: Nord Stream´s demand for pipes for its construction 
represented an important boost for German steel producers.145 For Gazprom was also positive that the 
European Union´s summit confirmed that the new Energy Strategy, planned to come into force not later 
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than 2010, would not affect Nord Stream.146 The confirmation that Nord Stream remained a priority 
project of the EU was given in June 2008.147  
However, the war in Georgia once more led to a flurry of criticism against Russia and could have 
a potentially negative influence on Nord Stream if an anti-Gazprom front reinforced itself as a 
consequence. Gordon Brown´s, UK Prime Minister, called for an end of the energy stranglehold of 
Europe by Russia,148which  was significant of how easily the images of Russia as an hostile energy 
superpower were resurrected every time that Moscow´s aggressive policy in the CIS space became 
manifest. 
Nord Stream´s goal: new resources or avoidance of transit countries 
There existed arguments indeed in favor of the economic suitability of transporting natural gas through 
the Baltic instead of Belarus or Ukraine, but the clear economic rationale was to expand supply from 
Russia to feed future demand, expected to be higher. In this respect, the gas deposits in the Yamal 
peninsula represented the main argument Gazprom could put forward.149  Gazprom was thus trapped 
between the danger of not being able to develop this resource base (as eventually happened) and the threat 
of over-supply in Europe if optimistic prospects of consumption proved unwarranted. 
Following the declarations of Sergei´ Emel´ianov, Vice-Head of GazExport, in September 2006, 
22.3bcm of the initial supplies (the first pipeline would have a total capacity of 27.5bcm per year) were to 
be new gas, whereas the rest would represent volumes currently exported through Belarus and Ukraine.150 
In fact, from the first batch of gas to be sold when Nord Stream became operative, 5bcm to be transited 
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through these two countries were already planned to be exported through the Baltic Sea.151 This could 
however only happen if Yamal´s resources were finally developed. 
In addition to Yamal, the other candidate for supplying Nord Stream was the offshore field of 
Shtokman. In this respect, Gazprom had recently decided that instead of developing Shtokman in 
cooperation with foreign companies152 and to later export LNG to the US market, it would henceforth 
exploit it alone and reserve its natural gas for Germany through Nord Stream.153 Gazprom was clearly 
promoting a strong energy partnership with Germany, an essential partner for the eventual success of 
Nord Stream. Shortly thereafter, Nord Stream AG presented on 14th November 2006 all needed 
documentation upon Russia, Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Germany, states through which territory the 
pipeline was planned to be laid down.154 The German anti-monopoly office gave its consent on Nord 
Stream in December, 155  so the biggest hurdle remained to convince Scandinavian countries whose 
exclusive economic zones were necessary for the pipeline´s transit.  
Whether the Shtokman field could eventually feed Nord Stream or not, the fact is that resources in 
the Yamal Peninsula were necessary for its earlier stage.156 In this respect, the warning from specialists in 
"Gasflot" (Gazprom´s daughter company responsible for exploration) that development of fields in the 
Yamal Peninsula could hardly close up the deficit of declining fields in Western Siberia, 157  was 
problematic for Gazprom´s projects. No less worrying was the announcement in April 2007, that supplies 
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from Shtokman would have to be delayed by three years, so they could only be available for 2013.158 
Even if Gazprom´s announcement that half of supplies would be reserved for the pipeline (the other half 
for LNG)159 sounded like a guarantee of the linkage between Shtokman and Nord Stream, this put the 
onus on natural gas from Yamal, which would have to ensure at least the first stages. Soon Gazprom 
backtracked from its announcement of developing Shtokman without foreign help, announcing that the 
first part would be developed with the French Total.160 
Gazprom calculated that natural gas from Yamal could be ready by 2011,161 that is, one year 
before the second spur of Nord Stream was supposed to be operative. The fact  is that in December 2007, 
an important agreement was struck between Gazprom and BASF to give the latter, in exchange for shares 
in Germany´s downstream sector, access for the development of the "Yuzhno-Russkoe" field in the 
peninsula of Yamal.162 Cashing in on the occasion that Russian-Polish relations were timidly improving 
by early 2008 (the Russian embargo on Polish meat was lifted), Sergey Lavrov assured Poland that the 
construction of Nord Stream would not provoke a lessened transit through the Yamal pipeline.163 This 
seemed to be a hint that Nord Stream was to mobilize new resources. Would Ukraine also be as lucky and 
not lose any volumes transiting the country? 
By the end of 2008, before the January 2009 energy war started (see chapter 8), doubts remained 
concerning the development of the resources from Shtokman, which were initially poised to become the 
main source for Nord Stream. The problem laid in the fact that without tax breaks, the management of the 
consortium Shtokman Development AG considered it would be uneconomical to exploit the field.164 The 
consortium was thus asking the state to assume some of the costs by waiving taxes from the imports of 
necessary technical equipment. As far as the Nord Stream was concerned, this did not pose any 
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immediate obstacle regarding the first stage, which would extract its resources from Yamal. However, the 
second spur needed Shtokman´s natural gas from it if Nord Stream wanted to ensure full capacity.165 
Ecological Issues enter the Turf and Nord Stream faces opposition among Baltic countries 
Ecology started playing an important role in the prospects of the Baltic route already by late 2006, when 
Nord Stream was just taking off and when Swedish Prime Minister, Göran Persson, pointed to the 
dangers the new pipeline might represent for the Baltic ecosystem.166 The victory of conservatives that 
same year in Sweden and their worse predisposition towards Russia167 was a bad omen for Nord Stream. 
Unfortunately for Russia, another delicate issue was that the submarine ground would have to be cleared 
of mines and bombs from World War II to guarantee the route´s security. Experts in the new Swedish 
government issued a harsh report on Nord Stream, stating that Sweden would extract no benefits from it, 
while the project was harmful for the country. According to the report, Sweden would demand at least 
that the technical platforms should not be close to its border,168 catering to general fear of negative 
ecological consequences and Russian espionage.169  
Along with Sweden, Finland soon became one of the most outspoken Baltic countries to voice 
similar concerns. In February 2007, Finland publicly demanded a detailed route of the pipeline through 
the Baltic Sea, in order to assess its potential environmental impact.170 The mood that seemed to be 
consolidating in Finland veered towards demanding that Nord Stream crosses Estonia´s territory instead 
of that of Finland.171 This was particularly dangerous for Gazprom for obvious reasons: leaving the fate of 
Nord Stream in the hands of one of the Baltic Republics, Estonia, which belonged to the group of 
countries staunchly opposed to Russia´s energy projects, was a guarantee for Nord Stream to remain still-
born; the veto by Estonia, in April 2007, when Gazprom requested its permission to conduct feasibility 
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studies in its maritime space, was a reminder of the consequences of depending on Tallin.172 The refusal 
one month later, from the side of Estonia´s Prime Minister, Andrus Ansip, to meet Gerhard Schroeder, in 
representation of Nord Stream, represented another cold shower.173 When Gazprom submitted a second 
request of permission, Estonia answered that they would carry out their own assessment.174  Worse, 
Estonian President Toomas Ilves announced in a clear provocation, that they had three years to conduct 
the assessment.175 These worries represented a particular challenge for Russia, as the problem could not 
be circumscribed only to Sweden and Finland. By its nature and by the potential ecological threat to the 
whole Baltic Sea, all riparian states demanded a environmental impact assessment (EIA).176 If Finland 
had proposed to use Estonian maritime territory instead, Lithuania now publicly proposed to build an 
alternative by land.177 
It is true that by April 2007, Russia could count on better news from the "Baltic front", as Latvia 
no longer opposed Nord Stream, with its Prime Minister, Aigar Kalvitis, stating he trusted the company to 
find a suitable solution to ecological issues and considered the project from a strictly commercial point of 
view.178 However, Gazprom could not count on any stable improvement (if there was any improvement at 
all), as one month later, Lithuania and Latvia were both proposing an alternative to Nord Stream, 
consisting of a Baltic pipeline crossing through their territory and Poland.179 This somber panorama 
seemed to improve when Finland granted permission to Gazprom to conduct studies within its maritime 
area, as initially considered.180 This finally opened for Gazprom a way out of Estonia´s intransigent 
position. At the same time, however, bad news kept piling up: 
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The European Commission, moving forward in its plans for deepening the EU´s common energy 
policy and working on the future 3rd Energy Package (approved in 2009), decried Gazprom´s 
monopolistic position in many countries in the EU, and pointed to Nord Stream: Gazprom might have to 
reduce its stake (51%) in the projected pipeline.181 If that was not enough, Nord Stream stumbled in July 
2007 against Denmark and Poland regarding a stretch earmarked for the project, as the area was disputed 
by both countries.182 The area, south of the island of Bornholm, was affected by explosives from World 
War II, so Gazprom decided to agree with Sweden to lay the pipeline through another route north of the 
island, and only within Sweden´s maritime area.183 This implied that additional difficulties might appear 
with Sweden, but at least Poland would no longer have any possibility to block the project.184 During the 
summer 2007, the Baltic countries and Poland struck and demanded that the EU Commission should 
force Gazprom to modify the course of the pipeline so Nord Stream crosses the Baltic Republics and 
Poland instead. These countries were thus reviving the project "Amber", proposed by Gazprom back in 
the 90s, and subsequently rejected.185 In August 2007, participants in a conference taking place in Tallinn 
and devoted to Nord Stream, called to exert pressure on Germany to oppose Nord Stream.186 Poland, after 
it had lost any chance to block Nord Stream by reviving its territorial conflict with Denmark, tried to 
influence other countries, demanding a new assessments of environmental impact.187 
News in the next months remained quite somber for Nord Stream. The Estonian press revealed 
that one of the reasons for Nord Stream AG´s agreeing to consider the Estonian route was the negative 
assessment allegedly given from Finland in 2006.188  However, the Estonian side seemed to remain 
opposed to Nord Stream´s construction in its territorial waters. Even if there had been news that the 
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country was ready to approve the pipeline,189 Estonia kept postponing its final decision.190 The next week, 
Urmas Paet, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Estonia, stated that the decision would be negative, as it had 
been in fact decided a long time ago.191 Some days later, the final rejection to Nord Stream´s intention to 
conduct assessments in the Estonian territorial waters was confirmed, in what was a hard blow to 
Gazprom.192 In exchange, Estonia revived the option, loathed by Gazprom, of laying the new pipeline on 
land.193 Estonia did not show any sign of relenting in its acrimonious opposition to the pipeline, even 
calling the European Commission and every country in the Baltic region, to form a common front against 
Nord Stream.194 This information, which appeared in the Finnish press, was denied by the Estonian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.195 However, no sign of improvement could be found. This left Finland as the 
only possible route for Nord Stream. 
While the blockade with Estonia persisted, difficulties appeared from the side of Sweden: 
Sweden´s Ministry of Environment expressed disappointment at the fact that Gazprom had failed to 
present yet an assessment of environmental impact as well as alternative routes for Nord Stream.196 
Sweden´s intention was simply to reroute the pipeline to a more environment-friendly area.197 As could 
have been expected, the difficulties the Baltic countries were putting forward against the project were 
sooner or later to affect the timetable of Nord Stream. At least that was the reason put forward by the 
technical director of Nord Stream AG, Sergei´ Serdiukov, who stated that the construction of the pipeline 
would start in mid-2009 that is, half a year later than foreseen.198 From Finland there were doubts that 
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even this timetable was unrealistic, as they considered that the report on environmental impact by Nord 
Stream could not be ready before April 2008.199  
In the face of the Swedish objections, Nord Stream announced the route would be changed to less 
ecologically sensitive areas.200 However, Finland stated that the course planned around the Swedish island 
of Gotland in its territorial waters (as the Estonian alternative remained closed) should be changed, as it 
would go through waters with poisonous deposits which might be extended because of the construction of 
Nord Stream.201 Among this flurry of disappointments for Gazprom and for all partners in Nord Stream, 
there was at least a good sign from the European Commission. In spite of being in the midst of preparing 
a new stage in the EU´s energy policy and despite negative omens regarding how new anti-monopoly 
legislation might eventually affect Nord Stream, the European Commission announced that the future 
pipeline, as a trans-boundary project, would not be affected by any changes in such direction.202 The 
Energy Commissar, Andris Piebalgs, reiterated the Commission´s support to Nord Stream in January 
2008.203     
The situation in 2008 remained quite delicate for Gazprom, given that Finland remained opposed, 
especially since news regarding hazards related to the route north of Gotland had transpired and Finland 
feared that the country might be affected in case of accident. Finland at the same time persisted in 
demanding that the pipeline was not to be laid through its territorial waters.204 Finland´s insistence could 
eventually lead to Nord Stream´s end, as we already saw how inflexible Estonia´s position was. Sweden 
at the same time was also increasing its opposition, worried now that the route chosen by Nord Stream 
went through an area of high maritime traffic.205 By February, Sweden demanded more details from Nord 
                                                           
199
 "Finlandiia ne verit v skorosti Nord Stream (Финляндия не верит в скорости Nord Stream)", Vedomosti, 9 November 
2007 (Accessed on the 8th April 2013, from Integrum, Helsinki University). 
200
 "Nord Stream meniaet napravlenie? (Nord Stream меняет направление?)", RusEnergy, 13 November 2007 (Accessed on 
the 19th April 2013, from Integrum, Helsinki University). 
201
 Chai´ka, Fedor: "Vsdornomu sosedu i kadmii´ mechaet (Вздорному соседу и кадмий мешает)", Izvestiia, 14 November 
2007 (Accessed on the 8th April 2013, from Integrum, Helsinki University). 
202
 Butrin, Dmitrii´: "ES ne otverg energoreformu s khodu (ЕС не отверг энергореформу с ходу)", Kommersant, 22 
September 2007 (Accessed on the 21st February 2013, from Integrum, Helsinki University). 
203
 "Evrokomissar po voprosam energetiki vystupil v zashchitu proekta Nord Stream (Еврокомиссар по вопросам энергетики 
выступил в защиту проекта Nord Stream)", RusEnergy, 30 January 2008 (Accessed on the 19th April 2013, from Integrum, 
Helsinki University). 
204
 "Finlandiia rekomendavala Nord Stream issledovat´ alternativnyi´ marshrut gazoprovoda, ne prokhodiashchii´ cherez ee 
vody (Финляндия рекомендовала Nord Stream исследовать альтернативный маршрут газопровода, не проходящий 
через ее воды)", RusEnergy, 22 January 2008 (Accessed on the 19st April 2013, from Integrum, Helsinki University). 
205
 Kulikov, Sergei´: "Soglasavaniie marshruta gazoprovoda Nord Stream prevrashchaetsia dlia Rossii v nastoiashchee 
ispytaniie (Согласование маршрута газопровода Nord Stream превращается для России в настоящее испытание)", 
Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 22 January 2008 (Accessed on the 19th February 2013, from Integrum, Helsinki University). 
    
 
341 
 
Stream in order to make its final assessment, as it remained dissatisfied with the information provided so 
far.206 
The environmental issue was important enough to attract the attention of the European 
Commission, which decided to assess the environmental impact of Nord Stream and to pronounce itself 
regarding the matter. 207  In May, the EU Parliament declared that Nord Stream could imperil the 
ecosystem of the Baltic Sea and therefore, deemed that an independent expertise of the project had to be 
undertaken. 208  However, difficulties from the side of the Scandinavian countries were the (at least 
apparent) motive for Nord Stream to delay the start of the pipeline to mid-2011 from early 2011.209 It was 
later suggested that Germany could receive natural gas from the pipeline at the earliest in 2012.210 Nord 
Stream announced that the first spur of the pipeline could be ready by October 2011 if all ecological 
issues were solved by 2009 and construction allowed through the route proposed.211 
In September 2008, Nord Stream announced it would go back to the South of the Island of 
Bornholm, as initially planned, but choosing a new route that avoided any area imperiled by weapon 
deposits.212 From the side of Finland, a meeting between Finnish Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen and his 
now Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, led to Finland´s promise to speed up the process of assessing 
the feasibility of the pipeline´s construction through Finland´s territorial waters.213 On the eve of the 
energy dispute of January 2009, Nord Stream remained blocked in its main front, the Scandinavian one: 
Finland announced that it would not pronounce on Nord Stream until March 2009.214   
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South Stream 
Compared to Nord Stream and Nabucco, South Stream was a late-comer. Before its conceptualization in 
2007, Gazprom tentatively explored other alternatives which soon petered out: There were talks in June 
with Slovenia to transport Russian gas to Italy,215 and with Hungary to link up with the Blue Stream 
(Russia-Turkey).216 This latest offer was the first predecessor of South Stream, even if the agreement 
signed between Gazprom and the Hungarian MOL did not push Hungary to leave Nabucco, as Budapest 
preferred to play on both sides. 217  Similar was the situation with Serbia, interested in Gazprom´s 
extension of Blue Stream through the Balkans (even if Gazprom had to put a brake on Belgrade´s 
enthusiasm).218 Facing Hungary´s ambiguous and opportunistic stance and Serbia´s enthusiasm, Rumania 
and Bulgaria remained staunch supporters of Nabucco.219 
A few months after these developments, Gazprom signed with the Hungarian MOL a more 
concrete agreement to establish a joint venture for the construction of the "South-European Pipeline",220 
in what was already a clear conceptualization of the future South Stream. Along with this, Gazprom 
planned to sign a landmark agreement with the Italian ENI for the construction of Blue Stream II and for 
supplying 5bcm to Italy through the new route.221 The interesting element in this project is that two routes 
were considered: either through Greece to Italy, or through Central Europe, servicing Bulgaria, Rumania, 
Hungary, Austria and retaining the option of still supplying Italy.222 This latter option poised this project 
as the clear competitor of Nabucco.  
However, at this stage, laying out Blue Stream II would add only 6bcm223 to the existing total 
capacity of 16bcm of Blue Stream, to which at least half was already contracted to Turkey; compared to 
Nabucco, Gazprom´s project did not seem to be a serious competitor. In addition to this, Gazprom seemed 
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to be overambitious, as it also planned that Blue Stream would branch out not only towards Europe, but to 
Israel too.224  
Despite the reasonable doubts that could be held as to Blue Stream´s extension prospects, by 2007 
Gazprom seemed to be able at least to maintain alive chances for its new alternative, in clear competition 
with Nabucco, due to Hungary´s continued ambiguity: Hungary´s prime minister, Ferenc Gyurcsany, 
stated that Nabucco, though welcome, was not realistic enough.225  Some days later, in a new variation, he 
simply stated that Hungary could perfectly split supplies and receive half from each of the two 
alternatives.226 MOL was supposed to take a final decision by July.227 Meanwhile, in its already usual 
play of (probably intended) inconsistency, the Prime Minister came out decrying Hungary´s dependency 
on Russia´s gas.228 By December, Hungary persisted in its ambiguity, calling for the creation of an energy 
consortium with Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Rumania, Bulgaria and Austria in order 
to ease obtaining credits for Nabucco,229 and to reinforce Nabucco´s negotiating position.230    
Then came in May the news that a new important partner might be on board for Gazprom´s 
projects of diversification: Bulgaria. In a meeting between Alexei´ Miller and Bulgaria´s Minister of 
Economy, Rumen Ovcharov, there was talk of increasing energy cooperation between Russia and 
Bulgaria. It was suspected that among all topics discussed, the possibilities opened by Blue Stream II 
were considered.231 Equally positive signs came from Greece, which proposed Gazprom to build a gas 
pipeline along the projected oil pipeline Bourgas (Bulgaria)-Alexandroupolis (Greece), thus reinforcing 
Gazprom´s presence in markets which were potential customers of Nabucco.232 
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The birth of South Stream 
This project of diversification, which competed with Nabucco, gave a leap forward when Putin travelled 
to the Balkans (to the Energy Summit of Southeast European Countries, in Zagreb, Croatia) to confer 
with a series of countries in the region (Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia, Serbia, 
Albania, Greece, Bulgaria and Romania).233 One day before the conference, President Vladimir Putin 
announced the creation of "South Stream": Gazprom signed with the Italian ENI a project to lay an 
underwater pipeline in the Black Sea which would link Russia to Bulgaria.234 From there, South Stream 
would branch out in two directions: to Austria and Slovenia and then to Southern Italy;235 the planned 
capacity was almost the same as that of Nabucco: 30bcm per year.236 Leaving Turkey out of this project 
and avoiding the prominence Ankara would have assumed in the event that Blue Stream had been 
expanded, made sense if Russia wanted to prevent excessive power from the part of a single country, 
which by the way, as was pointed out at the moment, had close relations to the US and had also easy 
access to other competing producers, such as Azerbaijan and Iran.237 
Gazprom tried to take a big step forward when it invited another key country into South Stream: 
Austria.238 This was also a very symbolic move, as the Austrian ÖMV was the main promoter of South 
Stream´s rival, Nabucco. In the meantime, Bulgaria seemed to be eagerly supporting South Stream, as 
when Kazakhstan expressed its interest in the pipeline during a visit by the Bulgarian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Ivai´lo Kalfin.239  In fact, in early November 2007, the Ministers  of Energy of Russia and 
Bulgaria, Viktor Khristenko and Petar Dimitrov met and manifested their support to South Stream.240 
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Some days later, Russia announced its intention to build South Stream from Russia to Bulgaria.241 This 
did not prevent Bulgaria from keeping at the same time lobbying for Nabucco in Azerbaijan, as Bulgaria 
was also partner of Nabucco.242  Soon after this, Gazprom was also moving forward with its Italian 
partner, ENI, signing an agreement to commission marketing and technical feasibility studies of the 
project.243  
Into 2008, trying to attract a new partner, Vladimir Putin welcomed Greece´s intention of doubling 
its imports of Russian natural gas and stated that this goal could be reached only if capacity was increased 
with the construction of South Stream.244 In January an important move forward for South Stream was 
planned, as Putin expected in his visit to Bulgaria to sign an agreement on the pipeline´s construction.245 
Bulgaria was as essential an eventual transit country, as a difficult partner. This became manifest when 
Sofia started criticizing the expected agreement.246 It was suspected that it might be playing a double 
game, the same way Hungary had been doing the last year, seeing South Stream merely as an insurance in 
case Nabucco finally did not materialize.247 Sofia demanded 51% in the new company that would build 
the Bulgarian section of South Stream.248 In the agreement finally signed, Bulgaria accepted a 50% 
stake.249 In parallel, Gazprom and ENI registered a company in Switzerland to implement the undertaking 
of  the pipeline´s construction.250 There was an interesting detail in the agreement signed, as it foresaw the 
capacity the pipeline would have: 30bcm per year.251 Again, close to what Nabucco would transport. 
January 2008 still reserved some more positive news for Gazprom, who seemed to be 
consolidating South Stream through the addition of new partners. This was the case with Serbia, another 
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country that was considered to be a future transit partner for the pipeline, whose territory Moscow 
obtained the right to use for South Stream.252 This deal was complemented with Russia´s penetration into 
the Serbian oil and gas state company, NIS. 253  If that was not enough, Gazprom also secured the 
permission from another potential key partner in South Stream: Austria.254 As in the case of Hungary, 
Austria´s good disposition was not only positive in practical terms, but also symbolic, as Vienna was the 
main promoter of the chief rival of South Stream, Nabucco.  
Then in February, Russia tried to make forays into Hungary, intending to agree with Budapest on 
a route for the pipeline through its territory.255 Securing the potential participation of Hungary in South 
Stream was essential to consolidate gains made in Bulgaria, Serbia and Austria in the last two months, 
especially because Budapest kept playing a double game between South Stream and Nabucco. Its 
enthusiasm for Nabucco did not relent, as was exemplified when Hungary sent to the ambassadors of 
Austria, Bulgaria, Rumania and Turkey a project of agreement for laying down Nabucco.256 As a result of 
a visit by Russia´s Prime Minister (and soon President), Dmitry Medvedev, Ferenc Gyurcsany, his 
Hungarian counterpart agreed on joining South Stream, thus taking a step forward in the direction of what 
had already been considered a year earlier in February 2007.257 The signature took place in Moscow, 
where Gyurcsany traveled after the Russian visit.258 The delicate situation of Nabucco, and the fact that 
the latter had gone as far as inviting Gazprom as supplier, enabled Medvedev to magnanimously proclaim 
that both South Stream and Nabucco were complimentary, in rhetoric similar to that proper of the 
equidistant Hungary itself.259 
In the month of April, Gazprom advanced in its plans with Slovenia as a possible new partner. A 
delegation headed by Alexei´ Miller traveled to Slovenia and met with Danilo Turk and Janez Jansa, 
President and Prime Minister and the discussions showed Slovenia´s interest in participating in South 
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Stream.260 Slovenia could become a very important partner because it opened a new route directly to 
Northern Italy, Gazprom´s main partner. This was also positive since it both added pressure on Austria or, 
if Austria decided to prioritize Nabucco, it made its participation unnecessary outright.261  At the same 
time, Greece officially agreed to join the project.262 By early June, Gazprom was announcing that an 
agreement would soon be signed with Austria.263 By October, it seemed that the mercurial Hungary 
would also agree with Gazprom on the establishment of a JV to manage Hungary´s part of South Stream 
through its country.264 
It is true that South Stream had a certain disadvantage compared to Nabucco, at least if we are to 
believe what Jeremy Ellis, from the German RWE (having become in 2008 the sixth partner for Nabucco) 
stated: according to him, South Stream was to cost around US$10bill whereas Nabucco, from Turkey to 
Austria, only US$7bill.265 However, in this calculation, the Trans-Caspian pipeline, to be eventually built 
if Turkmen gas was wanted, was not included. That would necessarily increase costs and nuance this 
comparison. Unless Nabucco managed to break the deadlock regarding Iran´s natural gas, the first stage 
of Nabucco could only export gas from Azerbaijan, and even this was doubtful (see section below). In 
May 2008, the consortium assessed the costs and stated they would jump from €4,6bill, as initially 
planned, to €7,9bill.266  
In October 2008, Gazprom approved in its report on the development of the gas sector to 2030, 
that South Stream would be ready at the earliest, two years later than what Alexei´ Miller had promised in 
January of the same year; instead of  2013, South Stream would not be operative earlier than 2015.267 The 
initial projected capacity of the pipeline would be 31bcm per year, exactly the same amount of natural gas 
that Nabucco was supposed to be able to transport.   
                                                           
260
 "Gazprom and Slovenia discussed possible participation in South Stream project", Oil and Gas Eurasia, 14 April 2008 
(Accessed on the 18th April 2013, from Integrum, Helsinki University). 
261
 Grib, Natal´ia: "Avstriia vypadaet iz "Iuzhnogo Potoka" (Австрия выпадает из "Южного потока")", Kommersant, 14 
April 2008 (Accessed on the 25th February 2013, from Integrum, Helsinki University). 
262
 "Greece to join Russian-backed South Stream gas pipeline project", International Herald Tribune, 15 April 2008 (Accessed 
on the 26th April 2013, from Integrum, Helsinki University). 
263
 Grivach, Alexei´: "Poslednii´ oplot Nabucco padaet (Последний оплот Nabucco падает)", Vremia Novostei´, 9 June 2008 
(Accessed on the 17th April 2013, from Integrum, Helsinki University). 
264
 Savinykh, Anastasia: "Iuzhnyi´ potok" do Vengrii dovedet (Южный поток до Венгрии доведет)", Izvestiia, 1 October 
2008 (Accessed on the 17th April 2013, from Integrum, Helsinki University). 
265
 "Nabucco deshevle "Iuzhnogo Potoka"? (Nabucco дешевле Южного потока)", RusEnergy, 20 March 2008 (Accessed on 
the 19th April 2013, from Integrum, Helsinki University). 
266
 "Nabucco podorozhal na 3 milliarda evro (Nabucco подорожал на 3 миллиарда евро)", RusEnergy, 29 May 2008 
(Accessed on the 22nd April 2013, from Integrum, Helsinki University). 
267
 Malkova, Irina; Mazneva, Elena and Zotova, Elena: "Medlennyi´ potok (Медленный поток)", Vedomosti, 3 October 2008  
(Accessed on the 22nd April 2013, from Integrum, Helsinki University). 
    
 
348 
 
At this stage, with South Stream having acquired substantial chances to come about, a delicate 
question surfaced regarding the possibilities of  using the Black Sea as a route for the new pipeline: would 
the Gazprom/ENI consortium use Ukraine´s or Turkey´s territorial waters? Russia was likely to fall prey 
to similar obstacles as in the case of Nord Stream, where Estonia, Finland and Sweden´s jurisdiction on 
their respective territorial waters left Nord Stream at the moment in a state of vagueness. As we had the 
chance to see in chapter 7, February and March 2008 were months of extreme tension with Ukraine; the 
news of Hungary´s signature to join South Stream in Moscow (the signature took place on the 28th of 
February, five days before Gazprom cut 25% of gas to Ukraine) were quite unwelcome for Kiev, which 
(quite accurately) suspected South Stream as a device to "switch off" Ukraine and reduce its power as 
transit country. However, the fact is that South Stream was planned to go through the Ukrainian shelf.268 
Timoshenko´s new government (see chapter 7) in fact insisted on the construction of the alternative White 
Stream, which would link the Caucasus with Europe through Ukraine.269 The discourse in Ukraine was 
that permission would be granted for South Stream, if White Stream was agreed in Europe.270 Apart from 
Ukraine, if South Stream was to reach Bulgaria, Rumania was also a necessary route, and Rumania was a 
partner in Nabucco.271 If Ukraine persisted in its negative, and with Timoshenko on board South Stream´s 
permission to use Ukraine´s shelf was almost impossible, Turkey remained a difficult option: if Turkey 
initially was to host the extension of Blue Stream to supply Europe with more Russian gas, it had been 
excluded in favor of Bulgaria.272 
The main question that was worth considering once Gazprom had decided to ditch Blue Stream II 
and propose a more ambitious project instead, was which would be the source for the new gas. Part of the 
first shipments was to come from gas fields previously operated by the former YUKOS,273 where Eni had 
acquired assets.274 The main suspicion though, was that Gazprom simply wanted to secure Nabucco´s 
potential resources from Central Asia,275 or as  might happen with Nord Stream, simply redirect gas 
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transported through Ukraine and deprive Ukraine of its strategic relevance. Gazprom publicly assumed a 
"fair play" position in relation to Nabucco, as the company even announced during June 2007 that it was 
ready to enter Nabucco itself if the consortium accepted.276 Gazprom´s mantra was that they would not 
call into question Nabucco´s viability as long as it could secure its own resources and thus guarantee its 
profitability;277 it might be reasonable to assume that the other side of this discourse was that the same 
applied to South Stream. If so, Gazprom needed to convince that there was a (new) resource basis for the 
project.  
In this respect, it may be argued that the reasonable doubts as to whether South Stream would be 
able to provide new resources put it at a disadvantage in comparison to Nabucco. However, as will be 
seen in the section below, once Nabucco started facing serious problems with Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan 
and of course, Iran, the promising initial supplier, who soon dropped out from the race for obvious 
political reasons, already existing Russian supplies through a new route were at an advantage versus no 
supplies at all. This became especially true once Nabucco´s deadline was pushed from 2011 to 2013, the 
same year South Stream was supposed to start working.278 Once Nabucco lost the temporal advantage, it 
would be left with less time to "prove" it could provide at least some supplies while South Stream was not 
yet active. 
Nabucco 
The project of Nabucco entered an important phase during 2005, when relations between Russia and 
Ukraine were steadily worsening (see chapter 6). On 29th June 2005 an agreement was signed, in which 
the company "Nabucco Gas Pipeline International" was established, which substituted its predecessor, 
solely devoted so far to technical aspects. The newly established company was to develop the project.279   
Nabucco entered this period with the very ambitious projection of opening a natural gas export 
route to Europe from a large array of potential suppliers: Iran, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and 
even Irak, Syria to which could later come Egypt and Libya.280 The first stage of the project was focused 
on Iran, which as early as January 2004, had signed a memorandum to take part in the project.281 
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Nabucco´s reliance on Iran implied the problem of the uncertainty regarding Iran´s natural gas reserves. 
However, this was not by far the real obstacle. The US, while promoting since the decade of the 90s 
energy diversification away from Russia in the whole Eurasian space, in what was called the "New Great 
Game", remained adamantly opposed to any kind of cooperation involving Teheran. As the Energy 
Commissar of the European Commission, Andris Piebalgs had to concede already in February 2006, the 
problem of Iran´s program of enrichment of uranium had to be solved first.282  
In this complex web of supply, there was another country with the potential to play a significant 
role in Nabucco: Azerbaijan. Its advantage lay in the fact of its proximity, so it could become crucial in a 
first stage of the project, before more sizable resources had been secured from other countries. Thanks to 
its significant reserves in the offshore field of Shah Deniz, Azerbaijan was already supplying the BTE 
pipeline inaugurated in 2006, with Turkey receiving the first volumes of natural gas in 2007. The 
challenge for Nabucco was whether Shah Deniz could be further developed early enough as to secure the 
project´s initial viability. In the BTE project, it was foreseen that Shah Deniz serves the regional supply, 
with Georgia and Turkey being the only consumers. If the still relatively reduced volumes of gas that 
Turkey was consuming from Azerbaijan left sizable volumes of natural gas for Nabucco, the paradox was 
that scarce consumption in Turkey imperiled Shah Deniz´s profitability and thus its eventual 
expansion.283 In the following years, Azerbaijan would prove a complicated partner, while relying on the 
fickle Turkmenistan and its ever-changing multivectorial energy policy would prove even worse.  
Nabucco after the January 2006 Dispute 
The (short, if compared to 2009) effects of the January 2006 energy dispute were necessarily registered 
by all those who found post-Soviet export routes risky. The lesson to be drawn was poised to be the exact 
opposite between those deeming transit countries like Ukraine as irresponsible, and those, who on the 
contrary, blamed Gazprom as the ultimate supplier. This latest narrative played into the interests of 
Nabucco´s promoters, and with this narrative holding the upper hand in the aftermaths of the dispute, the 
situation seemed more favorable than ever for the Austrian ÖMV as the main promoter of the ambitious 
project. The Hungarian Minister of Economy, Janos Koka´s, support for Nabucco (Hungarian MOL was 
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already involved),284 was certainly worrisome for Russia. The interest expressed by E.ON-Ruhrgas and 
GDF, usual partners of Gazprom, was even more important for Nabucco, given the importance of 
Germany and France, which could become significant consumers of Iranian gas.285 With the European 
Commission, which through its Energy Commissar, Andris Piebalgs, had already expressed its support 
for the construction of the pipeline in December 2005,286 these movements by national governments had 
to be seriously considered by the Russian government.  
An agreement was signed in June 2006 in Vienna between all members of the consortium to start 
the project.287 Though initially planned to be fully operative by 2011,288 the project was now to be ready 
for 2010.289 Beyond its merely declarative effect, the support of the EU translated into financial support 
from the part of the EBRD, which was ready to finance up to 20%-30% of the construction.290 When the 
European Commission presented its new energy policy in January 2007, this contained the pipeline 
Nabucco as one of the four connectors that were to improve the EU´s internal energy interconnectedness 
as well as the access to sources without the EU space.291  
However, probably in line with the uncertainties that were piling up regarding both source and 
transit issues, and which are briefly reviewed below, a EU Summit devoted to Nabucco in March 2007 
decided to postpone the final decision on the whole project for 2008.292 The probable dependence of 
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Nabucco on Azerbaijan as initial, if not only supplier (and even this would prove unsure) after the Iranian 
option faded and Turkmenistan seemed to be buoyed both by Russia and most importantly, by China (see 
below),293 cast shadow on this optimism: in October 2007, Azerbaijan announced that production of Shah 
Deniz II, on which Nabucco would have to rely, might be postponed to 2013 from 2012 as initially 
planned.294 
In October 2007, Nabucco received additional support when the German energy company RWE 
announced its desire to join the consortium.295 This came along with the explicit support of the German 
Minister of Economy, Michael Gloss to Azerbaijan´s gas.296 
Sources for Nabucco 
Interest in Europe for Nabucco underlined the inherent challenges mentioned in the section above. If 
Iran´s gas could not become a real alternative, then future consumers had to turn to Central Asia and the 
Caucasus, with Turkmenistan as a substitute for Iran, and with Azerbaijan providing gas for the first 
stage. Turkmen gas represented a particular obstacle, as the construction of a Trans-Caspian pipeline 
represented a clear challenge in terms of costs. In fact, it was reported in March 2006, that the costs 
foreseen jumped twice as compared to initial estimations from 1997,297 when such pipeline was first 
considered.  
The agreement signed in Vienna in June 2006 introduced important changes as for the sources of 
gas. Pending progress in Central Asia and given the uncertainty as for Iranian gas, Nabucco needed to 
ensure that Azerbaijan´s gas would be available for the first stage. It was thus agreed that Shah Deniz´s 
natural gas would have to be developed for Europe.298 Thus, before reaching its total capacity of 31bcm 
per year, Azerbaijan would ensure a supply of 10bcm in its initial stage.299  
                                                           
293
 "Iz trekh proektov eksporta gaza naimen´shie shansy na realizatsiiu imeet Transkaspii´skii´? (Из трех проектов экспорта 
газа наименьшие шансы на реализацию имеет Транскаспийский?)", RusEnergy, 4 October 2007 (Accessed on the 19th 
April 2013, from Integrum, Helsinki University).   
294
 "Azerbai´dzhan otlozhil na god nachalo vtoroi´ fazy na "Shakhdeniz" (Азербайджан отложил на год начало второй фазы 
на "Шахдениз")", RusEnergy, 2 October 2007 (Accessed on the 19th April 2013, from Integrum, Helsinki University). 
295
 Trempel´, Aleksandr: "RWE voi´det v Nabucco (RWE ВОЙДЕТ В NABUCCO)", Gazeta, 18 October 2007  (Accessed  on the 
17th April 2013, from Integrum, Helsinki University). 
296
 "Germaniia zainteresovana v postavkakh azerbai´dzhanskogo gaza (Германия заинтересована в поставках 
азербайджанского газа)", RusEnergy, 19 October 2007 (Accessed on the 19th April 2013, from Integrum, Helsinki 
University). 
297
 "Stoimost´ transkaspii´skogo gazoprovoda mozhet uvelichit´sia rovno v 2 raza (Стоимость транскаспийского 
газoпровода может увиличиться ровно в 2 раза)", RusEnergy, 29 March 2006 (Accessed on the 21st February 2013, from 
Integrum, Helsinki University). 
298
 Butrin, "ES uskorit", op. cit. 
299
 Ibid. 
    
 
353 
 
With the goal of securing Azerbaijan´s contribution to Nabucco, the Austrian ÖMV traveled in 
January 2007 to Baku.300 The reasons for such a trip were evident: the consortium planned to start the 
construction of the pipeline from Turkey to Austria in 2007 already, while natural gas was still absent.301 
Baku stated at the time they would be able to launch exports from Shah Deniz by 2012, which would 
force Nabucco to a delay of one year.302 However, with 16bcm being the foreseen volume of production, 
from which 6bcm were to be supplied to Turkey, 800mcm to Georgia and 9bcm reserved for internal 
consumption, the question was whether any gas at all would be available for the consortium.303 The 
pressure on Azerbaijan to supply enough gas for Nabucco and to secure its profitability was great, with 
the US government, which had already strongly lobbied for the construction of the BTC and BTE 
pipelines, trying to influence this time too.304 In fact, a memorandum of cooperation between Washington 
and Baku was signed in late March.305 
Given this situation, ÖMV´s delegation preferred to concentrate on securing Azerbaijan´s support 
for transit of an eventual Trans-Caspian pipeline for Turkmen and Kazakh gas.306 Independent of the 
success that Azerbaijan´s cooperation might have in the future to secure transit, the fact is that without a 
starting contribution by Shah Deniz´s gas, the consortium could hardly take off. In line with the 
consortium´s desires of securing its territory for transit, Azerbaijan, possibly in reaction to Gazprom´s 
price increases from the 1st of January 2007 (Baku paid now US$230tcm, as much as in Europe), lobbied 
for the inclusion of Turkmenistan in the project.307 Apart from the objective interest Baku had, this could 
also be meant in the understanding that first supplies should come immediately from Central Asia, given 
the limited resources from Shah Deniz. And in this respect, Baku made things clear: if supplies were not 
guaranteed, Azerbaijan expressed it was not worth joining Nabucco, making clear that Azeri resources 
did not suffice.308 The Hungarian MOL visit in May to Azerbaijan, confirmed that both Hungary and 
                                                           
300
 "V Azerbai´dzhane proshla vstrecha s predstavitelamy OMV (В Азербайджане прошла встреча с представителями 
OMV)", RusEnergy, 25 January 2007 (Accessed on the 18th April 2013, from Integrum, Helsinki University). 
301
 Grivach, Alexei´: "Iuzhno-Evropei´skii´ front (Южно-Европейский фронт)", Vremia Novostei´, 26 January 2007 
(Accessed on the 17th April 2013, from Integrum, Helsinki University). 
302
 Ibid. 
303
 Ibid. 
304
 "SshA sosdaiut v Evrope al´ternativu rossii´skim truboprovodam (США создают в Европе альтернативу российским 
трубопроводам)", RusEnergy, 16 March 2007 (Accessed on the 18th April 2013, from Integrum, Helsinki University). 
305
 "Azerbai´dzhan i SShA podpisali memorandum ob energeticheskoi´ bezopasnosti (Азербайджан и США подписали 
меморандум об энергетической безопасности)",  RusEnergy, 23 March 2007 (Accessed on the 18th April 2013, from 
Integrum, Helsinki University). 
306
 Grivach, "Iuzhno-Evropei´skii´ front", op. cit. 
307
 Grivach, Alexei´ and Dubnov, Arkadii´: "Bor´ba za nasledie Turkmenbashi (Борьба за наследие Туркменбаши)", Vremia 
Novostei´,  22 March 2007 (Accessed on the 17th April 2013, from Integrum, Helsinki University). 
308
 "Azerbai´dzhan mozhet otkazat´sia ot uchastiia v Nabucco (Азербайджан может отказаться от участия в Nabucco)", 
RusEnergy, 29 March 2007 (Accessed on the 19th April 2013, from Integrum, Helsinki University). 
    
 
354 
 
Azerbaijan were interested in principle in continuing work on Nabucco;309 Azerbaijan also showed its 
enthusiasm for Nabucco before American officials, active in promoting energy diversification away from 
Russia.310 However, this did not change the essence of the problem, which was that Azerbaijan still 
regarded its role more as transit country than as supplier.  
The US, which, as already mentioned, conducted an active lobbying policy to promote 
Nabucco,311 presented a very optimistic vision of the potential of Azerbaijan as a supplier of natural gas. 
According to Mathew Bryza, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Energy Affairs, Azerbaijan could 
supply by 2016 as much as a total of 50bcm per year, providing 25-31bcm for Nabucco and still having 
the capacity to provide 8-11bcm to another planned project, the Turkey-Greece-Italy (TGI) 
Interconnector.312 If trusting this assessment, Azerbaijan could in fact cover almost all of Nabucco´s 
projected capacity. Since the fiasco of the agreement on the Caspian pipeline between Turkmenistan, 
Kazakhstan and Russia, Azerbaijan itself started insisting it had enough resources for Nabucco. 313 
However, prospects did  not appear so optimistic to all actors involved: The TGI Interconnector, 
"Poseidon", represented a threat unless Azerbaijan could increase its production as the US promised.314 
The proposal to the Azeri SOCAR to enter the Nabucco consortium, responded to the sense of increased 
competition for scarce resources.315 Thus, the US strengthened its efforts for the construction of Trans-
Caspian pipelines to provide enough natural gas to Nabucco, and in avoidance with the Iranian territory 
(which, as seen below, was at some point favored by Turkey);316 The US would provide technical and 
economic assistance to Azerbaijan to consider the construction of two pipelines, one from Kazakhstan 
and another from Turkmenistan. 
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More marginally, there were also discussions with Kazakhstan, another potential supplier, with 
whom Nabucco´s partner, however, faced the same obstacle as with the Trans-Caspian pipeline from 
Turkmenistan. Here, the initiative was assumed not only by partners of Nabucco, but by Azerbaijan itself, 
as when Azerbaijan's Minister of Foreign Affairs Elmar Mammadyarov visited Astana in late February to 
discuss possible supplies from Kazakhstan.317 Worse than in the case of Turkmenistan, as we will see 
below, was the reality of Kazakhstan´s closeness to Russia, which further reduced the margin of action. 
Kazakhstan was interested enough to draft a proposal to the European Commission for financing a Trans-
Caspian pipeline. However, in conversations with US officials, the Kazakh side clearly stated 
consultations with Russia were necessary and even tentatively proposed to connect Russia to the future 
pipeline. 318  The impossibility of adding Kazakhstan to the project was unfortunate, as natural gas 
production was expected to increase to as much as 40 to 50bcm in 2014.319  A team from the European 
Union, including the German Minister of Foreign Affairs himself, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, travelled to 
Central Asia in March to lobby gas producers, including Kazakhstan,320 to find that Astana did not 
support the Trans-Caspian pipeline.321 
In any case, by September 2007, European efforts necessarily concentrated on the only viable 
alternative, either for eventual transit from Central Asia, or in order to secure resources from the country 
itself: Azerbaijan. Thus, in a visit to Baku, The Austrian Minister of Economics Martin Bartensteiner, 
proposed the Azeri SOCAR to become a partner in Nabucco, with the Azeri counterpart ensuring that 
Azerbaijan would produce, in the worst case, as much as 21bcm from the second stage of Shah Deniz by 
2011, thus ensuring a sizable supply for the pipeline to Europe.322  Soon, the President of SOCAR, 
Rovnag Abdullaev, stated that new estimates pointed to twice as much natural gaz in Shah Deniz as 
initially thought.323  If this increase in reserves was confirmed, then Nabucco could receive enough 
resources from Azerbaijan, at least for initial supplies, even if some of the country´s natural gas 
eventually went to the rival "Poseidon",324 as the second stage of Shah Deniz would add 16bcm instead of 
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8bcm per year as planned before.325 Thus, according to Natik Aliev, Minister of Industry and Energy of 
Azerbaijan, Azerbaijan could provide 12bcm per year to Nabucco, to which the consortium should find 
16bcm if it wanted to use the pipeline in maximum capacity.326 
Assuming that Azerbaijan could finally provide these volumes to Nabucco, the prospects for 
filling up the rest of the pipeline remained nevertheless quite obscure. The Iranian route, arguably the 
most promising, would remain closed, despite the surprising proposal by Matthew Bryce, that Iran could 
eventually provide as much as 5-12bcm per year to Nabucco.327 Javier Solana´s (High Commissar for 
Foreign Affairs of the EU) efforts to buoy Turkmenistan to make some gas available for Nabucco through 
a Trans-Caspian pipeline appeared equally futile,328 in spite of the fact that Ashgabad was pressuring 
Gazprom to accept higher prices (see chapter 7) and the September deadline for confirming the 
construction of the new Caspian pipeline through Russia had been missed. Azerbaijan approved its 
participation in Nabucco, but equally positive messages from Kazakhstan were more rhetoric than 
anything else.329 
Whatever optimism could be found in the active engagement of both the EU and the US, some 
could clearly see through misplaced voluntarism, as was the case with the President of the Energy Charter 
Treaty, André Mernier, who called Nabucco a "still-born" project.330 Mernier made such statements given 
the evidence that Nabucco did not really have enough secure resources. 331  The European Union´s 
assessment of the Trans-Caspian´s economic rationality after a meeting in Brussels with Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan, Georgia and Turkmenistan,332 given the reality of the uncompetitive position of the EU in its 
race against Russia and China for Central Asia´s gas resources, was probably an effort to improve as 
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much as possible the prospects of Nabucco precisely in a moment when it remained in the losing side. 
Even the US acknowledged that Nabucco was facing obstacles.333 
The delicate situation of Nabucco was exemplified by the contradictory offer made to Gazprom in 
February 2008, of supplying gas to the project.334 Even more devastating was the  sound of news that the 
consortium would push the deadline for entering in service two years later than foreseen, in 2013 instead 
of 2011.335 However, neither was  this new deadline a real guarantee for having enough gas, at least for its 
initial supply, as Azerbaijan´s resources seemed, according to analysts, insufficient, to cover 10bcm 
which should be the initial supply: According to Nezavisimaia Gazeta, in 2013, Azerbaijan might be 
producing around 18-19bcm per year; with an internal consumption of around 12bcm and 6.6bcm 
promised to Turkey and 0.3-0.8bcm to Georgia, any gas for Nabucco should necessarily come from 
volumes supplied to Turkey.336 Mathew Bryza´s statement that Azerbaijan had not only enough gas for 
Nabucco, but also for the TGI,337 was simply a vain effort of voluntarism. A new assessment provided in 
late November 2008 went in the same direction and was thus quite pessimistic in this respect: Azerbaijan 
could supply natural gas to Nabucco only in the event of the second stage of Shah Deniz being  
developed;338 This second stage, not yet approved at that moment, would supply in the most optimistic 
case by 2015, 8,6bcm more per year, from which only 7bcm could potentially go to Nabucco.339   
Turkmenistan´s promise to an EU delegation in April 2008, to supply natural gas to Nabucco 
could not be considered as any more realistic.340 Turkmenistan promised that as much as 10bcm could be 
supplied to Nabucco by 2009.341 True, this announcement by Turkmenistan had the effect of increasing 
                                                           
333
 "Amerikantsy prisnali, chto razrabatyvaemye imi proekty truboprovodov sil´no ustupaiut rossii´skim sistemam 
(Американцы признали, что разрабатываемые ими проекты трубопроводов сильно уступают российским системам)", 
RusEnergy, 6 December 2007 (Accessed on the 19th March 2013, from Integrum, Helsinki University). 
334
 Dempsey, Judy: "EU-sponsored pipeline to open up to Russian gas", International Herald Tribune, 6 February 2008 
(Accessed on the 26th April 2013, from Integrum, Helsinki University). 
335
 "Nabucco nakinuli sroka (Nabucco накинули срока)", Neftegaz.ru, 6 February 2008 (Accessed on the 18th April 2013, 
from Integrum, Helsinki University). 
336
 Mishin, Vladimir: "Za spinoi´ politiki - ushi kommertsii (За спиной политики – уши коммерции)", 11 March 2008 
(Accessed on the 19th March 2013, from Integrum, Helsinki University). 
337
 "Azerbai´dzhanskogo gaza khvatit na zapolneniie TGI i Nabucco (Азербайджанского газа хватит на заполнение TGI и 
Nabucco)", RusEnergy, 27 March 2008 (Accessed on the 19th April 2013, from Integrum, Helsinki University). 
338
 Mishin, Vladimir and Gavshina, Oksana: "Gazovoe svatovstvo (Газовое сватовство)", Gazeta, 28 November 2008 
(Accessed on the 17th April 2013, from Integrum, Helsinki University). 
339
 Ibid. 
340
 "ES napolnit Nabucco turkmenskim gazom (ЕС наполнит Nabucco туркменским газом)", RusEnergy, 11 April 2008  
(Accessed on the 19th April 2013, from Integrum, Helsinki University). 
341
 Kashin, Vasilii´: "Gazovoe obeshchanie (Газовое обещание)", Vedomosti, 15 April 2008 (Accessed on the 8th April 2013, 
from Integrum, Helsinki University). 
    
 
358 
 
optimism in Azerbaijan with regard to the prospects of the pipeline.342 Another good item of news for 
Nabucco was the apparent activation of an unexpected front, that of Irak, another potential supplier for 
Nabucco, which was much more accessible, in geographical terms, than Turkmenistan, and which 
promised a supply of 5bcm per year in its first stage.343 In May the EU had also secured the agreement 
from Egypt as potential supplier of 2bcm.344 It is with the benefit of hindsight that we may consider it 
unfortunate that news confirming the immense reserves that Turkmenistan possessed did not arrive much 
earlier. By October 2008, it was known that previous assessments from Turkmenistan, pointing to as 
much as 14Tcm, were realistic.345 
It is with the benefit of hindsight that we may clearly consider all this good news for Nabucco as 
unrealistic. How did Russia perceive it? Gazprom had actively moved in Central Asia and was probably 
not very worried over any intention from the side of Turkmenistan to open the Trans-Caspian line. Even 
if Russia failed (as it eventually did), China was a much better candidate to gain the upper hand than the 
EU (this is what happened and it was probably clear at the time that the EU was in a losing position). The 
Iranian option was the most promising for Nabucco. However, poor political relations between Teheran 
and the US blocked any realistic participation of Iran in Nabucco; they also precluded Turkmenistan´s 
chances for sending gas through a much easier route than that of the Caspian. As for Irak, the turmoil in 
which the country was engulfed represented the best guarantee for its non participation.346 The only 
realistic partner was Azerbaijan, even if as we have seen, it hardly represented a big promise for the EU. 
In any case, the offer that Gazprom made to Baku, namely, to purchase its gas at "market prices",347 was 
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clearly directed at precluding Nabucco of any chance of success. Hungary´s Prime Minister travelled to 
Azerbaijan in July to try to keep the Azeri option alive as the only realistic option.348 
As if all the problems Nabucco was facing with its potential supply sources were not enough, the 
war in Georgia, when Russia intervened in support of the break-away entities of Abkhazia and North-
Ossetia, cast a shadow over the eventual security of a pipeline running across such an unstable region.349 
In fact, what appeared as a severe blow to Nabucco, when Azerbaijan declared it would not take part in 
Nabucco, in spite of the US insistence (this happened in the context the US Vice-President´s, Dick 
Cheney, visit to Azerbaijan), could have been related to the assertive move by Russia against Georgia 
some weeks earlier and to Baku´s desire to maintain good relations with its powerful neighbor. 350 This 
information was soon rejected as wrong from Azerbaijan.351Amid the great uncertainty that shrouded the 
destiny of Nabucco, the project though, received good news from Turkmenistan concerning its potential 
resources and its prospect then, of supplying Nabucco: according to an international audit by the British 
company  "Gaffney, Cline & Associates," Turkmenistan´s resources were as big as the government had 
been claiming and left enough resources for Russia, China and Nabucco.352 
Transit for Nabucco and the role of Turkey 
Nabucco did not face smooth relations with key transit countries either. Apart from complicated relations 
with Azerbaijan, simultaneously the potential producer and needed transit country for Central Asian 
resources (as Iran was excluded either as producer or transit country), Turkey was necessarily the bridge 
to Europe for all supplies. Unfortunately, Turkey was no easy partner either. 
After the possible participation of the French Total had been excluded some time ago, in April 
2007, Turkey placed significant obstacles to the participation of Gaz de France, at a time when ÖMV was 
seeking a partner with whom it might share costs, and that, mostly for political reasons: France was about 
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to approve a bill calling the mass killing of Armenians by Turkey during World War I, a genocide.353 
Fears of depending excessively on Turkey (as would happen with Nabucco), might have been related to 
the idea of reviving the "White Stream", which would connect Georgia and Romania through the Black 
Sea.354 However, in 2006, Turkey had already threatened to gang-up with Russia instead and foster the 
expansion of Blue Stream, if the White Stream´s competition moved on.355  
With Russia signing in May 2007 an agreement with Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan for the 
construction of the Caspian Pipeline (see below), with Turkey´s announcement in June 2007 of its project 
of South Stream (see former section, above) and with Turkmenistan coming closer to China, Nabucco 
seemed to be facing hard challenges. This succession of blows might explain why Turkey assumed a 
more proactive role, as when Ankara tried to entice Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan into Nabucco.356 
Turkey even considered that Iranian gas, instead of exclusively supplying its internal market, could also 
be exported further to the West as far as Europe.357 In fact, an agreement was signed to develop the South 
Pars field in Iran and to export a yearly total of 30bcm of gas, 20bcm of Iranian gas and an additional 
10bcm from Turkmenistan;358  Turkey was trying to resurrect the more ancient plans of transporting 
Central Asian gas through Iran and to establish the latter country as the main supplier to Nabucco. True, 
Turkmenistan´s agreement had not been secured, whereas there was widespread scepticism among 
experts in the field, as to whether Turkmenistan could provide additional natural gas for Russia, China 
and Nabucco.359 Besides, as could be expected, the US soon voiced its opposition regarding the inclusion 
of Iran as part of any deal directly or indirectly concerning Nabucco.360 
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Turkey´s attempts to revive the prospects of Nabucco by way of resurrecting the Iranian route 
were in vain. More ambiguous for Nabucco was the announcement in July 2007 of the agreement 
between Turkey and Greece and Italy to build the TGI Interconnector, also known as "Poseidon", with 
plans to export 8bcm per year to these two countries.361 This could turn into a further blow to Gazprom, 
as it represented an additional plan to link Europe to non-Russian countries. However, the TGI 
Interconnector would also compete with Nabucco and deprive it of resources needed for its initial stages, 
as the main supplier for the TGI would be Azerbaijan.362 Then Turkey´s announcement that it intended to 
secure as much as 21bcm of natural gas that Azerbaijan might produce from the second stage of Shah 
Deniz exploitation,363 promised to conflict with the rest of Nabucco´s partners. Turkey promised to re-
export some of the Azeri gas obtained to Nabucco.364 However, Nabucco´s plans were rather to export 
that gas directly from Azerbaijan. 
Differences persisted between Turkey and Azerbaijan during 2008 which affected the prospects of 
Nabucco. Here again, the US was putting up as much effort as possible to enable both countries to 
agree.365 In spite of this, the EU could at least agree with Turkey where the pipeline would start,366 this 
being a sign of interest from the side of Ankara, even if it did not dispel Turkey´s idea of becoming more 
than a transit country who intended to own some of the gas transited through Nabucco instead, to be later 
re-exported. Turkey tried to dispel doubts regarding its participation in the project, announcing in late 
June that an agreement for the pipeline´s construction would be signed in the coming months.367  
Nabucco squeezed between Russia´s and China´s competition 
The complicated issue of securing resources from Nabucco once Iran dropped out of the list of potential 
suppliers (at least in the short term), with uncertainties regarding Azerbaijan and with the inherent 
difficulties of laying down a Trans-Caspian pipeline, was compounded by the fact that European 
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countries were by no means the only competitors for Turkmen gas: China was arguably in a better 
position, but so was Russia. As it would soon become manifest, in spite of the multi-pronged EU strategy, 
including economic cooperation and rule of law promotion, its democracy and free-market based 
approaches put it at a clear disadvantage compared to other actors who were more pragmatic and better 
positioned.368 
Russian efforts to secure its role of monopsonist 
As we had the occasion to see in chapter 6, Russia started with a relative advantage in relation to Europe, 
not only because of the post-Soviet legacy of being the monopsonist for Central Asian gas, but because 
Gazprom seemed to be able to increase this role. Russia had signed in 2003 an agreement to increase its 
purchases of Turkmen gas, so it would become the sole buyer by 2007. As we know, Russia managed to 
purchase all Turkmen gas for 2006 already, depriving Ukraine´s Naftohaz of its direct relations with 
Turkmenistan. Gazprom naturally wanted to secure Turkmenistan´s natural gas production, which could 
explode as a result of South Yolotan´s production, by upgrading the existing pipeline infrastructure.369 
The Central Asia - Center pipeline, which connected Turkmenistan with Russia, had a capacity of around 
40bcm and was planned to be upgraded to 55bcm per year by 2010, with the possibility of a future 
upgrade to as much as 90-100bcm per year.370 Russia´s game in 2007 would be mainly concentrated on 
the possibility of reinforcing its monopsony.  
Relying on a partner like Turkmenistan, ruled by the mercurial Saparmurat Niyazov, could 
become very frustrating for Nabucco (as previous chapters showed, in relation with Russia and Ukraine) 
and this proved a quite weak foundation for securing a stable long-term supply for the ambitious project. 
One blatant example of the kind of surprises that Ashgabat could reserve for Nabucco´s partners was the 
proposal made in November 2006 to both Russia and Germany, to lay a new pipeline through Russia with 
the goal of reaching Europe and with a capacity of as much as 40bcm per year.371 This bombastic project 
(which never saw the light) played in fact into the narrative dear to Russia, of reinforcing its monopsony 
and made Nabucco´s position very uncertain, with the Turkmenbashi having stated they did not consider 
the possibility of building the Trans-Caspian pipeline and with the European Commission desperately 
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trying to change course.372 Even if Turkmenistan dreamt of ridding itself of Russia´s influence, it seemed 
to be at the same time eager (quite inconsistently, may we add) to use its potential for diversification to 
secure suitable agreements with Russia as the best issue. 
Russia also suffered the inconsistency of Turkmenistan´s erratic changes in policy course and 
remained far from winning the game. As an example, Niyazov´s death by late 2006 stoked fears in Russia 
about changes this might bring in current projects of cooperation in the energy field. His succession by 
Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov increased the prospects of a possible change in Turkmenistan´s 
diplomatic course and decisive influence on the country´s energy policy. However, defining who would 
secure the price of Turkmenistan´s yearned resources was determining, especially given suspicions that 
Turkmenistan did not in fact have enough gas for all, both Russia, the EU (and possibly, Iran and China 
too).373 As it was usual in the late Niyazov, he had pledged to maintain energy relations with Russia, 
while it had promised around a yearly 15bcm to the EU to be supplied through Nabucco.374   
In his first meeting with President Putin, Berdymukhamedov did not promise to be an easy partner 
for Russia, rather in the line of his mercurial predecessor Niyazov: in what was probably meant to scare 
Russia into concessions, he proposed that the Trans-Caspian variant for diversification be seriously 
considered and discussed.375 However, a big victory, even if only temporary, was in the making for 
Russia, when the prospect of building a system of gas transportation along the shore of the Caspian Sea, 
for which Russia needed both Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan´s agreement, started to take shape.376 Thus, 
while a summit was taking place in Warsaw, trying to extend the Odessa-Brody pipeline to Gdansk,377 
with the expected participation of Poland, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Kazakhstan,378 Putin was 
making a tour in Central Asia with the goal of enticing both Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.379 
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The goal was scored when in a trilateral meeting in May 2007,380  with both Nazarbaev and 
Berdymukhamedov, the construction of the Caspian pipeline was decided.381 Besides this, it was also 
agreed that the existing pipelines running through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan would be expanded.382 
With a total added capacity of 20bcm per year, to be eventually expanded to 30bcm.383 This could serve a 
fatal blow to Nabucco, depriving it of a badly needed supply source, once Iran had ceased to be a serious 
alternative. As we could see earlier through chapters 6 to 8, Gazprom accepted price hikes for 
Turkmenistan, so the reclusive Central Asian republic could extract gains from reinforcing energy 
cooperation with Russia. True, Turkmenistan, faithful to its classical balancing strategy, did not refuse to 
continue its participation in the Trans-Caspian pipeline.384 
In what appeared to be a clear victory for Russia, the agreement on the Central Asian Pipeline, 
which further deprived Nabucco of a potential supplier, Turkmenistan (and arguably, the only realistic 
source of supply), was signed in December 2007 between Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.385 Even 
if these plans remained undefined in the next months, true to Turkmenistan´s policy of not committing 
itself, by July 2008 Ashgabad nevertheless stated it would not take part in the construction of Nabucco.386 
In September, Gazprom made a deal with Uzbekistan for the expansion of the Central Asian pipeline 
infrastructure to upgrade its transport capacity to 30bcm more per year.387 
China in the background and a new threat to Nabucco 
However, as the future would soon prove with the inauguration in 2010 of the first gas pipeline linking 
Turkmenistan and China, the latter and not Russia, promised to become the worse enemy for Nabucco 
and for all countries in the EU which supported the consortium as an alternative to dependence on 
Gazprom. 
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In July 2007, Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov planned a visit to China to 
discuss the conditions for selling gas to its big Eastern neighbor,388 and to make use of the immense 
potential it had if Turkmenistan wanted to rid itself of dependency on Russia. The goal of the visit, which 
had to take place from the 16th to the 18th of July, was to develop an agreement which had been signed in 
April 2006.389 The agreement in question planned the import by China of as much as 30bcm per year,390 
starting from 2009.391 As a proof of how successful the Central Asian-China vector would prove, Chinese 
CNPC started construction of the pipeline already in August 2007.392 Plans for having the pipeline ready 
by 2009 were hampered by a series of disagreements that delayed its planned progress. This explains why 
the pipeline´s completion was pushed further into 2010.393  
The pipeline´s completion might have eventually been pushed further beyond the new deadline, 
due to the difficulties of negotiating with Turkmenistan. However, the energy incident between Russia 
and Turkmenistan in April 2009, where an explosion interrupted the pipeline and damaged Russia-
Turkmenistan energy trade, probably definitively convinced Ashgabad of the need to diversify away from 
Russia. Explaining this, would take us beyond our  period under analysis. It suffices for us to know that 
China was arguably making the most successful inroads, inroads that would eventually (further) break 
Russian monopsony and leave European efforts to come to nil. 
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Chapter 11: Conclusions: Prospect Theory, the three Disputes and final comments 
 
11. 1. Main Hypothesis and Results of the Present Research 
As we highlighted in our first introductory chapter, the main hypotheses for our research were that 
Russia´s decisions to either escalate or deescalate each of the three disputes were closely related to both 
the status quo in Russia-Ukraine relations and to the risk factor related to consumers in the rest of Europe 
with a component of both economic and political factors.  
At this stage we may state that the dependent variable, variations in the process of escalation in the 
three disputes, were mostly influenced by the first independent variable; namely, a worsening status quo 
accounts for a tendency to escalate disputes from the side of Russia if objectives cannot be reached unless 
resistance from the side of Ukraine is broken. This would confirm what prospect theory expects in such 
situations. 
Within the first independent variable, mostly economic changes in the status quo, even if political 
factors may have had a certain influence, are to be accounted as the main explanatory factor. As will be 
explained in detail below, this research has shown there is a very close correlation between changes in the 
Russo-Ukrainian energy relations, energy politics by Central Asian suppliers or the context of 
international energy market, that account for the three disputes. Political aspects do not remain absent, 
even if they are generally closely related to economic factors and cannot always be clearly distinguished. 
Finally, as for the second independent variable, stemming from our hypothesis, this research did 
not find  significant variations regarding the best measuring tool, that is, competing pipeline projects, that 
could lead us to state that they had any significant influence on the outcome of the disputes. 
Chapter 9 summed up the results of the disputes and clarified that variations in the escalation of 
the three disputes were based on Russian decisions. This opened the ground for prospect theory based 
interpretations. Chapter 10 dealt with pipeline politics, completing thus the information this research was 
seeking in order to conclude what our final results are. We may thus further proceed with our final 
conclusions. These are explained further below.   
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11. 2. Russia´s Attitude towards Risk and the Risk Factor 
As we saw at the beginning, prospect theory´s strength lies in its consideration of actors´ perception of the 
status quo as located either in the domain of gain or losses. The theory expects actors not to take risks that 
may imperil a satisfactory status quo for the sake of gains, remaining thus risk-averse. It also expects 
actors to become risk-acceptant if the issue involves averting losses; risk-acceptant actors would assume 
risks more easily in order to avert impending losses linked to a worsened status quo. This Phd thesis 
tracks the process of escalation in the three energy disputes and compares it with the prevailing status 
quo. This should be an optimal way to determine whether Russia´s decisions to either escalate or de-
escalate in each instance, are related to pursuing gains or rather, to averting losses. The status quo here 
represents the first and main independent variable, from where we need to deduce Russia´s risk attitude in 
order to explain the dependent variable: the patterns of escalation. Along with this, we tried to measure 
variations of risk itself through the projects of pipeline diversification that were fostered during the period 
2006-2008. This represents an additional and secondary independent variable. 
 
11. 3. Explaining Energy Disputes through Prospect Theory: Attitudes to Risk and Economic and 
Political Factors 
As we could see in chapters 6-8, and as was summed up in chapter 9, changes in the pattern of escalation 
in each of the disputes do not respond to the degree of Ukraine´s resistance but to the lesser or greater 
need by Russia to escalate in each case in order to attain its goals. Even if the analysis of the agreements 
reached in each of the three cases is a relatively difficult source to determine the exact dimension of gains 
and losses for Russia, we can state with a high degree of certainty, that the way disputes escalated cannot 
be linked to Russia´s will to attain success at any cost in the face of a changing degree of resistance from 
the part of Ukraine. This is a good reason for analyzing the status quo and for considering whether 
changes in it modified the risk-attitude from the part of Russia and Gazprom. 
As we already explained in our first chapter, in accordance with the summing up by Jack Levy, 
prospect theory could be roughly reduced to the three following theses: 1) instead of evaluating outcomes 
based on the net asset levels, understood as an objective reference, actors evaluate outcomes based on a 
reference point subjectively chosen. Risk attitudes do not need to be explained through the lenses of 
prospect theory, as depending on the nature of actors, some of them can be located in different degrees of 
risk-acceptance/aversion. Using the language of constructivism, we could argue that the construction of 
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the point of reference will always be, at least to a certain degree, constructed and therefore, subjective. 
Thus, emphasis of subjectivity regarding the point of reference does not need to be exclusively 
understood through the lenses of prospect theory. However, what is characteristic of prospect theory is 
that actors tend to change their point of reference according to changes in the status quo; 2) losses are 
exaggerated as compared to gains; and 3) the most relevant insight for our research, actors tend to be risk-
averse regarding gains, and risk-acceptant regarding losses. The third point above means that Russia 
would not risk its status quo for prospective gains if satisfied with that status quo. On the contrary, we 
would expect Russia to run risks to prevent losses if it considered the status quo to be unsatisfactory. As 
we stated in the first chapter, we assume that risks derive from potential reputation losses Gazprom might 
incur if energy disputes provoke supply disruptions for which it might be held responsible. In our case, 
the status quo is a complex one, as there are both economic and political factors. 
Economic Factors 
As chapters 6 to 8 have shown, we have placed an intentional emphasis on the economic aspects, to 
which the biggest part of the chapters are devoted, with political factors being reduced to circumstantial 
mentions when needed. This is necessarily determined by the very aspect of the disputes, centering on 
debt accumulation, pricing discussions and the complex organization of energy trade, even if this should 
not prejudge us to assume exclusively economic factors as determinant. As necessary as these factors may 
be, they are not necessarily sufficient, as there is a large record of politicization  of the economy of energy 
in the post-Soviet space.  
The gap between Ukraine´s prices and market prices 
In the period leading up to the energy dispute of January 2006, oil prices had been increasing constantly 
during the whole decade. As a result of this, natural gas prices were increasing in Europe, where long-
term contracts had been established. This soon translated into higher profits for the Russian Federation´s 
budget in general, as revenues from oil exported by Russia increased. It also translated into higher profits 
for Gazprom, due to natural gas being pegged to oil. However, this also increased the opportunity costs of 
maintaining prices for Ukraine, which remained year after year lower than international prices. During 
2005 this gap had increased to intolerable levels. As an example, in 2005, average prices for the CIS 
region were at US$61tcm, whereas the average for Europe had already reached US$192tcm. Prices 
agreed with Ukraine in 2001 were as low as US$50tcm. In fact, being the largest consumer of natural gas 
in the region, Ukraine enjoyed the lowest prices, lower even than for Belarus or Armenia: US$54.1tcm 
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for Armenia, US$55tcm for Belarus, US$65tcm for Georgia and US$80tcm for Moldova. Besides this 
price gap, Ukraine represented in 2005 49% of Gazprom´s sales to the CIS countries, with as much as 
37.6bcm; Belarus in comparison, consumed 19.8bcm. The  opportunity cost was very high indeed.  
Gazprom announced in late 2005 a general revision of prices and expressed its intention of raising 
natural gas prices to market prices in the CIS region. This explains why Gazprom and the Russian 
government behind may have had a clear economic reason for updating energy prices for Ukraine. Seen 
from the lenses of prospect theory, the status quo deteriorated enough to encourage the Russian side to 
revise it, forcing negotiations and thus jumping on the occasion, when the new Ukrainian authorities 
proposed to revise transit tariffs; this initiated a dynamic of tense negotiations that could potentially (as 
indeed happened) lead to an energy dispute. Even if we have generally focused on the process of 
escalation from the moment that gas cut-offs took place, the truth is that previous negotiations also 
represent a pattern of incremental tension and can perfectly be explained in the same fashion.  
Triangular negotiations between Russia, Ukraine and Turkmenistan 
There was an additional element that can explain why in economic terms Gazprom could see its status 
quo clearly deteriorate. This element is closely determined by negotiations on prices of natural gas sold 
by Turkmenistan. As the thorough analysis in chapter 6 showed, both Russia and Ukraine were trapped in 
a triangle shared with the mercurial Turkmenistan, who arbitrarily modified agreements. The key here to 
understand how negotiations between Ukraine and Turkmenistan for the share of Turkmen natural gas 
imported by Naftohaz affected Gazprom is that the latter intended (and succeeded in) becoming the 
monoposony buyer of Turkmen natural gas and thus drove Naftohaz out of this market, in order to 
become the sole contractual supplier (either directly or indirectly through RosUkrEnergo). Gazprom 
needed  Naftohaz and the leadership in Kiev to accept price increases in order that Turkmen gas prices 
could be matched. Russia would ultimately agree with Ashgabad for a price of US$65tcm, whereas 
Ukraine expected (and in fact signed, if to no avail) for no more than US$60tcm. It must be pointed out 
though, that contrary to negotiations for 2007, 2008, and probably 2009 too, Gazprom did not simply seek 
to force Ukraine to accept prices that absorbed both prices of origin and transport costs (around 
US$30tcm) for Central Asian gas. With Gazprom demanding US$160tcm first (a more than threefold 
increase from US$50tcm) and US$230tcm later for its own natural gas, the goal seemed rather to 
establish a pricing system in accordance with its goal of imposing market prices.  
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The January 2006 Dispute and the 4th January Agreement 
There were obvious reasons from the point of view of Russia to start a dispute. However, after Gazprom 
cut off natural gas supplies, we know that Ukraine provoked gas disruptions that forced Russia to 
backtrack and then accept a losing compromise. How did the status quo change for Russia to explain this 
behavior? 
When Ukraine responded to Gazprom´s cut-off siphoning off natural gas, risks inherent to energy 
disputes took shape, with disruptions to third countries becoming a reality Russia had to cope with. It is 
fair to think that Russia´s perspective was not the prospective gains of imposing market prices on Ukraine 
anymore. Instead, Russia had now to avert losses to its reputation provoked by the energy dispute itself. 
We must note here that the gap between market prices and natural gas prices for Ukraine, which prior to 
the dispute was perceived as in the domain of losses and thus increased Russia´s risk-acceptance, 
switched now to the domain of gains when costs for imposing market prices increased. We consider that 
instead of establishing an unequivocal distinction between the status quo in the domain of losses and the 
domain of gains, these categories must be considered in relative terms. If the gap between prices 
worsened the status quo to the point of pushing Gazprom to risk an energy dispute, this was not 
significant enough to assume the reputational costs the dispute ended up provoking. The fact that Russia 
started being heavily criticized and the fact that Ukraine siphoned off more natural gas than was needed 
for technical reasons (see technical needs), probably played an important, if not determinant role in this 
change. In that respect, we consider the benefits of market prices for Ukraine were seen in this new 
context as gains for which further risk was not acceptable. Thus, Russia preferred to return to the status 
quo ex ante.  
It is noteworthy that the agreement of the 4th January 2006 was financially a loss for Gazprom. 
Either this became acceptable for Russia in the face of losses for Naftohaz or given possible non-financial 
gains (see RosUkrEnergo), the latter being, in virtue of our analysis, quite unlikely. It is possible that 
overall, Russia accepted a certain loss in order to secure the status quo. The risk of suffering reputational 
costs as a result of an energy dispute probably weighed more heavily after this had in fact happened, than 
before. This necessarily increased Russia´s risk-aversion and the acceptance of short-term losses (see the 
January agreement) rather than the risk of worse losses in the future.    
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The new Energy Framework from January 2006 
During three years, from January 2006 to January 2009, Ukraine-Russia energy relations were based on a 
new framework, whereby RosUkrEnergo became the sole supplier of a complex and opaque mix of 
natural gas and where Russian natural gas was either absent or had a very reduced presence (see chapter 6 
and summing up in chapter 9). During this period, the challenge was not so much to turn Ukraine into a 
supplier of Russian natural gas at market prices but rather to secure that Ukraine updated its import prices 
whenever producers in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and mainly Turkmenistan, decided to review their pricing 
policy. Ukraine´s prospective resistance was potentially harmful for Gazprom. Even if RosUkrEnergo 
was the sole exporter of natural gas to Ukraine, Gazprom was the sole buyer of natural gas in Central 
Asian since the agreements to purchase Turkmen gas at US$65tcm in late 2005. Gazprom purchased 
natural gas, which was sold to RosUkrEnergo and then either exported to Ukraine or re-exported to 
Central Europe, in coordination with Gazprom. In any case, it was Gazprom who had to agree on prices 
every year, without the assurance that Ukraine would subsequently accept them in addition to 
transportation costs. 
However, negotiations for new prices in 2007 and 2008 were uneventful. Naftohaz and the new 
intermediary UkrGazEnergo agreed to purchase RosUkrEnergo´s gas at US$130tcm in 2007, from 
US$95tcm in 2006, and then US$179.5tcm in 2008. These price increases were harmful for Ukraine, who 
had already been forced in 2006 to pass on the cost of imported gas to consumers at home. The financial 
situation of Naftohaz worsened considerably under the strain of these new prices and the fact that profits 
from selling to the industrial sector had to be shared with RosUkrEnergo, with whom Naftohaz had 
constituted the JV UkrGazEnergo. Even if this did not represent a particular obstacle for the conclusion of 
new pricing agreements, as Chapter 7 clearly explained, debt episodes became more frequent in this 
period. This is important to highlight, as the key for the second energy dispute in March 2008 was the 
debt due to Gazprom indirectly through the confused chain of responsibilities from Naftohaz through 
UkrGazEnergo and RosUkrEnergo. 
The March 2008 dispute: the road to the 12ve February agreements 
The second dispute that took place in March 2008 is different to those in January 2006 and January 2009. 
The obvious difference is the scope, which we have already mentioned earlier. However, the economic 
reasons for starting a new dispute are different in comparison with its predecessor, even if not so much 
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compared to what would happen some months later. The constitutive element of this new dispute was that 
it was exclusively based on debt owed to Gazprom. 
The issue of debt, which had had its last episode solved in late 2007, was compounded by the 
controversy on Russian gas consumed by Ukraine in January-February 2008 due to undersupplying from 
Central Asia. This caused a flare-up of emotions in Ukraine where it was seen as a ruse from Gazprom to 
force Ukraine to consume more expensive Russian gas. Debt had accumulated from 2007, while the 
Ukrainian side refused to pay for Russian gas, proposing to pay for it at US$179.5tcm instead of 
US$321tcm, forcing RosUkrEnergo to assume the additional expenses. In the midst of this, the new 
government of Yulia Timoshenko, elected as a result of the last elections in October 2007 and succeeding 
Viktor Yanukovich, wanted to get rid of RosUkrEnergo and UkrGazEnergo, fulfilling what she could not, 
in her first stint as Prime Minister back in 2005. The fact is that this had economic significance for 
Gazprom, as any eviction of RosUkrEnergo could eventually make debts owed to Gazprom to remain 
unpaid. In addition to this, the new government wanted to revise transit tariffs, which had been set at 
US$1.6tcm/100km and slightly raised to US$1.7tcm/100km in 2008, to compensate the increase in prices 
for natural gas supplies, going as far as to propose a new transit tariff of more than US$9tcm/100km. 
These plans represented a clear threat for Gazprom. 
As a consequence of this situation, we can understand the linkage Gazprom made to debt recovery 
and normal natural gas supplies. Thus, Gazprom stated that in the event that the current problems were 
not solved, gas supplies would be reduced. Gazprom and the Russian government could perfectly see the 
situation as located in the domain of losses, due to the debt accumulation and to the threat that plans by 
the new government could bring prejudice. In fact, this was not the first time this had happened. As a 
response to the debt problem that had surfaced in late 2007, still under the previous government headed 
by Yanukovich, and which was eventually solved, a reduction in supplies was already invoked. It should 
not be overlooked that at the time, parliamentary elections had already been celebrated and the 
nomination of Yulia Timoshenko as Prime Minister, along with her government´s prospective plans to 
revise the status quo in Russo-Ukrainian energy relations was expected. The decision to take the first step 
towards energy disputes that carried a certain risk for Gazprom, as seen in January 2006, can again be 
understood through the prism of prospect theory. 
There seemed to be a solution found to this situation in the compromise subscribed to by the 
presidents´ agreement of the 12th February between Vladimir Putin and Viktor Yushchenko. Besides 
opening up the perspective for avoiding prospective losses, it seemed Gazprom added new gains. The 
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elimination of intermediaries seemed relatively easy, as both sides had already expressed their desire to 
get rid of them and preferred their relations to be based on strictly bilateral frameworks between Gazprom 
and Naftohaz. This in fact was precisely what seemed to have been reached with a new company formed 
by the two state monopolies. This opened up the ground, as has been explained, to a greater presence of 
Gazprom in Ukraine´s internal market. It could be argued that Gazprom added gains as a result of 
negotiations.  
Opposition to the 12veFebruary Agreements and the Road to the Dispute 
As we know, Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko scuttled the agreement, focusing on the increased role 
Gazprom was to assume in Ukraine´s internal market as gas distributor. How did Gazprom arguably 
recalculate its position in relation to the status quo? As prospect theory shows, actors adapt faster to gains 
than to losses. This means an actor will more rapidly insert recently made gains into its status quo, 
whereas after losses, actors will probably continue for a long time taking the status quo ex ante as the 
reference point. A fastidious consequence of this, as Robert Jervis pointed, is that an actor challenged for 
recently made gains, has a high probability of seeing the loss of these gains not as lost gains, but a loss in 
its status quo. This could have an application in our research. There is a possibility that Gazprom did not 
see Timoshenko´s move as a challenge to recently made gains, but a challenge to its status quo, if the 
Russian side considered these gains as already integrated in the status quo. This could be an explanation 
for Gazprom´s readiness to reduce supplies by a total of 50% from 3rd to 5th of March. 
Even if this possibility is worth considering, it is not the best candidate to figure as the reason for 
Russia´s escalation. This is so for a simple reason: Timoshenko was nullifying recently made gains, but 
more important than that, she was going back to the status quo as before the latest agreement. This status 
quo bore in itself enough threats of losses to activate Gazprom´s harsh response. Besides this, the linkage 
between the resolution of the debt dispute and natural gas cut-offs had been made already, as we saw, in 
late 2007. If that threat had been voiced after Timoshenko´s scrapping of the presidents´ agreement, then 
we would have a more solid ground for suspicion. This is however, not the case. In addition, it must be 
added that it is far from clear that Gazprom had made in that agreement as many gains as could be 
deduced from what was announced in its aftermath, especially given new versions that were manifested. 
Opacity in these matters is an unsurpassable obstacle at this stage. That said, the fact that the 14th March 
agreement also presented conditions more favorable to Gazprom than those finally fulfilled, makes this 
suspicion highly plausible. 
    
 
375 
 
In any case, Gazprom took the fateful decision to reduce natural gas supplies by 25% on 3rd March 
and then an additional 25% on 4th March, so the total cut-off reached 50%. As opposed to January 2006, 
Gazprom´s cuts were progressive and did not go as far as imposing a total cut-off. The reason why this 
was so could be two-fold: 1) The stakes after all were not as high as in a dispute regarding pricing of 
natural gas. However, the fact that in January 2009 discussions on natural gas prices were intentionally 
blocked by Russia until a solution could be found for the latest debt episode is a reason not to 
underestimate the importance this had come to represent for Russia. A tougher attitude from the Russian 
side could be more understandable for January 2009 given that there were already precedents. If debt had 
become important enough to initiate a gas dispute, it might not yet have reached the stage to respond in 
the same manner as in January 2006 when risks loomed, as soon as Ukraine threatened disruptions. 2) In 
addition to this, it is plausible that Russia had become more careful and therefore more risk-averse as a 
consequence of the experience of January 2006, so even if the stakes involved in this debt disputes were 
similar for Russia to those involved two years earlier, risk aversion had understandably increased. These 
represent two explanations, either alternative or combined, to account for Russia´s behavior in March 
2008, where it eventually behaved as prospect theory would foresee for risk-averse actors. 
As for the agreement that was eventually signed, it offered similar solutions to that of the previous 
month: both the debt issue and the controversy over Russian natural gas consumed by Ukraine were 
satisfactorily solved for both sides, with no losses accruing for Gazprom. Regarding the reorganization of 
the energy market in Ukraine and therefore Russo-Ukrainian energy relations too, the new agreement 
mostly agreed on what had already been determined by the two presidents, namely, the immediate 
elimination of UkrGazEnergo and implicitly, the suppression of RosUkrEnergo too; in fact, the 
memorandum later signed between Russia and Ukraine on 2nd October confirmed the liquidation of 
RosUkrEnergo in 2009, as ultimately effected and as already agreed in February. However, the new 
scheme offered to Gazprom as a compensation for these changes and the suppression of UkrGazEnergo, 
raises some questions.  
If information provided on February´s agreement is correct, instead of acquiring half of Ukraine´s 
internal market (or the equivalent of half UkrGazEnergo), the agreement for Gazprom to sell as much as 
7.5bcm in the internal market represented not only a diminishment compared to February, but a loss 
compared to the status quo ante. Bearing in mind that in fact Gazprom ended up selling only around 
3bcm, Gazprom´s presence in the Ukrainian market became only marginal. In this deal we may see a 
similar pattern  to the case of January 2006. Gazprom may have miscalculated again to discover a 
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Ukrainian government more aggressive than initially thought and ready therefore to intentionally provoke 
havoc for the sake of gaining the upper hand and preferred thus to accept a losing compromise for the 
sake of ensuring stability in the future. However, we should not underestimate Gazprom´s inherent 
interest in establishing strictly bilateral relations, in which case Gazprom might have considered it ended 
up reinforcing its interests, in a win-win arrangement.  
Our analysis of how Russia´s interest remained after this dispute must thus present two possible 
conclusions without one being able to ascertain which of them should hold the upper hand: 1) Either 
Russia, as a loss-aversion actor, acted the same way as in January 2006 and even accepted lower losses in 
order not to risk bigger losses; 2) or Russia struck a win-win deal with Ukraine, which by the way, in a 
similar loss-aversion fashion, protected the status quo from further threats. 
The Dispute of January 2009 
Our last dispute is easier than its two predecessors regarding the outcome, as the analysis of the 
agreement in the previous section yields a clear victory for Gazprom. At the same time, it also matches 
the worst status quo for Russia as far as the economic situation is concerned. After having reached its 
peak in June 2008, oil prices started crumbling under the influence of the Big Recession, whose onset 
could be already perceived. Natural gas prices which were pegged to oil in long-term contracts 
necessarily had to fall, and with it Gazprom´s profits. It is therefore plausible to assume Gazprom 
perceived a radical worsening in the status quo and framed financial losses related with Ukraine as bigger. 
This prospect theory-based explanation would account for Gazprom´s radically modified approach to the 
dispute. As we already know, not only did Gazprom not backtrack when Ukraine started siphoning off 
natural gas a result of the cut-off, but it imposed a total gas embargo. Such a measure hardly helped 
Russia in its carefully staged rhetoric, days already before the dispute, warning of possible disruptions 
and putting the blame on Ukraine. In fact it justified the more blatantly anti-Russian rhetoric portraying 
Moscow as a bully willing to take consumers hostage. Gazprom did everything possible to expose itself to 
risks inherent to energy disputes with transit countries. Such behavior is coherent with countries who 
frame their status quo as in the domain of losses and become risk-acceptant. 
We can find mainly two candidates for intolerable economic costs that might have pushed Russia 
to cut off gas to Ukraine and to escalate to the stage of provoking a total energy embargo. 1) The first 
obvious candidate, if we are to weigh Russian financial needs, is Central Asian gas supplies that Ukraine 
consumed.  As had been the case for 2007 and 2008, Ukraine had to accept higher prices in the face of the 
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willingness of its suppliers to renegotiate prices. As we could see, the context of increasing world oil 
prices did not only affect Russia, but also Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, who officially 
declared they wanted market prices. This meant either Ukraine would have to accept them, or Gazprom 
would have to assume the costs if no agreement could be reached. As it appears, prices agreed were 
US$330tcm. 2) The second candidate is the same that had provoked the dispute in March 2008: debt. By 
late 2008 a new debt episode was unfolding and as was done before, Gazprom made a linkage to debt 
resolution. However, this time, the linkage was not exactly between debt resolution and maintenance of 
gas supply as some months earlier. Gazprom refused to continue discussions on prices for 2009 while 
debt was not solved. If no agreement could be reached on pricing by Year End, then gas supplies would 
be cut as in January 2006. It was an indirect linkage indeed which proved ominous, in the face of 
Ukraine´s incapacity or reluctance to solve the issue soon enough to leave margin for negotiations. 
However, the details of the negotiations are puzzling given the conditions Gazprom was offering. 
If Russia had established the debt linkage with the intention of boycotting negotiations, it is puzzling that 
Russia did not insist head on, on prices close to US$450tcm. This was the price Gazprom indicated it 
would impose on Ukraine if negotiations on prices failed. However, an agreement could not be reached 
because Ukraine would not agree on the much lower figure of US$250tcm, as it insisted on US$235tcm 
as a maximum. A price of US$250 could hardly cover prices for natural gas purchased in Central Asia, 
compared to US$360tcm agreed for the first quarter of 2009. As negotiations regarding this were 
extremely opaque, complete certainty on the conditions discussed in late-hour talks is not possible. If we 
should look for clues to make sense out of Russia´s motivations for offering such advantageous prices, we 
should highlight first that independently of Central Asian natural gas prices, market-based prices for 
Gazprom´s natural gas sold in Europe could not fall by the first quarter of 2009 that much. Taking 
average German import prices as calculated by Pirani, Yafimava and Stern, these had reached in the first 
quarter of 2009 US$398tcm. Even discounting transport prices, Ukraine could never have expected to be 
granted such advantageous prices.  
Nevertheless, the benefit of hindsight provides us with a key for assuming the most plausible 
explanation to this puzzle. In fact, as the reader may have remembered, negotiations in late 2008 did not 
specify for which period of time prices in negotiation were to apply. The quarter-based system of 
calculation, proper of oil-indexed natural gas prices, was introduced in Ukraine as a result of the 19th 
January 2009 agreements. However, to date, negotiations on prices between Russia and Ukraine had been 
negotiated on a yearly basis. In 2006, 2007 and 2008, as Central Asian producers decided to raise prices 
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on a yearly basis, this made full sense. But in fact, even if Gazprom wanted to establish quarter-based 
calculations, a particular feature of the common method to determine prices enabled negotiators to know 
what would be median prices for 2009. Oil-indexed natural gas prices as determined in long-term 
contracts, thus following the Groningen model, usually establish a delay of either two or three quarters. 
Due to this, it is easy to estimate what prices for the next year may be based on current oil prices. If we 
take quarterly prices Ukraine paid in 2009, based again on information compiled by Pirani, Yafimava and 
Stern, we may calculate that the median price Naftohaz paid, was US$259tcm. This almost matches 
prices Gazprom wanted in the latest stages of negotiations before 2009.   
Thus, the effect of the economic crisis that was setting in was twofold: on the  one hand, the strain 
on Gazprom and the Russian budget justified the assumption of risks, while the fall in prices guaranteed 
that relatively acceptable prices could be assumed by Naftohaz. The fact that prices similar to those 
discussed prior to the dispute were based on a discount from a price basis abusive for Ukraine, could 
point to Russia´s decision to punish Ukraine for its resistance. In such a context as analyzed in our 
research, Russia could have framed Ukraine´s resistance as a worsening of the status quo and reinforced 
the need to further compensate for an increased perception in the domain of losses through more 
advantageous conditions in the final agreement.    
Political Factors 
As seen in the section above, economic factors clearly hold the upper hand whenever it comes to link the 
status quo to Russian decisions in the energy disputes analyzed. If any changes in status quo did have an 
effect on Russia and on the monopolist Gazprom, these were arguably, as the reader may have perceived, 
economic factors. However, this is far from meaning that the economy was the sole factor responsible 
here. Far from that, politics seem to have been present, even if sometimes its influence may be more 
speculative than is the case with economic factors. 
The first instance where we may reasonably speculate with the role of political factors is the 
worsening of relations during the year 2005. With the inception of Yushchenko´s administration that year, 
precisely as a result of the Russian-backed candidate Viktor Yanukovich´s failure to be elected through 
rigged elections after being confronted with the Orange Revolution, the political orientation of the 
country became antithetical to Russian interests. As we analyzed already, the gap between prices for 
Ukraine and European countries buying natural gas at market prices had been increasing constantly, so 
the economic reasons for revising prices was obvious. Thus if the political change in Ukraine´s 
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government may offer an explanation, we should argue that it paradoxically triggered an attempt to 
depoliticize energy relations with the suppression of subsidized prices. That worsening conversations led 
Russia to offer worse conditions, thus presenting Ukraine with the prospect of undergoing a non-gradual 
transition, may be read in political terms. In particular, the increase from the initial offer of US$160tcm to 
US$230tcm may be seen as a punishment for Ukraine´s resistance, especially given that the latter were 
probably clearly above market prices.  In fact, in an interview in 2008, Alexander Medvedev himself, 
President of Gazexport at the time, expressed his surprise at this increase in prices, as he knew Ukraine 
would never be able to pay for that.     
Politicization may be suspected in a new episode, this time when a linkage was established 
between the repayment of outstanding debts and the normal supply of natural gas. The first instance when 
this was made was in late 2007. The second time this happened, this actually led to the threat being 
effected, provoking the March 2008 dispute. Both instances actually coincided with the return of Yulia 
Timoshenko as Prime Minister. Thus a political linkage may be easily suspected. The economic element 
though, is clearly present, as we already discussed. In fact, the linkage in late 2007 was made while 
Timoshenko had not been elected yet. The debt episode that triggered threats to reduce natural gas 
supplies happened, and was eventually solved, while Iurii´ Boi´ko was still Minister of Energy. This was 
probably linked to the fear of Timoshenko´s return as a factor that might lead to greater resistance to debt 
repayment, as in fact happened in the following year. Thus, even if we could not reject a political factor 
outright, we must be careful when it comes to assigning  political factors to these episodes, as rather than 
a clear political linkage from the part of the Russian side, it seems that a political change in the Ukrainian 
government led to increased fears of economic losses. 
The third time politics became a valuable candidate to offer an explanation for the energy disputes 
in discussion here, is a derivation of the linkage made in the March 2008 dispute. A linkage was made 
between debt repayment and negotiations on natural gas prices for 2009, which as we say above, led to a 
perfect storm. Again, we face the fact that the same political actors, Viktor Yushchenko as President and 
Yulia Timoshenko as Prime Minister, remained in place during this period, raising questions again about 
the possible politicization of energy relations between Russia and Ukraine. As in the case with the first 
episodes of linkage regarding debt repayment, we may find economic reasons for explaining Russia´s 
hardening. Along with this, it is true that the August 2008 war between Russia and Georgia worsened the 
political situation and might have exacerbated Russia´s feeling of siege. The fact that Ukraine expressed 
its explicit support for Georgia and even threatened to block the Russian Black Sea Fleet based in the 
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Peninsula of Crimea and thereafter warned of increased fees in exchange for the right to use the port of 
Sebastopol, in what seemed a clear political retaliation, offers a good candidate. It is nevertheless true that 
the linkage existed earlier and although the new type of linkage happens thereafter, our analysis in chapter 
8 does not provide solid evidence that these events triggered it. In fact, still in early October 2008, the two 
Prime Ministers, Vladimir Putin and Yulia Timoshenko, signed an optimistic memorandum, whose 
prospects were clearly spoiled once debt issues resurfaced.  Still, as for the abusive price basis for 
Ukraine in the 19th January agreement, a strictly political punishment cannot be excluded. 
 
10. 4. Attempting to Measure the Risk Factor 
The former section above summed up the most essential part in our research, as it concentrates our main 
conclusions. Focusing on changes in the status quo and matching these with different escalations in our 
three energy disputes yielded important conclusions. As prospect theory foresees, Russia reacted in a 
different fashion depending on differing perceptions of risk. However, this should be complemented with 
an analysis of the risk factor. 
Prospect theory offers as an interesting insight that depending on the perception of the status quo 
and its valuation as in the domain of gains or domain of losses, the attitude towards the same risks 
changes. These changes happen in spite of that risk remaining constant. Adding the factor of changes in 
the perception of risk itself to the equation could help us expand our understanding of how disputes took 
place and in what measure these changes might have exerted an influence. The material for this can be 
found in chapter 10. However, as we could see in that chapter, the elements for measuring an objective 
variation of risk, in the assumption that Russia would perfectly perceive these changes, are scarce, and 
where present, quite imperfect. 
In our research, for the reasons already described in chapter 1 and 10, we decided that the best 
element for measuring the existing risk in energy disputes was how energy diversification projects, which  
in themselves carried explicit conclusions as to who represented a challenge in EU-Russian energy 
relations, fared. While Nabucco implies that the EU has to reduce its dependence on Russia, two more 
projects, Nord Stream and South Stream, promoted directly by Russia, clearly implied that transit 
countries are the problem. It is therefore safe to conclude that these energy diversification projects 
represented the best way to determine in what measure Russia could assume that disturbances derived 
from energy disputes would backlash and affect negatively its energy policy.   
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The results of the analysis undertaken in chapter 10, starting from the assumption then, that 
progress in these three pipelines was determinant, cannot offer any conclusive answer as to the increase or 
decrease in objective risk.  
From the positive side, Russia saw from 2006 onwards that Nord Stream could be successfully 
reactivated. Especially positive for Moscow was the fact that a key country like Germany, seen by Russia 
as an important ally in Europe, the main consumer for Gazprom, and the eventual destination of Nord 
Stream, did not move away from this project. In spite of Germany´s conservative turn after the 2005 
parliamentary elections, a consensus remained in favor of this project. Besides this, the business 
community was very actively supporting Nord Stream, while Gazprom could count on the European 
Commission´s commitment to confirm the project as a EU priority project, as had been agreed back in 
2000. That said, until the very end of the period analyzed, Russia could not count on a definitive 
confirmation that Nord Stream could be built. The ecological opposition from Baltic riparian states, such 
as Sweden, Finland, Denmark and more fatefully, Estonia, hung over Nord Stream. By 2008, Russia had 
not been able to reach an agreement with any, as no positive ecological assessment had happened yet. 
Regarding Nabucco, Russia could interpret negatively the fact that this project was also spurred by 
the natural dispute of January 2006, with the European Commission establishing it as one of the priority 
projects. However, if troubles faced by Nord Stream were significant, no less difficult was the prospect of 
success for Nabucco. It could be argued in fact that Nabucco faced worse prospects than Nord Stream. 
The benefit of retrospect seems to reinforce this perception, as by 2011-2012 Nord Stream was fully 
completed, whereas Nabucco has not been built yet. The fact is that the most promising and 
geographically accessible supplier, Iran, was excluded from the beginning because of the US opposition. 
This also excluded Iran as the easiest transport route for the other promising alternative: Turkmenistan. 
With Iran out of the game, the consortium of Nabucco had to rely on the difficult Caspian route, marred 
by legal obstacles. As the Caspian Sea´s division had not been agreed yet, Russia was granted a big 
influence, so it could block the construction of a Trans-Caspian pipeline. Even worse, Turkmenistan was 
a voluble partner, with plenty of competitors to Nabucco at hand, namely, Russia and China. The news 
that Turkmenistan had in fact huge reserves was not known in this period, so this competition represented 
a serious challenge for the whole project. Compounding all this, other minor partners, Azerbaijan and 
Turkey, who were necessary transit countries, posed several problems. Azerbaijan was necessary to kick 
start Nabucco, as it could secure the first shipments of natural gas while the Turkmen route was being 
built. However, the truth is that Azerbaijan did not offer any reliable perspective of sufficient supplies. 
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Turkey as a transit country was somewhat troublesome, insisting that some of the gas transited should 
become its property, and thus making negotiations difficult. If all this was not enough, South Stream, the 
second project of Gazprom, lurked in the background. 
The record of South Stream is the most modest among all three projects considered here. No big 
defining success was ever achieved by this joint project between Gazprom and ENI. However, given the 
state of indeterminacy that pervaded the whole project, it may be assumed that it did a very good job 
convincing many Central European countries to participate in it. The fact that countries like Austria, 
Hungary, Bulgaria and Greece were either strong supporters of Nabucco or countries poised to benefit 
from it, and still at different degrees provided substantial support to South Stream, may be seen in itself as 
a victory. If the goal of South Stream was to undermine Nabucco´s already lackluster prospects, it may be 
argued that it was delivering in a quite satisfactory fashion. 
What conclusions may be extracted from the evolution of these three projects? We could argue 
that in general, prospects looked up for Russia, even if in general, the situation remained in limbo. It is 
important to note that up to the dispute of January 2009, Russia had no assurances that its flagship 
project, Nord Stream, would succeed. Even if this was partly compensated for by the worse prospects of 
Nabucco, in which Moscow could arguably count on South Stream to reduce or undermine it, it is evident 
that the situation had not radically changed in favor of Russia by 2008. If anything, it may be said that 
Russia secured a similar balance to that before the January 2006 dispute, so risks should have remained 
similar. Did however a perception of a slight balance in favor of Russia have influence on a higher degree 
of confidence? This may not be ruled out, even if we should not assign a particularly big influence to this. 
The fact that Gazprom behaved carefully in March 2008 and responded aggressively some months later, 
while no substantial change in the "pipeline front" had taken place, reduces substantially the explanatory 
power of this variable. 
 
11. 5. Final Comments 
Summing up, we may conclude that regarding the independent variable, variations in the process of 
escalation in the three disputes were mostly influenced by the first variable. Mostly economic changes in 
the status quo, even if political factors may have had a certain influence, are to be counted as the main 
explanatory factor. As for the second variable, variation of risk, we have found that this should be a 
relatively limited factor, if it had any influence at all. 
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This research stemmed from the consideration of what might have provoked a dispute like the one 
in January 2009. Highlighting in the beginning that dispute made sense, as this was the most extreme 
dispute that ever happened in the triangle between Russia, Ukraine and Europe. This was mostly so due to 
the repercussion of these cut-offs on third consumers. As for the length, a new energy dispute, not 
included in this research, happened in 2014 which lasted several months, but did not transcend Ukraine´s 
borders and did not cause undersupplies in Ukraine either. As we have had the occasion to see in our first 
chapter, January 2009 culminated a period of turbulence, where three energy disputes happened. 
Excepting March 2008, which was relatively uneventful, January 2006 and January 2006 attracted much 
attention. The process of escalation that could be observed in the three disputes offered an interesting clue 
to consider what had provoked these variations and to answer what kind of actor Russia was. Prospect 
theory seemed to be the best analytical tool as it combines both deterrence theory and spiral logic. At this 
stage, this seems fully warranted.  
One of the strong points in this thesis is that instead of focusing exclusively on the status quo as is 
usually done in most works that use prospect theory, the risk in itself has also been taken into account. 
The strength of prospect theory lies in its being able to offer an answer for why actors would change their 
risk attitudes and become more or less risk-averse depending on their perception of the status quo. 
However, this should not lead the analyst astray as to lose sight of one simple factor, which is the 
variance of risk itself. This adds further complexity to any analysis using prospect theory, as has been the 
case here. As we already concluded in the previous chapter, and as we reminded at the beginning of our 
conclusions here, we have found little support for linking risk variations in the escalation to the three 
energy disputes. However, the usefulness of having proceeded with the double analysis of the status quo 
and the risk factor itself is that we can satisfactorily isolate the factor of the status quo once the results 
have yielded no clear variation in the risk factor.  
It is true that the most suitable factor we could find for analyzing the risk factor was a very 
imprecise one, as the progress of diversification projects in the EU, either favoring or being detrimental to 
Russia´s interests. However our present research has the merit of having merged both analyses. This 
should be taken as an example for similar researches whenever the analysis is based on prospect theory.      
Due to their effects on third parties, the disputes were interpreted in different fashion. We had the 
chance to see existing discourses in our literature review. These different interpretations reflect the 
general debate on Russian foreign policy. Our conclusions should be the place, finally, to take up the 
debate on Russia´s characterization as an international actor after we can draw specific conclusions on the 
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three energy disputes. Our last section may be devoted to discuss Russia as an actor in international 
relations in the line of the different narratives existing regarding Russia. We may simplify them into two 
great poles, one portraying Russia as an aggressive and expanding power, the other as a conservative 
status-quo power reacting to challenges, rather than provoking them. As we had the occasion to see, these 
patterns are reproduced in the discussion on Russia and energy.  
In general, we have shown that Russia behaved rather in a reactive fashion and the use of natural 
gas as a weapon of foreign policy was very limited at best. This research thus strongly supports the vision 
of Russia as a restrained power, as opposed to the narratives of energy superpower. This does not mean 
that Russia behaved fairly and that it did not seek to punish Ukraine when its resistance went beyond its 
patience. The abusive agreement of January 2009 may be the best example in this respect. Politicization 
seems to be present in many instances, as when Ukraine was treated abusively in 2009 or when prices had 
been kept subsidized before 2006 as it suited Russia. However, this happened in the context of economic 
interests, while the fear of energy disputes harming third actors and thus affecting Gazprom´s reputation 
loomed large in most of the period analyzed here. Whenever Russia saw the status quo unfavorable, its 
risk-acceptance increased, and along with it, its aggressiveness. The findings here should be used to reject 
or at least nuance the classical view of Russia as a powerful actor, ready to behave aggressively and 
expand regardless of the consequences.  
As for relations between the Russian state and Gazprom, they remain the most obscure point 
within this research. We devoted some of the literature to this topic already in chapter 2, which has dealt 
with the issue. We also described  (pp. 49-50) how divergences between the state and Gazprom could be 
subsumed into our analysis, as changes in risk attitude could precisely have triggered reversion in 
hierarchy, although we may not prove exactly what the exact hierarchy was. A small evidence, not 
conclusive for its almost anecdotic presence, points both to divergences and to the ultimate subordination 
of Gazprom to the state, in the direction of what the literature review already showed in chapter 2. 
Declarations by Aleksandr Riazanov (Deputy CEO until being sacked in November 2006) in Vedomosti, 
where he explains how he opposed in 2005 the government´s decision to modify the offer to Ukraine and 
to hike Gazprom´s natural gas from US$160tcm to US230tcm; it is interesting to know both that the 
government prevailed and that Riazanov was ultimately sacked in 2006. 
Although again far from the degree of conclusiveness we might reasonably desire, the reader 
could nevertheless find as very instructive our discussion on relations between RosUkrEnergo and Russia, 
and our conclusion that the obscure intermediate hardly was a mere pawn of Russian interests. This must 
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be necessarily linked to our discussion of Russia as an international actor, for which this research offers a 
very useful case-study. Instead of a bully in full control of the situation and free to impose Machiavellian 
schemes that would eventually increase its power, we have found an actor, that may be Machiavellian 
indeed, but tends to reach compromises and sub-optima that prevent worse losses. The presence of 
intermediaries, whereof the most consummate creature is RosUkrEnergo beyond any doubt, seems to be a 
circumstance that may have favored Gazprom in different degrees. Nevertheless, these were deeply 
rooted in the corrupt panorama of Ukraine´s energy policy and could not be rooted off completely until 
Gazprom fully imposed itself in January 2009. Until then, Russia seemed to be behaving in relatively 
conservative terms.          
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***: "Saparmuratu Niiazovu gaz vse dorozhe (Международное сотрудничество. Сапармурату 
Ниязову газ все дороже), Kommersant, 21 November 2005. 
***: ""Gazprom" sdelal vygodnoe predlozhenie Ukraine ("Газпром" сделал выгодное предложение 
Украине)", Kommersant, 7 December 2005. 
***: ""Gazprom" otsenil otkaz Ukrainy ("Газпром" оценил отказ Украины)", Kommersant, 15 
December 2005. 
***: ""Naftogaz" zaplatit neizvestnym ("Нафтогаз" заплатит неизвестным)", Kommersant, 17 January 
2006. 
***: "Ukraina soglasna na "Gazprom" i gotova otkazat´sia ot Rosukrenergo (Украина согласна на 
"Газпром" и готова отказаться от Rosukrenergo)", Kommersant, 15 February 2006. 
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***: "Ukraina pereotsenila gazovuiu litsenziiu (Украина переоценила газовую лицензию)", 
Kommersant, 27 February 2006. 
***: ""Gazprom" oblozhili dopolnitel´nymi nalogami na vnutrennem rynke Ukrainy ("Газпром" 
обложили дополнительными налогами на внутреннем рынке Украины)", Kommersant, 13 March 
2006. 
***: "RosUkrEnergo ne raskrylas´ FSB (RosUkrEnergo не раскрылась ФСБ)", Kommersant, 14 April 
2006. 
***: ""Gazprom" predlozhil Ukraine ne smeshivat´ gaz ("Газпром" предложил Украине не смешивать 
газ)", Kommersant, 2 June 2006. 
***: ""Gazprom" lishit Ukrainu turkmenskogo gaza ("Газпром" лишит Украину туркменского газа)", 
Kommersant, 16 June 2006. 
***: ""Gazprom" snova otpravil Ukrainu k Turkmenbashi ("Газпром" снова отправил Украину к 
Туркменбаши)", Kommersant, 7 July 2006. 
***: "Rosukrenergo zaplatit za gaz dlia Ukrainy (Rosukrenergo заплатит за газ для Украины)", 
Kommersant, 12 September 2006. 
***: "Ukrainskie truby podtianut k rossii´skim nedram (Украинские трубы подтянут к российским 
недрам)", Kommersant, 2 February 2007. 
***: "Ukraina vlozhitsia v rossii´skie nedra (Украина вложится в российские недра)", Kommersant, 19 
February 2007. 
***: "V severnyi´ potok potrebovali novykh vlivanii´ (В северный поток потребовали новых 
вливаний)", Kommersant, 7 July 2007. 
***: ""Gazprom" oplatit dolgi "Naftogaza Ukrainy" ("Газпром" оплатит долги "Нафтогаза 
Украины")", Kommersant, 16 October 2007. 
***: "Gaz v obmen na transport (Газ в обмен на транспорт)", Kommersant, 23 October 2007. 
***: "Iuliia Timoshenko nachala likvidatsiiu "Ukrgaz-Energo" (Юлия Тимошенко начала ликвидацию 
"Укргаз-Энерго")", Kommersant, 7 February 2008. 
    
 
423 
 
***: "Otkliuchenie, podtverzhdaiushchee pravilo (Отключение, подтверждающее правило)", 
Kommersant, 8 February 2008. 
***: "Operatsiia "Posrednik" (Операция "Посредник")", Kommersant, 13 February 2008. 
***: ""Gazprom" otkupitsia ot Rosukrenergo ("Газпром" откупится от Rosukrenergo)", Kommersant, 14 
February 2008. 
***: ""Gazprom" dal Ukraine poltora mesiatsa ("Газпром" дал Украине полтора месяца)", 
Kommersant, 15 February 2008. 
***: ""Gazprom" ne uslyshal Iuliiu Timoshenko ("Газпром" не услышал Юлию Тимошенко)", 22 
February 2008. 
***: "Iuliia Timoshenko ne khochet platit´ za Viktora Iushchenko (Юлия Тимошенко не хочет платить 
за Виктора Ющенко)", Kommersant, 27 February 2008. 
***: "V "Iuzhnom Potoke" vsplyla Ukraina (В Южном потоке всплыла Украина)", Kommersant, 29 
February 2008. 
***: "Ukraina perekryla Rosukrenergo dostup v ES (Украина перекрыла Rosukrenergo доступ в ЕС)", 
Kommersant, 21 March 2008. 
***: "Ukrainu vystavili so schetom (Украину выставили со счетом)", 6 June 2008. 
***: ""Gazpromu" vzvinchivaiut tsenu ("Газпрому" взвинчивают цену)", Kommersant, 9 July 2008. 
***: ""Gazprom" vyzyvaet Ukrainu v sud ("Газпром" вызывает Украину в суд)", Kommersant, 25 
November 2008. 
***: "Gazprom" dal Ukraine otsrochku ("Газпром" дал Украине отсрочку)", Kommersant, 26 
November 2008. 
***: "Ukraina ostavila "Gazprom" s dolgom (Украина оставила "Газпром" с долгом)", Kommersant, 5 
December 2008. 
***: "Novyi´ staryi´ god (Новый старый год)", Kommersant, 19 December 2008. 
***: "Ukraina brosila slova na ventil´  (Украина бросила слова на вентиль)", Kommersant, 12 January 
2009. 
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***: "Dolgie gazoprovody (Долгие газопроводы)", Kommersant, 15 January 2009. 
***: "Moskva i Kiev ustupili v roli pobeditelei´ (Москва и Киев уступили в роли победителей)", 
Kommersant, 20 January 2009. 
***: "Posrednik isparilsia (Посредник испарился)", Kommersant, 21 January 2009. 
***: "Pol´she primorozili gaz (Польше приморозили газ)", Kommersant, 28 January 2009. 
Grib, Natal´ia and Glumskov, Dmitrii´: ""Gazprom" razvorachivaetsia na vostok ("Газпром" 
разворачивается на восток)", Kommersant, 21 December 2004. 
Grib, Natal´ia and Glumskova, Elena: "Druzhba narodov. Turkmeniia nagrela Ukrainu na gaze (Дружба 
народов. Туркмения нагрела Украину на газе)", Kommersant, 11 January 2005. 
***: "Ukraina i Rossiia zaniali gazovye pozitsii (Украина и Россия заняли газовые позиции)", 
Kommersant, 18 January 2008. 
Grib, Natal´ia and Khvostik, Evgenii´: "Vengriia schivaet gazovye seti (Венгрия сшивает газовые 
сети)", Kommersant, 6 December 2007. 
Grib, Natal´ia and Konstantinov, Aleksandr: "Kazakhskii´ drug dorozhe zapadnykh dvukh (Казахский 
друг дороже западных двух)", Kommersant, 10 May 2007. 
Grib, Natal´ia and Skorlygina, Natal´ia: "Turkmeniia nashla gaz v obkhod Rossii (Туркмения нашла газ 
в обход России)", Kommersant, 15 October 2008. 
Grib, Natal´ia and Zygar, Mikhail´: Smert´ Turkmenbashi stavit krest na soglasheniakh "Gazproma" i 
Ashkhabada" (Смерть Туркменбаши ставит крест на соглашениях Газпрома и Ашхабада)", 
Kommersant, 22 December 2006. 
***: "Bazar dlia troikh (Базар для троих)", Kommersant, 18 February 2008. 
Grib, Natalia; Butrin, Dmitrii´ and Vodo, Vladimir: "Germaniia prevyshe vsego (Германия превыше 
всего)", Kommersant, 10 October 2006. 
Grib, Natal´ia; Chernovalov, Alexandr and Gavrish, Oleg: "Ukraina gotova otdat´ "Gazpromu" 
truboprovody (Украина готова отдать "Газпрому" трубопроводы)", Kommersant, 14 July 2006. 
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Grib, Natal´ia; Gavrish, Oleg and Konstantinov, Aleksandr: "Natsenka po povedeniiu (Наценка по 
поведению)", Kommersant, 12 March 2008. 
***: "Iuliia Timoshenko nabila sebe tsenu (Юлия Тимошенко набила себе цену)", Kommersant, 14 
March 2008. 
Grib, Natal´ia; Granik, Irina and Gavrish, Oleg: "Rossiia raskachala gaz (Россия раскачала газ)", 
Kommersant, 19 January 2009. 
Grib, Natal´ia; Lambaeva, Renata and Skorobagatko, Denis: "Druzhba narodov. "Gazprom" podelilsia s 
Ukrainoi´ po-materinski. Za propavshii´ gaz s kontsernom rasplatitsia ego docherniaia kompaniia 
(Дружба народов."Газпром" поделился с Украиной по-матерински. За пропавший газ с концерном 
расплатится его дочерняя компания)", Kommersant, 18 July 2005. 
Grib, Natal´ia; Mordiushenko, Ol´ga and Gavrish, Oleg: "Ukraina razzhala trubu (Украина разжала 
трубу)", Kommersant, 1 February 2008. 
Grib, Natali´a, Netreba, Petr and Gavrish, Oleg:  "Iuliiu Timoshenko lishili prem´erskoi´ doli (Юлию 
Тимошенко лишили премьерской доли)", Kommersant, 10 October 2007. 
Grib, Natal´ia; Solov´ev, Vladimir and Gavrish, Oleg: "Viktora Yushchenko traviat gazom (Виктора 
Ющенко травят газом)", Kommersant, 16 January 2008. 
Grib, Natal´ia; Solov´ev, Vladimir; Sidorenko, Sergei´ and Gavrish, Oleg: "Prezident prezidentu – dolg 
(Президент президенту – долг)", Kommersant, 22 November 2008. 
Grishin, Aleksandr: "Obmen udarami (обмен ударами)", Moskovskii´ Komsomolets, 5 March 2008. 
Grishin, Alexandr and Bazak, Oleg: "Otmoroozhennye vsekh zamoroziat (ОТМОРОЖЕННЫЕ ВСЕХ 
ЗАМОРОЗЯТ)", Moskovskii Komsomolets, 31 December 2005. 
Grivach, Alexei´: "Tranzit na dvoikh. "Gazprom" podelilsia s "Naftogazom Ukrainy" ot transportirovki 
gaza (Транзит на двоих. "Газпром" поделилсяс "Нафтогазом Украины" доходами от 
транспортировки туркменского газа)", Vremia Novostei´, 14 March 2003. 
***: "Rynochnoe sosedstvo. "Gazprom" gotov vkliuchit´ Ukrainu v Evropu (Рыночное 
соседство."Газпром" готов включить Украину в Европу)", Vremia Novostei´, 29 March 2005. 
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***: "Barternyi´ rynok. Ukraina torguetsia s Turkmenbashi (Бартерный рынок. Украина торгуется с 
Туркменбаши)", Vremia Novostei´, 1 April 2005. 
***: "Proekt po-kievski. "Naftogaz Ukrainy" ugrozhaet "Gazpromu" postroit´ morskoi´ truboprovod v 
obkhod Rossii (Проектпо-киевски. "Нафтогаз Украины" угрожает "Газпрому" построить морской 
трубопровод в обход России)", Vremia Novostei´, 27 April 2005. 
***: "Glavnyi´ po gazu. Viktor Iushchenko lichno vedet kommercheskie peregovory s Alekseem 
Millerom (Главный по газу. Виктор Ющенко лично ведет коммерческие переговоры с Алексеем 
Миллером)", Vremia Novostei´, 28 April 2005. 
***: "Miller atakoval Ukrainu. Kievu predlozheno platit´ za gaz po vysshemu evropei´skomu urovniu 
(Миллер атаковал Украину. Киеву предложено платить за газ повысшему европейскому уровню)", 
Vremia Novostei´, 7 June 2005. 
***: "Ukraina nashla rossii´skii´ gaz. No khochet platit´ za nego v rassrochku (Украина нашла 
российский газ. Но хочет платить за него в рассрочку), Vremia Novostei´, 14 June 2005. 
***: "Po puti Rossii. "Naftogaz" lishil ukrainskikh proizvoditelei´ turkmenskogo rynka (По пути России. 
"Нафтогаз" лишил украинских производителей туркменского рынка)", Vremia Novostei´, 27 June 
2005. 
***: "Miller provel zachet. Defitsit gaza na Ukraine dostig 18 mlrd kubometrov (Миллер провелзачет. 
Дефицит газа наУкраине достиг 18 млрд кубометров)", Vremia Novostei´, 29 June 2005. 
***: "Novye tseny pugaiut. Iuliia Timoshenko zapretila "Naftogazu Ukrainy" reksportirovat´ gaz (Новые 
цены пугают. Юлия Тимошенко запретила "Нафтогазу Украины" реэкспортировать газ)", Vremia 
Novostei´, 30 June 2005. 
***: ""Proshu srochno peresmotret´ otnoshenie". Viktor Iushchenko otchital Iuliiu Timoshenko za 
gazovye ambitsii ("Прошу срочно пересмотреть отношение". Виктор Ющенко отчитал Юлию 
Тимошенко за газовые амбиции)", Vremia Novostei´, 7 July 2005. 
***: "Konets gaza. Iuliia Timoshenko trebuet ot "Naftogaza Ukrainy" srochno dogovorit´sia s Rossiei´ 
(Конец газа. Юлия Тимошенко требует от "Нафтогаза Украины" срочно договориться с Россией)", 
Vremia Novostei´, 12 July 2005. 
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***: "Dolg ministra iustitsii. Ukraina khochet peresmotret´ skhemu pogasheniia starykh dolgov 
"Gazpromu" (Долг министра юстиции.Украина хочет пересмотреть схему погашения старых 
долгов "Газпрому")", Vremia Novostei´, 21 July 2005. 
***: "Neulovimyi´ gaz (Неуловимый газ)", Vremia Novostei´, 27 July 2005. 
***: "Avtonomnyi´ "Naftogaz". Iuliia Timoshenko ne mozhet povliiat´ na Alekseia Ivchenko 
(Автономный "Нафтогаз". Юлия Тимошенко не может повлиять на Алексея Ивченко)", Vremia 
Novostei´, 28 July 2005. 
***: ""Otdel´nye ugolovnye skhemy". Ministr iustitsii Ukrainy gotovitsia k gazovym peregovoram s 
Rossiei´ ("Отдельные уголовные схемы". Министр юстиции Украины готовится к газовым 
переговорам с Россией)", Vremia Novostei´, 17 August 2005. 
***: "Kompromissa ne poluchaetsia. "Gazprom" i "Naftogaz" poka ne mogut dogovorit´sia ob usloviiakh 
tranzita rossii´skogo gaza (Компромисса неполучается. "Газпром" и "Нафтогаз" пока не могут 
договориться об условиях транзита российского газа)", Vremia Novostei´, 31 August 2005. 
***: ""Naftogazu Ukrainy" razreshili eksport ("Нафтогазу Украины" разрешили экспорт)", Vremia 
Novostei´, 19 September 2005. 
***: "Ochen´ uzkie mesta. "Gazprom" dogovorilsia s Uzbekistanom o minimal´nom tranzite 
turkmenskogo gaza (Очень узкие места. "Газпром" договорился с Узбекистаном о минимальном 
транзите туркменского газа)", Vremia Novostei´, 28 September 2005. 
***: "KONFLIKT. "Vy mnogo govorite, a nichego ne delaete" (КОНФЛИКТ."Вы много говорите, а 
ничего не делаете")", Vremia Novostei´, 14 October 2005. 
***: "Sosedi. Doplata za uslugu (СОСЕДИ. Доплата за услугу)", Vremia Novostei´, 21 October 2005. 
***: "Prezident skazal "ne igrat´" (Президент сказал "не играть")", Vremia Novostei´, 11 November 
2005. 
***: "Peregovornyi´  zastoi´  (Переговорный застой)", Vremia Novostei´, 15 November 2005.  
***: "Otstupat´ nekuda - vperedi Evropa (Отступать некуда - впереди Европа)", Vremia Novostei´, 20 
November 2005. 
***: "Turkmenskii´ retsidiv (Туркменский рецидив)", Vremia Novostei´, 21 November 2005. 
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***: "Novogodnee prevrashchenie (Новогоднее превращение)", Vremia Novostei´, 28 November 2005. 
***: "Zamorozki v peregovorakh (Заморозки в переговорах)", Vremia Novostei´, 29 November 2005. 
***: ""Schet idet na milliardy" ("Счет идет на миллиарды")", Vremia Novostei´, 9 December 2005. 
***: "Obmen liubeznostiami (Обмен любезностями)", Vremia Novostei´, 16 December 2005. 
***: "Struktura imeet znachenie (Структура имеет значение)", Vremia Novostei´, 13 January 2006. 
***: "Piatiletku za polgoda (Пятилетку за полгода)", Vremia Novostei´, 16 January 2006.  
***: "Zakonno-nezakonnyi´ otbor (Законно-незаконный отбор)", Vremia Novostei´, 24 January 2006. 
***: "Predpriiatie nedomolvok (Предприятие недомолвок)", Vremia Novostei´, 3 February 2006.  
***: "Sredneaziatskaia stavka dlia "Gazproma" (Среднеазиатская ставка для "Газпрома")", Vremia 
Novostei´, 23 January 2006. 
***: "Zavtra, mozhet, opiat´ voi´na  (Завтра, может, опять война)", Vremia Novostei´, 31 January 2006. 
***: ""Sprosite u Iushchenko" ("Спросите у Ющенко")", Vremia Novostei´, 8 February 2006. 
***: "Turkmenskaia sotnia (Туркменская сотня)", Vremia Novostei´, 13 February 2006. 
***: "Zadelo za zhivoe (Задело за живое)", Vremia Novostei´, 15 February 2006. 
***: "Zagazovannyi´ den´ rozhdeniia Turkmenbashi (Загазованный день рождения Туркменбаши)", 
Vremia Novostei´, 20 February 2006. 
***: "Siurpriz dlia "Gazproma" (Сюрприз для "Газпрома")", Vremia Novostei´, 10 March 2006.  
***: "Dolgovaia truba (Долговая труба)", Vremia Novostei´, 20 March 2006. 
***: "Avansovaia diskussiia (Авансовая дискуссия)", Vremia Novostei´, 21 March 2006.  
***: "Kiev snova ne platit (Киев снова не платит)", Vremia Novostei´, 14 April 2006. 
***: "Delo na 700 millionov (Дело на 700 миллионов)", Vremia Novostei´, 17 April 2006. 
***: "V kosmos ne letat´! (В космос не летать!)", Vremia Novostei´, 20 April 2006. 
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***: "Predpriiatie osobogo naznacheniia (Предприятие особого назначения)", Vremia Novostei´, 31 
May 2006. 
***: "Slovenskii´ Platsdarm (Словенский плацдарм)", Vremia Novostei´, 15 June 2006. 
***: ""My dogovorimsia" ("Мы договоримся")", Vremia Novostei´, 16 June 2006. 
***: "Prai´s-list ot Turkmenbashi (Прайс-лист от Туркменбаши)", Vremia Novostei´, 22 June 2006. 
***: "Uteret´ nos Nabucco (Утереть нос Nabucco)", Vremia Novostei´, 22 June 2006. 
***: "Ne otstupat´ i torgovat´sia (Не отступать и торговаться)", Vremia Novostei´, 30 June 2006.  
***: "Radovat´sia nuzhno" ("Радоваться нужно"), Vremia Novostei´, 7 July 2006. 
***: "Peregovory bez udavol´stviia (Переговоры без удовольствия)", Vremia Novostei´, 26 July 2006. 
***: "Strashnee krasnoi´ armii (Страшнее Красной армии)", Vremia Novostei´, 3 August 2006. 
***: "Preemstvennost´" i "nasledstvennost´" ("Преемственность" и "наследственность"), Vremya 
Novostei´, 8 August 2006. 
***: "Odnogo zhelaniia malo (Одного желания мало)", Vremia Novostei´, 17 August 2006.  
***: ""Naftogaz" nachal platit´  ("Нафтогаз" начал платить)", Vremia Novostei´, 21 August 2006.  
***: "Nikto ne khochet v Ashkhabad (Никто не хочет в Ашхабад)", Vremia Novostei´, 23 August 2006. 
***: "Gazovyi´ siurpriz dlia Kieva (Газовый сюрприз для Киева)", Vremia Novostei´, 6 September 
2006. 
***: "Ostatki "severnogo potoka" (Остатки "Северного потока"), Vremia Novostei´, 15 September 
2006. 
***: "Gasoprovodnye deviat´ protsentov (Газопроводные девять процентов)", Vremia Novostei´, 6 
October 2006. 
***: "Trekhletnii´ put´  (Трехлетний путь)", Vremia Novostei´, 12 October 2006. 
***: "Prizrak brodit po Evrope (Призрак бродит по Европе)", Vremia Novostei´, 29 November 2006. 
***: "Tsena gazovogo mira (Цена газового мира)", Vremia Novostei´, 12 December 2006.  
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***: Iuzhno-Evropei´skii´ front (Южно-Европейский фронт)", Vremia Novostei´, 26 January 2007. 
***: "Intriguiushchii´ signal (Интригующий сигнал)", Vremia Novostei´, 2 February 2007.  
***: "Nikomu nichego (Никому ничего)", Vremia Novostei´, 7 February 2007. 
***: "Politicheskoe dno (Политическое дно)", Vremia Novostei´, 28 February 2007. 
***: "Rokovaia rokirovka (Роковая рокировка)", Vremia Novostei´, 2 March 2007. 
***: "Duiut na vodu (Дуют на воду)", Vremia Novostei´, 16 April 2007. 
***: "Nabucco protiv "Poseidona" (Nabucco против "Посейдона")", Vremia Novostei´, 8 June 2007. 
***: "Iantarnoe pomishatel´stvo (Янтарное помешательство)", Vremia Novostei´, 25 July 2007. 
***: "Mimo Pol´shi (Мимо Польши)", Vremia Novostei´, 22 August 2007. 
***: "Udvoenie Shakh-Deniza (Удвоение Шах-Дениза)", Vremia Novostei´, 28 September 2007. 
***: "Oktiabr´skaia "kontrrevoliutsiia" (Октябрьская "контрреволюция")", Vremia Novostei´, 3 October 
2007. 
***: "Poka prem´er ne pomenialsia (Пока премьер не поменялся)", Vremia Novostei´, 9 October 2007. 
***: ""Oranzhevaia" strakhovka ("Оранжевая" страховка)", Vedomosti, 11 October 2007.  
***: "Oboi´demsia bez posrednikov (Обойдемся без посредников)", Vremia Novostei´, 16 October 
2007. 
***: "Podarok dlia Timoshenko (Подарок для Тимошенко)", Vremia Novostei´, 17 October 2007.  
***: "Nazad k barteru (Назад к бартеру)", Vremia Novostei´, 23 October 2007. 
***: "Mertvorozhdennyi´ gazoprovod (Мертворожденный газопровод)", Vremia Novostei´, 30 October 
2007. 
***: "Voi´na otkladyvaetsia (Война откладывается)", Vremia Novostei´, 1 November 2007. 
***: "Shantazh umesten (Шантаж уместен)", Vremia Novostei´, 29 November 2007. 
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***: "Putin forsiruet Prikaspii´skuiu trubu (Путин форсирует Прикаспийскую трубу)", Vremia 
Novostei´, 11 December 2007. 
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